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Open Access 2024 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

1. Introduction: A Masterclass in Dealing with Passive Aggressive Behaviour

Author : Carlos Lopes

Published in: The Self-Deception Trap

Publisher: Springer Nature Switzerland

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Abstract

In the lead-up to the 31st AU Summit in Nouakchott in July 2018, an unexpected honour came my way. The then AU Commission President, Faki Mahamat, approached me with a proposition that surprised me: the opportunity to guide AU’s efforts in EU-ACP agreements post-2020. These discussions eventually led to an invitation to address the African Heads of State on this topic directly. As I stood before the Heads of State, my message was simple: there was a need to acknowledge the diverse pathways inherent in the European-African relations. While the ACP grouping covered many African States, it might not be the most suitable conduit for fostering a structural partnership with Europe. Subsequent developments proved me right.
In the lead-up to the 31st AU Summit in Nouakchott in July 2018, an unexpected honour came my way. The then AU Commission President, Faki Mahamat, approached me with a proposition that surprised me: the opportunity to guide AU’s efforts in EU-ACP agreements post-2020. These discussions eventually led to an invitation to address the African Heads of State on this topic directly.
My familiarity with the AU Summit’s atmosphere was grounded in my prior role as the Executive Secretary of the UN Economic Commission for Africa. In that capacity, I had the chance to engage with the upper echelons of AU Summits, an experience I held with humility. I have contributed to several flagship initiatives throughout my tenure, including facilitating the inaugural interactive dialogue in 2013 that was foundational in shaping the subsequent development of the AU Agenda 2063, which I helped draft (African Union, 2013a).
As I stood before the Heads of State, my message was simple: there was a need to acknowledge the diverse pathways inherent in the European-African relations. While the ACP grouping covered many African states, it might not be the most suitable conduit for fostering a structural partnership with Europe. Subsequent developments proved me right.
I presented a trio of reasons supporting this viewpoint. Firstly, excluding North African countries within the ACP framework left a notable gap. Secondly, although sharing some affinities, including the Caribbean and Pacific regions bore the weight of historical categorisations that did not necessarily align with present realities. Lastly, the foundational principles underpinning the existing agreements did not align with Africa’s evolving trade relationship with Europe, especially given the growing importance of the AfCFTA. I gently underscored that the proliferation of divergent trade arrangements could inadvertently hinder Africa’s integration journey, fostering imbalanced dynamics due to misconceptions about the true extent of Africa’s continental trade.
In conclusion, I offered a modest proposal; a more practical approach to the Europe-Africa partnership necessitated a unified, continent-to-continent perspective and a move away from aid logic. I shared my belief that equitable governance could be better achieved by avoiding fragmentation and differential treatment across countries and regions.
The reception of my proposals was mixed: enthusiasm from the backbenchers and a degree of cautious apprehension from certain influential Heads of State. In retrospect, I recognised that the factual presentation I had delivered, which vividly illustrated the extent of fragmentation within Africa, lacked a certain diplomatic finesse. This realisation dawned on me as I observed the growing resistance to my newly designated role in the aftermath of the Summit. Nevertheless, despite the initial hesitations, my appointment received the necessary Summit endorsement.
Subsequently, I set about assembling a small, dedicated team. This team, carefully chosen, was tasked with the vital mission of collating the necessary information, a task of paramount importance as we embarked on the journey of supporting the forthcoming multi-track partnership negotiations.
The challenges we faced were multifaceted. Navigating the political landscape demanded a balance between boldness and tact, a line I was conscious of treading. While my convictions regarding the need for change remained steadfast, I understood the value of approaching these deliberations with a measure of self-effacement.
Our mission acquired a renewed sense of urgency as my team and I delved into the data. We meticulously collected evidence to underpin our proposals and bolster our arguments with undeniable facts. The process involved comprehensive research, consultations with experts, and a discerning analysis of the intricacies of the existing agreements.
Through this diligence, a clearer picture emerged. Our findings underscored the challenges resulting from fragmented approaches and illuminated the vast potential that a unified strategy held for Africa’s interests. Armed with this insight, we renewed the intent to garner support. The initial scepticism that had surfaced was not unexpected, and we were prepared to meet it with perseverance and a willingness to engage constructively.
Ultimately, it was not just about the AU High Representative’s role but the possibility of reshaping a partnership that could genuinely serve Africa’s collective aspirations. The journey had only begun, and the challenges were substantial, but the prospect of a more cohesive, equitable partnership kept our spirits high as we embarked on this consequential endeavour.
The AU ‘multi-layered cake’ represented a vulnerability throughout the process, setting the stage for competing interests that shrewd European actors would adeptly exploit. Within this intricate framework, the role of the AU High Representative became a delicate dance, requiring the deft balancing of varying viewpoints while fending off the EU’s attempts to exploit internal discord.
The labyrinthine landscape of AU dynamics enabled the EU to employ a strategic manoeuvre: the proliferation of different meetings and configurations, as detailed in Chap. 5. This elasticity allowed European proponents to engage those African leaders and influencers amenable to their initiatives outside the official negotiation avenues guided by the AU. This adroit manoeuvre permitted various European actors, including the EU Commission, to advance proposals with fractured African backing, effectively fragmenting the cohesive front that the AU intended to present.
