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Dynamic Games and Applications OnlineFirst articles


Mean Field Models to Regulate Carbon Emissions in Electricity Production

The most serious threat to ecosystems is the global climate change fueled by the uncontrolled increase in carbon emissions. In this project, we use mean field control and mean field game models to analyze and inform the decisions of electricity …

René Carmona, Gökçe Dayanıklı, Mathieu Laurière


Min-Max Robust Control in LQ-Differential Games

In this paper, we consider the design of equilibrium linear feedback control policies in an uncertain process (e.g., an economy) affected by either one or more players. We consider a process which nominal (commonly believed) development in time is …

Jacob Engwerda


Jump Equilibria in Public-Good Differential Games with a Single State Variable

A simple sufficient condition is proved for symmetric Markov subgame perfect Nash equilibria in public-good differential games with a single state variable. The condition admits equilibria in feedback strategies that have discontinuous dependence …

Johannes M. Schumacher, Puduru Viswanadha Reddy, Jacob C. Engwerda


Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework

We model the interaction between science and technology using an evolutionary game theoretic framework. Conflictual rather than synergistic relation between science and technology is assumed, in which they rely on openness and secrecy as …

Ozgur Aydogmus, Erkan Gürpinar


Noise-Induced Quasi-Heteroclinic Cycle in a Rock–Paper–Scissors Game with Random Payoffs

The rock–paper–scissors game is one of the main theoretical models in evolutionary game theory and has been used successfully to explain some observed phenomena in biology, economics and social science. In order to explore the influence of …

Tian-Jiao Feng, Jie Mei, Rui-Wu Wang, Sabin Lessard, Yi Tao, Xiu-Deng Zheng


Provably Efficient Reinforcement Learning in Decentralized General-Sum Markov Games

This paper addresses the problem of learning an equilibrium efficiently in general-sum Markov games through decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the fundamental difficulty of calculating a Nash equilibrium (NE), we instead aim …

Weichao Mao, Tamer Başar


Approximate Capture in Gromov–Hausdorff Close Spaces

This paper addresses the robustness of the capture radii with respect to perturbation in the phase space on the example of the so-called Lion and Man game. This is a two-person pursuit-evasion game with equal players’ top speeds. The existence of …

Olga Yufereva


Opinion Dynamics Control in a Social Network with a Communication Structure

This paper considers a game-theoretic model of external control influence on opinion dynamics and reached consensus in a social network. The network participants are linked through an arbitrary communication graph. The goal of control is to keep …

Hui Jiang, Vladimir V. Mazalov, Hongwei Gao, Chen Wang


An Evolutionary Approach to Pollution Control in Competitive Markets

We consider a large population of firms in a market environment. The firms are divided into a finite set of types, with each type being characterized by a distinct private cost function. Moreover, the firms generate an external cost like pollution …

Ratul Lahkar, Vinay Ramani

Open Access 02-11-2021

Trade and Resource Sustainability with Asset Markets

Trade changes incentives to protect an open-access natural resource independently of its effect on the resource price. General equilibrium linkages cause resource policy to affect the price of privately owned assets regardless of whether they are …

Larry Karp, Armon Rezai


Learning in Games with Cumulative Prospect Theoretic Preferences

We consider repeated games where the players behave according to cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We show that, when the players have calibrated strategies and behave according to CPT, the natural analog of the notion of correlated equilibrium in …

Soham R. Phade, Venkat Anantharam


Cooperation in a Dynamic Setting with Asymmetric Environmental Valuation and Responsibility

We analyze an environmental agreement as a cooperative differential game between two regions. The agreement is jointly profitable, since the current contributions in terms of emissions reduction is overcompensated by the benefits of a cleaner …

Francisco Cabo, Mabel Tidball