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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

4. Implementation of the MiFID and MiFID II Conduct of Business Rules in the Member States

Author : Marnix Wallinga

Published in: EU Investor Protection Regulation and Liability for Investment Losses

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

This chapter investigates the implementation of EU investor protection regulation in the national legal systems of Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. The aim is to show how national legislators have designed the enforcement of the conduct of business rules in these legal systems. A closer look is taken at the financial supervision frameworks in which these rules have been transposed and how these frameworks have evolved. The chapter deals with the financial supervision and administrative enforcement regimes to which the conduct of business rules have been subjected, focusing on the authority responsible for enforcement and the available enforcement and sanctioning tools. Furthermore, the chapter examines the transposition of the MiFID and MiFID II information disclosure duty and suitability rule as well as the levels of (national) legislation over which the implementation has been spread out. In addition, the chapter explores how the relationship between the conduct of business rules and redress is shaped within national financial supervision frameworks. Discussed are the perceived nature of the conduct of business rules and whether the frameworks either confer a cause of action on investors or enable the responsible authority to ensure redress on behalf of investors. It is analysed why retail investors might still prefer to bring a damages action in common law despite the importance of the Financial Ombudsman Service and the ability of the Financial Conduct Authority to secure consumer redress. It is also shown why investors generally depend on national private law for redress in Germany and the Netherlands.

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previous chapter MiFID and MiFID II Conduct of Business Rules and Their Relationship with Private Law: The EU Dimension

next chapter Contractual Liability

Gesetz über den Wertpapierhandel und zur Änderung börsenrechtlicher und wertpapierrechtlicher Vorschriften (Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz) vom 26. Juli 1994, BGBl. I, 1749. See also Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung §§ 31 ff, no. 32; Möllers (2014), no. 44; Koller (2003), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 7; Rothenhöfer (2008), p. 56.

Art. 20 Zweite Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz. Grundmann (2018a), no. 5 and 6; Grundmann (2018b), p. 3; with regard to the WpHG as a whole, see Hopt (1995), p. 135.

Gesetz zur Umsetzung von EG-Richtlinien zur Harmonisierung bank- und wertpapieraufsichtsrechtlicher Vorschriften (Umsetzungsgesetz) vom 22. Oktober 1997, BGBl. I, 2518. See also: Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung §§ 31 ff, no. 33; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 45.

Umsetzungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 2562 (modification of § 31 Abs. 1 No. 1 WpHG).

Umsetzungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 2559 (introduction of § 2 Abs. 3a No. 3 WpHG).

Gesetz zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie über Märkte für Finanzinstrumente und der Durchführungsrichtlinie der Kommission (Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungesetz) vom 16. Juli 2007, BGBl. I, 1330.

Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 1332 (introduction of § 3 Abs. 3 No. 9 WpHG).

Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 1338 et seq. (modification of § 31 WpHG). See also Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung §§ 31 ff, no. 39; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 46; Braun et al. (2011), no. 290.

Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 1339 (introduction of § 31a WpHG). See also: Grundmann (2018a), no. 12.

§ 31a WpHG (old); § 67 WpHG (new).

Gesetz zur Neuregelung der Rechtsverhältnisse bei Schuldverschreibungen aus Gesamtemissionen und zur verbesserten Durchsetzbarkeit von Ansprüchen von Anlegern aus Falschberatung (Schuldverschreibungsgesetz) vom 31. Juli 2009, BGBl. I, 2512, in particular 2519 (introduction of § 34 Abs. 2a and 2b WpHG).

BT-Drucks. 16/12814, 27. The competent regulatory authority is the BaFin, see more on this: Sect. 4.3.1.

Lang and Loy (2018), no. 565; Spindler (2016), no. 202.

Gesetz zur Stärkung des Anlegerschutzes und Verbesserung der Funktionsfähigkeit des Kapitalmarkts (Anlegerschutz- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz) vom 5. April 2011, BGBl. I, 538.

Anlegerschutz- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 539 (introduction of § 31 Abs. 4a WpHG); BT-Drucks. 17/3628, 21. See also: Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung §§ 31 ff, no. 43.

Anlegerschutz- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 539 (introduction of § 31 Abs. 3a WpHG).

BT-Drucks. 17/3628, 21.

Zweites Gesetz zur Novellierung von Finanzmarktvorschriften auf Grund europäischer Rechtsakte (Zweites Finanzmarktnovellierungsgesetz—2. FiMaNoG) vom 23. Juni 2017, BGBl. I, 1693.

The Wte 1995 also transposed the 1993 Capital Adequacy Directive.

See also: Kamerstukken II, 29 708, 2003–2004, no. 3, 2.

Staatsblad 2006, no. 664.

Staatsblad 2007, no. 408; Staatsblad 2007, no. 406.

For an overview of the sectoral supervisory acts that were absorbed by the Wft: Kamerstukken II, 29 708, 2003–2004, no. 3, 3.

Kamerstukken II, 29 708, 2003–2004, no. 3, 3; Kamerstukken II, 28 122, 2001–2002, no. 2, 2.

Kamerstukken II, 28 122, 2001–2002, no. 2, 22.

Art. 1:24 and 1:25 Wft.

See also about the changes for the conduct of business rules regime: Kamerstukken II, 34 583, no. 3, 3 et seq.

Staatsblad 2017, no. 512.

See on this: Black (2015), pp. 219 et seq.

In more detail about this period: Gower (1988). See also Black (2015), p. 219; MacNeil (2012), p. 43.

Black (2015), p. 219.

See: McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 11.01.

The implementation took place through the enactment of the Financial Services Act 1986 (Investment Services) (Extension of Scope of Act) Order 1995.

Black (2015), p. 219; Ferran (2002), p. 137.

The five SROs that were recognised under the FSA 1986 by the SIB are the Association of Futures Brokers and Dealers (AFBD), the Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (FIMBRA), mainly responsible for international dealings, the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO) responsible for firms that specialise in discretionary investment management, the Life Assurance and Unit Trust Regulatory Organisation (LAUTRO) responsible for life assurance and unit trusts marketed by insurance companies, unit trust managers and their associates and The Securities Association (TSA). Through mergers these were reduced to three in the 1990s: the IMRO, the Personal Investment Authority (PIA) replacing FIMBRA and LAUTRO and the Securities and Futures Authority (SFA) in the place of TSA and AFBD. It has been said, however, that the FSA 1986 effectively put an end to the tradition of self-regulation in the financial services industry in the light of the fact that the elements of self-regulation were but marginal in practice, see in more detail: MacNeil (2012), p. 43; Ferran (2002), p. 137.

In more detail on these shortcomings including further references: Black (2015), p. 220; MacNeil (2012), pp. 44 et seq.

Ellinger et al. (2011), pp. 33 et seq.; Ferran (2002), p. 135; Alcock (2000), pp. 9 et seq. See also: MacNeil (2012), p. 46, who states that the change took place in the period leading up to the enactment of the FSMA 2000 while the FSA 1986 in effect.

Armour et al. (2016), p. 601; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.13: Black (2015), p. 221.

Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.13; Ellinger et al. (2011), pp. 33 and 34.

