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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. ‘Guam Express’ and ‘Carrier Killers’: China’s Asymmetric Missile Threat to the United States in the Pacific

Author : James Johnson

Published in: The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Abstract

This chapter builds on the military-technological theme and discusses the strategic implications of a new generation of stealthier and increasingly survivable Chinese antiship missiles (ASMs) for U.S. naval surface fleets and carrier strike groups operating in the Western Pacific—especially the ability of these weapons to evade U.S. missile defenses. This chapter argues that the proliferation of China’s maturing precision-strike missile regime could presage a new military-technological paradigm on the future networked battlefield in the Asia-Pacific. It finds that the development and diffusion of these asymmetric precision-strike weapons increase the risks of miscalculation, deterrence failure, military escalation, inadvertent war, and an intractable security dilemma in this highly contested domain—or missile ‘salvo competition’.

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previous chapter China’s Vision of the Future Networked Battlefield: Emerging Military-Technological Challenges to the United States

next chapter Chinese Evolving Approaches to Nuclear ‘War-Fighting’: An Emerging Security Dilemma?

Pellerin, C. (2014). Work: Guam is a strategic hub to Asia-Pacific rebalance. DoD News, Defense Media Activity, 19 August 2014. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/603091/work-guam-is-strategic-hub-to-asia-pacific-rebalance (Accessed: 9 January 2017).

The United States faces a similar threat in the Persian Gulf from Iran and in the Baltic Seas from Russia. See Feigenhauer, P. (2012). Putin declares his defense agenda for the next decade. Eurasian Daily Monitor, 38(9).

Hagt, E., & Durnin, M. (2009). China’s anti-ship ballistic missile: Developments and missing links. Naval War College Review, 62(4), 87.

Erickson, A.S., & Yang, D. (2009). On the verge of a game-changer. U.S. Naval Institute, 135(5), 53–86; Stokes, M. (2012). Missile forces: The second artillery force and the future of long-range precision strike. Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 150; Friedberg, A.L. (2014). A contest for supremacy: China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia. W.W. Norton & Company, 15–20.

Cruise missiles propelled by jet engines are often described as ‘pilotless airplanes’, and during the terminal guidance phase they missile-approach their targets at similar flight paths. See Gromley, D.M., Erickson, A.S., & Yuan, J. (2014). A low-visibility force multiplier: Assessing China’s cruise missile ambitions. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2; U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center. (2013). Ballistic and cruise missile threat. Washington, DC: U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center, 26.

The additional range of the DF-26 will further complicate China’s complex targeting challenge.

The ‘kill chain’ is a military term to describe the sequence of events required for a missile system to successfully destroy or disable its intended target.

As Chap. 4 described, the ability of Chinese C4ISR systems to provide the requisite reconnaissance to support ASBMs (especially in ranges beyond China’s first chain island) remains a work in progress. See Wilson, J. (2016). China’s expanding ability to conduct conventional missile strikes on Guam. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 12.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 31. Erickson, A.S. (2015). Showtime: China reveals two ‘carrier-killer’ missiles. The National Interest, 3 September 2015. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-13769 (Accessed: 7 September 2015). Beyond these observations very little is known of the DF-26 and its variants.

China has possessed the capacity to target Guam with nuclear missiles for several decades. Prior to the development of the DF-26, the PLA’s conventional capabilities were dependent on air force and naval platforms to reach Guam. Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2016). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2016. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 25 and 67.

The United States–Soviet INF Treaty required the prohibition of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500–5500 km. China’s recent development of intermediate-range cruise and ballistic missiles has prompted debate on the durability of this treaty. See Reinsch, W.A., & Shea, D.C. (2015). 2015 report to congress of the U.S.-China economic and security review committee, 114th congress, 1st session, November 2015. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Committee, 370.

The U.S. Pershing II Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) boasted similar ballistic missile capabilities to Chinese ASBMs—the missile was terminated in 1987 to comply with the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). The development of the Chinese DF-21D ASBM was reportedly partially based on the U.S. Pershing II. See Perrett, B. (2015). U.S. Navy Sees Chinese HGV as part of a wider threat. Aviation Week, 27 January 2015. Available at: http://aviationweek.com/awin/us-navy-sees-chinese-hgv-part-wider-threat (Accessed: 25 August 2015).

