Skip to main content
Top
Published in: Journal of Business Ethics 1/2021

27-06-2020 | Original Paper

Information Asymmetries in Private Equity: Reporting Frequency, Endowments, and Governance

Authors: Sofia Johan, Minjie Zhang

Published in: Journal of Business Ethics | Issue 1/2021

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

Using PitchBook’s private equity (PE) database of 4548 PE funds from 42 countries for the 2000 to 2012 period, we find that higher reporting frequency is associated with lower information asymmetry in performance reports from general partners (GPs) to limited partners. We also find that endowments are systematically associated with less reported unrealized returns as a percentage of total returns generated from GPs. Moreover, endowments receive more performance reports from their PE funds, implying more stringent governance. These findings persist after controlling for various institutional and GP characteristics and are robust to several adjustments for endogeneity concerns. This study also contributes to the finance, accounting, and business ethics literature on financial reporting quality.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Footnotes
1
NACUBO stands for the National Association of College and University Business Officers which is a membership organization representing more than 1,900 colleges and universities across the U.S.
 
2
PitchBook database is a relatively new source to the academic literature and in recent studies by Brown, Harris, Jenkinson, Kaplan and Robinson (2015) and Harris, Jenkinson and Kaplan (2015), they discovered that PitchBook's coverage is pretty similar to other private equity databases, such as Preqin, Cambridge Associates and Burgiss, in North America but varies outside this region. According to PitchBook, the data are mainly obtained from filings, press releases and websites, and collected, verified, and integrated with additional information by their data teams. Their research team also surveys companies, advisers, investors, lawyers, accountants, and lenders to cross-validate collected data and to gather additional information (see https://​pitchbook.​com/​research-process for detailed information about how PitchBook collect data). Recent research on private equity and angel investors are using this database as the main data source (Cumming and Zhang, 2019; Fuchs, Füss, Jenkinson and Morkoetter, 2019).
 
3
We were initially concerned with the quality of the data as some LPs received more than 12 performance reports a year. Our concerns were however alleviated as we sought clarification from our data provider. We were informed that the valuations of unexited portfolio companies that appear in the fund/LP reports are the valuations reported by the GPs to the LPs. GPs are usually (depending on geography) required to value their holdings at least once a year (some do it much more frequently with varying levels of conservativeness) and this is reflected in the NAV and unrealized gains to the LPs. Such reporting behaviors are thus reflected how GPs report performances to LPs.
 
4
Distributed value to paid-in ratio (DPI) is the ratio of distributions paid out to investors to the original invested capital and residual value to paid-in ratio (RVPI) which is the of remaining portfolio holdings as valued by the PE fund to the original invested capital per year. Total value to paid-in ratio (TVPI) is the sum of the DPI and RVPI of the PE fund which measures the total returns in each year.
 
5
We realize that the relatively small number of endowments in our sample may be something of a concern. However, because the total of their observations is more than 6% of our entire sample, we do not believe this poses a serious problem. Note further that, in un-tabulated results, we performed a detailed analysis of the nine endowments, and we are certain our results are not caused by, nor do they suffer from, a bias toward the well-performing endowments in our sample. The top three performing endowments are quite different from the bottom three when sorting by characteristic. The detailed analysis is not included but is available upon request.
