6. International Studies in 1931: From Copenhagen to Shanghai

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA: Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations: Fourth Conference at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Toynbee to Bonnet, 18 March 1931, and Bourdillon to Picht, 7 May 1931, and Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the BCCIS, 29 April 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

Bonnet to Toynbee, 26 March 1931, and Picht to Toynbee, 23 April and 13 May 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

Picht to Toynbee, 13 May 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Ibid.

Ibid. See also Picht to Toynbee, 23 April 1931, and Toynbee to Picht, 28 April 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

Picht to Toynbee, 23 April 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA; Toynbee to Picht, 28 April 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA; and Werner Picht to Comte de Vinci, Premier Conseiller de l’Ambassade Royale de l’Italie, 25 February 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-II-4.b, UA.

Toynbee, ‘Les Tendances qui se sont manifestées depuis la guerre dans les relations internationales,’ 332.

Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 816.

Ibid., 814–6.

Toynbee, ‘Les Tendances qui se sont manifestées depuis la guerre dans les relations internationales,’ 333. See also Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 806–7. Toynbee was referring in this context respectively to the General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was concluded in Geneva on September 26, 1928 and the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes which was approved by the Assembly on October 2, 1924.

Ibid.

Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 808.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, 3, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 822 and Toynbee to Bonnet, 18 March 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

Toynbee to Picht, 6 May 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 822.

Ibid., 822–3.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix 1B: Fifth Meeting of the BCCIS, 17 June 1931, and Appendix 1A(1): Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations: Fourth Conference at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Quartrième Conférence des institutions pour l’étude scientifique des relations internationales (aprés la Conférence), 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-VI-1, UA.

Charles F. Loomis to Bonnet, 18 February 1932, Conférence des institutions pour l’étude scientifique des relations internationales, 1 October 1931–31 March 1932, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.d, UA and Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, x.

Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 825–6 and Toynbee to Bonnet, 18 March 1931.

Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 825.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix 1B: Fifth Meeting of the BCCIS, 17 June 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA, and Toynbee, ‘The Trend of International Affairs Since the War,’ 826.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix 1A: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix 1B: Fifth Meeting of the BCCIS, 17 June 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Ware, ed., The Study of International Relations in the United States: Survey for 1934, 448 and Bonnet, L’Oeuvre de L’Institut International De Coopération Intellectuelle, 68.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA(1): Institutions for the Scientific Study of International Relations: Fourth Conference at Copenhagen, June 8–10, 1931, and Appendix 1A: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Bourdillon to Picht, 7 May 1931, and the attached Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the BCCIS, 29 April 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

Bourdillon to Picht, 7 May 1931, and the attached Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the BCCIS, 29 April 1933, and Toynbee to Picht, 6 May 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.b, UA.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix IA: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Ibid.

Paul Mantoux, ‘Radical,’ Fourth CISSIR, Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931: Comparative handbook of the most important political terms which are liable to provoke misunderstanding in the intercourse of the great nations, English edition, AG 1-IICI-K-II-4.b, UA.

William Haas, ‘Rechte (German)—The Right (Right parties),’ Fourth CISSIR, Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931: Comparative handbook of the most important political terms which are liable to provoke misunderstanding in the intercourse of the great nations, English edition, AG 1-IICI-K-II-4.b, UA.

Ibid.

CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix 1A: Report by Mr. Bourdillon, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA. The BCCIS resolved that its secretary should consult Edward C. Carter and the Canadian Institute of International Affairs ‘in regard to the question whether an English edition [of the lexicon] was desirable and practicable. On the whole the view of the Committee was that an English edition was not necessary as far as Great Britain was concerned’ and that a French edition was sufficient for their purposes. See CISSIR: Fourth Conference held at Copenhagen, 8–10 June 1931, Appendix 1B: Fifth Meeting of the BCCIS, 17 June 1931, AG 1-IICI-K-I-1.c, UA.