The ‘asymmetric’ features of Chinese ASMs are conditioned by the tactical, operational, and strategic advantages of this relatively low-cost missile system compared with the overwhelming superiority of U.S. carrier strike groups (CSGs) and supporting fleets in the Western Pacific. In other words, ASBMs are only asymmetric in the context of U.S. military primacy, that is the presumed ‘target’ of ASBMs.

Erickson, A.S. (2013). Chinese anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) development: Drivers, trajectories and strategic implications. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 1–5.

Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China. (2015). China’s military strategy, 2014. Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council.

Ministry of National Defense, The People’s Republic of China. (2008). China’s national defense in 2008. Beijing, China: Information Office of the State Council.

Chinese analysts frequently cite the 1996 Taiwan crisis as one of the major drivers behind Chinese military modernization efforts—including the pursuit of ASBMs. See Hagt, E., & Durnin, M. (2009). China’s anti-ship ballistic missile: Developments and missing links. Naval War College Review, 62(4), 11.

For example, China’s boost-glide and hypersonic weapons (currently under development) could be used to evade Japanese or South Korean missile defense systems.

Chinese military writings have frequently used the ‘assassin’s mace’ to describe various asymmetric weapons (also referred to as ‘silver bullet’ or ‘trump card’ weapons) including ASBMs, ASCMs, LACMs, ASATs, and C4ISR systems. See Bruzdzinski, J.E. (2004). Demystifying the ‘shashoujian’: China’s “assassin’s mace” concept. In A. Scobell, & L. Wortzel (Eds.), Civil-military changes in China: Elites, institutes, and ideas after the 16th party congress (pp. 309–363). Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Institute. Erickson, A.S., & Yang, D. (2009). On the verge of a game-changer. U.S. Naval Institute, 135(5), 53–86.

Ibid., 61–62.

The Office of Naval Intelligence. (2015). The PLA navy: New capabilities and missions for the 21st century. Washington, DC: The Office of Naval Intelligence, 19.

Johnston, A.I. (2016). The evolution of interstate security crisis-management theory and practice in China. Naval War College Review, 69(1), 29–72.

Wilson, J. (2016). China’s expanding ability to conduct conventional missile strikes on Guam. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5–6.

Ibid., 7. In 2014, the U.S. Navy announced plans to deploy a fourth submarine to Guam. This followed the deployment in 2013 of Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems to Guam.

Friedberg, A.L. (2014). A contest for supremacy: China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia. W.W. Norton & Company, 219–220.

Chinese analysts and policy-makers have tended to characterize U.S. military and defense policies in Asia as designed to prevent China from achieving the kind of great power status that it believes it deserves. See Shambaugh, D. (2000). Sino-American strategic relations: From partners to competitors. Survival, 42(1), 97–115.

For example, researchers at the PLA’s Second Artillery Engineering College developed a series of theoretical models to modify and improve ASBMs’ maneuvering reentry vehicles systems (MaRVs), which could enhance the ability of ASBMs to defeat U.S. BMD interceptors. See Chase, M.S. (2014). Second artillery in the Hu Jintao era: Doctrine and capabilities. In R. Kamphausen, D. Lai, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Assessing the people’s liberation army in the Hu Jintao era (pp. 301–353). Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute and the U.S. Army War College Press, 301–353.

The PLA’s power projection capacity continues to be constrained by several factors including an underdeveloped blue-water naval capacity, minimal overseas bases, a lack of refueling aircraft (for air-to-air fueling), and an operational aircraft carrier fleet.

Several U.S. analysts have argued that China’s 2007 ASAT test indicated an inadequate appreciation by Beijing of the strategic implications a weapons test of this kind could have. See Lewis, J., & Kulacki, G. (2008). Understanding China’s anti-satellite test. The Nonproliferation Review, 15(2), 335–347.

The majority of Chinese open-source literature pertaining to ASMs has centered on the general feasibility of this weapon such as the various technical challenges in the development of ASBMs, for example accurate targeting and terminal guidance challenges. See Erickson, A.S. (2013). Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) development: Drivers, trajectories and strategic implications. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 58–59.

