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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

5. Improving External Involvement in the Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts

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Abstract

In this chapter other forms of external involvement in the settlement of secessionist conflicts are brought to a comprehensive discussion, for the sake of improvement. In order to avoid counterproductive or detrimental external involvement, external actors must first have a clear picture of the legal issues that are included in a secessionist conflict. This forms the indispensable basis for the standardization of external involvement in secessionist conflicts, which should be characterized by finding a balance between various conflicting interests. In balancing various conflicting interests the UN should play a pivotal role, which requires the Security Council and other UN bodies to exercise their power in a more rational manner. Besides, some specific external actions also deserve special attention: mediation, recognition, response to de facto secession and media coverage of secessionist conflicts, all of which can hamper effective conflict settlement if not managed well. Therefore, it is well-advised to render the exercise of mediating power by external actors more rational through standardization, including emphasizing the observation of legally non-binding UN instruments, replacing unsuitable mediators and eschewing artificial deadlines. The issue of recognition should be handled more cautiously: the significance of non-recognition should be recognized; a wish should not be mistakenly recognized as a legal right; the detrimental effects caused by unilateral secession should also be recognized. As for a reasonable response to de facto secession, it is necessary to bear in mind the Latin maxim nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria which can be deemed an aspect of the legal principle of good faith, and the significance of a fair distribution of territorial interests between secessionists and non-secessionists. The influence of the mass media on the settlement of a secessionist conflict should no longer be overlooked either: distorted media coverage will render the public ill-informed, but the public must be well-informed for effective conflict settlement to take place, so it is necessary to take a close look at how distorted media coverage can affect external involvement in conflict settlement.

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Footnotes
1
A/RES/46/182, Annex, I. Guiding Principles, paras. 2 and 3.
 
2
Oberg (1999).
 
3
Johnstone (1999).
 
4
Hannum (2011), Note 16.
 
5
Rosenau (1964), pp. 1 and 6.
 
6
United Nations Meetings Coverage & Press Releases, SG/A/955-BIO/3714.
 
7
See Chap. 4, Note 38.
 
8
UN Doc. A/66/10, p. 55, Art. 4 and p. 60, Art. 31.
 
9
The ICJ’s 1999 advisory opinion, Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, is a case in point. Malaysian companies deemed that comments a UN Special Rapporteur made during an interview with a magazine reporter constituted defamation and sued him before a national court. The ICJ held that the Special Rapporteur was immune from suit in national courts, and indicated that the UN could be required to bear responsibility for the damage arising from such acts according to section 29 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. In fact this section also implied that the UN enjoys great autonomy in deciding the scope of its obligations.
 
10
The Russian delegation pointed out: “the passion of some Council members for methods involving force prevailed. This is most unfortunate and regrettable. Responsibility for the inevitable humanitarian consequences of the excessive use of outside force in Libya will fall fair and square on the shoulders of those who might undertake such action. If this comes to pass, then not only the civilian population of Libya but also the cause of upholding peace and security throughout the entire region of North Africa and the Middle East will suffer. Such destabilizing developments must be avoided”, see United Nations Security Council, Sixty-sixth year, 6498th meeting, 17 March 2011, S/PV.6498, p. 8.
 
11
The representative of China pointed out: “China is always against the use of force in international relations. In the Security Council’s consultations on resolution 1973 (2011), we and other Council members asked specific questions. However, regrettably, many of those questions failed to be clarified or answered. China has serious difficulty with parts of the resolution”, see United Nations Security Council, Sixty-sixth year, 6498th meeting, 17 March 2011, S/PV.6498, p. 10.
 
12
The US president Barack Obama in an interview even expressed that the worst mistake of his presidency was “failing to plan for the day after what I think was the right thing to do in intervening in Libya”, see Malloy and Treyz (2016).
 
13
The Russian delegation stated: “I underscore yet again that we are consistent and firm advocates of the protection of the civilian population. Guided by this basic principle as well as by the common humanitarian values that we share with both the sponsors and other Council members, Russia did not prevent the adoption of this resolution”, see United Nations Security Council, Sixty-sixth year, 6498th meeting, 17 March 2011, S/PV. 6498, p. 8; the representative of China stated: “China is gravely concerned by the continuing deterioration of the situation in Libya. We support the Security Council’s adoption of appropriate and necessary action to stabilize the situation in Libya as soon as possible and to halt acts of violence against civilians”, S/PV. 6498, p. 10.
 
