Global Land Rush, Water Grabbing and the Human Right to Water

Deininger (2013), pp. 95–119.

Elbehri et al. (2013); Kay and Franco (2012); and Franco et al. (2014) (revised ed.).

See Deininger et al. (2011).

The Land Matrix is a monitoring initiative coordinated by a number of NGOs and research centres, including the International Land Coalition, and the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, plus several regional focal points. The initiative, which is financed partly by the partner organizations, partly by the European Commission and other donors (governments, civil society organizations), gathers information on land deals mainly from research papers and policy reports by international and local NGOs; field based research projects, media and official government records.

Liao et al. (2016).

Cotula et al. (2009) and Anseeuw et al. (2012).

Borras et al. (2012a), pp. 402–416.

Rulli et al. (2012), World Bank (2010) and Cotula et al. (2009).

Marx (1977) [1867]; White et al. (2012).

Rulli et al. (2012); Perrone (2013), pp. 205–209.

For categorization and details see the Global Map of Investments on Land Matrix http://​www.​landmatrix.​org/​en/​.

Margulis et al. (2013), pp. 1–23.

Margulis et al. (2014).

On the role of national legal frameworks in facilitating land grabbing see Künnemann and Monsalve Suárez (2013), pp. 123–139.

Mehta et al. (2012), Smaller and Cotula (2011), Skinner and Cotula (2011) and Woodhouse (2012).

Rulli et al. (2012).

WWAP (2012), p. 124; Molden (2007), pp. 57–89.

Cotula (2013).

In Ethiopia, for example, 31.6 million people are undernourished (32% of the total population). While in the Arab Emirates, the number of people suffering from hunger is not statistically significant. For further details see FAO (2015).

Rulli et al. (2012), p. 3. On these aspects, see also De Schutter (2009).

See Islar (2012a), pp. 376–391; Islar (2012b), pp. 317–329; Konak (2011); Franco et al. (2014).

On this aspect see Borras et al. (2010), pp. 575–592. For an example of how this happens see Hertzog et al. (2012), pp. 304–321, describing mechanisms of water grabbing in Mali.

Islar (2012a), pp. 376–391.

Islar (2012a). For a more in-depth analysis see Islar (2012b), pp. 317–329; and Konak (2011) describing hydro-schemes in Turkey.

Pearce (2013).

International Rivers, Gand Inga Dam, Dr Congo, available at https://​www.​internationalriv​ers.​org/​campaigns/​grand-inga-dam-dr-congo.

Yanacocha (2007).

For a full account of the case study, see Sosa and Zwarteveen (2012), pp. 364–369.

See for ex. Franco et al. (2014). See also Borras et al. (2012b), pp. 227–254. As these authors point out “grabbing the power to control land and other associated resources such as water in order to derive benefit from such control of resources” is essentially “control grabbing.” Resource control grabbing can take various forms, including purchasing and leasing, and involves large-scale capital.

Borras and Franco (2012), pp. 34–59; Messerli et al. (2013), pp. 528–534.

See, e.g., Kay and Franco (2012), p. 2.

On water privatization see, among others, Gleick et al. (2002), pp. 57–86; Bakker (2010); Moyo and Liebenber (2015).

On the negative effects of water privatization on access to water, see Petrova (2006), pp. 577–613; Bayliss (2002), p. 21; Bayliss and Fine (2008); Budds and McGranahan (2003).

A turning point in this process is marked by the International Conference on Water and Environment, held in Dublin, in 1992. Principle n. 4 of the Dublin Statement, adopted during the conference, states: “water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as an economic good.” On the organization and running of the Conference see Young et al. (1994). For a discussion of the implications of the Dublin Statement, and particularly Principle n. 4, see Solanes and Gonzalez-Villareal (1999); van der Zaag and Savenije (2006); Salman and Bradlow (2006) pp. 6–10 and 169. On water “as an economic good” see also Perry et al. (1997); Mc Neill (1998), pp. 253–261; Savenije and van der Zaag (2002).

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Resolution 1803 (XVII), 14 December 1962, UN Doc. A/5217, paras 1 and 3.

See Bossio et al. (2012) documenting foreign investment agreements and associated water use changes.

See the Ethiopian Water Resources Management Proclamation (No. 197/2000) implemented by Council of Ministers Ethiopian Water Resources Management Regulations (No. 115/2005), http://​faolex.​fao.​org/​docs/​pdf/​eth44004.​pdf. Accessed 12 September 2016.

See Seide (2016), Bossio et al. (2012) and Mousseau and Sosnoff (2011).