Picht wrote that the preparatory work on the lexicon was ‘only made possible’ because of the financial support of the German Coordinating Committee. Picht to Earle B. Babcock, 7 July 1932, AG 1-IICI-K-II-4.a UA.

Jäckh (address, Sixth CISSIR, London, 1 June 1933), AG 1-IICI-K-IV-2.c. For communication between Picht and Otto Hoetzsch on the handbook and reference centres, AG 1-IICI-K-II-3, UA. On the lexicon committee, see Haas to Picht, 9 July 1932, AG 1-IICI-K-II-4.a, UA.

Welt Politische Gegenwart, in Neuern Buchern des Verlages B. G. Teubner, 1932, 2–3., AG 1-IICI-K-IV-2.c, UA. For a sample of international politics courses, see Deutsche Hochschule für Politik: Vorlesungs-Verzeichnis für das Winterhalbjahr Semster 1926/27, AG 1-IICI-K-IV-2.c, UA. See also Otto Hoetzsch, ‘Außenpolitische Bildung und außenpolitische Erziehung,’ in Politik als Wissenschaft, ed., Jächk, 13–9, AG 1-IICI-K-IV-2.c, UA.

Korenblat, ‘A School for the Republic?,’ 400–1.

Ibid., 400.

Ibid., 76.

Ibid., 77.

Although strongly anti-Bolshevik, Hoetzsch was sympathetic towards Russia, stating that despite the terrible events there, Russia was ‘young and strong’. He opposed foreign intervention in Russia arguing that its internal organisation was its own business (ibid., 56, 83, 95–6).

Ibid., 81, 83, 102.

Ibid., 52.

Ibid., 62, 65.

Ibid., 75, 77.

Raymond Watt, ‘The League of Nations: Some Current Tendencies,’ Morpeth Review 2, no. 15 (1931): 30–7, 32. On Herriot, see Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 71. For Article 8 see ‘Appendix I: Covenant of the League of Nations,’ in Russell, Theories of International Relations, 556. 

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 68.

Russell, Theories of International Relations, 338–9 and William Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ International Conciliation, no. 231 (1927): 279–302, 287.

Russell, Theories of International Relations, 339. See also Bourgeois, Pour la Société des Nations, 278–84.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 68.

Ibid., 78–9.

Ibid., 82.

Ibid., 108.

The first proposed amendment ‘qualified the conditions of membership in the League so as to make “effective guarantees” of its intention to respect the Covenant a prerequisite for the admission of a new State and so as to emphasize the obligation of the new member to conform to the League’s regulations on armaments. The essence of this amendment, which strengthened somewhat the super-governmental aspect of the new international association, was accepted in principle by the Commission and now finds place in the second paragraph of Article 1 of the Covenant.’ The third French amendment proposed at the eighth meeting would have applied sanctions to enforce a unanimous opinion of the Council on a dispute submitted to it. This amendment was referred to the drafting committee of the commission but was not incorporated in the final covenant (ibid., 108–9, 111).

Ibid.

Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 207. See also Morley, Society of Nations, 109.

Woodrow Wilson, 1919, quoted in Morley, Society of Nations, 110 and Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 209.

Bourgeois, 1919 quoted in Morley, Society of Nations, 110. Bourgeois stressed ‘the importance of establishing each State member of the League in a position of “national security.” He regarded it as most important that there should be expressed in the Covenant some definite provision by which the force of the League would be immediately available for the support of any State which might be attacked.’ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 210.

Ibid.

Morley, Society of Nations, 35. As Morley pointed out, despite the cleavage that emerged between the French and Anglo-American positions, the French position was ‘very similar to that inherent in the earlier American program for a “league to enforce peace”’ (ibid., 120).

Ibid. Rappard quoted the following from an address given to the nation by Wilson on January 22, 1917: ‘It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected, that no nation, no probably combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major forces of mankind.’ Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 282.

