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Published in: Public Choice 1-2/2017

22-02-2017

Granting votes: exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within-between specification for panel data

Authors: Josip Glaurdić, Vuk Vuković

Published in: Public Choice | Issue 1-2/2017

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Abstract

Instead of alleviating fiscal inequalities, intergovernmental grants are often used to fulfill the grantors’ political goals. This study uses a unique panel dataset on more than 500 Croatian municipalities over a 12-year period to uncover the extent to which grant distribution is biased owing to grantors’ electoral concerns. Instead of the default fixed effects approach to modelling panel data, we apply a novel within-between specification aimed at uncovering the contextual source of variation, focusing on the effects of electoral concerns on grant allocation within and between municipalities. We find evidence of a substantial political bias in grant allocations both within and between municipalities, particularly when it comes to local-level electoral concerns. The paper offers researchers a new perspective when tackling the issue of politically biased grant allocation using panel data, particularly when they wish to uncover the simultaneous impact of time-variant and time-invariant factors, or when they cannot apply a quasi-experimental approach because of specific institutional contexts.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
Other papers that used a panel dataset either applied a more suitable methodological choice corresponding to their datasets (e.g., Dellmuth and Stoffel 2012 use a parametric Tobit regression, while Cadot et al. 2006 estimate a simultaneous equations model) or have applied quasi-experimental approaches. For example, Brollo and Nanicini (2012), Curto-Grau et al. (2012) and Baskaran and Hessami (2017) all use regression discontinuity designs, Sollé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008a, b) use a differences-in-differences estimation, while Veiga and Pinho (2007) apply a generalized methods of moments estimator wherein they use first-differencing to remove individual unobserved effects and estimate their relationship of interest using levels of the lagged dependent variable serving as an instrument.
 
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Metadata
Title
Granting votes: exposing the political bias of intergovernmental grants using the within-between specification for panel data
Authors
Josip Glaurdić
Vuk Vuković
Publication date
22-02-2017
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Public Choice / Issue 1-2/2017
Print ISSN: 0048-5829
Electronic ISSN: 1573-7101
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-017-0435-y

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