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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. IEDs in “New Wars”

Author : James Revill

Published in: Improvised Explosive Devices

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter looks at the role and rise of IEDs in the New Wars of the twenty-first century, paying particular attention to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, but also looking across the globe at how IEDs have emerged as the paradigmatic weapons of asymmetrical conflicts.

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previous chapter IEDs in the Twentieth Century

next chapter The Diffusion and Adoption of IED Technology

Kaldor. In Defence of New Wars.

See, for example, the underlying influence of Wahhabism, with its emphasis on the concept of Tauheed (something encapsulated in the notion of there being no god but Allah). Burke suggests strict interpretations of this concept leave “little room… for diversity among the community of believers. Pluralism was polytheism, polytheism was apostasy” a logic that generates significant implications for the Shia. Burke. The New Threat. Pg 44.

UN News Centre. 2012. “Afghanistan: Following Deadly Blast, UN Mission Calls on Taliban to Halt Use of Improvised Explosive Devices.” UN News, October 20. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=43341#.Vr-ttMeYEZY.

Based on data provided by in Science: Bohannon, John, and George Michael Brower. 2011. “Civilian Casualties in Afghanistan, 2009–2010.” Science. http://www.sciencemag.org/site/feature/data/hottopics/afghanistan/visualization/index.html.

Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. 2012. “Reaction of Islamic Emirate Regarding Accusations of UNAMA about Explosive Devices.” http://shahamat-english.com/english/index.php/paighamoona/28792-reaction-of-islamic-emirate-regarding-accusations-of-unama-about-explosive-devices.

It has been suggested that “Improvised explosive devices (IED) are one of the largest threats facing coalition forces in current military conflicts”, Weiss, L, E Whitaker, E Briscoe, and E Trewhitt. 2011. “Evaluating Counter-IED Strategies.” Defense and Security Analysis 27 (2): 135–47. doi:10.1080/14751798.2011.578717. http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-79960547372&partnerID=40&md5=f044a8cbc8be1b00e15f5dbc848d9bb0.

Bohannon, John. 2011. “Counting the Dead in Afghanistan.” Science 331 (March): 1256–60.

Several sources point to the predominant use of CAN fertiliser from Pakistan: A 2013 report suggest that an estimated “80 percent of the IEDs used in Afghanistan have homemade explosives as the main charge, and more than 80 percent of these are derived from CAN fertilizer produced in Pakistan”. Kamran Yousaf. 2013. “Deadly Fertiliser: Kayani Proposes Forum to Counter IED Threats.” The Express Tribune, May 20. http://tribune.com.pk/story/551923/deadly-fertiliser-kayani-proposes-forum-to-counter-ied-threats/. See also Brook, Tom Vanden. 2011. “Majority of IEDs Are Traced to Pakistan.” USA Today, February 10. http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2011-10-02/ieds-traced-to-pakistan/50638686/1#.; Carpenter, Jonathan. 2012. “Terrorist Networks in Pakistan and the Proliferation of Improvised Explosive Devices.” https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg79800/html/CHRG-112shrg79800.htm.

JIEDDO. 2014. “IEDs – Reducing the Risk.” 2014 Session of the Group of Experts, CCW Amended Protocol II http://www.unog.ch/__80256ee600585943.nsf/(httpPages)/39340de9a9659e5cc1257cf400344b35?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=3#_Section3.

Wilkinson, Bevan & Biddle. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs).

Tom Vanden Brook. 2013. “Afghan Bomb Makers Shifting to New Explosives for IEDs.” USA Today, June 25. http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/06/25/ammonium-nitrate-potassium-chlorate-ieds-afghanistan/2442191/.

Yusufzai, Mushtaq. 2009. “Wanted Taliban Leader Doesn’t Fear U.S.” NBC News World Blog, April 9. http://worldblog.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2009/04/09/4375885-wanted-taliban-leader-doesnt-fear-us.

A parallel has been drawn between chemistry of the opium refinement process and the development of home-made explosives in Afghanistan; certainly, Tomasi has suggested that “A chemist with the ability to refine opium would have sufficient skills to develop HME” Marco D. Tomasi. 2009. “Alternative Motivations for IED Use in Afghanistan.” Vol. Product Se. http://info.publicintelligence.net/JIEDDOafghanieds.pdf.