In the broader context, the ACP group introduced an additional layer of intricacy. The competition for leadership between the African Ambassadors stationed in Brussels and their counterparts based in Addis Ababa, representing the interests of distinct decision-making bodies they were affiliated with, amplified the discordant narrative. Simultaneously, the ACP Secretariat, a structure primarily funded by the EU, entrenched itself in spaces and roles that had long since become relics of the past. This situation engendered an impression that African representatives in Brussels were aligned with the EU Commission’s hierarchy, undercutting the AU’s negotiating clout.
The AU Commission’s predicament was further underscored by its need for delegated authority from individual member states. Navigating the complex negotiation processes with the EU compelled the AU Commission to seek broad-based approvals across various instances, diluting its authoritative stance when faced with an EU wielding full negotiating authority.
Furthermore, the promise of European aid or preferential treatment, intrinsic to numerous initiatives, exerted a magnetic pull on African countries. The prospect of garnering benefits from specific initiatives often led some countries astray from the united position, necessitating a delicate balance between upholding the AU’s consolidated voice and enticing immediate advantages.
Amidst these dynamics, a discernible pattern of competition unfolded. Certain African countries rallied behind a pro-ACP stance. In contrast, others astutely recognised the perils inherent in diverting continent-wide deliberations, endorsed by the AU, onto a trajectory that lacked inclusivity and rested heavily on the premise of aid dependency. The emergence of such dualistic approaches fomented divisions within the AU ranks, with each camp advocating for a distinct course of action.
Adding to this complexity was the fact that the EU, prior to AU deliberations specifying its positions, had already sanctioned a negotiating position for the post-Cotonou Agreement and a “Strategy for Africa” (European Commission, 2020; Gotev, 2017). This preexisting EU stance became an implicit benchmark against which the AU and its member states were expected to react.
The challenge posed by the AU High Representative’s firm stance of not accepting such a course of action was often interpreted by European counterparts as counterproductive, suggesting it provoked confusion and needed more clarity. Contrary to this perception, the clarity was resolutely present: the AU had a comprehensive agenda, namely, Agenda 2063, meticulously outlining its developmental aspirations (African Union, 2013b). Moreover, two AU Summits had unequivocally underscored the necessity for any negotiations on the post-Cotonou Agreement to conform to AU-approved decisions—not the inverse. This encompassed prioritised areas, as elucidated in chapter 5, and a strategic posture aligned to safeguard African interests.
Hence, the heart of the matter did not stem from any deficiency in the AU’s coherence but rather from the intricate challenge presented by the traditional EU-centric negotiation paradigm. Such a pivotal juncture offered a profound glimpse into the AU’s necessity to chart its autonomous course while engaging from a standpoint that resonated with its collective choices and imperatives.
The EU Commission was resolutely convinced that its endorsed negotiation positions held a sacrosanct status (Gotev, 2017). Such a positioning was akin to a donor dictating terms, where the one providing the funds held sway. As the High Representative, I intended to shift the discourse towards common interests, transcending the prevailing mindset. This included framing discussions around migration and ageing, the symbiotic relationship between technology and Africa’s burgeoning consumer market, and the indispensable role of strategic minerals and renewable energy in the climate discourse (Lopes, 2020).
The strategic approach I pushed was intended to underscore a vital truth: Africa’s cumulative trade volumes wielded considerably more significant influence than the dwindling sums of foreign assistance.
The response from European counterparts exhibited a persistent inclination to marginalise the AU High Representative with a pattern of passive-aggressive behaviour. This manifested in attempts to curtail my participation in crucial processes and events they steered. Alternatively, they often chose to disregard the positions and communications I conveyed, justifying this stance by citing the requirement for the AU Commission to secure authority from member states for each decision (Lopes, 2019).
Passive-aggressive behaviour refers to expressing negative feelings, resentment, or opposition indirectly rather than openly and directly. It involves disguising hostility or resistance through subtle actions, avoidance, or manipulation instead of openly addressing conflicts or issues. Passive-aggressive individuals often use tactics like sarcasm, backhanded compliments, procrastination, silent treatment, and intentionally ambiguous communication. This behaviour can be frustrating and challenging, obscuring true feelings and intentions and making it difficult to address and resolve conflicts effectively.
Recognising the need to preclude resistance to my approach, we proactively engaged member-state negotiators at the earliest opportunity. Through briefings and nuanced political explanations, we sought to dismantle barriers and build, on several occasions, a common understanding. In tandem, we recognised the power of media outreach and academic engagement. We attempted to cultivate a belief in the imperative for partnership reform by crafting a narrative that resonated with the Africans.
The undermining of the AU High Representative’s role progressively escalated, giving way to a regrettable atmosphere of hostility. The undermining tactics evolved from subtle insinuations to orchestrating messages aimed at media contacts and influential figures. These messages alluded to a perceived lack of support from African leaders for the AU High Representative. A carefully choreographed narrative unfolded, complete with a self-serving demonstration of his conspicuous absence from key gatherings, gatherings that, quite tellingly, happened to be those organised by the EU, particularly.