 
Literature
go back to reference Admati, A., & Pfleiderer, P. (2000). Forcing firms to talk: Financial disclosure regulation and externalities. The Review of Financial Studies, 13(3), 479–519.CrossRef Admati, A., & Pfleiderer, P. (2000). Forcing firms to talk: Financial disclosure regulation and externalities. The Review of Financial Studies, 13(3), 479–519.CrossRef
go back to reference Agrawal, A. (2013). The impact of investor protection law on corporate policy and performance: Evidence from the blue-sky laws. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2), 417–435.CrossRef Agrawal, A. (2013). The impact of investor protection law on corporate policy and performance: Evidence from the blue-sky laws. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2), 417–435.CrossRef
go back to reference Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.CrossRef Akerlof, G. (1970). The market for lemons: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84, 488–500.CrossRef
go back to reference Amit, R., Brander, J., & Zott, C. (1998). Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence. Journal of Business Venturing, 13(6), 441–466.CrossRef Amit, R., Brander, J., & Zott, C. (1998). Why do venture capital firms exist? Theory and Canadian evidence. Journal of Business Venturing, 13(6), 441–466.CrossRef
go back to reference Angrist, J., & Krueger, A. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 69–85.CrossRef Angrist, J., & Krueger, A. (2001). Instrumental variables and the search for identification: From supply and demand to natural experiments. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15(4), 69–85.CrossRef
go back to reference Armstrong, C., Davila, T., & Foster, G. (2005). Venture-backed private equity valuation and financial statement information. Review of Accounting Studies, 11, 119–135.CrossRef Armstrong, C., Davila, T., & Foster, G. (2005). Venture-backed private equity valuation and financial statement information. Review of Accounting Studies, 11, 119–135.CrossRef
go back to reference Barber, B., & Wang, G. (2013). Do (some) university endowments earn alpha? Financial Analyst Journal, 69(5), 26–44.CrossRef Barber, B., & Wang, G. (2013). Do (some) university endowments earn alpha? Financial Analyst Journal, 69(5), 26–44.CrossRef
go back to reference Benabou, R., & Laroque, G. (1992). Using privileged information to manipulate markets: Insiders, gurus and credibility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 921–958.CrossRef Benabou, R., & Laroque, G. (1992). Using privileged information to manipulate markets: Insiders, gurus and credibility. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(3), 921–958.CrossRef
go back to reference Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richard, J. (2003). Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect. European Economic Review, 47, 165–195.CrossRef Berkowitz, D., Pistor, K., & Richard, J. (2003). Economic development, legality, and the transplant effect. European Economic Review, 47, 165–195.CrossRef
go back to reference Beuselinck, C., Deloof, M., & Manigart, S. (2008). Private equity investments and disclosure policy. European Accounting Review, 17(4), 607–639.CrossRef Beuselinck, C., Deloof, M., & Manigart, S. (2008). Private equity investments and disclosure policy. European Accounting Review, 17(4), 607–639.CrossRef
go back to reference Beuselinck, C., Deloof, M., & Manigart, S. (2009). Private equity involvement and earnings quality. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 36, 587–615.CrossRef Beuselinck, C., Deloof, M., & Manigart, S. (2009). Private equity involvement and earnings quality. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 36, 587–615.CrossRef
go back to reference Bonnet, C., & Wirtz, P. (2012). Raising capital for rapid growth in young technology ventures: When business angels and venture capitalists coinvest. Venture Capital, 14(2–3), 91–110.CrossRef Bonnet, C., & Wirtz, P. (2012). Raising capital for rapid growth in young technology ventures: When business angels and venture capitalists coinvest. Venture Capital, 14(2–3), 91–110.CrossRef
go back to reference Brown, G., Gredil, O., & Kaplan, S. (2019). Do private equity funds manipulate reported returns? Journal of Financial Economics, 132(2), 267–297.CrossRef Brown, G., Gredil, O., & Kaplan, S. (2019). Do private equity funds manipulate reported returns? Journal of Financial Economics, 132(2), 267–297.CrossRef
go back to reference Brown, G., Harris, R., Jenkinson, T., Kaplan, S., & Robinson, D. (2015). What do different commercial data sets tell us about private equity performance? Working paper. Brown, G., Harris, R., Jenkinson, T., Kaplan, S., & Robinson, D. (2015). What do different commercial data sets tell us about private equity performance? Working paper.
