3. Legal Certainty and Legal Commitment Mechanisms

Oxford Dictionary, Definition of Commitment in English.

Oxford Dictionary, Definition of Credibility in English.

Miller (2002), p. 297.

Const. Peru Art. 44.

Const. Colombia Art. 267 para 1.

Const. Brazil Art. 54 (II a).

North (1993), p. 11. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that contracts or promises cannot be breached. But the legal system shall provide incentives to discourage deviating from promises made by the government.

Lachmann (1971), pp. 49–50.

Ibid., p. 61. By contrast, the institutional economics literature considers the players which are composed of people who seek to achieve a joint goal, organizations. Such organizations can be the state and its organs, private enterprises, churches, universities, or clubs. See North (1993), p. 12. For more detail on why it is not easy to fully disentangle the idea of organizations and institutions, see Khalil (1995), p. 448. Following the common usage of the term, monetary authorities are referred to as institutions.

“While ends define the organization, means include besides material and technological resources – para-digms and conventions or, in short institutions. Agents act according to ends – some of them objective, others entrepreneurial – in light of means – some of them give other potential.” Khalil (1995), p. 447.

Lachmann (1971), p. 51.

North (1993), p. 16. See also Lachmann (1971), pp. 72–73.

Ibid., p. 51. See also North (1990), p. 6.

North (1993), p. 17.

For more on credibility and commitment, see Weimer (1997), p. 23.

Of course, we do this all the time. For example, people tend to lend money to friends rather than strangers. We risk losing the money, but we can be sure that the friend will try to repay. His incentive is to keep the friendship. Some do not. Some never do. But the losses are limited. We will not lend high amounts to friends we know that will not repay. If so, it will be considered a gift. When the stakes are higher, we may not want to take that risk, which is why banks ask for collateral and lots of proof to provide loans.

North (1993), p. 13.

Chapman (2004), p. 478. In this game-theoretic approach to law, deviation is shown to be rationale, undermining commitments made earlier.

Ginsburg (2005), pp. 721–722.

Campos and Esfahani (2000), p. 221.

Miller (2002), pp. 291–292; see also Ginsburg (2005), pp. 721–722.

Simmons discusses reasons for international monetary commitments with the IMF following current account liberalization, suggesting that such commitments send a signal to markets. Countries seem to send such signals when reputation is at stake and other countries choose to commit to similar agreements. The article suggests that market pressure works as “enforcement mechanism” of such commitments. See Simmons (2000a), p. 821.

See, e.g., Chapman (2004), pp. 474–483 for Chapman’s example of the “Centipede Game.” See also Khalil (1995), p. 448; Simmons (2000b), p. 325.

Egebo and Englander (1992), p. 53. See also Gaubatz (1996), pp. 111–112.

Finnemore and Toope (2001), p. 748. See also Simmons (2000b), p. 325.

Brunner et al. (2011), p. 3.

Williamson writes of how to avoid opportunism using credible commitments. See Williamson (1994), p. 183.

Miller (2002), p. 318.

Egebo and Englander (1992), p. 53.

Campos and Esfahani (2000), p. 225.

Tinbergen (1952), p. 75.

Finnemore and Toope (2001), p. 749. Finnemore further explains that “legal claims are legitimate and persuasive only if they are rooted in reasoned argument that creates analogies to past practice, demonstrate congruence with the overall systemic logic of existing law, and attend to contemporary social aspirations and the large moral fabric of society.”

Weimer (1997), p. 20.

North and Weingast (1989), p. 803.

Miller (2002), pp. 291–292.

North and Weingast (1989), p. 804.

For further detail, see how Simmons explains in this article how reputation influences the fulfillment of legal commitments even in a situation of lack of central enforcement, like it is the case of committing to the rule of international treaties. See Simmons (2000b), pp. 325–327. To read about how stability of the policies does not guarantee credibility of government commitments, see Keefer and Stasavage (2003), p. 408.

North sets as an example of how attaching to the legal rules is preferable for long run economic growth. He says that the individual preference of, e.g., a King is to maximize his wealth. He could do so by confiscating property and forcing citizens to work. However, this type of action has a cost in terms of output because people work more and better if they can enjoy the benefits of their own work. On the other hand, giving people freedom to enjoy the fruit of their labour puts an authoritarian ruler in risk because people have more means to get rid of him. People would have a reason to do so if the fear that at some point the ruler is going to change his mind and change the original rule of respecting people’s property. Then, if the ruler considers that accumulating wealth is more important than assuring to remain in power, he will choose to create a rule that diminishes his power and bind him permanently. See North (1993), p. 14.

See also Gaubatz (1996). The author explains how the rule of law, as the main characteristic of liberal democracies is a determinant for the state to credibly commit internally and externally.

Van Alstine (2001), p. 1303.

Tamanaha (2007), pp. 11–12. See also Miller (2002), p. 311.

Brunner et al. (2011), p. 5.

North and Weingast (1989), p. 804.

Ibid. See also Campos and Esfahani (2000), p. 225.

Ginsburg (2005), p. 727.

Simmons (2000b), p. 333.

Mankiw and Taylor (2011), pp. 8–9.

Kose et al. (1999), pp. 8–62.

Von Hayek (2002), p. 9.

Rajan and Zingales (2003), p. 5.

Hegre et al. (2010), p. 763.

Simmons (2000b), p. 324.

Simmons (2000b), pp. 324–325.