14
Lehmann (2012), p. 117.
 
15
Boyle and Chinkin (2007), p. 233.
 
16
Wood (1998), p. 82.
 
17
UN Doc. A/61/10, p. 369.
 
18
UN Doc. A/61/10, p. 380.
 
19
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 415, para. 51.
 
20
S/RES/1244 (1999), para. 8.
 
21
S/RES/1244 (1999), para. 4.
 
22
Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1999, p. 62.
 
23
Caplan and Wolff (2015), p. 320.
 
24
See Chap. 2, Sect. 2.​4.​3.
 
25
Reaction in quotes: UN legal ruling on Kosovo, https://​www.​bbc.​com/​news/​world-europe-10733837, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
26
Ibid.
 
27
ICJ verdict on Kosovo must be precedent for NKR’s international recognition, https://​news.​am/​eng/​news/​25826.​html, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
29
United Nations Security Council Official Records, 887th Meeting, 21 August 1960, S/PV. 887, para. 8.
 
30
Ibid. paras. 11, 70, 88.
 
31
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 504, para. 22.
 
32
Merrills (2010), p. 563.
 
33
Report of the Secretary-General, Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution, A/66/811, pp. 10–11, paras. 36–38.
 
34
See Chap. 3, Note 17.
 
35
UN Doc. A/66/811, p. 31, para. 53.
 
36
The United Nations Manual for Mediators: Advice from United Nations Representatives and Envoys, published by The Programme in Peacemaking and Conflict Prevention of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and The Mediation Support Unit of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, 2010, pp. i–ii.
 
37
UN Doc. A/66/811, p. 25, para. 27.
 
38
The United Nations Manual for Mediators: Advice from United Nations Representatives and Envoys, 2010, p. 23.
 
39
Locke (2012), Chapter 11 §135.
 
40
UN Doc. A/66/811, p. 25, para. 28.
 
41
Financial Times, 8 Oct. 1998, p. 13.
 
42
See Chap. 4, Note 91.
 
43
See Chap. 4, Note 77.
 
44
See Chap. 4, Note 91.
 
45
See Chap. 4, Note 96.
 
46
UN Doc. A/63/677, p. 9.
 
47
Statement by the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group in Munich on 17 February 2017, http://​www.​osce.​org/​mg/​300591, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
48
See above Note 3.
 
49
Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council attaching the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, United Nations doc. S/2007/168, paras. 1 and 4.
 
50
Ibid. para. 4.
 
51
See above Note 49.
 
52
The United Nations Manual for Mediators: Advice from United Nations Representatives and Envoys, 2010, p. 40.
 
53
Ibid.
 
54
UN Doc. A/66/811, p. 22, para. 13.
 
55
Ibid. p. 25, para. 28.
 
56
UN Doc. S/2007/168, para. 3.
 
57
Ahtisaari plan is mentioned eight times in the Kosovo Declaration of Independence, the Kosovo Declaration of Independence, http://​www.​assembly-kosova.​org/​?​cid=​2,128,1635, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
58
UN Doc. A/66/811, pp. 109–110.
 
59
See above Note 52.
 
60
UN Doc. S/2007/168, paras. 3 and 5.
 
61
The author also cannot find this document on the UN website.
 
62
See above Note 51.
 
63
S/RES/1244 (1999), para. 8.
 
64
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Koroma, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 470, para. 11.
 
65
UN doc. S/2007/168, paras. 3 and 5.
 
66
See above Note 52.
 
67
Christakis (2011), p. 86.
 
68
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Declaration of Vice President Tomka, I.C.J. Reports 2010, pp. 455–456, para. 7; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, I.C.J. Reports 2010, pp. 500–501, para. 3; Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Separate Opinion of Judge Keith, I.C.J. Reports 2010, pp. 483–484, para. 6.
 
69
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 504, para. 22.
 
70
“Moscow had vowed to veto the two earlier drafts prepared by the US and European Union members based on the status proposals from Martti Ahtisaari, the UN envoy in the Kosovo dispute, which suggested a framework for statehood under EU-led supervision.” Neil MacDonald, Russia rejects plan for Kosovo, Financial Times, 13 July 2007, https://​www.​ft.​com/​content/​f3f09aae-30a0-11dc-9a81-0000779fd2ac, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
71
This model declaration is fully based on the proposition of Ahtisaari, see Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council attaching the Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s future status, United Nations doc. S/2007/168, paras. 1–5.
 
