Skip to main content

Social Choice and Welfare OnlineFirst articles

20-09-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Lower and upper bound estimates of inequality of opportunity for emerging economies

Equality of opportunity is an important normative ideal of distributive justice. In spite of its wide acceptance and economic relevance, standard estimation approaches suffer from data limitations that can lead to both downward and upward biased …

Paul Hufe, Andreas Peichl, Daniel Weishaar

03-09-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

On the axiomatic approach to sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues

We take the axiomatic approach to uncover the structure of the revenue-sharing problem from broadcasting sports leagues. We formalize two notions of impartiality, depending on the stance one takes with respect to the revenue generated in the games …

Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

03-09-2021 | Original Paper

Evolutionary stability of preferences: altruism, selfishness, and envy

This paper examines evolutionary stability of preferences in games with strategic complements or substitutes following the indirect evolutionary approach. Preferences are classified into three types: altruism, selfishness, and envy. Depending on …

Sung-Hoon Park, Jeong-Yoo Kim

01-09-2021 | Original Paper

Generalized medians and a political center

Building on properties of the median in one dimension under simple majority rule, I propose two generalizations for multi-dimensional environments and general voting rules. A P-ball (for pivotal) is a smallest radius ball such that, for every pair …

Tasos Kalandrakis

26-08-2021 | Original Paper

The excess method: a multiwinner approval voting procedure to allocate wasted votes

In using approval voting to elect multiple winners to a committee or council, it is desirable that excess votes—approvals beyond those that a candidate, especially a shoo-in, needs to win a seat—not be wasted. Common voting procedures such as …

Steven J. Brams, Markus Brill, Anne-Marie George

19-08-2021 | Original Paper

When is the deferred acceptance mechanism responsive to priority-based affirmative action?

For school choice with affirmative action, responsiveness is used as a measure of how a matching mechanism performs in terms of a certain type of affirmative action policy. We know that the Deferred Acceptance (DA) mechanism is not responsive to …

Zhenhua Jiao, Ziyang Shen, Guoqiang Tian

05-08-2021 | Original Paper

Rational inattention and public signals

In this paper, I study the incentives to produce public signals in a rational inattention setting. Agents working in teams must take two actions, but are uncertain about the optimal actions. One optimal action has a ‘private’ signal associated …

Daniel Susskind

27-07-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Responsibility utility and the difference between preference and desirance: implications for welfare evaluation

Actions can provide “responsibility utility” when they signal the actors’ identities or values to others or to themselves. This paper considers a novel implication of this responsibility utility for welfare analysis: fully informed …

David A. Comerford, Leonhard K. Lades

27-07-2021 | Original Paper

Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best?

Weighted scoring rules, perhaps the most common procedures for multi-candidate, single-winner elections, are defined by score vectors, of which the Borda Count is the best known example. The concept of Borda dominance identifies candidates who …

D. Marc Kilgour, Jean-Charles Grégoire, Angèle M. Foley

10-07-2021 | Original Paper

Optimal tax problems with multidimensional heterogeneity: a mechanism design approach

We propose a new method, that we call an allocation perturbation, to derive the optimal nonlinear income tax schedules with multidimensional individual characteristics on which taxes cannot be conditioned. It is well established that, when …

Laurence Jacquet, Etienne Lehmann

28-06-2021 | Original Paper

Taxation behind the veil of ignorance

We explore the design of impartial tax schemes in a simple setup where agents’ incomes are completely determined by their inborn talents. Building on Harsanyi’s veil-of-ignorance approach, we conceptualize an impartial observer who chooses a tax …

Biung-Ghi Ju, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero

04-06-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Strategy-proof mechanism design with non-quasi-linear preferences: ex-post revenue maximization for an arbitrary number of objects

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation mechanisms satisfying individual rationality, non-wastefulness, equal treatment of equals …

Ryosuke Sakai, Shigehiro Serizawa

30-05-2021 | Original Paper Open Access

Roberts’ weak welfarism theorem: a minor correction

Roberts’ “weak neutrality” or “weak welfarism” theorem concerns Sen social welfare functionals which are defined on an unrestricted domain of utility function profiles and satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives, the Pareto condition, and …

Peter J. Hammond

21-04-2021 | Original Paper

A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism

The Boston mechanism (BOS) is widely used for the assignment of students to schools. Yet, BOS is highly manipulable and, therefore, may lead to Pareto inferior assignments. We propose a new indirect matching mechanism ( $${{ NBOS }}$$ NBOS ) that …

Benoit Decerf

26-03-2021 | Original Paper

Undominated rules with three alternatives in an almost unrestricted domain

We consider the collective decision problem of a society choosing among three alternatives on a strict preference domain in which one preference ordering over alternatives is not admissible. We propose the family of Sequential Pareto Undominated …

Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno, Antonio Nicolò

18-02-2021 | Original Paper

New perspectives on the Gini and Bonferroni indices of inequality

This paper rigorously demonstrates that for any unequal income distribution, the well-known Gini index of inequality is bounded above by the recently revived Bonferroni inequality index. The bound is exactly attained if and only if out of n …

Satya R. Chakravarty, Palash Sarkar

06-01-2021 | Original Paper

Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems

For sequencing problems, we identify the set of all mechanisms satisfying queue efficiency, strategy-proofness and budget balance. Such mechanisms are balanced VCG (or B-VCG) mechanisms up to an agent specific function that does not depend on the …

Youngsub Chun, Manipushpak Mitra, Suresh Mutuswami

14-10-2020 | Original Paper

Tailored recommendations

Many popular internet platforms use so-called collaborative filtering systems to give personalized recommendations to their users, based on other users who provided similar ratings for some items. We propose a novel approach to such recommendation …

Eric Danan, Thibault Gajdos, Jean-Marc Tallon

28-08-2020 | Original Paper

Ordinal allocation

A generalization of the well-known Vickrey auctions are lottery qualification auctions–where the m highest bidders win the good with uniform probability, and pay the $$m+1$$ m + 1 st highest bid upon winning. A random lottery qualification …

Christopher P. Chambers, Michael Richter