See in more detail about these “hallmarks” of the UK financial regulatory framework: Black (2015), pp. 221 et seq.; MacNeil (2012), pp. 97 et seq.

Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.6; MacNeil (2012), pp. 94 and 95.

McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 12.02 et seq.; Hudson (2013a), no. 10.01; Hudson (2013b), no. 3.39.

FSA, ‘The Turner Review. A regulatory response to the global banking crisis’, London: March 2009.

See also the accompanying FSA Discussion Paper: FSA, ‘A regulatory response to the global banking crisis’, London: March 2009, DP09/2. In more detail about this reorganisation, see Hudson (2013b), no. 3.03; MacNeil (2012), pp. 68 et seq.

See The Financial Services Act 2012 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2013, SI 2013/423.

Black (2015), p. 234; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 7.01; Hudson (2013a), no. 8.02 and 8.25.

Black (2015), p. 239; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 11.01.

FSMA 2000, s. 137A-T as amended by FSA 2012.

See FCA, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation – Policy Statement II’, London: July 2017, PS17/14; FCA, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation – Policy Statement I’, London: March 2017, PS17/5.

About this in general and about the concept of equivalence in particular, see Wymeersch (2017), Armour (2017), Ahern and Kho (2017) and Reynolds and Comyn (2017).

Gesetz über die Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz) vom 22. April 2002, BGBl. I, 1301.

§ 4 Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz. Finanzdienstleistungsaufsichtsgesetz, BGBl. I, 1301 and 1302. In supervising banking matters the BaFin works together with the Bundesbank (§ 7 Kreditwesengesetz). The way the BaFin and the Bundesbank cooperate on supervision of banking matters is laid down in an agreement. See on this: <https://www.bafin.de/DE/DieBaFin/AufgabenGeschichte/Bankenaufsicht/ZusammenarbeitBundesbank/zusammenarbeitbundesbank_node.html> accessed 12 February 2019. The BaFin has, in consultation with the Bundesbank, issued a supervision guideline on the cooperation on supervision with the Bundesbank, available at: <https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Aufsichtsrecht/Richtlinie/rl_130521_aufsichtsrichtlinie.html?nn=7845864> accessed 12 February 2019.

These are the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (also known as the BAKred), the Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel (also known as the BAWe) and the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Versicherungswesen (also known as the BAV).

§ 1 WpHG (old); § 2 WpHG (new). Buck-Heeb (2013a), no. 757.

§ 4 WpHG (old); § 6 WpHG (new).

§ 32 Kreditwesengesetz, the German Banking Act, hereafter: the: “KWG”.

§ 35 WpHG (old); § 88 WpHG (new). Other responsibilities of the BaFin include insider trading, insider information and market manipulation.

Finanzmarktrichtlinie-Umsetzungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 1351 (introduction of § 39 Abs. 2 sub 15–19). See also Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 439.

§ 39 jo. 40 WpHG (old); § 120 jo. 121 WpHG (new).

§ 39 Abs. 2 sub 16 jo. § 31 Abs. 4 WpHG resp. § 39 Abs. 2 sub 16a jo. § 31 Abs. 4a WpHG (old); § 120 Abs. 8 sub 38 jo. § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

§ 36 WpHG (old); § 89 WpHG (new).

§ 36 Abs. 2 WpHG resp. § 36 Abs. 4 WpHG (old); § 89 Abs. 3 resp. § 89 Abs 5 WpHG (new).

§ 35 WpHG (old); § 88 WpHG (new).

§ 35 Abs. 2 No. 6 KWG.

Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 443; Benicke (2006), p. 377.

§ 36 Abs. 1 and, ch 1 2 KWG.

§ 40b WpHG (old); § 123 WpHG (new). See also: § 17 Abs. 2 FinDAG.

§4 Abs. 1 WpHG (old); § 6 WpHG (new).

Art. 1:25 and 2:96 Wft.

This was deemed unnecessary by the legislator: Kamerstukken II, 2004–2005, 29 708, no. 9, 26.

Art. 1:74 Wft jo. 5:16 Awb and art. 5:15 Awb.

Art. 1:75 Wft.

Art. 1:79 Wft jo. section 5.3.2 Awb.

Art. 1:80 Wft jo. section 5.4 Awb.

Art. 1:94 Wft. A public warning may be issued, for example, in the event a financial institution provides investment advice without the required license (art. 1:94 jo. 2:96 Wft).

Art. 1:104 Wft.

Art. 1:79 and 1:80 Wft.

Withdrawal of the license is considered a last resort measure, as it prevents financial institutions from providing their services without violating art. 2:96 Wft. See Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 29 708, no. 19, 324.

Art. 1:97 and 1:99 Wft.

See in more detail Svetiev and Ottow (2014), pp. 516 et seq.

AFM, ‘Brief Ministerie van Financiën: Herbeoordeling rentederivaten’, Amsterdam: 3 December 2015.

Ministry of Finance, ‘Kamerbrief: Aanpak herbeoordeling rentederivaten MKB’, The Hague: 1 March 2016, available at: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/03/01/kamerbrief-aanpak-herbeoordeling-rentederivaten-mkb/kamerbrief-aanpak-herbeoordeling-rentederivaten-mkb.pdf> accessed 12 February 2019.

Derivatencommissie, ‘Aanbieding uniform herstelkader rentederivaten’, Amsterdam/Rotterdam: 5 July 2016, available at: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2016/07/05/kamerbrief-uniform-herstelkader-herbeoordelingen-rentederivaten-in-het-mkb/kamerbrief-uniform-herstelkader-herbeoordelingen-rentederivaten-in-het-mkb.pdf> accessed 12 February 2019. See for the framework itself: <https://www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/onderwerpen/derivaten/herstelkader-rentederivaten-mkb.ashx> accessed 12 February 2019.

AFM, ‘Wetgevingsbrief’, Amsterdam: 27 June 2016, 6 and 7, available at: <https://www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/afm/2016/wetgevingsbrief/wetgevingsbrief.ashx> accessed 12 February 2019.

Ministry of Finance, ‘Kamerbrief: Resultaten consultatie effectiviteit en gewenste mate van bescherming voor zzp-ers en mkb-ers bij financiële diensten en producten en vervolgstappen’, The Hague: 12 April 2017, available at: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/binaries/rijksoverheid/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/04/12/kamerbrief-over-consultatie-effectiviteit-en-gewenste-mate-van-bescherming-voor-zzp-ers-en-mkb-ers-bij-financiele-diensten-en-producten/kamerbrief-over-consultatie-effectiviteit-en-gewenste-mate-van-bescherming-voor-zzp-ers-en-mkb-ers-bij-financiele-diensten-en-producten.pdf> accessed 12 February 2019. See also the consultation document: Ministry of Finance, ‘Effectiviteit en gewenste mate van bescherming voor zzp-ers en mkb-ers bij financiële diensten en producten’, The Hague: 1 September 2016, 12.

FSA 2012, s. 55A(2). The Financial Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001 specifies the activities which require authorisation under the so-called general prohibition, which includes the provision of investment advice (Chapter XII). See in more detail about the general prohibition: Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.007 et seq.; Hudson (2013a), no. 8.03; Russen (2006), no. 1.27 et seq.