On States/foreign investor asymmetries see, among many, Sheffer (2011) and Chaisse and Polo (2015).

Bordignon et al. (2016), Swyngedouw (2007) and Bluemel (2005).

ICSID, Case no. ARB/97/3, Award of November 21, 2000 16 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 641 (2001) and Case no. ARB/01/12, Award of July 14, 2006, annulled on September 1, 2009, available at: icsid.​worldbank.​org.

See Morgan (2006), pp. 228–234. See also Chaisse and Polo (2015).

See Condon (2014) who found that general exceptions for public interest have also begun to be introduced in investment treaties.

Analogous considerations apply to international investment treaties in farmland, see Cotula (2015).

See Art. 1, Art.12(1) and Art. 11(1) of the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.

UNICEF and WHO (2015).

UNICEF and WHO (2015) and WHO (2012).

United Nations General Assembly Resolution “The human right to water and sanitation” (A/RES/64/292), adopted at the 108th plenary meeting, 28 July 2010 and Human Rights Council, Resolution 15/9 “Human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation,” adopted at 31st meeting, 30 September 2010. The human right to water is also recognized in several sectoral conventions, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (art. 14, para.2 (h)), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (art. 24, para. 2 (c)), and others.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was adopted and opened for signature by General Assembly Resolution 2200A of 16 December 1966, which entered into force 3 January 1976. At present, the Covenant includes 164 States parties.

See General Comment no. 15, para 7.

General Comment no.15, para 14.

WHO (2003).

Report A/HRC/27/55, p. 9.

The United Nations General Assembly with the Resolution, “Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” A/RES/63/117, adopted on 10 December 2008 and entered into force on 5 May 2013, enabled the Committee to receive and consider communications submitted by, or in behalf of, individuals or group of individuals, claiming to be victims of a violation of any economic, social or cultural rights set forth in the ICESCR. For a detailed overview of the role of the Committee in this regard, see Odello and Seatzu (2014). More in brief, see Biglino and Golay (2013). For a general outline of the various complaints procedures before Human Rights Bodies, see http://​www.​ohchr.​org/​EN/​HRBodies/​TBPetitions/​Pages/​HRTBPetitions.​aspx. Accessed 21 September 2016. Cases related to the human right to water have been brought before, and decided by, the Human Rights Committee under the First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights. In ÁngelaPomaPoma v. Peru, for example, the Human Rights Committee (Communication No. 1457/2006, Doc. CCPR/C/95D/1457/2006 of 27 March 2009) decided in favor of the complainant, a member of the indigenous Aymara people, who had been deprived of their traditional sources of water because of the diversion of water, decided by the Peruvian government, from the Peruvian highland to a coastal city. For a detailed account of the case, see Göcke (2010).

See Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, Urgent appeals and letters of allegation on human rights violations, http://​www2.​ohchr.​org/​english/​bodies/​chr/​special/​docs/​communicationsbr​ochure_​en.​pdf. Accessed 21 September 2016.

Craven (1993), Drinan (2001), and Winkler (2012, 2017).

UN Special Rapporteur on the human right to safe drinking water and sanitation (2014) (hereinafter UN Special Rapporteur on the HRWS).

See UN Special Rapporteur on the HRWS (2014), p. 8, for an overview of cases in which courts have adjudicated on the human right to water.

In this regard, see, for example, XákmokKásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 214, 26 August 2010 and Comunidad Indigena Sawhoyamaxa vs. Paraguay, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Series C No. 146, 29 March 2006.

On the right to water as a collective right, see Zolo (2005).

UN Special Rapporteur on the HRWS (2014), p. 52.

UN Special Rapporteur on the HRWS, p. 40.

Report A/HRC/27/55, p. 22.

See General Comment no. 15, p. 11, which also states “steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to water of individuals and communities in other countries” (para 32, p. 12).

Allan et al. (2012).

On participation in water governance see, among many, Bruch et al. (2005), Krchnak (2005), Razzaque (2009) and Goldin (2013).

Franco (2014).

For example, Food and Agriculture Organization (2014) and International Finance Corporation – World Bank Group (2012).

Scharpf (1997).

On the value of inclusiveness in democratic decision making, see Habermas (1996).

See, for ex., Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick (2009), arguing that, under certain conditions, investments can provide key resources for agriculture.

In this sense, see HLPE (2011).

World Bank (2010), Da Vià (2011), Messerli et al. (2013) and Dell’Angelo et al. (2017).

On this term and its implications, see Schuerkens (2004) and Bauman (2013).