go back to reference Brown, J., Dimmock, S., Kang, J., & Weisbenner, S. (2014). How university endowments respond to financial market shocks: Evidence and implications. American Economic Review, 104(3), 931–962.CrossRef Brown, J., Dimmock, S., Kang, J., & Weisbenner, S. (2014). How university endowments respond to financial market shocks: Evidence and implications. American Economic Review, 104(3), 931–962.CrossRef
go back to reference Brown, K., Garlappi, C., & Tiu, C. (2010). Asset allocation and portfolio performance: Evidence from university endowment funds. Journal of Financial Markets, 13(2), 268–294.CrossRef Brown, K., Garlappi, C., & Tiu, C. (2010). Asset allocation and portfolio performance: Evidence from university endowment funds. Journal of Financial Markets, 13(2), 268–294.CrossRef
go back to reference Burton, J., & Scherschmidt, R. (2004). First-time venture fundraising: Challenges and best practices. Journal of Private Equity, 8, 9–21.CrossRef Burton, J., & Scherschmidt, R. (2004). First-time venture fundraising: Challenges and best practices. Journal of Private Equity, 8, 9–21.CrossRef
go back to reference Cheng, E., & Courtenay, S. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime, and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 41, 262–289.CrossRef Cheng, E., & Courtenay, S. (2006). Board composition, regulatory regime, and voluntary disclosure. The International Journal of Accounting, 41, 262–289.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., & Zhang, M. (2019). Angel Investors around the World. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(5), 692–719.CrossRef Cumming, D., & Zhang, M. (2019). Angel Investors around the World. Journal of International Business Studies, 50(5), 692–719.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D. (2005). Agency costs, institutions, learning and taxation in venture capital contracting. Journal of Business Venturing, 20, 573–622.CrossRef Cumming, D. (2005). Agency costs, institutions, learning and taxation in venture capital contracting. Journal of Business Venturing, 20, 573–622.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., & Dai, N. (2010). Hedge fund regulation and misreported returns. European Financial Management, 16(5), 829–857.CrossRef Cumming, D., & Dai, N. (2010). Hedge fund regulation and misreported returns. European Financial Management, 16(5), 829–857.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., & Johan, S. (2007). Regulatory harmonization and the development of private equity markets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 3218–3250.CrossRef Cumming, D., & Johan, S. (2007). Regulatory harmonization and the development of private equity markets. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31, 3218–3250.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., & Johan, S. (2013). Venture capital and private equity contracting: An international perspective (2nd ed.). Waltham: Elsevier Science Academic Press. Cumming, D., & Johan, S. (2013). Venture capital and private equity contracting: An international perspective (2nd ed.). Waltham: Elsevier Science Academic Press.
go back to reference Cumming, D., & Walz, U. (2010). Private equity returns and disclosure around the world. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 727–754.CrossRef Cumming, D., & Walz, U. (2010). Private equity returns and disclosure around the world. Journal of International Business Studies, 41, 727–754.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., Dai, N., & Johan, S. (2013). Hedge fund governance, regulation and performance around the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef Cumming, D., Dai, N., & Johan, S. (2013). Hedge fund governance, regulation and performance around the world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., Fleming, G., & Suchard, J. (2005). Venture capitalist value-added activities, fundraising and drawdowns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 295–331.CrossRef Cumming, D., Fleming, G., & Suchard, J. (2005). Venture capitalist value-added activities, fundraising and drawdowns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 29, 295–331.CrossRef
go back to reference Cumming, D., Schmidt, D., & Walz, U. (2010). Legality and venture capital governance around the world. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1), 54–72.CrossRef Cumming, D., Schmidt, D., & Walz, U. (2010). Legality and venture capital governance around the world. Journal of Business Venturing, 25(1), 54–72.CrossRef
go back to reference D’Adduzio, J., Koo, D., Ramalingegowda, S., & Yu, Y. (2018). Financial reporting frequency and investor myopia. Working paper. D’Adduzio, J., Koo, D., Ramalingegowda, S., & Yu, Y. (2018). Financial reporting frequency and investor myopia. Working paper.
