Kosovo and the "Internationals"

Table of Contents

1. Frontmatter

2. Chapter 1. Kosovo and the Dark Side of Hope

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   In this chapter I provide an overview of the book’s key arguments and theoretical framework. I note that following NATO’s military intervention in 1999 the people of Kosovo were certainly in need of help and were thus metaphorically—and in many cases literally—“patients”. However, I argue that the “doctors”—the Internationals—were not singularly motivated by a desire to help their patients recover, their prescriptions were not effective, and the “hospital” they created within which the people of Kosovo were expected to recuperate was dysfunctional. Additionally, the patients were not as incapacitated as the doctor’s initial diagnosis suggested but, convinced by the doctors—and their local advocates—that their recovery was conditional upon them adopting an uncritically compliant disposition, the majority accepted the nature of the relationship and the prescriptions advanced; it was hope, therefore, which pacified the locals. But it was also hope—albeit a different variant—which inspired the Internationals to behave as they did. Recent events in Kosovo, however, highlight that the damage done by “bad hope” is not irreversible. Both wishful and wilful hopers engage in a form of hoping which is ultimately doomed; as is widely noted, the failure of hopes to materialise can lead to despair which itself manifests as despondency or anger. Despondency and anger have certainly manifested in Kosovo, but “good hope” has triumphed with most people channelling their energy into supporting a political movement promoting a more assertive, self-reliant disposition.

3. Chapter 2. Good Hope and Bad Hope

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   I begin this chapter by defining hope; central to this definition is that hope is orientated around sustaining commitment and promoting resilience during hardship by maintaining a focus on a future goal. A key determinant on whether hope is positive or negative, however, is the extent to which that which is hoped for is achievable, and thus whether hoping—and enduring hardship to achieve hoped-for goals—is rational. I then demonstrate that to “hope well” requires not only that the goals desired are rational, but also that the process of hoping mobilises action; hope is an empowering force, therefore, when it inspires agency, but I demonstrate that it can be disempowering if it encourages passivity. This is apparent in situations where those who hope are—or at least believe they are—dependent on another to realise their goals. Finally, I engage with Victoria McGeer’s analysis of “wilful hopers” and “wishful hopers” which outlines the pathology that can arise in those who fail to hope well. Both groups, will ultimately find that their hopes are not realised, and thus fall into despair. Despair leads to either despondency or anger; while anger can lead people to make destructive choices, the anger that stems from despair need not always be destructive and can inspire the setting of a new set of more rational goals and serve as the catalyst for related action.

4. Chapter 3. The End of History and the Rise of Hope

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   This chapter initially traces the emergence of the optimistic view of the future which emerged when the Cold War ended, identifying the bases for the key claims made during the 1990s. I demonstrate that while the prevailing narrative was one of hope and progress, others warned that unipolarity was inherently transitory; history proved, they argued, that the dominant power within such a systemic alignment inevitably behaved impulsively, acted arrogantly, and engaged in “imperial overstretch” thereby compelling rival powers to align against it and thus ultimately precipitating their own demise. These warnings were, however, essentially ignored. I then assess the strategies employed during the 1990s and the strengthening of the conviction within the West that there existed a stark core/periphery dichotomy with progress – and even survival – presented as singularly conditional on embracing and adhering to liberal values. Following the disastrous response to the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica, the conviction that the West should be less constrained by international law, and engage more in benevolent unilateralism, was further strengthened culminating in the “illegal but legitimate” intervention in Kosovo in 1999. Subsequently, I argue that the initiation of the “war on terror” accentuated many of the key themes which had previously guided Western foreign policy. Ultimately, this chapter outlines the broader context within which the disposition adopted by the Internationals in Kosovo existed, demonstrating that the “hubris” that characterised the Internationals did not manifest in a vacuum.

5. Chapter 4. Western Power and the Intervention in Kosovo

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   In the first section of this chapter, I build on the broader reflection on the West’s dominance when the Cold War ended as outlined in Chapter 3, to highlight the extent to which humanitarian intervention and statebuilding became central to the West’s new foreign policy. Despite the many universalist claims made about human rights, Western states responded to intra-state humanitarian crises in an overtly self-interested fashion. While this does not mean that every putative humanitarian intervention was prosecuted for purely self-interested reasons and/or unwarranted, it does mean that interventions only ever happened when there was something to be gained from so doing. Building on this link between interests and action, I then analyse the intervention in Kosovo; I begin by noting the extent to which Kosovo was essentially ignored from 1989 to 1998 despite the systemic oppression inflicted on the Albanian community. When in late 1998 the West increased its engagement with Kosovo, the situation had deteriorated to the extent that it posed a threat to regional security and the credibility of NATO. The intervention in March 1999 was, therefore, motivated by self-interest much more than any desire to save the people of Kosovo. Finally, I demonstrate how the unilateral nature of the intervention coheres with the characteristics of the wilful hoper described in Chapter 2 and how the backlash against NATO’s actions from other states set in motion a process by which “balancing” against NATO in the wake of the intervention ultimately precipitated the later shift towards multipolarity.

6. Chapter 5. Statebuilding in Kosovo: 1999–2009

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   In this chapter I begin by outlining the many challenges facing the UN-led mission when it deployed to Kosovo in the Summer of 1999; while these collectively constituted an objectively onerous task, I note that the UN was afforded unprecedented powers. The mission itself was not only initially powerful, it in fact became more powerful in the five years after it was established to the extent that it became perceived by the local population as imperious, unaccountable and a barrier to the realisation of the Kosovo Albanian’s independence aspirations. Having outlined the extent to which UNMIK struggled to maintain a “constructive ambiguity” regarding Kosovo’s final status and caused resentment through its top-down governance style, I demonstrate that the Kosovo Albanian’s anger boiled over in March 2004 resulting in widespread rioting. While the international community condemned the rioters, the violence in fact precipitated a significant change in strategy; thereafter, Western states focused on facilitating Kosovo’s independence. Thus, the Ahtisaari process was launched and while nominal efforts were made to reach an agreement with Serbia and Russia, the process—as expected—culminated in Kosovo unilaterally declaring independence in February 2008. I note in the final section, however, that while Kosovo was thus technically “independent”, the nature of Kosovo’s formally “supervised independence” and the extent to which Western powers—especially the US—designed the constitution and symbols of the new state, meant that Kosovo remained under external control.

