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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Index of Implicit Power as a Measure of Reciprocal Ownership

Authors : Jacek Mercik, Krzysztof Łobos

Published in: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

The multitude of existing forms of business organization (e.g. limited liability company, private partnership, joint stock company, etc.) and the possibilities of relationships and interactions between them call for the need to recognise individual components of these forms as elements influencing the group decision-making process. Among the many possible ways to assess this impact are so-called power indices, including the implicit index proposed here as a means of measuring of power in reciprocal ownership structures.

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previous chapter Holdout Threats During Wage Bargaining

next chapter Manipulability of Voting Procedures: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination

This non-linearity often allows control company operations without holding a qualified majority of shares.

According to commercial codes some of these relationships are considered illegal in many countries, depending on their form and/or extent.

This comes directly from the definition of a weighted game.

The analysis of the application of classical power index for similar situations is found in Gambarelli, Owen (1994) and Leech (2002). The latter in particular also presents empirical analysis of the situation of minority shareholders in UK companies.

This is a classic Johnston power index.

In such instances Gambarelli and Owen (1994) take into account only individual shareholders. In our opinion the fact that majority shareholders tend to implement their policy by appointing board members and/or certain other CEOs bestows a certain independence on companies and thus should be included in the calculation of power.

We do not observe such situations in reality, either.

This assumption also means that the majority (the winning coalition) must hold at least 11 shares.

Kim (2008) presents an interesting discussion on this issue.

The values of shares shown in Fig. 2 have been approximate for convenience.

Banzhaf, J.F.: Weighted voting doesn’t work: a mathematical analysis. Rutgers Law Rev. 19(2), 317–343 (1965)

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Johnston, R.J.: On the measurement of power: some reactions to Laver. Environ. Plann. A10(8), 907–914 (1978)CrossRef

Kim, C.-D.: The implication of cross ownership and its voting right (2008). http://www.hanyang.ac.kr/home_news/H5EAFA/0002/101/2008/10.pdf

Leech, D.: Ownership concentration and the theory of the firm: and simple-game-theoretic approach. J. Ind. Econ. 35, 225–240 (1987)

Leech, D.: Shareholder voting power and ownership control of companies. In: Warwick Economic Research Papers, No. 564 (2002)

Mercik, J.W.: A priori veto power of the president of Poland. Operations Res. Decisions 19(4), 61–75 (2009)

Penrose, L.S.: The elementary statistics of majority voting. J. Roy. Stat. Soc. 109, 53–57 (1946)CrossRef

Shapley, L.S.: A value for n-person games. In: Kuhn, H.W., Tucker, A.W. (eds.) Contributions to the Theory of Games, vol. 2 (1953). Ann. Math. Stud. 28, 307–317

Shapley, L.S., Shubik, M.: A method of evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system. Am. Political Sci. Rev. 48(3), 787–792 (1954). doi:10.2307/1951053

Title: Index of Implicit Power as a Measure of Reciprocal Ownership
Authors: Jacek Mercik
Krzysztof Łobos
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book: Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXIII
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-52885-3

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-52886-0

Copyright Year: 2016
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-52886-0_8

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