See: Wilson, Clay. 2007. “Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan: Effects and Countermeasures.” http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RS22330.pdf.; Johnson, Thomas H. 2013. “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24 (1): 3–27. doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.740228. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2013.740228.

Dietz, A S. 2011. “Countering the Effects of IED Systems in Afghanistan: An Integral Approach.” Small Wars and Insurgencies 22 (2): 385–401. doi:10.1080/09592318.2011.573423. http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-79959549871&partnerID=40&md5=3dc7917242c5519f5a4ecf4ffb29cac6.

Several individuals have been explicitly identified in the “List of individuals and entities established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1988 (2011)”, such as Abdul Rauf and Sayed Esmatullah and other such actors identified as providing training and support for IED manufacture and deployment in Afghanistan, see UN Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011). 2015. “The List Established and Maintained by the 1988 (2011) Committee.” Vol. 1988. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1988/list.shtml.

Dietz. Countering the Effects of IED Systems in Afghanistan.

Nasiri, Omar. 2007. Inside the Jihad: My Life with Al Qaeda. Basic Books. Pg 221.

Yousafzai, Sami. 2009. “The Taliban’s Oral History of the Afghanistan War.” Newsweek. http://www.newsweek.com/talibans-oral-history-afghanistan-war-79553.; See also Johnson, Thomas H. 2013. “Taliban Adaptations and Innovations.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 24 (1): 3–27. doi:10.1080/09592318.2013.740228. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592318.2013.740228.

Barker, A D. 2011. “Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002–2009.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34 (8): 600–620. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2011.582630. http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-79960960598&partnerID=40&md5=ac36934f62ee1d91d9fc131c9f38c2c0.

Barker. Improvised explosive devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan.

Binnie & Wright. ‘Infernal Machines’ Improvised Explosive Devices.

Barker. Improvised explosive devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan.

National Research Council. 2007. “Countering the Threat of Improvised Explosive Devices: Basic Research Opportunities.” doi:0-309-10916-7,. http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11953. Pg xi.

Grouille, Olivier. 2009. “Bird and Fairweather in Context Assessing the Ied Threat.” The RUSI Journal 154 (4): 40–45. doi:10.1080/03071840903255252. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071840903255252.

Barker. Improvised explosive devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan.

Smith, Andrew. 2003. “Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003–09: A Case of Operational Surprise and Institutional Response.” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA.

Smith. Improvised Explosive Devices in Iraq, 2003–09.

Atkinson, Rick. 2007. “The Single Most Effective Weapon against Our Deployed Forces.” Washington Post, September 30. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/29/AR2007092900750.html.

Wilkinson et al. have suggested that by January 2003, “377 tonnes of premium quality high explosive had been looted” adding that Iraq “stands as an example of how access to ammunition stockpiles in post-conflict environments can provide heavy firepower to non-state actors and, ultimately, compromise post-conflict recovery”. Wilkinson, Bevan & Biddle. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs); Klingelhoefer, Mark. 2005. “Captured Enemy Ammunition in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Its Strategic Importance in Post-Conflict Operations.” http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil72.pdf.

Atkinson, Rick. 2007. “‘There Was a Two-Year Learning Curve…and a Lot of People Died in Those Two Years.’” The Washington Post, October 1. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/30/AR2007093001675_pf.html.

The Iraqi Perspectives Project provides a number of examples of how regime elements smuggled IED components in diplomatic bags but also how “An IIS memorandum dated 5 August 2001 describes in detail the manufacture and testing of a powerful type of lED that could be exploded by remote control and ‘vectored like rays so it will largely [destroy] the objective’ … These devices were tested in a ‘residential area,’ with an emphasis on wireless detonation from 100 to 200 meters, and camouflaged to match the area” see Woods, Kevin M. 2007. “Primary Source Material for Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents.” Vol. 1. https://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/iraqi/v1.pdf. Pg 7.

Woods. Saddam and Terrorism.

Moreover, such expertise has proved innovative and been able to respond to US and coalition improvements in detection and defence by moving from simple wired devices to remote detonation via “cell-phones and garage-door openers”. Hoffman, Bruce. 2007. “The ‘cult of the Insurgent’: Its Tactical and Strategic Implications.” Australian Journal of International Affairs 61 (3): 312–29. doi:10.1080/10357710701531503. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10357710701531503.