Interestingly, the reactions from the Foreign Ministries of prominent European countries stood in stark contrast to this overtly hostile atmosphere. Rather than echoing the antagonistic sentiment, they showed genuine interest in engaging with our critiques of the EU Commission’s stance on the negotiations and its resistance to agree to the key proposal of having a mutually agreed governance system for the continent-continent partnership and not allowing the post-Cotonou Agreement to serve as the basis for defining the relations with the continent but rather a new instrument created explicitly between the EU and the AU.
We found fertile ground to construct compelling arguments on trade dynamics, climate change, and migration patterns in the engagements with European countries’ Foreign Ministries. This parallel channel of engagement was, understandably, a source of frustration for EU Commission officials. Accustomed to maintaining a firm grip on the narrative, they grappled with the unexpected reality of the AU High Representative gaining space—space they systematically denied. This shift challenged their narrative control, leading to a palpable discomfort.
A striking example of passive-aggressive manoeuvring was the attempt to influence key AU bureaucrats by insinuating that the positions endorsed by the AU High Representative had the potential to erode the excellent and harmonious relationship they shared with the EU. Unfortunately, the stratagem bore some fruit.
The “Strategy for Europe”—a blueprint we developed aimed at steering the conversation away from merely reacting to the EU’s strategy for Africa—faced consistent obstruction by some AU bureaucrats. Those responsible for transmitting the strategy to the African member states tactically omitted its submission, derailing possible firmer decisions. Paradoxically, the absence of this very document was subsequently employed by negotiators on both sides to assert that the African continent lacked a coherent strategy.
The rapport I established as the AU High Representative with the ACP lead negotiator for the Post-Cotonou Agreement, Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey, was notably amicable. However, a distinct pattern emerged as the negotiations unfolded, with the EU consistently affording greater prominence to the ACP negotiator while downplaying the AU’s role. The rationale they used to justify such an approach rested on the legal status disparity between the ACP agreement and the AU partnership; the ACP agreement bore a legal weight that the AU partnership did not possess. While this assertion held validity, it was a situation that could have been adjusted had the recommendations emanating from the Abidjan AU-EU Summit been heeded. The Abidjan Summit’s final declaration carried an implicit impetus towards achieving such an elevated level of ambition, an aspect explained in Chap. 6.
During the post-Cotonou Agreement negotiations, a transformation became evident. What had been historically a trade and aid agreement underwent an evolution into a fundamentally political accord. Strikingly, this transformation occurred without the retention of aid allocations, while the trade dimensions were relegated to the EU-sponsored EPAs, as delineated in Chap. 8. Despite the reconfiguration that led to the removal of the perceived advantages linked to aid allocations, both sides of the negotiation table hailed the conclusion of the agreement on April 15, 2021, as a victory. EU International Partnerships Commissioner Jutta Urpilainen and Togo’s Foreign Minister jointly sealed the new text (European Commission, 2021).
The agreement took so long to negotiate that it necessitated two prolongments of the previous one, expiring in 2020. However, despite the ceremonial culmination of the negotiations, a notable hitch persists. The agreement, albeit agreed upon, has yet to undergo the process of ratification. Given the prevailing circumstances, its implementation will remain deferred in the foreseeable future. These developments underscore the complexities inherent in international agreements and the multifaceted challenges that can hinder their practical realisation.
The transition from the ACP group to the OACPS was supposed to signify a step towards enhanced autonomy from the EU and, consequently, an improvement in the representational capacity of ACP countries. However, this shift hinged on securing financial contributions from ACP member countries, a requirement currently facing materialisation challenges.
Further complicating matters, South Africa’s decision to withdraw from the OACPS and the post-Cotonou Agreement constitutes an additional setback. This exit highlights the intricate challenge of creating inclusive agreements harmonising with diverse interests and priorities. The departure of such a significant participant deals a significant blow to a process the EU had anticipated would greatly influence its engagement with most African countries.
North African countries have chosen a distinct path, opting to negotiate individually with the EU. The migration routes they can exercise control over have emerged as a leverage point, affording them the means to extract more favourable terms. This approach diverges considerably from the ACP negotiation format, as North African nations eschew processes they perceive as tainted by unwelcome political intervention. Their stance towards the AU-led continent-to-continent process has also remained ambivalent. While offering support to the AU High Representative when convenient, they exhibit a deliberate reluctance to commit, a way of safeguarding their manoeuvrability.
As the AU High Representative, navigating the currents of resistance underscored the delicate equilibrium between assertiveness and diplomacy. The evolving landscape revealed how underlying neocolonial tendencies shaped interactions, perpetuating a cycle of subverted intentions. While the EU’s passive-aggressive manoeuvres aimed to steer negotiations, the eventual outcome unveiled a shared reality: neither the EU’s objectives nor the AU’s aspirations were fully realised. As the dust settled, the complex interplay of interests revealed the limitations of both sides’ strategies (See Annex B).