The use of ASBMs in multiple salvo operations, especially in conjunction with other precision-strike missile systems capabilities, could compensate for the relatively wide ‘margin of error’ associated with the successful terminal guidance of this missile system. See Cote, O.R. (2012). Assessing the undersea balance between the U.S. and China. In T.G. Mahnken (Ed.), Competitive strategies for the 21st century—Theory, history, practice (pp. 184–206). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Kazianis, H.J. (2015). Is China’s ‘carrier killer’ really a threat to the U.S. navy? The National Interest, 2 September 2015. Available at: http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/chinas-carrier-killer-really-threat-the-us-navy-13765?page=show (Accessed: 7 September 2015).

Work, R. (2015). Deputy secretary of defense speech: China Aerospace Studies Institute, 22 June 2015. Available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/606683/china-aerospace-studies-institute (Accessed: 10 January 2017).

A ‘fully operational’ ASBM would need to be effectively fused with C4ISR systems, to supply real-time satellite imagery, accurate target-locating information, satellite reconnaissance, navigation, and continued tracking ability. The U.S. DoD recently stated that it is ‘unclear whether China has the capability to collect accurate targeting information and pass it to launch platforms in time for successful strikes in sea areas’. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2015. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 37.

According to U.S. DoD officials, China in 2015 deployed ASCMs on the disputed South China Sea Woody Island, and reportedly test-fired the YJ-62 ASCM—which follows the deployment of an advanced air defense missile system (the HQ-9) on the same group of islands in the same year. Gertz, B. (2016). Pentagon concerned by Chinese anti-ship cruise firing. Freebeacon, 30 March 2016. Available at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-concerned-chinese-anti-ship-missile-firing/ (Accessed: 5 January 2017).

A recent RAND Corp. report estimated that with an inventory of only 50 IRBMs (e.g. the DF-26), Beijing could keep Anderson base at Guam closed to large aircraft for more than a week, and with 100 IRBMs it could shut down these facilities for almost two weeks—assuming a 75 percent missile-targeting reliability rate. Heginbotham, E., Nixon, M., Morgan, F.E., Heim, J.L., Hagan, J., & Li, S. (Eds.). (2015). The U.S.-China military scorecard: Forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power 1996–2014. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 64–65.

Mearsheimer, J.J. (1983). Conventional deterrence. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

The U.S. DoD began to publicly discuss Chinese ASBMs as early as 2004. In 2005 a DoD report to Congress explicitly contextualized ASBMs with broader Chinese A2/AD missions and strategies. See Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2005). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2005. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 4–33.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2008). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2008. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, i.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2011). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2011. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 29.

In 2017, the U.S. DoD reported that the PLA Navy ‘is improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targeting capability … which can be used in conjunction with reconnaissance satellites to locate targets [i.e. U.S. CSGs] at great distances from China … thereby supporting long-range precision strikes, including employment of anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs)’, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 57.

Erickson, A.S. (2013). Chinese Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) development: Drivers, trajectories and strategic implications. Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, 8.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2017). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2017. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 37.

The Pentagon’s Air–Sea Battle operational concept emerged as one of the central U.S. countervails to address the A2/AD ‘military problem set’ and preserve U.S. military power projection and navigation freedoms in the Western Pacific. Other DoD programs with similar strategic objectives have subsequently emerged including the U.S. Defense Innovation Initiative (DII) and the ‘Third Offset Strategy’. These initiatives were designed to leverage U.S. advantages in emerging military technologies to counter the perception of declining U.S. dominance in several conventional military domains—especially precision-guided munitions, space, and cyber domains. O’Rourke, R. (2014). China naval modernization: Implications for U.S. navy capabilities—Background and issues for congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 55.

Admiral Greenert described ‘hard-kill’ measures as ‘knocking it [ASBM] down, a bullet on a bullet’ including improved versions of the missile defense SM-3 interceptors; the acceleration in the development of the electronic rail gun (EMRG); high-power free-electron lasers (FELs), and solid-state lasers (SSLs). ‘Soft-kill’ measures included jamming, spoofing, and other confusion and decoy tactics, as the missiles approach their targets—especially the use of EW. Ibid., 67–69.