Cecil to House, 22 July 1918, in Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, vol. 4, 39–40 and Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 284. See also Russell, Theories of International Relations, 344.

Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 284.

Robert Cecil, quoted in Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 284–5. See also ‘Speech Delivered before the Peace Conference by Members of the Commission of the League of Nations,’ 372–5.

Ibid.

Ibid., 111–3.

David Hunter Miller, quoted ibid., 113.

Ibid., 114–5. Jaime Batalha Reis stated: ‘The League of Nations is a work of union and concord preparing a future of peace between peoples. I would not like to see its organic Act begin with words of condemnation and punishment. How could the nations which remained neutral during the war accept the preamble of the Covenant if it were thus drawn up?’ (ibid., 114).

Pollock, The League of Nations, 125 and Lloyd E. Ambrosius, Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and his Legacy in American Foreign Relations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 57–8. See also Morley, Society of Nations, 19.

Cecil, 1919, quoted ibid. and Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 243. Cecil’s amendment was later modified to read as follows: ‘A permanent commission shall be constituted to advise the Council on the execution of the provisions of Articles 1 and 8 and on military, naval and air questions generally’ (Morley, Society of Nations, 119).

‘Appendix 2: The Covenant of the League of Nations With a Commentary [by the British Foreign Office] Thereon,’ in Pollock, The League of Nations, 230. On the representative nature of the British Foreign Office commentary on the covenant, see Pollock, The League of Nations, 91.

Minutes (English), tenth meeting, 1919, quoted in Morley, Society of Nations, 120 and Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 260.

Morley, Society of Nations, 120. This amendment would be reintroduced at the eleventh meeting of the Crillon Commission on March 22. See also Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 319–20.

Ibid., 129.

‘Speeches Delivered before the Peace Conference by Members of the Commission of the League of Nations: Speech Delivered by President Wilson before the Peace Conference at the reading of the draft of the Constitution of the League of Nations,’ 360.

Ibid.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 69–70.

‘Speeches Delivered before the Peace Conference by Members of the Commission of the League of Nations: Speech of M. Léon Bourgeois,’ 369.

Ibid., 370.

Ibid.

Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 292.

Ibid., 287. Russell noted that Clemenceau was ‘openly contemptuous of the League,’ was ‘frankly a believer in the balance of power system’ and that he announced on the eve of the Peace Conference in the Chamber of Deputies ‘that if entrusted with the making of peace he would work for a treaty based on the old principle.’ Russell, Theories of International Relations, 339n.

Léon Bourgeois, 1918, quoted in Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 288.

Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 292–3.

‘Appendix 2: The Covenant of the League of Nations With a Commentary [by the British Foreign Office] Thereon,’ in Pollock, The League of Nations, 228. For the statement concerning dangerous and hostile states and that concerning Bolshevik Russia, see Document 6: ‘The Cecil Plan, 14 January 1919,’ in Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 2, 61. Russell wrote that ‘[e]xcept for the exclusion of Bolshevist Russia,’ Cecil was not ‘particularly concerned about excluding other states.’ Russell, Theories of International Relations, 344. Miller recorded that at the third meeting of the Crillon Commission, Cecil asked Hymans ‘if it was in his imagination that Germany might come in as a great power.’ Miller noted that in response to this question ‘there was a general demurrer.’ Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, vol. 1, 156.

Minutes, fourteenth meeting, 1919, quoted in Morley, Society of Nations, 190–1. See also Rappard, ‘The League of Nations as an Historical Fact,’ 292–3. Brussels was ‘the only serious alternative to Geneva’ as the seat of the League. Pollock, The League of Nations, 116.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 69. The Foch-Tardieu plan was named after Marshal Ferdinand Foch and the French politician and later prime minister, Andrė Tardieu. Tardieu assisted Clemenceau at the Paris Peace Conference.

Ibid.

Ibid., 70.