A Book Is Born

This book was born out of my observations of these processes and seeks to underscore the critical need for proactive diplomacy, cohesive strategy, and vigilant resistance against passive-aggressive manipulation. It is a humble attempt to navigate the complex terrain of African-European relations, unpick historical threads, and decipher power dynamics. Ultimately, I seek to highlight how an authentic partnership transcends manipulation, pointing towards the necessity of recalibrating power dynamics to achieve equitable, enduring collaborations.
I believe that European and African leaders who head up the partnership between these two continents share a deeply ingrained mindset characterised by self-deception, and it is this mindset that I endeavour to unravel and elucidate within the pages of this book.
Self-deception in a medical context refers to a cognitive phenomenon where an individual knowingly or unknowingly distorts their perception of their health, symptoms, or well-being. It involves creating a mental framework that downplays or denies existing health concerns, often as a psychological defence mechanism against anxiety or distress. This can result in individuals avoiding medical attention, neglecting necessary treatments, or minimising the severity of their conditions, which may lead to delayed diagnosis and intervention. Self-deception in healthcare underscores the intricate connection between psychological factors and physical health outcomes, highlighting the need for a holistic approach to patient care that addresses both the medical and psychological dimensions.
In the realm of politics and diplomacy, a concept as delicate as self-deception does not often take centre stage. However, it can offer a lens through which we can decipher the complexities of decision-making and interaction at these levels. At its core, self-deception in politics and diplomacy entails the subtle art of bending reality to align with one’s aspirations, beliefs, and self-perception. It is a psychological mechanism that weaves a comforting veil over inconvenient truths, subtly reshaping the narrative to fit personal inclinations. This can become a strategic tool that astute politicians and diplomats wield. It is a mechanism that enables leaders to tread the delicate line between managing public perception and safeguarding their own interests.
This artful orchestration often bridges gaps and forges pathways to consensus. Yet, those consensuses can become deceptive themselves and lack legitimacy.
Akin to the maestro’s wand, self-deception can also harmonise the disparate voices within a political ensemble. Leaders adeptly use this tool to nurture unity, blurring the lines of disagreement and casting a spotlight on shared goals. Through this, they foster a sense of cohesion that bolsters collective strength. On the grand stage of international affairs, the judicious use of self-deception becomes an instrument of diplomacy itself. Politicians skilfully navigate public opinion by sculpting their self-image and painting policies with the brushstrokes of righteousness. Even in the face of controversy, this mechanism softens the edges of decision-making, imbuing actions with an air of moral rectitude.
However, as we unfurl this tapestry of self-deception, we must tread cautiously, for the boundary between strategic adaptation and delusional entrapment is perilously thin. Straying too far down the path of self-deception can lead to grave consequences, obscuring reality and stifling effective decision-making. When self-deception becomes a crutch, it impedes honest engagement, hampering collaboration and amplifying conflicts.
In what I hope is an exciting exploration, this book delves into the multifaceted layers of this phenomenon.
It dawned upon me that on both sides of the negotiating table, leaders are inexorably compelled to cater to the demands of their respective domestic or regional constituencies. In essence, this book endeavours to cast light on the complexities that govern—in the shadows—the partnership between Africa and Europe. It seeks to provide insight into the underlying currents shaping this relationship and offer a nuanced understanding of the motivations driving actions and decisions. In doing so, my aspiration is not to cast blame but to illuminate the underlying mechanisms that have perpetuated a cycle of self-deception and to foster a platform for more informed and authentic engagement moving forward.
