1 Introduction
The relationship between fund flows and financial performance is one of the most intensely researched topics in the mutual fund literature. Warther (
1995), Edelen and Warner (
2001), Goetzmann and Massa (
2003), and Ben-Rephael et al. (
2011) provide clear evidence that fund flows into equity mutual funds can exert price pressure on aggregate stock market returns. More recently, Coval and Stafford (
2007), Frazzini and Lamont (
2008), and Lou (
2012) document how individual stock returns can be affected by fund flows into equity mutual funds. In addition, mutual fund flows themselves have been suggested as a potential source for the well-documented underperformance of mutual funds relative to their benchmarks as extreme inflows or outflows force mutual funds to engage in costly transactions (Grinblatt and Titman
1989; Wermers
2000). Edelen (
1999) and Rakowski (
2010) provide direct evidence for the hypothesis that fund flow-induced transaction costs are a cause of the underperformance of mutual funds.
While the effects of fund flows on the performance of individual stocks and on the funds themselves are well-documented, thus far little is known about the flow-return dynamics among mutual funds. We aim to fill this gap in the literature, by analysing how fund returns are affected by flows into other mutual funds.
In this paper, we test whether the performance of individual mutual funds is subject to spillover risk caused by fund flows into connected mutual funds. We measure the degree of connectedness between two mutual funds by their share of overlapping portfolio holdings. The interconnectedness among entities from investing in common assets is considered an important channel for the propagation of systemic risk (see (Elliott et al.
2014a; Lin and Guo
2019) and many others). However, the majority of the literature uses the network analysis method and emphasizes the position of an entity inside the network (see for example (Eisenberg and Noe
2001; Gai and Kapadia
2010; May and Arinaminpathy
2010; Lin and Guo
2019)). Only few studies focus on network externalities. Antón and Polk (
2014) provide evidence of excessive co-movement in individual stock returns caused by the shared ownership of active mutual funds. Blocher (
2016) studies the impact of overlapping portfolio holdings on the co-movement in the returns of mutual funds. Different from previous literature, this paper studies the characteristics that can affect a firms’ vulnerability to network externalities. Building on the price pressure effects documented in the mutual fund literature, we hypothesize that flows into connected funds can affect individual mutual fund performance. Moreover, we examine whether there is a predictive relationship, by testing the spillover hypothesis not only based on actual flows, but also using expected fund flows, which are predicted from past fund returns and flows. Our empirical study is based on a global sample of 3,010 US-focused equity mutual funds over the January 2005 to December 2014 period.
Building up on the works of Lou (
2012) and Blocher (
2016), we confirm that flows into connected mutual funds impact the abnormal performance of individual mutual funds in a predictable way. We find that a one standard deviation increase in monthly expected flows to connected funds is associated with an annualized excess return of 0.22%. When splitting the sample of connected funds into three equal groups, we find that a one standard deviation increase in flows to the most connected funds is associated with an annualized spillover effect of 1.13%.
We make several contributions to the literature. First, we contribute to the literature on liquidity-based price pressure in the mutual fund industry. When mutual funds experience strong outflows, they are reliant on the liquidity provided by other market participants and may be forced to sell assets at ‘fire-sale’ prices (Coval and Stafford
2007). Our results provide evidence that spillover effects are significantly more pronounced during periods of constrained market liquidity.
1 During crisis periods, a one standard deviation increase in expected flows to the tertile of funds with the highest overlap is associated with a monthly excess return of 1.50%.
