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Social Choice and Welfare OnlineFirst articles

26-11-2021 | Correction

Correction to: Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?

In the original publication of the article, some of the data in Tables 5 and 7 were wrong. The correct Tables 5 and 7 should read as given below. Case I 3 I 2 L 3 I L 2 Cv I /2 L I /3 L /2 L/3 3-IAC 88.57 89.49 90.25 92.27 92.27 92.53 91.48 91.48 …

D. Marc Kilgour, Jean-Charles Grégoire, Angèle M. Foley

20-11-2021 | Original Paper

Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study

We study criteria that compare mechanisms according to a property (e.g., Pareto efficiency or stability) in the presence of multiple equilibria. The multiplicity of equilibria complicates such comparisons when some equilibria satisfy the property …

Benoit Decerf, Francois Woitrin

16-11-2021 | Original Paper

Fair cake-cutting for imitative agents

We investigate cases of preference change in the context of cake-cutting problems. In some circumstances, believing that some other player can be credited with a particular preference structure triggers a preference shift by imitation. As a result …

Eleonora Cresto, Diego Tajer

15-11-2021 | Original Paper

Strategy-proof and fair reallocation with single-peaked preferences

We consider the strategy-proof rules for reallocating individual endowments of an infinitely divisible good when agents’ preferences are single-peaked. In social endowment setting, the seminal work established by Sprumont (Econometrica 59:509–519 …

Zhen Zhao, Shinji Ohseto

14-11-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

The doctrinal paradox: comparison of decision rules in a probabilistic framework

The doctrinal paradox is analysed from a probabilistic point of view assuming a simple parametric model for the committee’s behaviour. The well known premise-based and conclusion-based majority rules are compared in this model, by means of the …

Aureli Alabert, Mercè Farré

09-11-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

The problem of no hands: responsibility voids in collective decisions

The problem of no hands concerns the existence of so-called responsibility voids: cases where a group makes a certain decision, yet no individual member of the group can be held responsible for this decision. Criteria-based collective decision …

Hein Duijf, Frederik Van De Putte

08-11-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Laissez-faire versus Pareto

Consider two principles for social evaluation. The first, “laissez-faire”, says that mean-preserving redistribution away from laissez-faire incomes should be regarded as a social worsening. This principle captures a key aspect of libertarian …

Kristof Bosmans, Z. Emel Öztürk

03-11-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Voting behavior under outside pressure: promoting true majorities with sequential voting?

When including outside pressure on voters as individual costs, sequential voting (as in roll call votes) is theoretically preferable to simultaneous voting (as in recorded ballots). Under complete information, sequential voting has a unique …

Friedel Bolle, Philipp E. Otto

01-11-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Who’s miserable now? Identifying clusters of people with the lowest subjective wellbeing in the UK

Policymakers are generally most concerned about improving the lives of the worst-off members of society. Identifying these people can be challenging. We take various measures of subjective wellbeing (SWB) as indicators of the how well people are …

Paul Dolan, Kate Laffan, Alina Velias

27-10-2021 | Original Paper

Voting on sanctioning institutions in open and closed communities: experimental evidence

We experimentally analyze the effect of endogenous group formation on the type of sanctioning institutions emerging in a society. We allocate subjects to one of two groups. Subjects play a repeated public goods game and vote on the sanctioning …

Ramón Cobo-Reyes, Gabriel Katz, Thomas Markussen, Simone Meraglia

23-10-2021 | Original Paper

Campaign finance and welfare when contributions are spent on mobilizing voters

We build a political competition model to analyze the welfare effect of campaign finance policies in a context where parties spend campaign contributions on mobilizing voters—rather than on advertising, as is usually done in this literature. This …

Oskar Nupia, Francisco Eslava

20-10-2021 | Original Paper

Axiomatization of the counting rule for cost-sharing with possibly redundant items

For cost allocation problems with an existing set of indivisible public resources with heterogeneous individual needs and non-rivalry access, an axiomatization is provided for the allocation rule that proportionally charges agents for a given …

Gildas Sédry Fopa, Issofa Moyouwou, Joseph Siani

19-10-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond

We consider an odd-sized “jury”, which votes sequentially between two equiprobable states of Nature (say A and B, or Innocent and Guilty), with the majority opinion determining the verdict. Jurors have private information in the form of a signal …

Steve Alpern, Bo Chen

16-10-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Poisson voting games under proportional rule

We analyze strategic voting under proportional rule and two parties, embedding the basic spatial model into the Poisson framework of population uncertainty. We prove that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium. We show that it is characterized by …

Francesco De Sinopoli, Claudia Meroni

26-09-2021 | Original Paper

Voting over selfishly optimal income tax schedules with tax-driven migrations

We study majority voting over selfishly optimal nonlinear income tax schedules proposed by a continuum of workers who can migrate between two competing jurisdictions. Both skill level and migration cost are the private information of each worker …

Darong Dai, Guoqiang Tian

23-09-2021 | Original Paper

The pivotal mechanism versus the voluntary contribution mechanism: an experimental comparison

We conduct an experimental comparison of two well-known mechanisms for undertaking a binary public project: the pivotal mechanism and the voluntary contribution mechanism. We compare the two mechanisms under complete information in which each …

Tatsuki Homma, Ryosuke Iba, Junyi Shen, Takuma Wakayama, Hirofumi Yamamura, Takehiko Yamato

20-09-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Lower and upper bound estimates of inequality of opportunity for emerging economies

Equality of opportunity is an important normative ideal of distributive justice. In spite of its wide acceptance and economic relevance, standard estimation approaches suffer from data limitations that can lead to both downward and upward biased …

Paul Hufe, Andreas Peichl, Daniel Weishaar

03-09-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

We take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing problem from broadcasting sports leagues. We formalize two notions of impartiality, depending on the stance one takes with respect to the revenue generated in the games …

Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

03-09-2021 | Original Paper

Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy

This paper examines evolutionary stability of preferences in games with strategic complements or substitutes following the indirect evolutionary approach. Preferences are classified into three types: altruism, selfishness, and envy. Depending on …

Sung-Hoon Park, Jeong-Yoo Kim

01-09-2021 | Original Paper

Generalized medians and a political center

Building on properties of the median in one dimension under simple majority rule, I propose two generalizations for multi-dimensional environments and general voting rules. A P-ball (for pivotal) is a smallest radius ball such that, for every pair …

Tasos Kalandrakis