7. Chapter 6. Wilful/Wishful Hopers and the Creation of Kosovo

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   Building on the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 2, in this chapter I argue that the relationship between the Internationals and the locals which developed from 1999 to the declaration of independence in 2008 was influenced by wilful hope on the part of the former and wishful hope on the part of the latter. I begin by arguing that the aims avowed, and the disposition adopted, by the Internationals coheres with the characteristics of the wilful hoper. The statebuilding project pursued in Kosovo between 1999 and 2008—as detailed in the previous chapter—has to be seen in the context of the prevailing Western dominance, and the accompanying sense of imminent global transformation as discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, which led to the burgeoning sense of wilful hope. I then argue that the disposition adopted by the majority of Kosovo Albanians aligns with the characteristics of the wishful hoper. This derived from the fact that the Albanians perceived the Internationals as saviours who would lead them to peace, prosperity, and independence; the fact that this belief existed following NATO’s intervention in 1999 was hardly surprising, but its persistence in light of the Internationals’ behaviour became problematic. Finally, I argue that the corrupt elite which grew in power in Kosovo from 1999 onwards fed on the Internationals’ wilful hope and the local’s wishful hope as they set about initiating state capture.

8. Chapter 7. Kosovo and the End of Hubris: 2009–2019

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   This chapter charts the degeneration in Kosovo’s fortunes after the 2008 declaration of independence up to the 2019 general election. As noted in Chapter 5, the intervention and subsequent statebuilding in Kosovo were a product of the “unipolar” moment. As such, Kosovo’s fate was intrinsically tied to Western power, especially that of the US. The unipolar era led not to the benign transformation of the world, but rather to the emergence of a multipolar era characterised by the rise of alternative great powers, a crisis of confidence within West, and the wholesale resetting of Western foreign policy towards a significantly more insular and transactional outlook. In this chapter I argue that this had profound implications for Kosovo; between 2008 and 2019, the West’s support for Kosovo diminished significantly as it sought to incorporate Serbia into its sphere of influence. The Internationals sought stability in Kosovo rather than progress domestically or internationally, and persistently interfered in Kosovo’s domestic political system—in both formal and informal ways—to realise this goal. Kosovo’s compliant political elite acceded to the Internationals’ new stance in return for them turning a blind eye to their corruption; thus, to secure the Kosovo government’s compliance, the Internationals tolerated—if not supported—the process of state capture, which contributed to mass unemployment, poor education, and inadequate healthcare and mass migration. As a consequence of all the above, by the time of the 2019 general election in Kosovo, the public mood had soured dramatically.

9. Chapter 8. A New Hope? The Rise of Vetëvendosje

   Aidan Hehir

   Abstract

   This chapter examines how the people of Kosovo responded to the failure of the hopes they held in the wake of the 2008 declaration of independence to materialise, as outlined in Chapter 7. When Kosovo declared independence, the vast majority of Albanians celebrated not just the event itself but the future it ostensibly heralded. As outlined in the previous chapter, this hope did not last. By the time of the 2019 general election in Kosovo, the public mood had changed markedly as illustrated by the election of Vetëvendosje. For many years Vetëvendosje had been portrayed as insignificant radicals; its emergence as the most popular party in Kosovo is remarkable, especially given that state capture was so pronounced in Kosovo, and the Albanian community was so reluctant to criticise the Internationals. In this chapter, I argue that the rise of Vetëvendosje was certainly a function of increased anger but crucially, unlike the rise of anger elsewhere in Eastern Europe—and indeed worldwide—during the same period, anger in Kosovo did not lead to increased support for an illiberal/authoritarian movement; though Vetëvendosje came to power promising major change, it is committed to democracy, liberal values, and international integration. The dashing of hopes in Kosovo thus precipitated a degree of despondency—as evidenced by the emigration and voter apathy discussed in the previous chapter—and some increased support for extremist groups, but overall, the result of hopes being dashed was constructive anger and the attendant rise of Vetëvendosje.

10. Chapter 9. Kosovo: A Beacon of Hope?

    Aidan Hehir

    Abstract

    In this chapter, I begin by giving an overview of recent developments in Kosovo, highlighting the extent to which Kosovo has now come to be undermined rather than supported by the West. I then summarise the book’s key lessons focusing on three variants of hope which have played a key role in Kosovo’s evolution since 1999 and have implications beyond Kosovo. I conclude by arguing that the people of Kosovo should have been commended for the way they maintained hope for progressive change and acted to achieve this through the exercise of collective agency and grassroots political mobilisation; instead, they have been treated as pariahs. The way their democratically elected government has been bullied, castigated, and punished by Western states since it came to power in 2021, is a damning indictment of the craven outlook and cynical priorities that now guide Western foreign policy. It is also dangerously short-sighted; should the West continue to appease Serbia and push Kosovo into the international wilderness, there is little Vetëvendosje, or the people of Kosovo can do. But should Vetëvendosje ultimately prove unable to convince the West to rethink its strategy, and thus dash the hopes of its own supporters, this will likely catalyse a wave of hopeless anger within Kosovo that could ultimately precipitate a sudden shift towards more extreme political movements with destabilising implications for peace in Kosovo and the region.

11. Backmatter