go back to reference DaRin, M., & Phalippou, L. (2017). The importance of size in private equity: Evidence from a survey of limited partners. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 31, 64–76.CrossRef DaRin, M., & Phalippou, L. (2017). The importance of size in private equity: Evidence from a survey of limited partners. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 31, 64–76.CrossRef
go back to reference Darrough, M., & Stoughton, N. (1990). Financial disclosure policy in an entry game. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12(1–3), 219–243.CrossRef Darrough, M., & Stoughton, N. (1990). Financial disclosure policy in an entry game. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12(1–3), 219–243.CrossRef
go back to reference De Bettignies, J., & Brander, J. (2007). Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital. Journal of Business Venturing, 22(6), 808–832.CrossRef De Bettignies, J., & Brander, J. (2007). Financing entrepreneurship: Bank finance versus venture capital. Journal of Business Venturing, 22(6), 808–832.CrossRef
go back to reference Dimmock, S. (2012). Background risk and university endowment funds. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(3), 789–799.CrossRef Dimmock, S. (2012). Background risk and university endowment funds. Review of Economics and Statistics, 94(3), 789–799.CrossRef
go back to reference Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14, 57–74.CrossRef Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14, 57–74.CrossRef
go back to reference Elayan, F., Li, J., & Liu, Z. (2016). Changes in the covalence ethical quote, financial performance and financial reporting quality. Journal of Business Ethics, 134(3), 369–395.CrossRef Elayan, F., Li, J., & Liu, Z. (2016). Changes in the covalence ethical quote, financial performance and financial reporting quality. Journal of Business Ethics, 134(3), 369–395.CrossRef
go back to reference Ernstberger, J., Link, B., Stich, M., & Vogler, O. (2017). The real effects of mandatory quarterly reporting. The Accounting Review, 92(5), 33–60.CrossRef Ernstberger, J., Link, B., Stich, M., & Vogler, O. (2017). The real effects of mandatory quarterly reporting. The Accounting Review, 92(5), 33–60.CrossRef
go back to reference Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288–307.CrossRef Fama, E. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288–307.CrossRef
go back to reference Ferran, E. (2011). After the crisis: The regulation of hedge funds and private equity in the EU. European Business Organization Law Review, 12(3), 379–414.CrossRef Ferran, E. (2011). After the crisis: The regulation of hedge funds and private equity in the EU. European Business Organization Law Review, 12(3), 379–414.CrossRef
go back to reference Frecka, T. (2008). Ethical issues in financial reporting: Is intentional structuring of lease contracts to avoid capitalization unethical? Journal of Business Ethics, 80(1), 45–59.CrossRef Frecka, T. (2008). Ethical issues in financial reporting: Is intentional structuring of lease contracts to avoid capitalization unethical? Journal of Business Ethics, 80(1), 45–59.CrossRef
go back to reference Fried, J., & Ganor, M. (2006). Agency costs of venture capital control in startups. New York University Law Review, 81, 967–1025. Fried, J., & Ganor, M. (2006). Agency costs of venture capital control in startups. New York University Law Review, 81, 967–1025.
go back to reference Fu, R., Kraft, A., & Zhang, H. (2012). Financial reporting frequency, information asymmetry, and the cost of equity. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 54(2–3), 132–149.CrossRef Fu, R., Kraft, A., & Zhang, H. (2012). Financial reporting frequency, information asymmetry, and the cost of equity. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 54(2–3), 132–149.CrossRef
go back to reference Fuchs, F., Füss, R., Jenkinson, T., & Morkoetter, S. (2019). Winning a deal in private equity: Do educational ties matter? Working paper. Fuchs, F., Füss, R., Jenkinson, T., & Morkoetter, S. (2019). Winning a deal in private equity: Do educational ties matter? Working paper.