Second, we document that the spillover effect is more pronounced for small cap stock mutual funds relative to large cap mutual funds. During periods with strong outflows, the spillover effect to small cap stock funds is 1.07% per month, while only 0.02% for large cap stock funds. Several papers have challenged the suitability of the open-end fund structure as an investment vehicle. Stein (
2005) argues that the risk of sudden withdrawals in case of short-term underperformance makes open-end funds managers unlikely to bet on profitable long term opportunities, where convergence to fundamental values is unlikely to be either smooth or rapid (see also Shleifer and Vishny (
1997)). Cherkes et al. (
2009) emphasize the suitability of closed-end funds to hold illiquid securities, because they are not subject to large-scale creation or redemption of shares, which can lead to potentially large transaction costs, as is the case with open-end funds. Chen et al. (
2010) document that funds investing in less liquid stocks exhibit a stronger sensitivity of outflows to poor past performance than funds with liquid assets. The authors argue an investor’s tendency to withdraw increases when there is a concern for the damaging effect of other investors’ redemptions, due to higher trading costs. Our findings contribute to this strand of the mutual fund literature by showing that the spillover risk-factor is predominantly a concern for small cap stock funds. In contrast, the open-end mutual fund structure is more suitable for large cap stock funds, as suggested by their robustness with respect to the spillover risk factor.
The third contribution we make is related to a recent strand of the financial literature that focuses on the dark side of diversification. While the diversification is generally perceived positively due to well-documented reduction for the risk of individual financial entities, Slijkerman et al. (
2013) argue that it can lead to increased systemic risk. Allen et al. (
2010) show that diversification results in more overlap and more similarities among the portfolios of financial entities, thereby increasing the probability of coinciding failures with other similar institutions. However, thus far only very little empirical evidence is provided to support this argument. Most of the analyses are from theoretical or analytical perspective (see for example (Allen and Gale
2000; Upper and Worms
2004; Acemoglu et al.
2015; Elliott et al.
2014b, October)). In this paper, we empirically test whether similarity in portfolio positions results in increased spillover effects. For this purpose, we group funds into highly and less diversified funds. During periods with strong outflows, the spillover effect to the 25 percentile of most diversified funds rises to 2.6% per month, while the effect is only 0.1% for the 25 percentile of least diversified funds. These results confirm that funds with more diversified assets are most seriously affected by the spillover effect. This finding provides empirical evidence that diversification can increase the transfer of risks between financial institutions. The reduction of the risks at the individual portfolio level does hence come at the cost of increased risk sharing between entities with similar portfolio positions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 introduces the dataset and descriptive statistics. Section
3 introduces the methodology. The empirical results are provided in Section
4. Section
5 contains the conclusion.
2 Data and descriptive statistics
2.1 Mutual fund data
Our empirical study is based on the global universe of open-end equity mutual funds with an investment focus on US stocks, including non-surviving funds. While many mutual fund studies focus on US-domiciled funds only, we also include international funds, because they are also likely to contribute to any spillover effects as long as the funds share a common investment focus. Our main data source is Morningstar Direct, a survivorship bias-free institutional research database, which provides one of the most comprehensive coverage of open-end mutual funds across the globe.
A necessary criterion for the inclusion in our sample is the availability of data on the funds’ portfolio holdings. According to SEC rules, all US-domiciled funds have been required to report their holdings on a quarterly basis since February 2004. For non-US-domiciled funds no uniform regulation exists, so we include all international funds for which quarterly holding data are available in Morningstar.
Since the names of portfolio holdings are often ambiguous, we use a more conservative approach by identifying overlapping positions based on ISINs. A disadvantage of this method is that ISINs are not provided in some cases. To identify the portfolio holdings of a fund reasonably well, we require the share of non-identified holdings in a given quarter to be less than 20%. Furthermore, we require the share of non-US stock holdings to be smaller than 30% to ensure that the funds in our sample are actually focused on US stocks.
Moreover, our analysis is conducted at the fund level and not at the share class level. Different share classes of the same fund hold a common portfolio and opposing flows into different share classes may offset each other at the fund level. Hence, we use the total flow to all share classes to measure any spillover effect on other funds.
Fund returns, total net assets (TNA) and other fund characteristics are also obtained from Morningstar Direct. For non-US-domiciled funds, all financial data are converted to US dollars. Overall, our sample contains 3,010 distinct US-focused equity mutual funds and 209,458 fund-month observations over the 2005-2014 period.