Talmadge, E. (2011). 3-Star: Anti-carrier missile won’t stop navy. Navy Times, 15 February 2011. Available at: http://archive.navytimes.com/article/20110215/NEWS/102150313/3-star-Anti-carrier-missile-won-t-stop-Navy (Accessed: 15 September 2015).

For example, China could launch an opening salvo of missile strikes to degrade or weaken U.S. air defenses, missile defenses, and its command and control centers as a precursor to a more intense round of precision air strikes. Heginbotham, E., Nixon, M., Morgan, F.E., Heim, J.L., Hagan, J., & Li, S. (Eds.). (2015). The U.S.-China military scorecard: Forces, geography, and the evolving balance of power 1996–2014. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 153–200.

Analyst Roger Cliff highlighted the various technical challenges and time-sensitive issues associated with BMD (e.g. Aegis SM-3) interceptions of ASBMs. Kazianis, H.J. (2012). Behind the China missile hype—Interview with Roger Cliff of RAND Corporation. The Diplomat, 20 January 2012. Available at: http://thediplomat.com/2012/01/behind-the-china-missile-hype/?allpages=yes (Accessed: 8 May 2015).

For example, during The Battle of Midway of 1942 the United States by subjecting Japanese naval forces to a multi-axis attack was able to successfully overcome Japan’s air defenses.

The YJ-18 is reportedly capable of reaching supersonic speeds during the terminal phase of its flight, which would significantly inhibit the reaction time available to the United States—compared to its sub-supersonic predecessors. See The Office of Naval Intelligence. (2015). The PLA navy: New capabilities and missions for the 21st century. Washington, DC: The Office of Naval Intelligence, 19–21.

Yoshihara, T. (2011). Chinese views of sea-based ballistic missiles defense. In A.S. Erickson, & L.J. Goldstein (Eds.), Chinese aerospace power: Evolving maritime roles (pp. 343–359). Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2014). Quadrennial defense review report. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 61. Recent U.S. tests of a sophisticated layered missile defense system combining Aegis and Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense systems—designed to simultaneously detect, track, and destroy ballistic and cruise missiles—have been considered by analysts as a direct response to heightened threat perceptions posed by the Chinese multi-axis A2/AD challenge.

Currently, the United States possesses sea-based skimming supersonic target vehicles to develop defenses for supersonic ASCMs, but lacks an equivalent supersonic ASCM capability.

For example, China’s new YJ-12 long-range air-launched supersonic ASCM potentially more than doubles the ranges of the PLA’s previous systems (estimated 400 km), and, with its ability to perform evasive maneuvers as it approaches its target, poses new challenges to U.S. missile defenses—especially as China improves its bomber in-air refueling capabilities. Pilger, M. (2015). China’s new YJ-18 anti-ship cruise missile: Capabilities and implications for U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5.

Currently, the United States possesses sea-based skimming supersonics target vehicles to develop defenses for supersonic ASCMs, but lacks an equivalent supersonic ASCM capability. Haddick, R. (2014). China’s most dangerous missile (so far). War on the Rocks, 2 July 2014. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2014/07/chinas-most-dangerous-missile-so-far/ (Accessed: 2 January 2017).

Recent evidence indicates that China possesses several cruise missiles that are able to target Guam including air-launched land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs); air-launched antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs); and sea-launched antiship cruise missiles. Technical upgrades made to China’s bomber fleet (i.e. the H-6Ks) have increased the ranges of the PLA’s air-launched precision cruise missiles (i.e. the CJ-20 and the dual-payload CJ-10A LACM, and the new YJ-12 long-range supersonic ASCM) for missions that potentially reach Guam for the first time. Fisher, R.D. (2017). China’s H-6K bomber shows new strike capabilities. IHS Jane’s 360, 9 January 2017. Available at: http://www.janes.com/article/66779/china-s-h-6k-bomber-shows-new-strike-capabilities (Accessed: 10 January 2017).