League of Nations, Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Proposal of the French Delegation, Conf. D. 56, 1. See also Pollock, The League of Nations, 133; Morley, Society of Nations, 120–1; and Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 69–70.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 70.

B. J. C. McKercher, ‘The League of Nations and the Problem of Collective Security,’ in United Nations Library at Geneva: The League of Nations Archives, The League of Nations, 1920–1946, 68. See also Morley, Society of Nations, 280.

Farrer, 1919, quoted in McKercher, ‘The League of Nations and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 68. No given name or initials are recorded.

Sir Eric Drummond, 1919, quoted in McKercher, ‘The League of Nations and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 68.

Ibid.

McKercher, ‘The League of Nations and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 68.

Ibid.

Ibid., 68–9.

Ibid., 69.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. Brownlie points out that the term war ‘as a term of art had acquired a technical and restrictive meaning in the nineteenth century and the influence of this doctrine continued in the life of the League.’ He further notes that the ‘importance [of this doctrine] diminished in the period since 1920 as a result of a realization by governments that obligations, the observance of which was related to the existence of “war” in its formal aspect, could be evaded too easily.’ Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 220, 394.

Hill, ‘The Second Assembly of the League of Nations,’ 64.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Levermore ed., Second Year Book of the League of Nations, 163–4 and Cecil, ‘League of Nations Sanctions,’ 7. Hill pointed to the imperative of ‘identity of action’ in regard to the council’s role in fixing the date for action. Hill, ‘The Second Assembly of the League of Nations,’ 64.

Ibid., 16.

Ibid., 15.

Cecil, ‘League of Nations Sanctions,’ 7.

Cecil, ‘League of Nations Sanctions,’ 7.

Cecil, ‘League of Nations Sanctions,’ 7. Cecil also stated the following: ‘I do not quote these resolutions [concerning the economic weapon] as being necessarily and always the best method of putting Article 16 in force. But they do afford an illustration of how it could be practically operated’ (Ibid.).

Ibid.

Cecil, ‘League of Nations Sanctions,’ 7.

Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 65. The interpretive resolution proposed by Canada at the Fourth Assembly stated the following: ‘It is for the constitutional authorities of each Member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and integrity of Members, in what degree the Member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces.’ Resolution Proposed by the Canadian Delegation, 1923, quoted in G. M. Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs 1920–1939, 4th ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1950) 66. See also Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 70.

Canadian delegation to the LON, 1922, quoted in Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 66. Brownlie also notes that the Canadian resolution of 1923 concerning Article 10 was not carried because it was opposed by Persia, however, he too observes that the majority vote in favour of it had an impact, stating that it ‘greatly diminished’ the article’s ‘potential practical importance.’ At the same time, Brownlie points out that ‘the article was invoked on a considerable number of occasions in the life of the League and seems to have been regarded as a general principle to which appeal could be made whenever a serious threat to the personality of a state was apprehended….The fact that the Council and member states preferred to use the machinery of Article 11 and other articles may create an impression that Article 10 was unimportant. Nevertheless, although it was not used for the procedural purpose of seising the League of a dispute, the article remained as a clear expression of an obligation of members of the League. The powers of the Council under the article were vague, the principle it stated was not, at least when its text was considered in isolation. In time it was utilized as the basis for the doctrine of non-recognition and as such it represented the one part of the Covenant which was dynamic. A breach of the obligation in that article was not merely a breach of the Covenant, it had more general legal consequences.’ Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, 65–6.

Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 67. ‘The efforts to amend Art. XVI have proved abortive; the interpretations—notably the resolutions of 1921—have in no way altered obligations assumed by Member States. But as Sir John Fischer Williams has pointed out, “it is difficult not to treat them [Members of the League] as bound by their own declaration” in adopting by formal resolution, “rules of guidance” for the application of the “immediate” measures of coercion prescribed by paragraph 1 of Art. XVI (d).’ Bradley, ‘Some Legislative and Administrative Aspects of the Application of Article XVI of the Covenant,’ 15.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 70.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 70.