2 Table
1 contains some descriptive characteristics on the funds in our sample. On average, the monthly fund return is 0.78% with a standard deviation of 5.06%. The average family size is 52.8 billion USD and the average age is around 14 years. The average expense ratio is 1.18%. Moreover, the funds in our sample exhibit an average cash ratio of 3.3% and a turnover ratio of 75%. Overall, these statistics are consistent with the literature on US mutual funds.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of fund characteristics
Return (%) | 0.78 | 5.06 | –34.79 | –8.22 | 3.73 | 57.37 | 209458 |
Excess return (%) | 0.00 | 1.72 | –23.15 | –2.66 | 2.67 | 45.37 | 209458 |
Actual flow | –1.24 | 37.96 | –159.91 | –49.82 | 45.15 | 172.28 | 209458 |
Expected flow | 0.53 | 36.33 | –139.64 | –45.16 | 49.49 | 173.75 | 209458 |
Fund size (TNA) | 1.69 | 7.74 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 5.98 | 383.00 | 209458 |
Family size | 52.80 | 144.66 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 409.60 | 1412.01 | 209458 |
Age | 172.65 | 144.63 | 7.00 | 31.00 | 449.00 | 1085.00 | 209458 |
Expense ratio (%) | 1.18 | 0.52 | –0.51 | 0.36 | 2.00 | 10.92 | 209458 |
Cash ratio (%) | 3.30 | 6.02 | –656.71 | 0.00 | 10.91 | 330.73 | 209458 |
Turnover ratio (%) | 75.31 | 178.50 | –397.05 | 5.00 | 205.00 | 31596.00 | 209458 |
2.2 Fund flows
Following prior literature, we compute fund flows using monthly total net assets (TNA) and fund returns (Ippolito
1992; Guercio and Tkac
2002). The net flow of funds to mutual fund
j during month
t is defined as:
$$ Flow_{j,t} = TNA_{j,t} - TNA_{j,t-1}(1+R_{j,t}), $$
(1)
where
TNAj,t is the Morningstar TNA value for fund
j at the end of month
t, and
Rj,t is the monthly return for fund
j over month
t.
3
In our empirical analysis we measure spillover effects of fund flows on returns two different ways: (1) by using actual fund flows; and (2) by using expected fund flows. Measuring the spillover effect based expected flows enables us to test whether flows into connected funds impact fund performance in a predictable way. Moreover, expected flows circumvent potential endogeneity issues. It is well-documented in the literature that fund flows are strongly related to past performance (e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Given our monthly data set, it cannot be excluded that fund flows towards the end of the month react to returns at the beginning of the month. This could potentially lead to a biased estimation of spillover intensity if the explanatory variable (fund flows) is correlated with the error term. On the other hand, fund flows may cause spillover effects irrespective of their source or use of origin, so we choose to report the results based on actual flows, too.
We follow Coval and Stafford (
2007) and estimate expected flows from fund returns and flows over the previous 12 months as the explanatory variables:
$$ Flow(\%)_{j,t} = a_{i}+ \sum\limits_{k=1}^{12} {b_{i}Flow(\%)_{j,t-k}} + \sum\limits_{k=1}^{12} {c_{i}R_{j,t-k}} + e_{i,t}. $$
(2)
where
Flow(
%)
j,t is the percentage net flow to fund
j relative to the funds’ TNA at the end of the previous period.
The fitted values of
\(\widehat {Flow(\%)}_{j,t}\) from Eq.
2 on average explain 41.4% of the variation in flows,
4 suggesting that fund flows can be predicted reasonably well using past flows and returns. We then calculate expected flows (
\(\widehat {Flow}_{j,t}\)) by multiplying (
\(\widehat {Flow(\%)}_{j,t}\)) with
TNAj,t− 1. As shown in Table
1, the average monthly actual fund flow is -1.24 million USD, with a standard deviation of 37.96 million USD. The negative outflow is consistent with the general trend of falling assets under management within the active mutual fund industry in recent years. Moreover, many funds have suffered substantial outflows during the global financial crisis. Expected flows, exhibit a slightly positive average of 0.53 million USD and a standard deviation of 36.33 million USD, which is in line with the volatility of actual fund flows. The average fund size is 1.69 billion USD with a standard deviation of 7.74 billion USD.