Gertz, B. (2016). Pentagon concerned by Chinese anti-ship cruise firing. Freebeacon, 30 March 2016. Available at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-concerned-chinese-anti-ship-missile-firing/ (Accessed: 5 January 2017).

The dynamic between two militaries that each has PGMs and precision defensive capabilities can be called a ‘salvo competition’. In this competition, both combatants seek to gain the advantage by improving their capabilities to attack with precision and/or defend against precision strikes.

In 2009, U.S. President Barack Obama announced a significant shift in the strategic direction of the Aegis ballistic missile defense (ABMD) program, which resulted in a so-called Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) in East Asia.

Chinese analysts have consistently criticized U.S. BMD for undermining its conventional missile deterrent against Taiwan, and potentially allowing the United States to subject China to ‘nuclear blackmail’. See Lawrence, S., Rinehart, I., & Hildreth, S. (2013). Ballistic missile defense in the Asia-Pacific region: Co-operation and opposition. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 1–21.

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2010). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2010. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense.

Ibid., 3–9.

Entous, A., & Barnes, J. (2014). U.S. plans new Asia missile defenses. Wall Street Journal, 23 August 2012. Available at: http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444812704577605591629039400 (Accessed: 1 January 2017).

Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense. (2013). Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China, 2013. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 31–32.

Several recent initiatives by Washington to engage China in senior-level dialogue on nuclear and BMD issues resulted in limited success. The 2009–2016 rounds of the United States–China Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) focused on cyber and maritime security issues, and avoided direct discussion on either nuclear or BMD issues.

Jervis, R. (1976). Perception and misperception in international politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 75.

Van Evera, S. (1999). Causes of war. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Strategic ambiguities related to warhead ambiguity for escalation control featured heavily in U.S. debates surrounding the Pentagon’s 2006 proposal to deploy a conventionally armed version of the nuclear Trident missile—a proposal to deploy conventional missiles on U.S. Trident submarines was rejected by Congress because of these concerns. See Pollack, J. (2009). Emerging strategic dilemma in U.S.-China relations. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 65(4), 53–63.

For example, China could use a nuclear-armed ballistic missile to create a high-altitude EMP attack intended (temporarily or permanently) to disable or destroy U.S. C4ISR systems—or other civilian or military systems.

Hypersonic weapons are able to maintain missile flight speeds of Mach 5 to Mach 10, and sustain these speeds for a duration beyond the ability of any existing ballistic missiles. It is unclear, however, whether Beijing intended to arm its hypersonic weapons with nuclear or conventional payloads—or both. See Pollack, J.H. (2015). Boost-glide weapons and US-China strategic stability. The Nonproliferation Review, 22(2), 155–164.

Because of the opacity surrounding Chinese nuclear policy, there is very limited information on how the PLA stores its nuclear warheads. Most foreign analysts assume that the PLA maintains separate stores for its nuclear warheads and missiles—or a ‘de-alerted’ posture. See Lewis, J. (2013). China’s nuclear modernization: Surprise, restraint, and uncertainty. In A. Tellis, & T. Tanner (Eds.), Strategic Asia 2012–13: China’s military challenge (pp. 67–96). Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR).

Acton, J.M. (2013). Silver bullet? Asking the right questions about conventional prompt global strike. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1–4.

The evidence suggests that the PLA maintains shared command and control structures for both its nuclear and conventional arsenals. See Pollack, J.H. (2015). Boost-glide weapons and US-China strategic stability. The Nonproliferation Review, 22(2), 155–164.

Christensen, T.J. (2012). The meaning of the nuclear evolution: China’s strategic modernization and US-China security relations. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(4), 467.

Hallion, R.P., Bedke, C.M., & Schanz, M.V. (2016). Hypersonic weapons and US national security: A 21st century breakthrough (January). Arlington, VA: The Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies Air Force Association, 2–34; O’Rourke, R. (2013). China naval modernization: Implications for U.S. navy capabilities—Background and issues for congress, Congressional Research Service, Washington, DC, pp. 70–72.

