Skip to main content
Top
Published in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 2/2021

13-08-2020

Growing Skylines: The Economic Determinants of Skyscrapers in China

Authors: Jason Barr, Jingshu Luo

Published in: The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics | Issue 2/2021

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Since 1978, when China instituted economic reforms, cities throughout the country have embraced skyscraper construction. Despite their importance to the domestic economy, little is understood about what has been driving skyscraper heights and frequencies in China. This work explores the degree to which skyscraper construction patterns are the result of economic fundamentals, versus political factors and intercity competition. We find a strong economic rational across China, but we also find evidence of noneconomic factors. We show that incentives for political officials, such as career promotion, are helping to contribute to the growth in China’s skylines. We also find that small cities tend to overbuild skyscrapers. Spatial autoregression results further suggest some intercity competition, especially for those within the same tier.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
Unfortunately, the sources that provide information on skyscrapers do not provide year of completion for about 10% of the buildings. Also, if a building is not reported on one of the several websites that we used to collect data, then we do not know of its existence.
 
2
This report is written in Mandarin.
 
3
For example, in 1890, the world’s tallest building was 90 m; today it is 828 m (Barr et al. 2015).
 
4
Note that in several cases different websites gave different years for completion. For this paper, we use year of completion as the average of the 2 yrs. Our investigations show that using the latest year, for example, does not appreciably affect the results. In addition, we do not have data of building use and year of building start.
 
5
We choose 600 ft (183 m) as a comprise height—one that is sufficiently tall to be unusual, but not so unusual as to severely reduce the number of ones in the dependent variable.
 