go back to reference Getmansky, M., Lo, A., & Makarov, I. (2004). An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 529–609.CrossRef Getmansky, M., Lo, A., & Makarov, I. (2004). An econometric model of serial correlation and illiquidity in hedge fund returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 74, 529–609.CrossRef
go back to reference Gigler, F., Kanodia, C., Sapra, H., & Venugopalan, R. (2014). How frequent financial reporting can cause managerial short-termism: An analysis of the costs and benefits of increasing reporting frequency. Journal of Accounting Research, 52(2), 357–387.CrossRef Gigler, F., Kanodia, C., Sapra, H., & Venugopalan, R. (2014). How frequent financial reporting can cause managerial short-termism: An analysis of the costs and benefits of increasing reporting frequency. Journal of Accounting Research, 52(2), 357–387.CrossRef
go back to reference Goktan, M., & Muslu, V. (2018). Benefits of public reporting: Evidence from IPOs backed by listed private equity firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, 669–668.CrossRef Goktan, M., & Muslu, V. (2018). Benefits of public reporting: Evidence from IPOs backed by listed private equity firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 50, 669–668.CrossRef
go back to reference Gottschalg, O., & Phalippou, L. (2006). The performance of private equity funds. In Paris, H. (Ed.), Les Cahiers de Recherche, 852. Gottschalg, O., & Phalippou, L. (2006). The performance of private equity funds. In Paris, H. (Ed.), Les Cahiers de Recherche, 852.
go back to reference Hain, D., Johan, S., & Wang, D. (2016). Determinants of cross-border venture capital investments in emerging and developed economies: The effects of relational and institutional trust. Journal of Business Ethics, 138(4), 743–764.CrossRef Hain, D., Johan, S., & Wang, D. (2016). Determinants of cross-border venture capital investments in emerging and developed economies: The effects of relational and institutional trust. Journal of Business Ethics, 138(4), 743–764.CrossRef
go back to reference Hand, J. (2005). The value of relevance of financial statements within and across private and public equity markets. The Accounting Review, 80, 613–648.CrossRef Hand, J. (2005). The value of relevance of financial statements within and across private and public equity markets. The Accounting Review, 80, 613–648.CrossRef
go back to reference Harris, R., Jenkinson, T., & Kaplan, S. (2014). Private equity performance: What do we know? Journal of Finance, 69(5), 1851–1882.CrossRef Harris, R., Jenkinson, T., & Kaplan, S. (2014). Private equity performance: What do we know? Journal of Finance, 69(5), 1851–1882.CrossRef
go back to reference Harris, R., Jenkinson, T., & Kaplan, S. (2016). How do private equity investments perform compared to public equity? Journal of Investment Management, 14(3), 14–37. Harris, R., Jenkinson, T., & Kaplan, S. (2016). How do private equity investments perform compared to public equity? Journal of Investment Management, 14(3), 14–37.
go back to reference Hayes, R., & Lundholm, R. (1996). Segment reporting to the capital market in the presence of a competitor. Journal of Accounting Research, 34(2), 261–279.CrossRef Hayes, R., & Lundholm, R. (1996). Segment reporting to the capital market in the presence of a competitor. Journal of Accounting Research, 34(2), 261–279.CrossRef
go back to reference Healy, P., & Palepu, K. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405–440.CrossRef Healy, P., & Palepu, K. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405–440.CrossRef
go back to reference Higashide, H., & Birley, S. (2002). The consequences of conflict between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneurial team in the United Kingdom from the perspective of the venture capitalist. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(1), 59–81.CrossRef Higashide, H., & Birley, S. (2002). The consequences of conflict between the venture capitalist and the entrepreneurial team in the United Kingdom from the perspective of the venture capitalist. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(1), 59–81.CrossRef
go back to reference Huang, W., Li, J., & Zhang, Q. (2019). Information asymmetry, legal environment, and family firm governance: Evidence from IPO underpricing in China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 51, 155–170. Huang, W., Li, J., & Zhang, Q. (2019). Information asymmetry, legal environment, and family firm governance: Evidence from IPO underpricing in China. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 51, 155–170.