The motivation behind this effort is rooted in a sincere quest to explore the historical nuances that have inadvertently relegated Africa to the periphery of global discourse and have unintentionally confined its economic interactions to the marginal role of a provider of commodities. With a respectful curiosity, I seek to illuminate the intricate influences subtly shaping such a role on the global stage. With a critical lens, I endeavour to dissect the concept of comparative advantages, laying bare its inadvertent limitations on Africa’s economic identity. However, within this exploration, I also strive to challenge the prevailing belief that Africa cannot redefine its future. The book highlights instances that showcase the continent’s latent potential for transformation.
Traversing the intricate path of African-European relations, I investigate the journey culminating in the Brussels Summit between the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU) in February 2022. A recurring theme emerges throughout my observed interactions—a calculated effort to fragment key African governments and other stakeholders.
The book dissects the European notion of partnership, revealing how it sometimes unwittingly perpetuates existing power dynamics (Smith, 2002). In my quest for understanding, I propose a shift in perspective that sidesteps traditional aid approaches. Instead, I imagine a path for a different relationship to harness the potential hidden within the three global megatrends: demography, environment, and technology. My focus centres mainly on the transformative potential of collaborative climate action.
The book assesses the influence wielded by stigmatised narratives—a subject I approach with profound reverence for its complexity. The aim is to carefully dissect how these narratives, laden with biases, shape the actions of pivotal actors and the intricate processes that define the landscape.
A discernible pattern emerges—European actors, often driven by benevolent intentions, perpetuate an image of altruism. Nevertheless, they may sometimes overlook the unintended consequences of their charitable endeavours, obstructing true transformation. Intriguingly, while voicing their reservations about European attitudes, African leaders paradoxically compete for attention, seeking to maximise aid and enhance their global standing. I contend that both these perspectives are the rooted cause of self-deception, where the quest for truth bends to the sway of individual interests.
The Africa in the pages of this book pertains to the member states of the AU. While this might appear self-evident, the reality unveils a more intricate picture. As a continent, Africa has been segmented into subgroups by international stakeholders, often amalgamating its northern region with other continents. This amalgamation is, at times, linked to Arab culture. Although Arab culture is dominant, it is one among several cultures present in that region (Mazrui & Tidy, 2003).However, these divisions are not solely anchored in cultural considerations; other motives come into play. The application of economic criteria in such cases is fraught with complexities, as the disparities between a nation like Mauritania and a prosperous Gulf monarchy, for example, are vast and diverse.
Geographically, the prevailing use of the term “sub-Saharan Africa” tends to overlook the fact that some countries in this category are more Saharan in nature, while others excluded from this categorisation might be located further to the south. Within the context of relations with the EU, these divisions have been tactically employed to fragment negotiations into distinct interest groups, thereby undercutting the potential for a unified and stronger stance representing the entire African continent. This sub-division strategy has sometimes inadvertently weakened the continent’s collective voice in engagements with the EU.
The Europe discussed within these pages primarily pertains to the countries that are members of the EU and the European Commission itself, given its pivotal leadership role in contemporary times and its substantial influence in shaping the framework for engagement between European countries and Africa. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom (UK) is frequently encompassed in the analyses due to its historical significance in shaping the relations between the two continents and its instrumental role in moulding EU policies until the advent of Brexit. The behaviours of the UK continue to align closely with the patterns observed in other Western nations, not only EU member states but also countries that comprise the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), led by the G7.