FSMA 2000, s. 165–176.

FSMA 2000, s. 205.

FSMA 2000, s. 206.

FSMA 2000, s. 45.

FSMA 2000, s. 33.

FSMA 2000, s. 56.

See in more detail about these enforcement tools: Walker and Purves (2014), no. 6.79 et seq.; MacNeil (2012), pp. 113 et seq.; Alcock (2000), pp. 148 et seq.

FSMA 2000, s. 384 and 382. See about these tools Chiu and Brener (2019), pp. 245 et seq.; Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.25 et seq.; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.088 et seq.; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 18.228 et seq.; MacNeil (2012), p. 230; Alcock (2000), pp. 158 and 159.

FSMA 2000, s. 384(5) and 382(3).

FSA 2012 s. 55N(5) and FSMA 2000, s. 380(2).

See also: Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.097.

FSMA, s. 380(2). See also Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.096.

FSMA 2000, s. 404(1)(a).

100

FSMA 2000, s. 404(1)(b).

101

FSMA 2000, ss. 404–404G. See in more detail Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.32.

102

Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.31.

103

See in more detail McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 19.163 et seq.

104

See in more detail Samuel (2016), p. 132.

105

Established by FSMA 2000, s. 225. See also: Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.37; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.111; Ferran (2002), p. 145.

106

FCA, ‘SME access to the Financial Ombudsman Service – near-final rules’, London: October 2018, PS18/21; FCA, ‘Consultation on SME access to the Financial Ombudsman Service and Feedback to DP15/17: SMEs as Users of Financial Services’, London: January 2018, CP18/3.

107

Small Business (Eligible Complaint) Instrument 2018 (FCA 2018/61; FOS 2018/7). Access to the FOS has also been extended to charities and trusts.

108

See Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.110; Ferran (2002), pp. 141 and 142.

109

Additionally, the FCA functions as the “competent authority” for the purposes of the Consumer ADR (Directive 2013/11/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on alternative dispute resolution for consumer disputes and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC (OJEU L 165/63)), see: Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.110.

110

See about this including further references: Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.37; Russen (2006), no. 11.02 and 11.04. See also the 2015 Memorandum of Understanding between the FCA and the FOS, available at: <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/mou-fos.pdf> accessed 12 February 2019.

111

Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.46. See also in detail about the FOS’ response (alongside the FSA) to the PPI-scandal: Ferran (2012), p. 247. See for more data about the complaints filed to the FOS: <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/complaints-data.html> accessed 12 February 2019.

112

For an overview of the renumbering of the conduct of business rules, see: Grundmann (2018a), no. 127.

113

This can be traced back to the implementation of the general principle of loyalty of art. 11 ISD. Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 53; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 111; Koller (2012), § 31, no. 13.

114

Translation by Möllers (2015), footnote 59.

115

§ 4 WpDVerOV (old) jo. § 31 Abs. 2 WpHG (old).

116

§ 5 WpDVerOV (old) jo. § 31 Abs. 3 WpHG (old).

117

§ 6 WpDVerOV (old) jo. § 31 Abs. 4 WpHG (old).

118

MiFID II Delegated Regulation EU 2017/565.

119

§ 35 Abs. 4 WpHG (old); § 88 Abs. 4 WpHG (new).

120

BaFin Guideline, ‘Mindestanforderungen an die Compliance-Funktion und die weiteren Verhaltens-, Organisations- und Transparenzpflichten nach §§ 31 ff. WpHG für Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen’, 4/2010 (WA), June: 2010. See also Zahrte (2019), no. 111; Buck-Heeb (2013a), no. 707.

121

Verordnung zur Konkretisierung der Verhaltensregeln und Organisationsforderungen für Wertpapierdienstleistungsunternehmen (Wertpapierdienstleistungs-Verhaltens- und Organisationsverordnung—WpDVerOV) vom 20. Juli 2007, BGBl. I, 1432; Press Release BaFin, ‘Aufhebung der Wohlverhaltensrichtlinie, der Compliance-Richtlinie und der Mitarbeiterleitsätze’, 23 October 2007, available at: <https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/DE/Rundschreiben/rs_071023_aufhebung.html> accessed 6 August 2019.

122

See in more detail about: Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 93; Spindler (2016), no. 32; Seiler and Kniehase (2011), no. 72.

123

Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 17; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 4. It should be noted that prior to the implementation of MiFID, the BGH had adopted a similar approach in its seminal Bond-decision, see in more detail about this decision: Sect. 5.2.3.

124

§ 31a WpHG (old); § 67 WpHG (new). Art. 4(1) sub 11 and 12; MiFID, rec. 40; Art. 28 MiFID Implementing Directive.

125

§4 WpDVerOV (old), for example, provided for additional information disclosure duties when investment firms are dealing with retail investors. See also: Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 93.

126

Such as the general duty of loyalty (§ 31 Abs. 1 WpHG), the applicable standards regarding information disclosure (§ 31 Abs. 2 WpHG) and the general information disclosure obligation (§ 31 Abs. 3 WpHG).

127

§ 31 Abs. 4 resp. Abs. 5 WpHG (old); § 64 resp. 63 WpHG (new). The WpHG distinguishes between investment advisory and portfolio management relationships and the provision of other investment services.

128

§ 31 Abs. 4 and 4a WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new); § 31 Abs. 4b WpHG; § 64 Abs. 1 WpHG (new).

129

§ 34 Abs. 2 WpHG (old), with § 14(2) WpDVerOV specifying what further information needs to be included in these records; 83 Abs. 2 WpHG (new).

130

§ 34 Abs. 2a WpHG.

131

132

§ 83 WpHG (new). It might be said that the aim underlying the duty introduced by the Schludverschreibungsgesetz is, at least to a certain extent, realised by the duty to provide investors in the course of the provision of investment advice with a suitability report (art. 25(6) MiFID II and MiFID II, rec. 82). See in particular about the implementation of this duty in the German framework of financial regulation: Sect. 4.6.1.

133

Art. 19(1) MiFID and art. 24(1) MiFID II.

134

See also: Kamerstukken II, 2006–2007, 31 086, no. 3, 133 and 134.

135

Staatsblad 2017, no. 513, 32.

136

See, for example, on the know your client-duty: AFM Guideline, ‘Informatie over risicoprofielen. Aanbevelingen voor een betere aansluiting tussen beleggingen en risicoprofielen’, September: 2015; AFM Guideline, ‘De klant in beeld. Aanbevelingen voor zorgvuldig beleggingsadvies en vermogensbeheer’, November: 2011; AFM Guideline, ‘Leidraad actief en passief beleggen in het belang van de klant’, October: 2011; AFM Guideline, ‘Informatie over risicoprofielen. Aanbevelingen voor een betere aansluiting tussen beleggingen en risicoprofielen’, November: 2010; AFM Guideline, ‘Leidraad zorgvuldig adviseren over vermogensbouw’, December: 2009. Specifying the information disclosure obligation: AFM Policy Rule, ‘Beleidsregel Informatieverstrekking. Waar let de AFM op bij het beoordelen van informatieverstrekking door financiële ondernemingen over financiële producten en diensten?’, September: 2013.