Jones, S G, and P B Johnston. 2012. “The Future of Insurgency.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36 (1): 1–25. doi: 10.1080/1057610X.2013.739077.http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84871452316&partnerID=40&md5=1a897f31cf9e0658903af4da7b3505ba.

Atkinson. The Single Most Effective Weapon against Our Deployed Forces.

Atkinson, Rick. 2008. “Left of the Boom: The Struggle to Defeat Roadside Bombs.” The Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/world/specials/leftofboom/.

Cordesman, Anthony H, Charles Loi, and Vivek Kocharlakota. 2010. “IED Metrics for Iraq: June 2003 – September 2010.” http://csis.org/files/publication/101110_ied_metrics_iraq.pdf.

There is a series of attacks attributed to the factions of the Mahdi militia in Spring 2008. See Johnson, David E., M. Wade Markel, and Brian Shannon. 2013. “The 2008 Battle of Sadr City.” RAND http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP335.pdf.

Wilson. Improvised Explosive Devices. Pg 5.

Atkinson. The single most effective weapon against our deployed forces.

Ackerman, Gary, and Maranda Sorrells. 2009. “Workshop Report Human and Social Forces in the Spread of the IED Threat: Innovation, Diffusion and Adaptation.” Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) http://www.start.umd.edu/sites/default/files/files/announcements/IED_Workshop_Report.pdf.

Mcfate, Montgomery. 2005. “Iraq: The Social Context of IEDs.” Military Review, June.

Mcfate. Iraq.

Garver, Christopher. 2007. “Amateur Hour.” CBRNE World, 24–27.

In Baghdad, a roadside bomb containing sarin nerve agent explodes in the vicinity of a US military convoy, resulting in two persons requiring treatment for “minor exposure”. Recounting the incident two days later, US military spokesman in Iraq, Mark Kimmitt, says: “The Iraqi Survey Group confirmed today that a 155-millimeter artillery round containing sarin nerve agent had been found. The round had been rigged as an IED (improvised explosive device) which was discovered by a US force convoy. A detonation occurred before the IED could be rendered inoperable. This produced a very small dispersal of agent… Two explosive ordnance team members were treated for minor exposure to nerve agent as a result of the partial detonation of the round.” As Cited in: Harvard Sussex Program. 2004. News Chronology May through July 2004. The CBW Conventions Bulletin, (65), Pg 24.

Harvard Sussex Program. News Chronology May through July 2004.

Ali, A L I. 2011. “Displacement and Statecraft in Iraq : Recent Trends,” 5 (2): 231–45. doi:10.1386/ijcis.5.2.231.

International Crisis Group. 2008. “Iraq after the Surge I: The New Sunni Landscape.” Middle East Report. http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/MiddleEastNorthAfrica/IraqSyriaLebanon/Iraq/74_iraq_after_the_surge_i_the_new_sunni_landscape.pdf. Pg 7.

Higgins, Eliot. 2012. “Syria’s DIY Revolt.” Foreign Policy July. http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/30/syrias-diy-revolt/.

Karouny, Mariam. 2014. “Massive Tunnel Bomb Hits Syrian Army Base: Video.” Reuters, May 15. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-airstrikes-idUSBREA4E09520140515.

Unknown. 2012. “Syrian Rebels Make Driverless Car Bomb.” Military.Com. http://www.military.com/video/operations-and-strategy/improvised-weapons/syrian-rebels-make-driverless-car-bomb/1565016817001. Notably this tacit was reportedly tried by Sendero Luminos and FARC in Latin America previously see United States Office of the Secretary of State. 1991. “Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1990.” http://fas.org/irp/threat/terror_90/index.html.

Amnesty International. 2015. “Syria’s ‘Circle of Hell’: Barrel Bombs in Aleppo Bring Terror and Bloodshed Forcing Civilians Underground.” Amnesty International News. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/05/syrias-circle-of-hell-barrel-bombs-in-aleppo/.

UN Security Council. 2014. “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2139 (2014) to Ease Aid Delivery to Syrians, Provide Relief from ‘Chilling Darkness.’” United Nations. http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sc11292.doc.htm.