go back to reference Hughes, P., & Sankar, M. (2006). The quality of discretionary disclosure under litigation risk. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 21(1), 55–81.CrossRef Hughes, P., & Sankar, M. (2006). The quality of discretionary disclosure under litigation risk. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 21(1), 55–81.CrossRef
go back to reference Jääskeläinen, M., Maula, M., & Seppä, T. (2006). Allocation of attention to portfolio companies and the performance of venture capital firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(2), 185–206.CrossRef Jääskeläinen, M., Maula, M., & Seppä, T. (2006). Allocation of attention to portfolio companies and the performance of venture capital firms. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(2), 185–206.CrossRef
go back to reference Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.CrossRef Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.CrossRef
go back to reference Jones, C., & Rhodes-Kropf, M. (2003). The price of diversifiable risk in venture capital and private equity. Working paper, Columbia University. Jones, C., & Rhodes-Kropf, M. (2003). The price of diversifiable risk in venture capital and private equity. Working paper, Columbia University.
go back to reference Kandel, E., Leshchinskii, D., & Yuklea, H. (2011). VC funds: Aging brings myopia. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(2), 431–457.CrossRef Kandel, E., Leshchinskii, D., & Yuklea, H. (2011). VC funds: Aging brings myopia. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(2), 431–457.CrossRef
go back to reference Kanniainen, V., & Keuschnigg, C. (2003). The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(5), 521–534.CrossRef Kanniainen, V., & Keuschnigg, C. (2003). The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance. Journal of Corporate Finance, 9(5), 521–534.CrossRef
go back to reference Kanniainen, V., & Keuschnigg, C. (2004). Start-up investment with scarce venture capital support. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(8), 1935–1959.CrossRef Kanniainen, V., & Keuschnigg, C. (2004). Start-up investment with scarce venture capital support. Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(8), 1935–1959.CrossRef
go back to reference Kaplan, S., & Schoar, A. (2005). Private equity performance: Returns, persistence, and capital flows. Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1791–1823.CrossRef Kaplan, S., & Schoar, A. (2005). Private equity performance: Returns, persistence, and capital flows. Journal of Finance, 60(4), 1791–1823.CrossRef
go back to reference Katz, S. (2009). Earnings quality and ownership structure: The role of private equity sponsors. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 623–658.CrossRef Katz, S. (2009). Earnings quality and ownership structure: The role of private equity sponsors. The Accounting Review, 84(3), 623–658.CrossRef
go back to reference Kraft, A., Vashishtha, R., & Venkatachalam, M. (2018). Frequent financial reporting and managerial myopia. The Accounting Review, 93(2), 249–275.CrossRef Kraft, A., Vashishtha, R., & Venkatachalam, M. (2018). Frequent financial reporting and managerial myopia. The Accounting Review, 93(2), 249–275.CrossRef
go back to reference Kusnadi, Y., Leong, K., Suwardy, T., & Wang, J. (2016). Audit committees and financial reporting quality in Singapore. Journal of Business Ethics, 139(1), 197–214.CrossRef Kusnadi, Y., Leong, K., Suwardy, T., & Wang, J. (2016). Audit committees and financial reporting quality in Singapore. Journal of Business Ethics, 139(1), 197–214.CrossRef
go back to reference La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.CrossRef La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1998). Law and finance. Journal of Political Economy, 106, 1113–1155.CrossRef
go back to reference La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2006). What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance, 61, 1–32.CrossRef La Porta, R., Lopes-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (2006). What works in securities laws? Journal of Finance, 61, 1–32.CrossRef
go back to reference Lerner, J., Schoar, A., & Wang, J. (2008). Secrets of the academy: The drivers of university endowment success. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3), 207–222.CrossRef Lerner, J., Schoar, A., & Wang, J. (2008). Secrets of the academy: The drivers of university endowment success. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3), 207–222.CrossRef