2.3 Measuring connectedness from overlapping portfolio holdings
A necessary condition for any spillover effect from the flows to one fund on the returns of another fund is some connection between the two funds. We measure the degree of connectedness between two funds by their overlapping portfolio positions. If two funds hold the same stock, we define the size of their overlapping portfolio position as the smaller one of both positions, measured by the size of the position relative to the size of the total portfolio. If one fund owns a stock, while another fund has a short position in the same stock, we calculate their overlapping portfolio position as the difference between both positions.
In formal terms,
s, the overlapping portfolio position between two funds regarding each stock
l, is defined as the minimum holding of stock
l by the two funds, or, as the difference between the position if one fund holds stock
l, while the other fund is short stock
l:
$$ s_{l,i,j,t} = \left\{\begin{array}{ll} \ \min{(|h^{l}_{i,t}|,|h^{l}_{j,t}|)} & \quad \text{if } h^{l}_{i,t} \times h^{l}_{j,t} \geq 0\\ \\-(|h^{l}_{i,t}|+|h^{l}_{j,t}|) & \quad \text{if } h^{l}_{i,t} \times h^{l}_{j,t} < 0 \end{array} \right. $$
(3)
where
\(h^{l}_{i,t}\) is the percentage ratio of fund
i’s position in stock
l in period
t. For example, if Fund 1 holds 20% of Stock A, and Fund 2 holds 10% of Stock A, then the overlapping portfolio position between the two funds regarding stock A is 10%, and if Fund 1 holds 5% of Stock B, while Fund 2 has a short position of -2% in Stock B, their overlapping position regarding Stock B is -7%.
We then calculate
S, the total share of overlapping portfolio positions between two funds by summing up their overlapping positions over all stocks:
$$ S_{i,j,t} = \sum\limits_{l=1}^{L_{t}} {s_{l,i,j,t}}, $$
(4)
where
Lt is total number of stocks in period
t. With the given example, the total share of overlapping portfolio positions between Fund 1 and Fund 2 is 10
% + (− 7
%) = 3
%, assuming there are no other overlapping positions except for Stock A and Stock B.
Almost all mutual funds in our sample file their reports at the end of a quarter. For the rare exceptions, we calculate overlapping positions assuming that portfolio compositions remain constant until the new report is released. For example, if one fund reports by the end of December and another fund by the end of January, we measure an updated overlapping ratio by the end of January, which remains constant during February and March until the first fund reports new holdings by the end of March.
Table
2 provides descriptive statistics on the number of portfolio positions by fund and on the number of connected and unconnected funds over our sample period. Two funds are referred to be connected if they share at least one common portfolio position in a given period. On average, each fund in our sample has 176 portfolio positions. Given that all funds hold about 9,000 distinct positions in an average year, it is not surprising that many funds are not connected at all. For example, there is no reason why a fund which focuses on large cap stocks would share any positions with a small cap stock fund. On the other hand, there is a considerable degree of variation in the number of positions per fund, ranging from 1 to 2,999, which increases the chances of overlapping positions. The average number of connected funds is 947, and the average ratio of connected funds relative to all funds in our sample is 40.9%.