72
See Chap. 2, Note 114.
 
73
Letter Dated 11 June 1993 from the Chargé d’ affairs a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, UN Doc. A/48/207—S/25936, 14 June 1993, p. 2.
 
74
Conference on Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission, Opinion No. 2, 31 International Legal Materials (1992), p. 1498.
 
75
Radan (2011), p. 524.
 
76
Hannum (2011), pp. 160–161.
 
77
Kuperman (2008), pp. 57–58.
 
78
S/RES/216 (1965), para. 2.
 
79
S/RES/541 (1983), para. 7.
 
80
A/RES/68/262, para. 6.
 
81
See Chap. 2, Note 107.
 
82
UN Doc. A/54/2000, para. 217.
 
83
The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, 2001, p. 51.
 
84
See Chap. 3, Note 92.
 
85
See Chap. 3, Note 26.
 
86
Johnstone (1998).
 
87
Troebst (1998), p. 60.
 
88
See Chap. 4, Note 96.
 
89
The conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Doc. 10364, 29 November 2004, https://​assembly.​coe.​int/​nw/​xml/​XRef/​X2H-Xref-ViewHTML.​asp?​FileID=​10733&​lang=​en, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
90
See Chap. 3, Note 88.
 
91
More relevant information see Johnstone (1999).
 
92
“Serbs … have reportedly been harassed by Albanians and have packed up and left the region. The exodus of Serbs is admittedly one of the main problems that the authorities have to contend with in Kosovo, an autonomous province of Yugoslavia inhabited largely by Albanians… The nationalists have a two-point platform… first to establish what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to form a greater Albania.” Howe (1982).
 
93
See Chap. 1, Note 23.
 
94
See above Note 3.
 
95
See above Note 89.
 
96
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bennouna, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 505, para. 25.
 
97
Cheng (1987), p. viii.
 
98
See Chap. 1, Note 6.
 
99
See Chap. 2, Note 125.
 
100
See above Note 3.
 
101
See Chap. 4, Note 161.
 
102
See Chap. 4, Note 166.
 
103
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Petrén, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 113.
 
104
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge de Castro, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 172.
 
105
Council of Europe—Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1416 (2005), para. 11.
 
106
Pilger (2000), p. 132.
 
107
Ackerman and Naureckas (2000), p. 100.
 
108
Ibid. p. 99.
 
109
Ibid. p. 100.
 
110
Ibid. p. 118.
 
111
Hume (2000), p. 70.
 
112
Ibid. p. 72.
 
113
See above Note 92.
 
114
Simpson (2008), p. 9.
 
115
It is the translation of the author; the original text is: “Wir haben es diesmal mit einer deutschen Regierung zu tun, die willentlich und mit Überzeugung in diesen Krieg gegangen ist. Und in dieser Situation erreicht der Propaganda-Apparat der Regierung eine neue Qualität. Ich habe noch keinen Verteidigungsminister erlebt, der wie Herr Scharping mit Fotos vor die Presse gegangen ist und uns aufforderte, genau das zu beschreiben, was auch er daraus erkenne. Der in Interviews keine Zwischenfragen mehr zulassen will. Als müsse er sich selbst von dem überzeugen, was er da sagt.”, Menschen Machen Medien, Heft 7/1999, https://​mmm.​verdi.​de/​beruf/​wer-kritische-fragen-stellt-rechtfertigt-den-kriegsgegner-28529, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
116
Deichmann (2000), p. 153.
 
118
Johnstone (2000), p. 148.
 
119
Henley (1999).
 
120
Ibid.
 
121
See above Note 118.
 
122
See above Note 4.
 
123
See Chap. 2, Note 12.
 
124
See Chap. 2, Note 13.
 
125
Ackerman and Naureckas (2000), p. 98.
 
126
Clark (2000), pp. 70–121.
 
127
Gorin (1999).
 
128
International Federation of Journalists Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists, Para. 1, http://​www.​ifj.​org/​about-ifj/​ifj-code-of-principles/​, last accessed on 15.06.2018.
 
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Metadata
Title
Improving External Involvement in the Settlement of Secessionist Conflicts
Author
Jing Lu
Copyright Year
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-97448-4_5