go back to reference Lerner, J., Schoar, A., & Wongsunwai, W. (2007). Smart institutions, foolish choices: The limited partner performance puzzle. Journal of Finance, 62, 731–764.CrossRef Lerner, J., Schoar, A., & Wongsunwai, W. (2007). Smart institutions, foolish choices: The limited partner performance puzzle. Journal of Finance, 62, 731–764.CrossRef
go back to reference Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91–124.CrossRef Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. (2000). The economic consequences of increased disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 38, 91–124.CrossRef
go back to reference Mensah, Y., & Werner, R. (2008). The capital market implications of the frequency of interim financial reporting: An international analysis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 31(1), 71–104.CrossRef Mensah, Y., & Werner, R. (2008). The capital market implications of the frequency of interim financial reporting: An international analysis. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 31(1), 71–104.CrossRef
go back to reference Miller, D., & Reisel, N. (2012). Do country-level investor protections affect security-level contract design? Evidence from foreign bond covenants. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(2), 408–438.CrossRef Miller, D., & Reisel, N. (2012). Do country-level investor protections affect security-level contract design? Evidence from foreign bond covenants. The Review of Financial Studies, 25(2), 408–438.CrossRef
go back to reference Morrell, K., & Clark, I. (2010). Private equity and the public good. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(2), 249–263.CrossRef Morrell, K., & Clark, I. (2010). Private equity and the public good. Journal of Business Ethics, 96(2), 249–263.CrossRef
go back to reference Morsfield, S., & Tan, C. (2006). Do venture capitalists influence the decision to manage earnings in initial public offerings? The Accounting Review, 81(5), 1119–1150.CrossRef Morsfield, S., & Tan, C. (2006). Do venture capitalists influence the decision to manage earnings in initial public offerings? The Accounting Review, 81(5), 1119–1150.CrossRef
go back to reference Nallareddy, S., Pozen, R., & Rajgopal, S. (2017). Consequences of mandatory quarterly reporting: The U.K. experience. Working paper. Nallareddy, S., Pozen, R., & Rajgopal, S. (2017). Consequences of mandatory quarterly reporting: The U.K. experience. Working paper.
go back to reference Neus, W., & Walz, U. (2005). Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an initial public offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14, 253–277.CrossRef Neus, W., & Walz, U. (2005). Exit timing of venture capitalists in the course of an initial public offering. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 14, 253–277.CrossRef
go back to reference Nielsen, K. (2008). Institutional investors and private equity. Review of Finance, 12(1), 185–219.CrossRef Nielsen, K. (2008). Institutional investors and private equity. Review of Finance, 12(1), 185–219.CrossRef
go back to reference Norton, E. (1995). Venture capital as an alternative means to allocate capital: An agency theoretic view. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 20, 19–29.CrossRef Norton, E. (1995). Venture capital as an alternative means to allocate capital: An agency theoretic view. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 20, 19–29.CrossRef
go back to reference Penno, M. (1997). Information quality and voluntary disclosure. The Accounting Review, 72(2), 275–284. Penno, M. (1997). Information quality and voluntary disclosure. The Accounting Review, 72(2), 275–284.
go back to reference Renders, A., & Gaeremynck, A. (2007). The impact of legal and voluntary investor protection on the early adoption of IFRS. De Economist, 155(24), 49–72.CrossRef Renders, A., & Gaeremynck, A. (2007). The impact of legal and voluntary investor protection on the early adoption of IFRS. De Economist, 155(24), 49–72.CrossRef
go back to reference Robinson, D., & Sensoy, B. (2016). Cyclicality, performance measurement, and cash flow liquidity in private equity. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(3), 521–543.CrossRef Robinson, D., & Sensoy, B. (2016). Cyclicality, performance measurement, and cash flow liquidity in private equity. Journal of Financial Economics, 122(3), 521–543.CrossRef
go back to reference Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. (2019). The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 68(2), 179–194. Roychowdhury, S., Shroff, N., & Verdi, R. (2019). The effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment: A review. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 68(2), 179–194.