137

Art. 4:23 Wft.

138

Art. 4:24 Wft.

139

Art. 4:89 Wft. See also: Kamerstukken II, 2006–2007, 31 086, no. 3, 130.

140

Implementing art. 19(7) MiFID; art. 25(5) MiFID II.

141

Art. 4:89(2) Wft.

142

4:89(2) Wft. Art. 168 Bgfo specifies additional aspects that shall be included in the contract.

143

Art. 4:89(3) Wft jo. art. 168 Bgfo.

144

Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.033 et seq.; MacNeil (2012), p. 94.; Russen (2006), no. 1.78 et seq.

145

Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.003; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 2.47; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.16; Hudson (2013a), no. 9.02.

146

In the Handbook the FCA adopted many of the instruments made by predecessor FSA. See in more detail: Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.034; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 12.13.

147

They are relied on by the FCA in the exercise of its enforcement and sanctioning powers against regulated firms (see in more detail about these powers: Sect. 4.3.3). See also more in general: Hudson (2013a), no. 10.01 and 14.053; Hudson (2013b), no. 9.44; Russen (2006), no. 1.61.

148

Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.055.

149

Black (2015), 238 and 239; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 11.01.

150

Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.051; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 4.39.

151

See also about the different levels of UK financial regulation: Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.033 et seq.; Hudson (2013a), no. 9.05, who identifies six tiers.

152

Moloney describes Gower as “one of the fathers of modern UK financial regulation” (Moloney 2015, p. 22).

153

Gower L, ‘Review of Investor Protection – A Discussion Paper’, London: January 1982 no. 2.01. See also Moloney (2015), p. 741.

154

Gower, ‘Review of Investor Protection, Report: Part I’, London: 1984, Cmnd. 9125, no. 4.27. See also Gower, ‘Review of Investor Protection, Report: Part II’, London: 1985, Cmnd. 9125, no. 4.15.

155

Department of Trade and Industry, ‘Financial services in the United Kingdom – a new framework for investor protection’, London: January 1985, Cmnd. 9432, no. 7.13 and 7.14.

156

See in more detail about these rules of conduct Nelson (2008), pp. 20 and 21; Schlueter (2001), pp. 104 et seq. and 113.

157

Marshall (2014), p. 682; MacNeil (2012), p. 217.

158

COBS 3 jo. s. 156(1) FSMA 2000. See MacNeil (2012), p. 217. In more detail about the development of the regulatory framework: Sect. 4.2.3.

159

Under MiFID, see COBS 8 and 9. Under MiFID II, see COBS 9 et seq.

160

COBS 8.1.4(1)R.

161

COBS 8.1.4(2)R.

162

FCA, ‘Discussion Paper on a duty of care and potential alternative approaches’, London: July 2018, DP18/5.

163

FCA, ‘A duty of care and potential alternative approaches: summary of responses and next steps’, London: April 2019, FS19/2, no. 1.2.; FCA, ‘Mission: Approach to Consumers’, July 2018: London, last updated July 2019, available at <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/approach-to-consumers.pdf>, accessed 30 August 2019.

164

FCA, ‘A duty of care and potential alternative approaches: summary of responses and next steps’, London: April 2019, FS19/2, no. 6.1; Mission 2017, available at <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/corporate/our-mission-2017.pdf>, accessed 30 August 2019.

165

In more detail about the distinction between the two, see FCA, ‘Discussion Paper on a duty of care and potential alternative approaches’, London: July 2018, DP18/5, 5 and Annex 1.

166

FCA, ‘A duty of care and potential alternative approaches: summary of responses and next steps’, London: April 2019, FS19/2, no. 1.35.

167

FCA, ‘A duty of care and potential alternative approaches: summary of responses and next steps’, London: April 2019, FS19/2, no. 1.37.

168

FCA, ‘A duty of care and potential alternative approaches: summary of responses and next steps’, London: April 2019, FS19/2, no. 6.1 et seq.

169

BT-Drucks. 16/4028, 63 and 64.

170

§ 31 Abs. 2 WpHG (old), implementing art. 19(2) MiFID; § 63 Abs. 1 WpHG (new), implementing art. 24(3) MiFID II. Under MiFID, these standards were clarified in § 4 WpDVerOV (old), for when investment firms were dealing with retail investors, requiring that the information provided to such investors has to be sufficient and provided in such a way that is understandable for the targeted group of clients. Furthermore, § 4 WpDVerOV (old) put forward several specific requirements which had to be fulfilled, covering the way potential profits have to be disclosed alongside possible risks and on the manner both past and future performance of the instrument needs to be presented. These specifications implemented art. 27 MiFID Implementing Directive et seq., which under MiFID II is incorporated in art. 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

171

That the information disclosure under § 31 Abs. 3 WpHG does not need to be catered to the specific characteristics and needs of the individual investor is inferred in literature from the fact that the provision states that the required information can be provided in standardised form. Additionally, § 4 WpDVerOV requires that the information be comprehensible for the targeted group of clients. See on this: Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 126; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 246.

172

Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 126; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 247; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 170.

173

Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 130; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 171.

174

Koller (2018), § 63, no. 97; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 122; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 238, referring to MiFID Implementing Directive, rec. 238; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 180. Under MiFID, § 5 Abs. 3 WpDVerOV (old), which has not been incorporated in the new Bgfo under the implementation of MiFID II, specified what constitutes in a timely manner when dealing with retail investors. According to the provision, information about contractual conditions needs to be disclosed before the opinion of a contract, whereas the remaining mandatory information on, for example, the nature and risks of a financial instrument needs to be provided before the provision of an investment or ancillary service including execution of the transaction.

175

Zahrte (2019), no. 36 and 404; Weller (2011), p. 192; Schäfer (2011), no. 1460.

176

§ 5 Abs. 4 WpDVerOV (old), implementing 29(6) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 46(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

177

For more detailed information, see: Grundmann 2018a), no. 173; Spindler (2016), no. 108; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 118 and 131 et seq.; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 259 et seq. See in particular Möllers, no. 237 in which he discuses the tension between the requirement of § 5 Abs. 2 WpDVerOV to cater the information to the knowledge of the investor and the possibility to provide information in standardised form.

178

Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 253; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 216.

179

§ 31 Abs. 3 WpHG (old), § 63 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

180

§ 31 Abs. 3 sub 2 WpHG (old); § 61 Abs. 7 sub 1 WpHG (new).

181

Considering the wording of § 31 Abs. 2 WpHG and the fact that § 31 Abs. 3 WpHG lays down the general information disclosure obligation concerning abstract information, the information disclosure under § 5 Abs. 1 WpDVerOV needs to relate to the type of financial instrument as opposed to the concrete instrument recommended to the investor in the context of investment advice. See on this: Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 122; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 147; Ekkenga (2014), no. 323; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 220. Differently Koller (2012), § 31, no. 107.