What to Expect in This Book

The book is structured in three parts. The first part (Chaps. 1, 2, 3, and 4) delves into history, carefully tracing the roots and evolution of this intricate relationship. The second part (Chaps. 5, 6, 7, and 8) offers a panorama of current affairs, concentrating on the last three years of negotiations that have shaped the narrative between these two continents. The third and final part (the concluding Chap. 9) casts a contemplative gaze forward, addressing the challenges and opportunities ahead.
The book raises historical echoes in Chap. 2, unearthing the persisting influence of the colonial legacy that shapes perceptions on both sides. Here, the narrative engages with the philosophies of African luminaries like Frantz Fanon and Amilcar Cabral, presenting their insights on decolonising minds as part of the broader colonial and post-colonial context.
Chapter 3 navigates the terrain of aid effectiveness debates, revealing how structural adjustments and conditionalities have perpetuated a cycle of dependence. Building on this, Chap. 4 introduces a more profound lens, examining the concept of comparative advantages and its impact on the dynamics that kept Africa anchored to a colonial model of commodity dependency. Here, the narrative compares the developmental trajectories of African and Asian countries, exploring the repercussions of decades of aid on Africa’s progress.
Chapter 5 paints a nuanced picture of Africa’s disillusionment with development promises in the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter weaves a tale of high expectations and subsequent setbacks, highlighting European involvement in shaping Africa’s developmental path.
In Chap. 6, the discourse explores the intricacies of European engagement, encompassing initiatives and agreements that shape the Africa-EU partnership. While not explicitly mentioned, the text tackles the layers of evolving strategies and diplomatic nuances.
Chapter 7 takes readers into the realm of migration, meticulously dissecting demographic shifts and the consequent European apprehensions that underscore the discourse about this hot topic. It provides an incisive analysis of migration policies and their implications, alluding to specific measures that undermine international humanitarian law.
Subsequently, Chap. 8 unravels the centrality of trade in the relationship, revealing how trade agreements have influenced Africa’s position in the global economy. The text navigates this landscape, providing insight into the roles Europe plays in Africa’s international trade, hinting at pivotal agreements that can impede Africa’s integration.
Finally, in Chap. 9, the narrative weaves together the threads of self-deception that run through the book. Drawing upon the cumulative insights of the preceding chapters, it beckons for a recalibrated partnership that embraces pragmatic opportunities in critical areas. As the book concludes, readers are left with a renewed understanding of the Africa-EU relationship and the potential for transformative collaboration.
Guided by my previous works, this book is infused with storytelling, bridging the worlds of academia and accessibility. While avoiding the trappings of journalism, I draw from published materials, interviews, and the wisdom of relevant authors. And I use anecdotes gleaned from extraordinary instances, illustrating the subtle manifestations of self-deception.
What justifies my use of the term ‘self-deception’ is the interplay between official discourse, strong beliefs, and interests stemming from a desire for self-preservation of the key protagonists in the Africa-Europe relationship that I have observed over time. With a genuine sense of humility commensurate with the intricate nature of the subject matter, this endeavour aims to curate the wealth of existing knowledge thoughtfully. This curated insight is designed to resonate with the perceptive perspectives of political leaders, scholars, and policymakers while inviting a broader public engagement.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://​creativecommons.​org/​licenses/​by/​4.​0/​), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and indicate if changes were made.
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Literature
go back to reference Mazrui, A. A., & Tidy, M. (Eds.). (2003). Nationalism and the New States in Africa: From About 1935 to the Present. Heinemann Educational Books. Mazrui, A. A., & Tidy, M. (Eds.). (2003). Nationalism and the New States in Africa: From About 1935 to the Present. Heinemann Educational Books.
go back to reference Smith, K. E. (2002). European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Polity. Smith, K. E. (2002). European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World. Polity.
Metadata
Title
Introduction: A Masterclass in Dealing with Passive Aggressive Behaviour
Author
Carlos Lopes
Copyright Year
2024
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-57591-4_1

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