Skip to main content
main-content
Top

Hint

Swipe to navigate through the chapters of this book

2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Internationales Krisenmanagement

Authors : Sandra Destradi, Christian von Soest

Published in: Handbuch Krisenforschung

Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

share
SHARE

Zusammenfassung

Beim internationalen Krisenmanagement liegt der Fokus auf der Rolle internationaler Akteure, die sich zur Lösung einer als Bedrohung der bestehenden Ordnung wahrgenommenen Krise engagieren. Nach einer grundlegenden Begriffsbestimmung stellt der Beitrag dar, in welchen Situationen Krisenmanagement angewendet wird, welche Formen es annehmen kann und durch welche Akteure es häufig Anwendung findet. Der Beitrag geht exemplarisch auf internationale Sanktionen als Zwangsmittel des internationalen Krisenmanagements sowie auf Mediation als freiwilliges Instrument ein, durch das internationale Akteure sich um eine Entschärfung oder Beilegung einer Krise bemühen. Dabei werden diese Instrumente, ihre Erfolgsbedingungen und insbesondere ihre nichtintendierten Folgen diskutiert.
Footnotes
1
Wir danken Cordula Tibi Weber für ihre sehr hilfreiche Unterstützung bei der Recherche.
 
2
Unter Krisenprävention versteht man „das systematische, zielorientierte und vorausschauende Bemühen der internationalen Gemeinschaft um die Verhütung von gewaltträchtigen Krisen, das sich an den normativen Leitbildern der friedlichen Konfliktbearbeitung sowie der Humanisierung und Zivilisierung der internationalen Politik orientiert“ (Matthies 2000, S. 9).
 