182

§ 5 Abs. 1 sub 1 WpDVerOV (old), implementing art. 31(2)(a) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 48(2)(a) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

183

§ 5 Abs. 1 sub 2 WpDVerOV, implementing art. 31(2)(b) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 48(2)(b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

184

§ 5 Abs. 1 sub 3 WpDVerOV, implementing art. 31(2)(c) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 48(2)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

185

§ 5 Abs. 1 sub 4 WpDVerOV, implementing art. 31(2)(d) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 48(2)(e) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

186

§ 5 Abs. 1 sub 5 WpDVerOV, implementing art. 31(4) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 48(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

187

§ 31 Abs. 3a, 4 and 4a WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 1–4 WpHG (new). The requirement to provide a brief and easily understandable product information sheet (§ 31 Abs. 3a WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 2 WpHG (new).) is not discussed in this study as it is not based on MiFID and MiFID II, see in more detail about this duty: Spindler (2016), no. 112; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 197; Möllers (2015), p. 150.

188

§ 31 Abs. 4 WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG. See also Koller (2018), § 64, no. 48 et seq.; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 95; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 269 et seq.; Braun et al. (2011), no. 383. See differently: Veil (2008), p. 38; Mülbert (2007), p. 1157.

189

§ 31 Abs. 4a WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new). For more information, see also Grundmann (2018a), no. 208.

190

§ 31 Abs. 4 WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

191

Koller (2018), § 64, no. 24; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 241; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 244.

192

Koller (2018), § 64, no. 47; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 262; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 274.

193

See also: Staatsblad 2017, no. 513, 32.

226

FSA, ‘Implementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)’, London: January 2007, PS07/2; specifically regarding information disclosure: FSA, ‘Reforming Conduct of Business Regulation’, London: October 2007, CP 06/19, no. 19.28. See also: McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 12.11. See with regard to the implementation of the MiFID II conduct of business rules regime: FCA, ‘Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II Implementation – Policy Statement II’, London: July 2017, PS17/14, no. 2.1.

227

Art. 27 MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 44 MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

228

COBS 4.2.2(1)G.

229

COBS 4.5.2(2)R.

230

COBS 4.5.2(2)R; COBS 4.5A.3EU, based on art. 44(2)(b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

231

COBS 4.5.2(3)R; COBS 4.5A.3EU, based on art. 44(2)(d) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

232

COBS 2.2.1R; COBS 2.2A.2R.

233

COBS 2.2.1(1)R; COBS 2.2A.2(1)R. Designated investments are defined in the Glossary to the FCA Handbook as a security or a contractually-based investment that is one of the investments specified in Part III of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001.

234

COBS 2.2.1(2)R; COBS 2.2A.2(2)R and COBS 2.2A.3(2)R.

235

COBS 14.3.2R; COBS 14.3A.5EU, based on art. 48 MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

236

COBS 14.3.2(1)R implementing art. 31(1) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 14.3A.5EU, based on art. 48(1) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

237

COBS 14.3.2R(2), implementing art. 31(2) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 14.3A.5EU, based on art. 48(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

238

COBS 14.3A.5EU, based on 48(2)(c) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

239

COBS 14.3.4R; COBS 14.3A.5EU, based on 48(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

240

COBS 14.3.5R, implementing art. 31(5) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 14.3A.5EU, based on 48(5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

241

COBS 14.3.10R, implementing art. 29(6) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 14.3A.10EU, based on art. 46(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

242

COBS 14.3.9R, implementing art. 29(2) and (5) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 14.3A.7EU, based on art. 46 MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

243

COBS 6.2B.33(1)(b)R.

244

COBS 6.2B.35, based on art. 52(1) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

245

Which is understood as investment advice that does not meet the standard of independent advice (see COBS 6.2B.11) or basic advice (which involves providing advice on stakeholder products using a process that involves putting pre-scripted questions to a retail client, see art. 52B Regulated Activities order (Providing basic advice on stakeholder products)).

246

COBS 6.2B.33(1)R.

247

COBS 9A.3.6R.

248

Under MiFID, this was expressly provided for by § 31 Abs. 4 in fine WpHG (old).

249

Originally, a specific element to this effect was added to the WpHG by the introduction of § 31 Abs. 4a WpHG (old) by the Anleger- und Funktionsverbesserungsgesetz (see: Sect. 4.2.1). Under MiFID II, it can be inferred from § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

250

§ 31 Abs. 4 WpHG (old), § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

251

See also: § 6 Abs. 1 and 2 WpDVerOV (old) (“erforderlich”). For more information on this condition, see Koller (2018), § 64, no. 37 et seq.; Grundmann (2018a), no. 172; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 212 and 222; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 227 et seq.

252

Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 266; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 227.

253

Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 219; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 243.

254

In more detail about the practice: Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 216; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 237.

255

§ 31 Abs. 6 WpHG (old), implementing art. 37(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565. See also Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 227; Koller (2012), § 31, no. 146.

256

See on this Hannöver and Walz (2017), no. 49; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 229; Koller (2012), § 31, no. 146.

257

§ 6 in fine WpDVerOV (old), implementing art. 37(2) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation.

258

Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 232; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 239.

259

Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

260

§ 6 Abs. 1 sub 2 WpDVerOV (old), implementing art. 35(4) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 54(5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

261

Koller (2018), § 64, no. 29; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 251.

262

§ 6 Abs. 1 sub 1 WpDVerOV (old), implementing art. 35(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 54(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

263

§ 6 Abs. 2 WpDVerOV (old), implementing art. 37(1) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(1) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

264

Koller (2018), § 64, no. 24; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 241; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 244.

265

Lang and Loy (2018), no. 609; Hannöver and Walz (2017), no. 86; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 219 et seq.; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 357; Koller (2012), § 31, no. 148.

266

§ 31 Abs. 4 jo. 4a WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

267

§ 31 Abs. 4 WpHG (old); § 64Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

268

Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 357; Koller (2012), § 31, no. 148; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 257. See also Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 219, who derives the requirement to control and update information provided by the client from the core conduct of business obligation contained in § 31 Abs. 1 sub 1 WpHG.

269

Lang and Loy (2018), no. 609; Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 220; Möllers (2014), § 31, no. 358; Koller (2012), § 31, no. 148; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 257.

270

Fuchs (2016), § 31, no. 217 and 280; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 227; Veil (2008), pp. 37 and 38.

271

§ 31 Abs. 4 WpHG (old); § 64 Abs. 3 WpHG (new).

272

Koller (2018), § 64, no. 46; Spindler (2016), no. 103; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 271.

273

Art. 25(6) MIFID.

274

Art. 19(4) MiFID; art. 25(2) MiFID II.

275

Art. 4:23(1)(a) Wft.

276

Art. 4:23(1)(b) Wft.

277

Compare art. 19(4) MiFID; art. 25(2) MiFID II.

278

Staatsblad 2007/407, 98.

279

Art. 80c(2) Bgfo, implementing art. 38(2) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

280

Art. 38(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

281

Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

282

Art. 80a(2) Bgfo, implementing art. 35(4) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 54(5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

283

Art. 80a(1)(b) Bgfo, implementing art. 35(1)(b) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 54(2)(b) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

284

Art. 80(3) Bgfo, implementing art. 35(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 54(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

285

Art. 80a(1)(c) Bgfo, implementing art. 35(1)(c) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 54(2)(c) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

286

Art. 80c(1) Bgfo, implementing art. 37(1) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(1) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

287

Ibidem.