Table 2
Portfolio positions and connections between funds
2005 | 157 | 254 | 1 | 2582 | 6890 | 509 | 923 | 1432 |
2006 | 164 | 274 | 1 | 2894 | 8428 | 749 | 1148 | 1897 |
2007 | 168 | 283 | 1 | 2759 | 9313 | 870 | 1220 | 2090 |
2008 | 176 | 304 | 1 | 2861 | 9208 | 1010 | 1310 | 2320 |
2009 | 183 | 329 | 1 | 2999 | 8684 | 1046 | 1389 | 2435 |
2010 | 180 | 298 | 1 | 2764 | 8432 | 1034 | 1489 | 2523 |
2011 | 179 | 308 | 1 | 2602 | 8929 | 1042 | 1522 | 2564 |
2012 | 181 | 319 | 1 | 2652 | 8747 | 1060 | 1544 | 2604 |
2013 | 185 | 327 | 1 | 2837 | 8485 | 1046 | 1565 | 2611 |
2014 | 190 | 342 | 1 | 2999 | 9166 | 1102 | 1594 | 2696 |
Total | 176 | 304 | 1 | 2999 | 30034 | 947 | 1370 | 2317 |
Table
3 shows the distribution of overlapping portfolio holdings for the sample of connected funds. The average portfolio overlap between two connected funds is 9.73% with a standard deviation of 10.94%. The intensity of any spillover effect of flows from one fund on the returns of another fund is most likely related to the degree of overlapping portfolio holdings. For the purpose of our empirical analysis, we rank all connected funds by their overlapping ratio and split them into three equal groups. The average overlapping ratio for the tertile of connected funds with the lowest overlap is 1.08%, 5.98% for the middle tertile, and 21.7% for the upper tertile.
Table 3
Distribution of overlapping portfolio holdings between connected funds
2005 | 10.27 | 11.47 | –25.12 | 2.72 | 6.11 | 11.52 | 101.72 | 1.13 | 6.36 | 22.91 |
2006 | 9.09 | 10.53 | –51.66 | 2.38 | 5.04 | 9.71 | 100.05 | 1.01 | 5.30 | 20.57 |
2007 | 9.35 | 10.79 | –77.37 | 2.45 | 5.26 | 10.05 | 107.18 | 0.99 | 5.51 | 21.07 |
2008 | 9.61 | 11.10 | –82.79 | 2.58 | 5.43 | 10.18 | 123.91 | 1.01 | 5.67 | 21.63 |
2009 | 10.42 | 11.55 | –106.87 | 2.91 | 6.15 | 11.51 | 120.83 | 1.15 | 6.42 | 23.17 |
2010 | 10.01 | 10.95 | –115.81 | 2.83 | 6.05 | 11.30 | 121.30 | 1.14 | 6.31 | 22.09 |
2011 | 9.63 | 10.71 | –101.07 | 2.73 | 5.80 | 10.70 | 103.11 | 1.11 | 6.03 | 21.29 |
2012 | 9.97 | 11.01 | –87.12 | 2.78 | 6.02 | 11.17 | 129.46 | 1.11 | 6.27 | 22.04 |
2013 | 9.60 | 10.70 | –62.76 | 2.79 | 5.86 | 10.55 | 154.67 | 1.10 | 6.05 | 21.12 |
2014 | 9.39 | 10.64 | –85.32 | 2.70 | 5.68 | 10.29 | 156.63 | 1.06 | 5.88 | 20.71 |
Total | 9.73 | 10.94 | –115.81 | 2.69 | 5.74 | 10.70 | 156.63 | 1.08 | 5.98 | 21.66 |
3 Modelling spillover effects in the mutual fund industry
To estimate potential spillover effects, we examine how the excess returns of mutual funds are affected by flows to other mutual funds. The excess return
\(\widetilde {R}\) of fund
i in period
t is defined as the difference between the fund return and fund size-weighted average return of all US-focused equity funds in our sample:
\(\widetilde {R}_{i,t}=R_{i,t}-\bar {R}_{t}\). In our sample, the average excess return is close to zero, and the standard deviation is 1.72% (Table
1).
There are two reasons why we opt for the simple excess return rather than alternative performance measures such as raw fund returns or three or four-factor model alphas. (1) By using excess returns, we remove the return component of the general stock market. The literature documents that fund flows and contemporaneous returns are highly correlated (see for example (Warther
1995), or (Ben-Rephael et al.