Christensen, T.J. (2012). The meaning of the nuclear evolution: China’s strategic modernization and US-China security relations. Journal of Strategic Studies, 35(4), 447–487. Several U.S. defense analysts have advocated investment in long-range strategic missiles programs such as the Long-Range Strike Bomber (LRS-B)—comprising heavy-stealth payloads that would allow the United States to operate beyond the ranges of Chinese missiles. See Wilson, J. (2016). China’s expanding ability to conduct conventional missile strikes on Guam. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 15.

The Chinese concept of ‘strategic deterrence’ describes a broader and multifaceted version of deterrence that includes nuclear and conventional, as well as cyber, space, and electronic warfare domains. Chinese state media described the PLA’s dual-payload DF-26 as ‘a new weapon for strategic deterrence’. See Chase S.M., & Chan, A. (2016). China’s evolving approach to ‘integrated strategic deterrence’. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation.

McDevitt, M. (2011). The PLA navy’s anti-access role in a Taiwan contingency. In P. Saunders, C. Yung, M. Swaine, & A. En-Dzu Yang (Eds.), The Chinese navy: Expanding capabilities, evolving roles (pp. 191–214). Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 209–210.

Morgan, F.E., Mueller, K.P., Medeiros, E.S., Pollpeter, K.L., & Cliff, R. (2008). Dangerous thresholds: Managing escalation in the 21st century. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 7–45.

Ibid.

Snyder, G. (1965). The balance of power and the balance of terror. In P. Seabury (Ed.), The balance of power (pp. 184–201). San Francisco, CA: Chandler, 184–201.

Schelling, T.C. (1966). Arms and influence. London; New Haven: Yale University Press.

Saunders, P.C., & Scobell, A. (Eds.). (2015). PLA influence on China’s national security policymaking. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1–33.

Erickson, A.S., & Yang, D. (2009). On the verge of a game-changer. U.S. Naval Institute, 135(5), 53–86.

Goldstein, A. (2013). First things first: The pressing danger of crisis instability in U.S.-China relations. International Security, 37(4), 49–89.

Cote, O.R. (2012). Assessing the undersea balance between the U.S. and China. In T.G. Mahnken (Ed.), Competitive strategies for the 21st century—Theory, history, practice (pp. 184–206). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

The INF treaty in eliminating a class of strategic moves has been regarded as a milestone in United States–Russia security relations, and prohibiting Russia from deploying these missiles for ‘political coercion’ purposes on Europe’s boarders—as China has done in Taiwan since the 1990s. Wilson, J. (2016). China’s expanding ability to conduct conventional missile strikes on Guam. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 15.

Other states, notably India, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, Israel, and Turkey, have also expanded their ballistic and cruise missile capabilities in the post–Cold-War era. See Ghoshal, D. (2016). China and the INF treaty. Comparative Strategy, 35(5), 363–370.

To date, China has not expressed any intention to join the INF Treaty. Ibid., 364.

Hallex, M. (2014). China’s mighty missile threat: What should America do about it? National Interest, 13 September 2014. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-mighty-missile-threat-what-should-america-do-about-it-11271 (Accessed: 10 January 2017).

From a technical perspective, a maneuverable medium-range ballistic missile system (such as the DF-21D ASBM) would not be too dissimilar to a ‘regional’ version of the U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) program. Gormley, D.M. (2015). US advanced conventional systems and conventional prompt global strike systems. The Nonproliferation Review, 22(2), 123–139.

Pollack, J.H. (2015). Boost-glide weapons and US-China strategic stability. The Nonproliferation Review, 22(2), 128.

Montgomery, E.B. (2014). China’s missile forces are growing: Is it time to modify the INF treaty? National Interest, 2 July 2014. Available at: http://nationalinterest.org/feature/chinas-missile-forces-are-growing-it-time-modify-the-inf-10791 (Accessed: 10 January 2017).

Wilson, J. (2016). China’s expanding ability to conduct conventional missile strikes on Guam. Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 13–15.

Title: ‘Guam Express’ and ‘Carrier Killers’: China’s Asymmetric Missile Threat to the United States in the Pacific
Author: James Johnson
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: The US-China Military and Defense Relationship during the Obama Presidency
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-75837-4

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-75838-1

Copyright Year: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-75838-1_5