288

Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 29 708, no. 19, 555.

289

See also: art. 37(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; art. 55(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

290

MiFID Questions and Answers on Investor Protection and Intermediaries (ESMA/2011/119), 5; Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID suitability requirements (ESMA/2012/387), 34.

291

AFM Guideline, ‘De klant in beeld. Aanbevelingen voor zorgvuldig beleggingsadvies en vermogensbeheer’, November: 2011, 48.

292

AFM Report, ‘Kwaliteit Beleggingsdienstverlening 2015’, 23 et seq.

293

Fine imposed by the AFM 10 September 2015 (Gooisch effectenhuis), para. 4.2.7, digitally available at: <https://www.afm.nl/~/profmedia/files/maatregelen/boetes/2015/gooisch-effectenhuis.ashx>. The AFM derives this pretransactional reassessment duty from art. 4:23(1)(a) Wft jo. 80a Bgfo. The AFM interprets, in other words, the duty to assess the suitability of an intended investment as imposing a pretransactional obligation on investment firms to make sure that they have sufficiently up-to-date information to be able to properly perform the suitability assessment.

294

Art. 25(6) MIFID.

295

FSA, ‘Implementing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)’, London: January 2007, PS07/2; specifically in relation to the suitability rule: FSA, ‘Reforming Conduct of Business Regulation’, London: October 2007, CP 06/19, no. 14.6.

296

As mentioned in Sect. 4.5.3, the FCA Handbook Glossary defines this as a security or a contractually-based investment that is one of the investments specified in Part III of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001.

297

COBS 9.2.1(1)R; COBS 9A.2.1R.

298

COBS 9.2.1(2)R; COBS 9A2.1R.

299

COBS 9.2.2(1), implementing art. 35(1) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.1(2)EU.

300

COBS 9.2.6, implementing compare art. 35(5) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.13G, based on art. 54(8) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

301

COBS 9.2.4, implementing art. 37(2) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.11EU, based on art. 55(2) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

302

COBS 9.2.2(2)R, implementing art. 35(4) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.8EU, based on art. 54(5) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

303

COBS 9.2.2(3)R, implementing art. 35(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.7EU, based on art. 54(4) MiFID II Delegated Regulation.

304

COBS 9.2.3R, implementing art. 37(2) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.6EU, based on art. 55(1) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

305

COBS 9.2.5R, implementing art. 37(3) MiFID Implementing Directive; COBS 9A.2.12EU, based on art. 55(3) MiFID II Delegated Regulation 2017/565.

306

FSA, ‘Assessing suitability: establishing the risk a customer is willing and able to take and making a suitable investment selection’, London: March 2011, FG11/5, no. 3.25 and 3.26.

307

FCA, ‘Wealth management firms and private banks: Suitability of investment portfolios’, London: December 2015, TR15/12, no. 4.7.

308

COBS 9A.3.2R, implementing art. 25(6) MiFID II.

309

The WpHG also contained § 37a WpHG which provided for special rules regarding the prescription period of claims for damages investors could have against financial institutions providing investment services or ancillary services (see also about this provision: Sect. 8.4.1). The provision was repealed by the Schuldverschreibungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 2512, see in particular: p. 2518.

310

See in more detail: Zahrte (2019), no. 114; Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 97; Spindler (2016), no. 30; Casper and Altgen (2012), no. 4.121. The provision contained in § 31 Abs. 4 WpHG barring financial institutions from recommending an investment if the required information to make up the client profile has not been acquired does not qualify as a statutory prohibition in the sense of § 134 BGB: Koller (2018), § 63, no. 13; Buck-Heeb (2013b), p. 1409; Rothenhöfer (2010), § 31, no. 291; Veil (2007), p. 1826.

311

A third school of thought that regards the conduct of business rules as private law in nature is left out of the discussion due to the limited traction it has gained in literature: Einsele (2016), pp. 249 et seq.; Einsele (2014), p. 713; Einsele (2008), p. 483.

312

Grundmann (2018a), no. 125 and 126; Grundmann (2018b), p. 3; Möllers (2014), § 31 no. 15 et seq.; Balzer and Lang (2014), p. 370; Otto (2010), pp. 2018 and 2019; Veil (2008), pp. 40 and 42; Nikolaus and d’Oleire (2007), p. 2134; Weichert and Wenninger (2007), p. 635; Veil (2007), pp. 1825 and 1826; Benicke (2006), p. 461; Leisch (2004), pp. 66 et seq. and 85; Lang (2004), p. 289. On account of that his approach boils down to essentially the same, Mülbert could also be counted among the proponents of the Doppelnatur-approach Mülbert (2008), pp. 183 et seq.; Mülbert (2007), p. 1157. See also: Bachof (1978), pp. 11 et seq.; Betterman (1977), pp. 515 et seq., who are regarded as the intellectual founders of the general concept of Doppelnormen.

313

Benicke (2006), p. 461; Lang (2004), p. 294.

314

Veil (2008), p. 40; Weichert and Wenninger (2007), p. 635; Lang (2004), pp. 294 and 295. Critical about this: Einsele (2016), pp. 247 and 248, who counters this in the light of the prevalent “modifizierte Subjektstheorie” by arguing that only clients are entitled to the behavior the WpHG conduct of business rules require from financial institutions, never the BaFin in its capacity as supervisory authority, in the same vein Dieckmann (2013), p. 24.

315

Grundmann (2018a), no. 125; Grundmann (2017), p. 934; Grundmann (2018b), pp. 3 and 4; Leisch (2004), pp. 21 et seq. and 30; Möllers (2014), § 31 no. 4 et seq. Critical about this: pp. 74 et seq. and 86 et seq. See also: Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 72 et seq., who argues that although the conduct of business rules are designed to realise both public and private interests, this double protection aim is insufficient to justify the Doppelnatur-approach and denouncing the traditional division between public and private law (no. 78 et seq.), in the same vein: Spindler (2016), no. 30.

316

Hopt (1995), p. 159; for Hopt’s foundational account of the inseparability of protection of the individual investor (“Individualschutz”) and protection of the functioning of capital markets (“Funktionenschutz”), see Hopt (1975), pp. 51 et seq. and 334 et seq. (“Der Gesetzgeber, der das eine schützt, schützt zugleich das andere, und gibt er das andere preis, geht das auch zu Lasten des einen”). See also about this Grundmann (2017), p. 929; Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 75.

317

Schuldverschreibungsgesetz, BGBl. I, 2512, in particular: p. 2518. See also: Spindler (2016), no. 30, who interprets the repealment as rendering this argument moot.

318

Grundmann (2018b), p. 4; Benicke (2006), p. 465; Leisch (2004), p. 73. Critical about Forschner (2013), pp. 15, 93 and 94, who argues that § 37a WpHG was a reaction to supervisory law and cannot be interpreted in the sense that financial supervision standards on conduct were assigned (also) a private law nature.