Literature
go back to reference Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems. American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 723–740. CrossRef Beardsley, Kyle. 2008. Agreement without peace? International mediation and time inconsistency problems. American Journal of Political Science 52 (4): 723–740. CrossRef
go back to reference Beardsley, K., D. M. Quinn, B. Biswas, und J. Wilkenfeld. 2006. Mediation style and crisis outcomes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (1): 58–86. CrossRef Beardsley, K., D. M. Quinn, B. Biswas, und J. Wilkenfeld. 2006. Mediation style and crisis outcomes. Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (1): 58–86. CrossRef
go back to reference Bercovitch, J., und S. S. Gartner. 2009. Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation. In International conflict mediation: New approaches and findings, Hrsg. Jacob Bercovitch und S. S. Gartner, 19–42. Abingdon: Routledge. Bercovitch, J., und S. S. Gartner. 2009. Is there method in the madness of mediation? Some lessons for mediators from quantitative studies of mediation. In International conflict mediation: New approaches and findings, Hrsg. Jacob Bercovitch und S. S. Gartner, 19–42. Abingdon: Routledge.
go back to reference Bercovitch, Jacob, und R. Jackson. 2009. Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. CrossRef Bercovitch, Jacob, und R. Jackson. 2009. Conflict resolution in the twenty-first century. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. CrossRef
go back to reference Bercovitch, J., J. T. Anagnoson, und D. L. Wille. 1991. Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations. Journal of Peace Research 28 (1): 7–17. CrossRef Bercovitch, J., J. T. Anagnoson, und D. L. Wille. 1991. Some conceptual issues and empirical trends in the study of successful mediation in international relations. Journal of Peace Research 28 (1): 7–17. CrossRef
go back to reference Cortright, David, und G. A. Lopez. 2000. The sanctions decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. Cortright, David, und G. A. Lopez. 2000. The sanctions decade: Assessing UN strategies in the 1990s. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
go back to reference Council of the European Union. 2004. Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures (sanctions). Brussels: Council of the European Union. Council of the European Union. 2004. Basic principles on the use of restrictive measures (sanctions). Brussels: Council of the European Union.
go back to reference Crawford, Neta C., und A. Klotz. 1999. How sanctions work: Lessons from South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s. Crawford, Neta C., und A. Klotz. 1999. How sanctions work: Lessons from South Africa. New York: St. Martin’s.
go back to reference Destradi, Sandra. 2012. Indian foreign and security policy in South Asia: Regional power strategies. London: Routledge. CrossRef Destradi, Sandra. 2012. Indian foreign and security policy in South Asia: Regional power strategies. London: Routledge. CrossRef
go back to reference Doxey, Margaret P. 1996. International sanctions in contemporary perspective, 2. Aufl. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. CrossRef Doxey, Margaret P. 1996. International sanctions in contemporary perspective, 2. Aufl. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. CrossRef
go back to reference Drezner, Daniel W. 2011. Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice. International Studies Review 13 (1): 96–108. CrossRef Drezner, Daniel W. 2011. Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice. International Studies Review 13 (1): 96–108. CrossRef
go back to reference Eriksson, Mikael. 2011. Targeting peace: Understanding UN and EU targeted sanctions. Farnham: Ashgate. Eriksson, Mikael. 2011. Targeting peace: Understanding UN and EU targeted sanctions. Farnham: Ashgate.
go back to reference Galtung, Johan. 1967. On the effects of international economic sanctions: With examples from the case of Rhodesia. World Politics 19 (3): 378–416. CrossRef Galtung, Johan. 1967. On the effects of international economic sanctions: With examples from the case of Rhodesia. World Politics 19 (3): 378–416. CrossRef
go back to reference Grauvogel, J., und C. von Soest. 2014. Claims to legitimacy count: Why sanctions fail to instigate democratisation in authoritarian regimes. European Journal of Political Research 53 (4): 635–653. CrossRef Grauvogel, J., und C. von Soest. 2014. Claims to legitimacy count: Why sanctions fail to instigate democratisation in authoritarian regimes. European Journal of Political Research 53 (4): 635–653. CrossRef
go back to reference Greig, J. Michael. 2001. Moments of opportunity: Recognizing conditions of ripeness for international mediation between enduring rivals. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (6): 691–718. CrossRef Greig, J. Michael. 2001. Moments of opportunity: Recognizing conditions of ripeness for international mediation between enduring rivals. Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (6): 691–718. CrossRef
go back to reference Hartmann, Christof. 2017. ECOWAS and the restoration of democracy in the Gambia. Africa Spectrum 52 (1): 85–99. CrossRef Hartmann, Christof. 2017. ECOWAS and the restoration of democracy in the Gambia. Africa Spectrum 52 (1): 85–99. CrossRef
go back to reference Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, J. J. Schott, K. A. Elliott, und B. Oegg. 2007. Economic sanctions reconsidered, 3. Aufl. Washington DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics. Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, J. J. Schott, K. A. Elliott, und B. Oegg. 2007. Economic sanctions reconsidered, 3. Aufl. Washington DC: Peterson Institute of International Economics.
go back to reference Hultman, L., und D. Peksen. 2017. Successful or counterproductive coercion? The effect of international sanctions on conflict intensity. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (6): 1315–1339. CrossRef Hultman, L., und D. Peksen. 2017. Successful or counterproductive coercion? The effect of international sanctions on conflict intensity. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61 (6): 1315–1339. CrossRef
go back to reference Jones, Lee. 2015. Societies under siege: Exploring how international economic sanctions (Do not) work. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef Jones, Lee. 2015. Societies under siege: Exploring how international economic sanctions (Do not) work. Oxford: Oxford University Press. CrossRef
go back to reference Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. Understanding success and failure of international mediation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (2): 360–389. CrossRef Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. Understanding success and failure of international mediation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 40 (2): 360–389. CrossRef
go back to reference Lehrs, Lior. 2016. Private peace entrepreneurs in conflict resolution processes. International Negotiation 21 (3): 381–408. CrossRef Lehrs, Lior. 2016. Private peace entrepreneurs in conflict resolution processes. International Negotiation 21 (3): 381–408. CrossRef