2011)). Thus, it would not be clear whether positive fund returns are due to spillover effects from flows to connected mutual funds, or due to high returns in the stock market in general. (2) Three or four-factor alphas aim to capture risk exposure of the fund to small cap, value, or momentum stocks, but these risk factors might themselves be driven by above-average flows to their respective subgroups. For example, Lou (
2012) finds evidence that flow-driven return effects can at least partially account for mutual fund performance persistence and stock price momentum. Hence, risk-adjusted returns are not ideally suited to isolate any fund flow-driven spillover effects.
5
Our base model to estimate spillover effects of fund flows on the performance of other mutual funds is represented by the following equation:
$$ \widetilde{R}_{i,t}=\rho \sum\limits_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N_{t}}{w_{i,j,t}{Flow_{j,t}}}+\beta Control_{i,t} + u_{i} +\varepsilon_{i,t} \\ $$
(5)
where
ρ is the coefficient for the spillover effect of flows to connected funds on fund returns. Flows to connected funds are measured by the term
\( \sum\limits_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N_{t}}{w_{i,j,t}{Flow_{j,t}}}\), where
Flow is either the actual or expected flow to fund
j in period
t, as described in the previous section.
6
The list of control variables (Controli,t) is consistent with the literature on fund performance and includes fund flows, lagged fund returns, fund size, the size of the fund family, fund age, the expense ratio, the fund’s cash ratio, and the turnover ratio. ui stands for the firm fixed effects, which captures time-invariant firm characteristics, such as the country.
A special emphasis needs to be placed on how flows to connected funds are weighted. The strength of the total spillover effect from the flows of all connected funds is likely to be related to the number of connections and the degree of connectedness between each pair of funds. Thus, perhaps the most intuitive approach is to weight the total flows to all connected funds by the respective total share of overlapping portfolio positions between each pair of funds, as \( \sum\limits_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N} {S_{i,j,t}{Flow_{j,t}}}\), where Si,j,t is the total share of overlapping portfolio positions between fund i and fund j in period t. This weighted sum of all fund flows to connected funds can then be interpreted as the total fund flow relevant to fund i. A disadvantage of this approach is, however, that it is no longer feasible to differentiate whether the spillover effect is due to a high number of connected funds, a high degree of overlapping portfolio holdings, or due to strong flows to only a few connected funds.
Bell and Bockstael (2000) suggest to row-standardize the weight matrix in order to allow for the appealing interpretation that the sum of the effects of neighbors in different bands can vary over bands. In our setting, we are interested in whether the same dollar amount of fund flows causes a stronger spillover effect for funds with a higher degree of overlapping portfolio holdings. Thus, we row-standardize the weight matrix
wi,j,t, by transforming the total share of overlapping portfolio holdings between each pair of funds, so that the total weights sum up to one for each fund:
$$ w_{i,j,t}=\frac{S_{i,j,t}}{{\sum}_{j=1,i\neq j}^{N_{t}} {S_{i,j,t}}} . $$
(6)
This approach implicitly assumes that the spillover effect from the total flows to all connected funds remains constant, irrespective of the number of the connections of a fund or the share of overlapping portfolio holdings.
In order to test whether the spillover effect of funds flows is related to the degree of connectedness, we split the sample of connected funds into three groups:
$$ \begin{array}{@{}rcl@{}} \widetilde{R}_{i,t}&= & \rho_{1} \sum\limits_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N_{t}}{w^{Q1}_{i,j,t}{Flow_{j,t}}}+\rho_{2} \sum\limits_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N_{t}}{w^{Q2}_{i,j,t}{Flow_{j,t}}}+\rho_{3} \sum\limits_{j=1,j\neq i}^{N_{t}}{w^{Q3}_{i,j,t}{Flow_{j,t}}} \\ && +\beta Control_{i,t}+u_{i}+\varepsilon_{i,t} \end{array} $$
(7)
where
Q1 (
Q3) denotes the tertile of funds with the lowest (highest) total share of overlapping portfolio holdings
Si,j,t.
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