319

Weichert and Wenninger (2007), p. 635; Benicke (2006), p. 478; Leisch (2004), p. 85.

320

Zahrte (2019), no. 102 et seq.; Ekkenga (2019), no. 72 and 278; Koller (2018), § 63, no. 8; Lang and Loy (2018), no. 576 and 778; Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 77; Spindler (2016), no. 30; Lerch (2015), pp. 414 et seq.; Forschner (2013), p. 69; Dieckmann (2013), p. 28; Assmann (2011), pp. 46, 47 and 49; Casper and Altgen (2012), no. 4.23; Braun et al. (2011), no. 487; Schwark (2010), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 15; Ellenberger (2009), 535; Rothenhöfer (2008), 63; Lang (2000), 455; Wieneke (1999), 87; Bliesener (1998), 140; Balzer (1997), 261 and 262; Norbert (1997), 149; Gaßner and Escher (1997), 94. See also: Einsele (2016), 238 who despite representing a third school regarding the nature of the WpHG provisions acknowledges that the view of the conduct of business rules being exclusively public law in nature is the prevailing one.

321

BGH 3 June 2014, XI ZR 147/12, para. 35; BGH 17 September, XI ZR 332/12, para. 16; BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 182/10, para. 47; BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 178/10, para. 50; BGH Resolution 20 January 2009, XI ZR 510/07, para. 12. See also regarding the conduct of business rules prior to implementation of MiFID: BGH 19 December 2006, XI ZR 56/05, para. 18; BGH 5 May 2001, XI ZR 192/00, 8; BGH 5 October 1999, XI ZR 296/96, para. 32. Also in this respect: Grundmann (2017), 933.

322

BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 182/10, para. 47; BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 178/10, para. 50.

323

Ibidem.

324

Art. 47(2) TEC; art. 53(1) TFEU forms the legislative basis for MiFID II.

325

Zahrte (2019), no. 105; Spindler (2016), no. 26a; Assmann (2011), pp. 49 and 50; Schwark (2010), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 14; Veil (2008), p. 41. Critical about this: Einsele (2016), pp. 238 and 239. See about the EU legislator lacking a general competence to harmonise private law Dieckmann (2013), p. 27; Assmann (2008), p. 30.

326

See, inter alia Dieckmann (2013), pp. 26 and 27; Forschner (2013), p. 47.

327

Koller (2018), § 63, no. 8; Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 76; Ellenberger (2009), p. 537. In the same vein: BGH 17 September 2013, XI ZR 332/12, para. 16.

328

Zahrte (2019), no. 107; Dieckmann (2013), p. 28; Koller (2012), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 2; Schwark (2010), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 14; BT-Drucks. 16/4899, 12; BT-Drucks. 16/4028, 53. In a similar vein, see BGH 17 September 2013, XI ZR 332/12, para. 17 and 18, referring to BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 182/10, para. 47 and BGH 27 September XI ZR 178/10, para. 50.

329

Zahrte (2019), no. 107; Dieckmann (2013), p. 28; Koller (2012), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 2; Schwark (2010), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 14; BT-Drucks. 16/4899, 12; BT-Drucks. 16/4028, 53. In a similar vein: BGH 17 September 2013, XI ZR 332/12, para. 17 and 18, referring to BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 182/10, para. 47 and BGH 27 September 2011, XI ZR 178/10, para. 50.

330

Art. 74 Abs. 1 sub 1 Grundgesetz.

331

Art. 74 Abs. 1 sub 11 Grundgesetz. BT-Drucks. 16/4028, 53. See on this: Zahrte (2019), no. 107; Koller (2012), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 2. Critical about this: Einsele (2016), p. 243; Forschner (2013), p. 85; Leisch (2004), p. 54.

332

Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 77; Schwark (2010), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 15.

333

Fuchs (2016), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 77; Dieckmann (2013), p. 25; Schwark (2010), Vorbemerkung § 31, no. 15.

334

For more information including further references, see: Grundmann (2018a), no. 224; Grundmann (2018b), pp. 3 and 4.

335

Grundmann (2018a), no. 126.

336

Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 29 708, no. 20, 9 and 10.

337

This ground for avoidability is contained in art. 3:40(2) BW.

338

Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 29 708, no. 19, 392.

339

Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 29 708, no. 19, 392.

340

Kamerstukken II, 2005–2006, 29 708, no. 19, 393.

341

Bierens (2013), p. 15; Cortenraad (2012), p. 700; Busch (2012); Cherednychenko (2010); Van Baalen (2010), p. 1013. Seemingly different: Janssen (2017), pp. 312 et seq., who appears to view the regulatory conduct of business rules as general rules determining both public law and private law, indicating an approach similar to that of the German school of Doppelnatur (see in more detail: Sect. 4.7.2).

342

HR 5 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2815 (Dexia v. De Treek); HR 5 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2811 (Levob Bank v. Bolle); HR 5 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2822 (Stichting GeSp v. Aegon Bank).

343

Opinion of the Deputy Procurator General C.L. de Vries Lentsch-Kostense HR 5 June 2009, ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2815 (Dexia v. De Treek), no. 3.21.

344

HR 14 December 2018, ECLI:NL:HR:2018:2298, para. 3.4.2; HR 16 June 2017, ECLI:NL:HR:2017:1107 (SNS v. Stichting Gedupeerden Overwaardeconstructie W&P), see in particular para. 4.2.5.

345

Also, more in general, see Busch (2013b), pp. 17, 18 and 20; Cherednychenko (2012), p. 230; Busch (2013a), p. 3; Cortenraad (2012), p. 4.

346

Art. 6:162(2) BW.

347

See for example with regard to regulation in the field of insurance: Wallinga and Cherednychenko (2016).

348

FSMA 2000, s. 138E(2), as amended by FSA 2012. See on this: Hudson (2013a), no. 9.95. It should however be noted that transactions made by an investment firm carrying on an unauthorised business, acting in breach of the general prohibition (see in more detail about this prohibition: Sect. 4.3.3), are unenforceable (FSMA 2000, s. 26(1)). It grants retail investors, who are on the other side of such a transaction, the right to recovery of the money and property paid or transferred under the unenforceable transaction as well as to compensation of losses suffered as a result (FSMA, s. 26(2)). However, this does not apply to breach of conduct of business rules incorporated by the FCA in the COBS section of its Handbook. See in more detail: Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.073 and 14.074; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 18.75; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 7.22; Russen (2006), no. 1.28 and 5.08.

349

Alcock (2000), p. 176.

350

See in more detail Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.02 et seq.; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.116; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 19.22; MacNeil (2012), p. 224; Ferran (2002), p. 140.

351

DISP 1, more in particular: DISP 1.4.1 et seq.

352

See in this regard McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 19.01 et seq.; Ferran (2002), p. 140.

353

DISP 1.6.2 and 1.6.4. See Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.08; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.117.

354

Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.46 and 7.73 et seq. See also in detail about the response to the PPI-scandal Ferran (2002), p. 247. For more in depth data about complaints made to the FOS, see: <http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/complaints-data.html>, accessed 12 February 2019.