Morley, Society of Nations, 157. See also Salvador de Madariaga, Disarmament (London: Oxford University Press, 1929), 78–81.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 71. Emphasis in original.

Ibid., 71.

Scelle and Cassin observed that the zeal of England and the neutrals for disarmament had cooled because the ‘Anglo-Saxons wished to complete the Washington agreements of 1921 and to achieve agreements about naval armaments independently of land disarmament and before it.’ By contrast, the French wanted the disarmament negotiations to be ‘stimulated’ by Germany’s entry into the LON and urged the study of the ‘problem as a whole’ within the framework of the LON (ibid., 72).

Watt, ‘The League of Nations: Some Current Tendencies,’ 33–4. Cecil and Murray also laboured to fill this gap in the covenant.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 72. See also Watt, ‘The League of Nations: Some Current Tendencies,’ 34.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 72.

Ibid., 67–8, 73.

Ibid., 74.

‘Speech by German May Arouse Poles,’ Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 11, 1930 and ‘The German Grudge Against France and Poland,’ Literary Digest, September 6, 1930, 12.

Literary Digest, September 6, 1930, 12. See also ‘Germany’s Position: Eastern Frontier: Demand for Revision,’ Sydney Morning Herald, September 2, 1930.

‘Bulletin du jour: le discours de M. Treviranus,’ Le Temps, August 12, 1930. See also Literary Digest, September 6, 1930, 12.

Michael Pugh writes that Briand’s plan for a European Federal Union, which was first aired in 1929 and was addressed in Geneva in May 1930, ‘although primarily economic in thrust’ was seen in Britain, like its plans to militarise the League, ‘as yet another artifice to buttress French security’. Michael Pugh, ‘Policing the World: Lord Davies and the Quest for Order in the 1930s,’ International Relations: 16, no. 1 (2002): 97–115, 103.

Ibid.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 74–5. Emphasis in original.

Robert Cecil, 1930, quoted in Pugh, ‘Policing the World,’ 103–4.

Pugh, ‘Policing the World,’ 104.

Scelle and Cassin, ‘French Opinion and the Problem of Collective Security,’ 74; French Ministers Visit Berlin: Reparations Question Not To Be Touched?,’ The Straits Times, September 28, 1931; and ‘Dr Curtius Criticised: Geneva Speech Resented,’ West Australian, September 15, 1931.

‘French Ministers Visit Berlin: Reparations Question Not To Be Touched?,’ Pittsburgh Chronicle (a), September 28, 1931, and ‘Paris, Berlin Leaders Plan Economic Pact: Briand, Laval Wildly Cheered On Visit To Berlin,’ Pittsburgh Chronicle (b), September 28, 1931.

Arnold Wolfers maintained that expressions of desire for colonial mandates in Germany did not justify talk of a ‘new German imperialism’ in the form of ‘expansion and aggression’. Arnold Wolfers, ‘Germany in the League: A Survey and a Forecast’ in Problems of Peace: Lectures Delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, August, 1927 (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), 248–9.

Angell, ‘Japan, the League and Us,’ 1302. See also Sandra Wilson, ‘The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals: the Japan Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations,’ Modern Asian Studies 26, no. 3 (1992): 507–44, 508 and James Weland, ‘Misguided Intelligence: Japanese Military Intelligence Officers in the Manchurian Incident, September 1931,’ Journal of Military History: 5, no. 3 (1994): 445–60, 445. The Japanese officers, according to James Weland, involved in the incident were Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and Lieutenant Colonel Itagaki Seishirō.

Institute of Pacific Relations: Summary of Activities: 1931–1932, Honolulu, 11 April 1932, and ISIPR, ‘A Pacific Research Program,’ AG 1-IICI-K-VI-2, UA.

Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, v, 512n.

‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 10 and Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, 512.