go back to reference Lektzian, D., und P. M. Regan. 2016. Economic sanctions, military interventions, and civil conflict outcomes. Journal of Peace Research 53 (4): 554–568. CrossRef Lektzian, D., und P. M. Regan. 2016. Economic sanctions, military interventions, and civil conflict outcomes. Journal of Peace Research 53 (4): 554–568. CrossRef
go back to reference Major, C., T. Pietz, E. Schöndorf, und W. Hummel. 2011. Toolbox Krisenmanagement. Von der zivilen Krisenprävention bis zum Peacebuilding: Prinzipien, Akteure, Instrumente. Berlin: SWP/ZIF. Major, C., T. Pietz, E. Schöndorf, und W. Hummel. 2011. Toolbox Krisenmanagement. Von der zivilen Krisenprävention bis zum Peacebuilding: Prinzipien, Akteure, Instrumente. Berlin: SWP/ZIF.
go back to reference Matthies, Volker. 2000. Krisenprävention: Vorbeugen ist besser als Heilen. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien. CrossRef Matthies, Volker. 2000. Krisenprävention: Vorbeugen ist besser als Heilen. Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien. CrossRef
go back to reference Melander, E., T. Pettersson, und L. Themnér. 2016. Organized violence, 1989–2015. Journal of Peace Research 53 (5): 727–742. CrossRef Melander, E., T. Pettersson, und L. Themnér. 2016. Organized violence, 1989–2015. Journal of Peace Research 53 (5): 727–742. CrossRef
go back to reference Morgan, T. C., N. Bapat, und Y. Kobayashi. 2014. Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31 (5): 541–558. CrossRef Morgan, T. C., N. Bapat, und Y. Kobayashi. 2014. Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. Conflict Management and Peace Science 31 (5): 541–558. CrossRef
go back to reference Pape, Robert A. 1997. Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security 22 (2): 90–136. CrossRef Pape, Robert A. 1997. Why economic sanctions do not work. International Security 22 (2): 90–136. CrossRef
go back to reference Paris, Roland. 1997. Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. International Security 22 (2): 54–89. CrossRef Paris, Roland. 1997. Peacebuilding and the limits of liberal internationalism. International Security 22 (2): 54–89. CrossRef
go back to reference Peksen, Dursun. 2009. Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights. Journal of Peace Research 46 (1): 59–77. CrossRef Peksen, Dursun. 2009. Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights. Journal of Peace Research 46 (1): 59–77. CrossRef
go back to reference Schneckener, Ulrich. 2016. Peacebuilding in Crisis? Debating Peacebuilding Paradigms and Practices. In Peacebuilding in crisis: Rethinking paradigms and practices of transnational cooperation, Hrsg. T. Debiel, T. Held, und U. Schneckener, 1–20. London: Routledge Global Cooperation Series. Schneckener, Ulrich. 2016. Peacebuilding in Crisis? Debating Peacebuilding Paradigms and Practices. In Peacebuilding in crisis: Rethinking paradigms and practices of transnational cooperation, Hrsg. T. Debiel, T. Held, und U. Schneckener, 1–20. London: Routledge Global Cooperation Series.
go back to reference Straus, Scott. 2015. Making and unmaking nations: War, leadership, and genocide in modern Africa. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Straus, Scott. 2015. Making and unmaking nations: War, leadership, and genocide in modern Africa. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
go back to reference Svensson, Isak. 2007. Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace. Journal of Peace Research 44 (2): 177–194. CrossRef Svensson, Isak. 2007. Bargaining, bias and peace brokers: How rebels commit to peace. Journal of Peace Research 44 (2): 177–194. CrossRef
go back to reference Thakur, Ramesh. 2013. R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging emerging powers. The Washington Quarterly 36 (2): 61–76. CrossRef Thakur, Ramesh. 2013. R2P after Libya and Syria: Engaging emerging powers. The Washington Quarterly 36 (2): 61–76. CrossRef
go back to reference Tostensen, A., und B. Bull. 2002. Are smart sanctions feasible? World Politics 54 (3): 373–403. CrossRef Tostensen, A., und B. Bull. 2002. Are smart sanctions feasible? World Politics 54 (3): 373–403. CrossRef
go back to reference United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2011. 6498th meeting, 17. März 2011. S/PV.6498. United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2011. 6498th meeting, 17. März 2011. S/PV.6498.
go back to reference Vines, Alex. 2013. A decade of African peace and security architecture. International Affairs 89 (1): 89–109. CrossRef Vines, Alex. 2013. A decade of African peace and security architecture. International Affairs 89 (1): 89–109. CrossRef
go back to reference von Soest, C., und M. Wahman. 2015a. Not all dictators are equal: Coups, fraudulent elections, and the selective targeting of democratic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research 52 (1): 17–31. CrossRef von Soest, C., und M. Wahman. 2015a. Not all dictators are equal: Coups, fraudulent elections, and the selective targeting of democratic sanctions. Journal of Peace Research 52 (1): 17–31. CrossRef
go back to reference von Soest, C., und M. Wahman. 2015b. Are Democratic sanctions really counterproductive? Democratization 22 (6): 957–980. CrossRef von Soest, C., und M. Wahman. 2015b. Are Democratic sanctions really counterproductive? Democratization 22 (6): 957–980. CrossRef
go back to reference Vüllers, J., und S. Destradi. 2013. Speech is silver, silence is golden? The consequences of failed mediation in civil wars. Civil Wars 15 (4): 486–507. CrossRef Vüllers, J., und S. Destradi. 2013. Speech is silver, silence is golden? The consequences of failed mediation in civil wars. Civil Wars 15 (4): 486–507. CrossRef
go back to reference Wood, Reed M. 2008. ‚A hand upon the throat of the nation‘: Economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–2001. International Studies Quarterly 52:489–513. CrossRef Wood, Reed M. 2008. ‚A hand upon the throat of the nation‘: Economic sanctions and state repression, 1976–2001. International Studies Quarterly 52:489–513. CrossRef
go back to reference World Bank. 2011. World development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. CrossRef World Bank. 2011. World development report 2011: Conflict, security, and development. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. CrossRef
go back to reference Zartman, I. William. 1985. Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press. Zartman, I. William. 1985. Ripe for resolution: Conflict and intervention in Africa. New York: Oxford University Press.
go back to reference Zartman, I. W., und S. Touval. 1985. International mediation conflict resolution and power politics. Journal of Social Issues 41 (2): 27–45. CrossRef Zartman, I. W., und S. Touval. 1985. International mediation conflict resolution and power politics. Journal of Social Issues 41 (2): 27–45. CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Internationales Krisenmanagement
Authors
Sandra Destradi
Christian von Soest
Copyright Year
2020
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-28571-5_12

Premium Partner