355

DISP 2.7.1.

356

DISP 2.7.3(1). See in further detail about complaint eligibility Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.67; Stanton (2017), p. 158.

357

DISP 2.7.3(2).

358

Small Business (Eligible Complaint) Instrument 2018 (FCA 2018/61; FOS 2018/7). See FCA, ‘SME access to the Financial Ombudsman Service – near-final rules’, London: October 2018, PS18/21; FCA, ‘Consultation on SME access to the Financial Ombudsman Service and Feedback to DP15/17: SMEs as Users of Financial Services’, London: January 2018, CP18/3.

359

Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.63; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.116.

360

FSMA 2000, s. 226(4) jo. Chapter XII of the Financial Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001. The voluntary jurisdiction is a scheme which regulated firms can choose to subject themselves to. This jurisdiction is not discussed further as retail investors can make complaints to the FOS in relation to breach of conduct of business rule in the investment advisory relationship under the compulsory jurisdiction.

361

McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 12.34.

362

See in extensive detail about this including further references: Ferran (2002), pp. 147 et seq. and 155.

363

In a similar vein Stanton (2013), p. 279; Hudson (2013c), p. 248; Stanton (2012), p. 67; Russen (2006), no. 5.12.

364

Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.83; Stanton (2013), p. 279; Russen (2006), no. 5.12; Ferran (2002), p. 145.

365

FSMA 2000, s. 229(2)(a) and DISP 3.7.1(1).

366

FSMA 2000, s. 229(2)(b) and DISP 3.7.1(4).

367

FSMA 2000, s. 229(3) jo. DISP 3.7.2.

368

DISP 3.7.1(2) and (3).

369

DISP 3.7.4, see FCA, ‘Increasing the award limit for the Financial Ombudsman Service’, London: March 2019, PS19/8. For complaints referred to the ombudsman prior to 1 January 2012 this was £100,000.

370

See the FCA’s guidance contained DISP 3.7.6. About this in more detail Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.86; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.127.

371

FSMA 2000, s. 229(8)(b) jo. FSMA 2000, Scheme 17, para. 16.

372

FSMA 2000, s. 229(9).

373

The only way for regulated firms when dissatisfied with the determination made by the FSO to contest the determination is through either judicial review or through a defence against an action to enforce the award. See in more detail about this including extensive references Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.122.

374

See including further references Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.124.

375

In a similar vein: Ellinger et al. (2011), p. 48.

376

See also about these tools: FCA, ‘Discussion Paper on a duty of care and potential alternative approaches’, London: July 2018, DP18/5, p. 31; Chiu and Brener (2019), pp. 245 et seq.; Walker et al. (2018), no. 10.27 et seq.; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.088 et seq.; McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 18.228 et seq.; MacNeil (2012), p. 230; Alcock (2000), pp. 158 and 159.

377

FSMA 2000, s. 384(1).

378

FSMA 2000, s. 384 (5).

379

FSMA 2000, s. 382(1).

380

FSMA 2000, s. 382(3).

381

FCA Handbook Enforcement Guide, paras. 11.4 and 11.5.

382

FSMA 2000, s. 404(1)(a), see also: Sect. 4.3.3.

383

FSMA 2000, ss. 404–404G, as amended by the FSA 2010.

384

See in more detail Samuel (2016).

385

Including further references McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 19.163 et seq.; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.47 and 7.50.

386

See about this in further detail: Stanton (2013), p. 278.

387

Enforcement Guide, 11.2.1 sub 5.

388

Further details about the cooperation between the FOS and the FCA are set out in their 2015 Memorandum of Understanding, see in particular para. 6, available at: <https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/mou/mou-fos.pdf> accessed 12 February 2019. See also in this regard: Russen (2006), no. 11.04 et seq.

389

In a similar vein Russen (2006), no. 11.02.

390

Memorandum of Understanding between FOS and FCA, para. 14. See also the FCA Handbook’s Consumer Redress Module, s. 1.6 about the relationship between the FOS and the consumer redress scheme ordered by the FCA.

391

Memorandum of Understanding between FOS and FCA, para. 17.

392

FSMA 2000, s. 138D(2), as amended by FSA 2012.

393

Stanton (2013), p. 270.

394

The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Rights of Action) Regulations 2001, regulation 3, which states that “private person” is meant to include any individual unless he suffers the loss in question in the course of carrying on any regulated activity. See in more detail about the definition of “private person” and the unavailability, therefore, of the remedy for businesses: McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 4.21; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 7.27. See also Afghan (2018), who argues that in light of the basis of the statutory remedy no longer being appropriate, the remedy should be revisited to allow SMEs to bring action for breach of rules of the FCA Handbook.

395

Stanton (2013), pp. 271 and 273.

396

Ferran (2002), p. 150.

397

McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 4.20.

398

FSMA 2000, s. 138D(3).

399

See PRIN 3.4.4R and Scheme 5 of the PRIN sourcebook of the FCA’s Handbook.

400

See also in this regard Stanton (2013), p. 273.

401

McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 12.34; MacNeil (2012), p. 119; Stanton (2012), p. 67; Stanton (2013), p. 273; Russen (2006), no. 5.12. It has been suggested that although there is little formal use by the FCA of its compensation powers it can provide for an instrument of pressure in negotiating settlements, see MacNeil (2012), p. 101, footnote 153. The FCA itself has also indicated that it expects to deploy these powers on “rare occasions only”, see the EG 11.1.2 of the Enforcement Guide of its handbook. Critical about the FCA’s retreat from fostering consumer redress as a public regulatory role, see Chiu and Brener (2019), p. 234. The first time the FCA exercised its power to require a company to award restitution to investors was in relation to market abuse by Tesco, see: <https://www.fca.org.uk/news/press-releases/tesco-pay-redress-market-abuse>. I thank Professor Paul Davies for this insight.

402

Hudson (2013c), p. 248.

403

See in this regard: McMeel and Virgo (2014), no. 12.34.

404

James (2014), p. 110.

405

In more detail including further references Stanton (2017), p. 155; Powell and Stewart (2017), no. 14.082; Walker and Purves (2014), no. 7.29; MacNeil (2012), p. 233.

406

In a similar vein: Ellinger et al. (2011), p. 48.

407

408

Stanton (2017), p. 156.

409

Black (2004), p. 47.

410

Including further references: Walker and Purves (2014), no. 1.47 and 7.50.

411

Stanton (2017), p. 154; Stanton (2013), p. 273; Russen (2006), no. 5.06.

412

In the light of the current compensation limit of the FOS of £350,000 (£160,000 concerning acts or omissions which occurred before 1 April 2019), judicial enforcement in the context of investment advisory relationship will generally be a matter for high net worth individuals who have the resources to make investments that are capable of yielding such a loss.

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Title: Implementation of the MiFID and MiFID II Conduct of Business Rules in the Member States
Author: Marnix Wallinga
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: EU Investor Protection Regulation and Liability for Investment Losses
Print ISBN: 978-3-030-54000-5

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-030-54001-2

Copyright Year: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54001-2_4