‘Appendix 2: Holland-Hooper Interviews,’ in Hooper ed., Remembering the Institute of Pacific Relations, 10, and Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, 513.

Lewis L. Lorwin, The Need for World Economic Planning (New York: American Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations, 1931), 4, 6–7. See also Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, 40, and Morley, Society of Nations, 254n, 610n, 622n.

Lewis L. Lorwin, ‘Addendum: The Problem of Economic Planning,’ in Mary Lambertine Fleddérus, ed., World Social Economic Planning: The Necessity for Planned Adjustment of Productive Capacity and Standards of Living (The Hague: International Industrial relations Institute, 1932), 773–98. See also Karl W. Papp, ‘Economic Regulation and Economic Planning,’ American Economic Review 29, no. 4 (1939): 760–73, 761.

Ibid.

Ibid., 388.

Angus, The Problem of Peaceful Change in the Pacific Area, 159 and Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, 387.

Ibid., 390.

Ibid., 408.

Advertisement, Bruno Lasker and William L. Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations, Hangchow and Shanghai, China, October 21 to November 2, AG 1-IICI-K-VI-2, UA. One reviewer described the 1931 volume of Problems of the Pacific as ‘imposing.’ ‘Comptes Rendus,’ Bulletin de la Coopération Intellectuelle, no. 20–1 (1932): 1165–9, 1167.

Kenzō Takayanagi, ‘Manchuria—A Case Problem,’ in Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, 235. On Takayanagi’s discipleship of Nitobe, see Wilson, ‘The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals,’ 519.

Takayanagi, ‘Manchuria—A Case Problem,’ 235.

Tsurumi, ‘Japan in the Modern World,’ 265.

Tsurumi Yusuke, 1931, quoted in Wilson, ‘The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals,’ 541.

Weland, ‘Misguided Intelligence,’ 447–8.

Wilson, ‘The Manchurian Crisis and Moderate Japanese Intellectuals,’ 520.

Takayanagi, ‘Manchuria—A Case Problem,’ 231.

Ibid., 231–2.

Yasaka, ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine,’ 945.

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Sir Austen Chamberlain, to the American Ambassador in London, Alanson, B. Houghton, 1928, quoted in Myers, Origin and Conclusion of the Paris Pact, 127 and. Yasaka, ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine,’ 950. See also Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 182.

Chamberlain to Houghton, 1928, quoted in Myers, Origin and Conclusion of the Paris Pact, 126. See also Bryce Marian Wood, Peaceful Change and the Colonial Problem (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), 22 and Gathorne-Hardy, A Short History of International Affairs, 183. Some commentators considered that the statement in the British note mainly concerned Egypt.

Yasaka, ‘World Peace Machinery and the Asia Monroe Doctrine,’ 952.

Ibid., 945, 951.

John Fischer Williams, ‘Recognition,’ Transactions of the Grotius Society 15 (1929): 53–81, 63–5, and John Fischer Williams, ‘The New Doctrine of “Recognition,”’ Transactions of the Grotius Society, 18 (1932): 109–29, 115.

Takayanagi, ‘Manchuria—A Case Problem,’ 231–2.

Ibid., 233–4.

Takayanagi, ‘Manchuria—A Case Problem,’ 233.

Ibid., 238–9.

Ibid., 236–7.

Ibid., 236–7, 239.

Ibid., 245, 257.

Ibid., 245, 257.

Ibid., 175.

Angus pointed out that the Japanese claims in relation to Manchuria could be viewed as a ‘logical result of the lack of response by English-speaking countries to the suggestions for greater opportunities for migration, better assurance of access to the raw materials of industry, and better access to markets….[This] created both the material incentive and the necessary atmosphere of fear and resentment’ which conduced to Japanese aggression (ibid., 51).

Morley, Society of Nations, 434–6. See also Lasker and Holland eds., Problems of the Pacific, 1931, 249.

Ibid.

Ibid., 245.