Literature
go back to reference Ahlfeldt, G. M., & McMillen, D. P. (2018). Tall buildings and land values: height and construction cost elasticities in Chicago, 1870–2010. Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(5), 861–875. Ahlfeldt, G. M., & McMillen, D. P. (2018). Tall buildings and land values: height and construction cost elasticities in Chicago, 1870–2010. Review of Economics and Statistics, 100(5), 861–875.
go back to reference Anselin, Luc. (2013). Spatial econometrics: Methods and models. Vol. 4. Springer Science & Business Media. Anselin, Luc. (2013). Spatial econometrics: Methods and models. Vol. 4. Springer Science & Business Media.
go back to reference Barr, J. (2010). Skyscrapers and the skyline: Manhattan, 1895–2004. Real Estate Economics, 38(3), 567–597.CrossRef Barr, J. (2010). Skyscrapers and the skyline: Manhattan, 1895–2004. Real Estate Economics, 38(3), 567–597.CrossRef
go back to reference Barr, J. (2012). Skyscraper height. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45(3), 723–753.CrossRef Barr, J. (2012). Skyscraper height. The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 45(3), 723–753.CrossRef
go back to reference Barr, J. (2013). Skyscrapers and skylines: New York and Chicago, 1885–2007. Journal of Regional Science, 53(3), 369–391.CrossRef Barr, J. (2013). Skyscrapers and skylines: New York and Chicago, 1885–2007. Journal of Regional Science, 53(3), 369–391.CrossRef
go back to reference Barr, J., Mizrach, B., & Mundra, K. (2015). Skyscraper height and the business cycle: Separating myth from reality. Applied Economics, 47(2), 148–160.CrossRef Barr, J., Mizrach, B., & Mundra, K. (2015). Skyscraper height and the business cycle: Separating myth from reality. Applied Economics, 47(2), 148–160.CrossRef
go back to reference Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188.CrossRef Brueckner, J. K. (2003). Strategic interaction among governments: An overview of empirical studies. International Regional Science Review, 26(2), 175–188.CrossRef
go back to reference Brueckner, J. K. (2011). Lectures on urban economics, MIT Press. Brueckner, J. K. (2011). Lectures on urban economics, MIT Press.
go back to reference Brueckner, J. K., & Saavedra, L. (2001). Do local governments engage in strategic property—Tax competition? National Tax Journal, 54, 203–229.CrossRef Brueckner, J. K., & Saavedra, L. (2001). Do local governments engage in strategic property—Tax competition? National Tax Journal, 54, 203–229.CrossRef
go back to reference Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985). Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), 488–511.CrossRef Bulow, J. I., Geanakoplos, J. D., & Klemperer, P. D. (1985). Multimarket oligopoly: Strategic substitutes and complements. Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), 488–511.CrossRef
go back to reference Cai, Y. (2004). Irresponsible state: Local cadres and image-building in China. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20(4), 20–41.CrossRef Cai, Y. (2004). Irresponsible state: Local cadres and image-building in China. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 20(4), 20–41.CrossRef
go back to reference Chen, T. and J. Kung. (2018). Busting the ‘princelings’: The campaign against corruption in China's primary land market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming. Chen, T. and J. Kung. (2018). Busting the ‘princelings’: The campaign against corruption in China's primary land market. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
go back to reference Glaeser, E., Huang, W., Ma, Y., & Shleifer, A. (2017). A real estate boom with Chinese characteristics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1), 93–116.CrossRef Glaeser, E., Huang, W., Ma, Y., & Shleifer, A. (2017). A real estate boom with Chinese characteristics. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(1), 93–116.CrossRef
go back to reference Guo, G. (2009). China’s local political budget cycles. American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 621–632.CrossRef Guo, G. (2009). China’s local political budget cycles. American Journal of Political Science, 53(3), 621–632.CrossRef
go back to reference Head, K., & Ries, J. (1996). Inter-city competition for foreign investment: Static and dynamic effects of China’s incentive areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 40(1), 38–60.CrossRef Head, K., & Ries, J. (1996). Inter-city competition for foreign investment: Static and dynamic effects of China’s incentive areas. Journal of Urban Economics, 40(1), 38–60.CrossRef
go back to reference Helsley, R. W., & Strange, W. (2008). A game-theoretic analysis of skyscrapers. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(1), 49–64.CrossRef Helsley, R. W., & Strange, W. (2008). A game-theoretic analysis of skyscrapers. Journal of Urban Economics, 64(1), 49–64.CrossRef
go back to reference Kung, J and Chen, T. (2013). Do land revenue windfalls reduce the career incentives of county leaders? Evidence from China. working paper, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China. Kung, J and Chen, T. (2013). Do land revenue windfalls reduce the career incentives of county leaders? Evidence from China. working paper, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China.
go back to reference Lee, Y., et al. (2012). The report of skyscraper construction and development in China. Research Institute of Complex Engineering & Management: Tongji University, Shanghai, China. Lee, Y., et al. (2012). The report of skyscraper construction and development in China. Research Institute of Complex Engineering & Management: Tongji University, Shanghai, China.
go back to reference LeSage, J and K. Pace (2009). Introduction to spatial econometrics (Chapman and Hall/CRC). LeSage, J and K. Pace (2009). Introduction to spatial econometrics (Chapman and Hall/CRC).
go back to reference Li, H., & Zhou, L. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: The incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9), 1743–1762.CrossRef Li, H., & Zhou, L. (2005). Political turnover and economic performance: The incentive role of personnel control in China. Journal of Public Economics, 89(9), 1743–1762.CrossRef
go back to reference Li, Q., & Wang, L. (2018). Is the Chinese skyscraper boom excessive? Working paper. Singapore: National University of Singapore. Li, Q., & Wang, L. (2018). Is the Chinese skyscraper boom excessive? Working paper. Singapore: National University of Singapore.
go back to reference Lichtenberg, E., Ding, C., & C. (2009). Local officials as land developers: Urban spatial expansion in China. Journal of Urban Economics, 66(1), 57–64.CrossRef Lichtenberg, E., Ding, C., & C. (2009). Local officials as land developers: Urban spatial expansion in China. Journal of Urban Economics, 66(1), 57–64.CrossRef
go back to reference Maskin, E., Qian, Y., & Xu, C. (2000). Incentives, information, and organizational form. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(2), 359–378.CrossRef Maskin, E., Qian, Y., & Xu, C. (2000). Incentives, information, and organizational form. The Review of Economic Studies, 67(2), 359–378.CrossRef
go back to reference Ren, Xuefei. (2013). Urban China, John Wiley & Sons. Ren, Xuefei. (2013). Urban China, John Wiley & Sons.
go back to reference World Bank (2014). Urban China: Toward efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urbanization. research report, Washington D.C. World Bank (2014). Urban China: Toward efficient, inclusive, and sustainable urbanization. research report, Washington D.C.
go back to reference Wu, F. (2009). Globalization, the changing state, and local governance in Shanghai. In Chen, Xiangming, ed., Rising Shanghai: State Power and Local Transformations in a Global Megacity, 125-144. Wu, F. (2009). Globalization, the changing state, and local governance in Shanghai. In Chen, Xiangming, ed., Rising Shanghai: State Power and Local Transformations in a Global Megacity, 125-144.
go back to reference Wu, J., Deng, Y., Huang, J., Morck, R., and Yeung, B. (2013). Incentives and outcomes: China's environmental policy (no. w18754). National Bureau of Economic Research. Wu, J., Deng, Y., Huang, J., Morck, R., and Yeung, B. (2013). Incentives and outcomes: China's environmental policy (no. w18754). National Bureau of Economic Research.
go back to reference Xu, C. (2011). The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076–1151. Xu, C. (2011). The fundamental institutions of China’s reforms and development. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(4), 1076–1151.
go back to reference Yu, J., Zhou, L., & Zhu, G. (2016). Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 57, 23–37.CrossRef Yu, J., Zhou, L., & Zhu, G. (2016). Strategic interaction in political competition: Evidence from spatial effects across Chinese cities. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 57, 23–37.CrossRef
go back to reference Zhang, J. (2011). Interjurisdictional competition for FDI: The case of China’s development zone fever. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 41(2), 145–159.CrossRef Zhang, J. (2011). Interjurisdictional competition for FDI: The case of China’s development zone fever. Regional Science and Urban Economics, 41(2), 145–159.CrossRef
go back to reference Zhao, S. X., Zhan, H., Jiang, Y., & Pan, W. (2017). How big is China’s real estate bubble and why hasn’t it burst yet? Land Use Policy, 64, 153–162.CrossRef Zhao, S. X., Zhan, H., Jiang, Y., & Pan, W. (2017). How big is China’s real estate bubble and why hasn’t it burst yet? Land Use Policy, 64, 153–162.CrossRef
go back to reference Zhu, J. (2012). The shadow of the skyscrapers: Real estate corruption in China. Journal of Contemporary China, 21(74), 243–260.CrossRef Zhu, J. (2012). The shadow of the skyscrapers: Real estate corruption in China. Journal of Contemporary China, 21(74), 243–260.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Growing Skylines: The Economic Determinants of Skyscrapers in China
Authors
Jason Barr
Jingshu Luo
Publication date
13-08-2020
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics / Issue 2/2021
Print ISSN: 0895-5638
Electronic ISSN: 1573-045X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11146-020-09764-7

Other articles of this Issue 2/2021

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 2/2021 Go to the issue