Jones, S G, and P B Johnston. 2012. “The Future of Insurgency.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 36 (1): 1–25. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2013.739077. http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-84871452316&partnerID=40&md5=1a897f31cf9e0658903af4da7b3505ba.

Walters, Robert. 2013. “Remarks by Brigadier General Robert Walters Deputy Director for Operations and Intelligence.” In Pakistan Counter-IED Symposium. JIEDDO. https://www.jieddo.mil/content/docs/20130520_BG_Walters_remarks_at_Pakistan_Counter-IED_Symposium_AS_PREPARED.pdf; Sonnex, Peter, and Tim Peacock. 2012. “Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices.” In 2012 Session of the Group of Experts on Amended Protocol II. Geneva: United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/4659EE6F59A2374DC12579F10039C3DC/$file/UK_IEDs+2012.pdf.

Jones & Johnston. The Future of Insurgency.

Gallego, Pablo Esteban Parra. 2012. “COLOMBIA Improvised Explosive Devices.” In 2012 Session of the Group of Experts on Amended Protocol II. Geneva: United Nations Office at Geneva. http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/EFDFCCD728A2754FC12579F1003988EE/$file/Colombia_IEDs+2012.pdf.

BBC. 2000. “‘Necklace’ Bomb Halts Colombia Talks.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/751237.stm.

Gallego. COLOMBIA Improvised Explosive Devices.

BBC. 2000. “‘Necklace’ Bomb Halts Colombia Talks.” BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/751237.stm.

US Army Intelligence and Security Command. “Review of IED Activity in Mexico.” https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/9/9625_US%20Army%20NGIC%20Review%20of%20IED%20Activity%20in%20Mexico-1.pdf.

Campbell, Lisa J. 2010. “Los Zetas: Operational Assessment.” Small Wars & Insurgencies 21 (1): 55–80. doi:10.1080/09592310903561429. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09592310903561429.

US Army Intelligence and Security Command. “Review of IED Activity in Mexico”. https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/attach/9/9625_US%20Army%20NGIC%20Review%20of%20IED%20Activity%20in%20Mexico-1.pdf

Jones, Calvert. 2006. “Al-Qaeda’s Innovative Improvisers: Learning in a Diffuse Transnational Network.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 19 (4): 555–69. doi:10.1080/09557570601003205. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09557570601003205.

Clarke, Michael, and Valentina Soria. 2009. “Terrorism in the United Kingdom.” The RUSI Journal 154 (3): 44–53. doi:10.1080/03071840903097647. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03071840903097647.

According to Jones and Johnston Boko Haram: “dramatically increased its rate of IED attacks, from only one documented attack in 2009 to nine in 2010 and 88 in 2011… Boko Haram has improved its ability to build hollow charges—or directional blast devices—that are capable of causing substantial damage to structures and lightly armoured vehicles”. Jones & Johnston. The Future of Insurgency. Pg 16.

Bale. Jihadist Cells and “IED” Capabilities in Europe. Pg 11.

Stenersen. Bomb-Making for Beginners.

Bale. Jihadist Cells and “IED” Capabilities in Europe. Pg 62.

Micha Michael Corderre, and Michael Register. 2009. “Fighting Back Against IEDs.” Police – The Law Enforcement Magazine September (September). http://www.policemag.com/channel/swat/articles/2009/09/fighting-back-against-ieds.aspx.

Clarke & Soria. Terrorism in the United Kingdom.

Metropolitan Police. 2006. “Metropolitan Police Terrorist Jailed for Life for Conspiracy to Murder in the UK and US.” News. http://content.met.police.uk/News/Terrorist-jailed-for-life-for-conspiracy-to-murder-in-the-UK-and-US/1260267887712/1257246745756.

Unknown. 2006. “United States of America V Dhiren Barot.” Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/articles/hindi.pdf.

Carlisle, David. 2007. “Dhiren Barot: Was He an Al Qaeda Mastermind or Merely a Hapless Plotter?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 30 (March 2015): 1057–71. doi:10.1080/10576100701670979.

Carlisle. Dhiren Barot.

Clarke & Soria. Terrorism in the United Kingdom. Pg 50.

Title: IEDs in “New Wars”
Author: James Revill
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Improvised Explosive Devices
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-33833-0

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-33834-7

Copyright Year: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33834-7_4

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