go back to reference Sahlman, W. (1990). The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 473–521.CrossRef Sahlman, W. (1990). The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations. Journal of Financial Economics, 27, 473–521.CrossRef
go back to reference Sapienza, H., Manigart, S., & Vermeir, W. (1996). Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing, 11(6), 439–469.CrossRef Sapienza, H., Manigart, S., & Vermeir, W. (1996). Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries. Journal of Business Venturing, 11(6), 439–469.CrossRef
go back to reference Sapienza, H. (1992). When do venture capitalists add value? Journal of Business Venturing, 7(1), 9–27.CrossRef Sapienza, H. (1992). When do venture capitalists add value? Journal of Business Venturing, 7(1), 9–27.CrossRef
go back to reference Schertler, A., & Tykvová, T. (2006). Rivals or partners? Evidence from Europe’s international private equity deals. Working paper. Schertler, A., & Tykvová, T. (2006). Rivals or partners? Evidence from Europe’s international private equity deals. Working paper.
go back to reference Sensoy, B., Wang, Y., & Weisbach, M. (2014). Limited partner performance and the maturing of the private equity industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 112, 320–343.CrossRef Sensoy, B., Wang, Y., & Weisbach, M. (2014). Limited partner performance and the maturing of the private equity industry. Journal of Financial Economics, 112, 320–343.CrossRef
go back to reference Skinner, D. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(1), 38–60.CrossRef Skinner, D. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Accounting Research, 32(1), 38–60.CrossRef
go back to reference Staubus, G. (2005). Ethics failures in corporate financial reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 57(1), 5–15.CrossRef Staubus, G. (2005). Ethics failures in corporate financial reporting. Journal of Business Ethics, 57(1), 5–15.CrossRef
go back to reference Stein, J. (1989). Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), 655–669.CrossRef Stein, J. (1989). Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 104(4), 655–669.CrossRef
go back to reference Stewart, I. (1986). Ethics and financial reporting in the United States. Journal of Business Ethics, 5(5), 401–408.CrossRef Stewart, I. (1986). Ethics and financial reporting in the United States. Journal of Business Ethics, 5(5), 401–408.CrossRef
go back to reference Stocken, P. (2000). Credibility of voluntary disclosure. RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 359–374.CrossRef Stocken, P. (2000). Credibility of voluntary disclosure. RAND Journal of Economics, 31, 359–374.CrossRef
go back to reference Van Buskirk, A. (2012). Disclosure frequency and information asymmetry. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 38(4), 411–440.CrossRef Van Buskirk, A. (2012). Disclosure frequency and information asymmetry. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 38(4), 411–440.CrossRef
go back to reference Verrecchia, R. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 179–194.CrossRef Verrecchia, R. (1983). Discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 5, 179–194.CrossRef
go back to reference Verrecchia, R. (1990). Information quality and discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12(4), 365–380.CrossRef Verrecchia, R. (1990). Information quality and discretionary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 12(4), 365–380.CrossRef
go back to reference Wongsunwai, W. (2013). The effect of external monitoring on accrual-based and real earnings management: Evidence from venture-backed initial public offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 296–324.CrossRef Wongsunwai, W. (2013). The effect of external monitoring on accrual-based and real earnings management: Evidence from venture-backed initial public offerings. Contemporary Accounting Research, 30(1), 296–324.CrossRef
go back to reference Yitshaki, R. (2008). Venture capitalist-entrepreneur conflicts: An exploratory study of determinants and possible resolutions. International Journal of Conflict Management, 19(3), 262–292.CrossRef Yitshaki, R. (2008). Venture capitalist-entrepreneur conflicts: An exploratory study of determinants and possible resolutions. International Journal of Conflict Management, 19(3), 262–292.CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Information Asymmetries in Private Equity: Reporting Frequency, Endowments, and Governance
Authors
Sofia Johan
Minjie Zhang
Publication date
27-06-2020
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Published in
Journal of Business Ethics / Issue 1/2021
Print ISSN: 0167-4544
Electronic ISSN: 1573-0697
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-020-04558-6

Other articles of this Issue 1/2021

Journal of Business Ethics 1/2021 Go to the issue