Campos and Esfahani (2000), pp. 229–230. The authors explain that creating international agreements entails costs. Some of them can be e.g., “transportation costs”. The cost of transporting goods and people from one place to other will induce to create international agreements among neighbours. Another example is the “transaction costs” that constantly controlling a countries attachment to the treaty. In this sense, the characteristics of the domestic rule of law of a country signal the potential “costs of transaction”. This transaction costs are lower and less worrisome when the country domestically enforces property rights and contracts.

Simmons (2000a), pp. 822, 832.

Simmons (2000b), p. 324. See also Simmons (2000a), pp. 819–822.

Yackee (2008), pp. 805–806. Yackee explains that the idea behind the Bilateral Investment Treaties is to balance the rules of law among different countries to create a “formally strong international rule of law.” Generally, the BITs are signed between a developed country and an emerging market or developing country which does not offer the same degree of legal certainty. The BITs seek to assure that if in the future, the contracts and property rights of investors are endangered by e.g., a modification of the legal framework, they can apply dispute settlements provisions that permit initiation of international arbitration against the non-compliant state. Ginsburg (2005), p. 712. Ginsburg explains how international treaties can influence the reliability of domestic commitments in cases of transition from dictatorship to democracy.

Simmons (2000b), p. 351.

Ginsburg (2005), p. 730.

Simmons (2000a), p. 822. See also Ginsburg (2005), p. 730.

Ginsburg (2005), pp. 724–726; see also Raustiala (2005), p. 598.

However, some countries signed treaties but never ratified them. See Yackee (2008), p. 815. Yackee mentions the case of Brazil that signed several Bilateral Investment Treaties and has not ratified them to avoid facing international arbitration courts that are out the control of the national legal and political structure.

Raustiala (2005), pp. 591–592. According to the author, pledges are more flexible than contracts, among other reasons, because pledges set less obligations on states. Therefore, the states can modify international pledges more easily. Because pledges are not as widely published as contracts, the reputational costs in case on noncompliance are much lower. Finally, pledges are easier to negotiate and as pledges almost never require ratification of the legislative, they are directly in force.

Raustiala (2005), pp. 581–587. This author further explains how the elements of legality, substance and structure are intertwined and how they determine the architecture of international agreements. He analyses how the design of international agreements determines the deepness of the commitments that states get through international agreements. The formal characteristics of the rule of law are among the elements that determine the deepness of state’s legal commitments.

There are two ways of understanding the difference between hard and soft law in international law. One of the criteria to differentiate them is that the first is binding and the later non-binding. The critics of this point of view claim that a critical characteristic of the legal rules is their binding force. Thus, rules that are non-binding are not rules at all therefore, soft law cannot be a legal category. Others explain that hard law in the international context has three elements: obligation, precision, and delegation. Thus, soft law has one or more of these elements weakened. This is, either it is nonbinding, or vague or does not delegate authority to any third party to monitor its implementation. For more detail, see Schaffer and Pollack (2010), pp. 712–717.

Raustiala criticizes the notion of soft law as imprecise law. See Raustiala (2005), pp. 586–591.

Yackee (2008), p. 807.

Ginsburg (2005), pp. 733–734.

The six countries analysed are IMF members. See International Monetary Fund (n.d.).

Simmons (2000a), pp. 819–821.

Weingast (1995), p. 15.

Ginsburg (2005), pp. 722–723.

George (2001), p. 2269.

Kelsen (1945), p. 115.

Raz (1970), pp. 95–97. Here we find the legal positivist hypothesis that the basic norm of the legal system was somehow drafted by authorized people.

O’Donnell (2004), p. 38. Here, O’Donnell explains how authority always derives from the citizens, not only the authority of those democratically elected but also those appointed by them.

Ginsburg (2005), pp. 722–723.

North and Weingast (1989), p. 808.

Figueruelo Burrieza (1993), pp. 47–48.

Tesler (1980), pp. 27–44.

Lachmann (1971), p. 104.

Ginsburg (2005), p. 710.

Weingast (1995), p. 26.

Weingast (2005), pp. 10–13.

Yrarrázabal (1987), p. 98.

Richard Epstein explains that constitutional interpretation deals with the introduction of principles that are not expressly mentioned in the constitutional text. However, interpretation must make sense of the constitutional prescriptions. For instance, the principle of the “police power of the state” is no mentioned in the U.S. constitution but is the justification for state intervention in education, health care, security and even morals. This practice is a normal part of constitutional interpretation and can be even beneficial if it is performed according to the meaning, functions, and objectives of the original text. See Epstein (2007), pp. 9–11.

Kelsen (1945), p. 115; Raz (1970), pp. 95–97. See also Sepúlveda Iguiniz (2006), p. 227.

To read more about Kelsen’s ideas on the constitution and the chain of legal validity, see Raz (1970), pp. 96–108 or look up Kelsen (1945), Parts X and XI.

Lyons (1977), p. 428.

Montesquieu (1989), p. 173.

López Guerra (1980), pp. 22–23.

See, e.g., North and Weingast (1989), pp. 817–819. They explain how the Glorious Revolution improved the credibility of the government to commit because it allowed for a system of “checks and balances” with, for instance, independent judges.

O’Donnell (2004), p. 37. According to the author, “vertical accountability” is, for instance, set up via elections.

For more on the lack of constitutional entrenchment of Latin American constitutions and the difference to the constitution of the United States of America, see Schor (2006), p. 6.

Weingast (1995), p. 14. Weingast explains how material differences among people make a difference in sharing ideas of limiting the power of the state.

Gamboa and Segovia (2016), pp. 136–137; see also Verdugo (2014), p. 43.

To read how the constitution and the law evolved historically in Latin America, see Schor (2006), pp. 14–24.

Sepúlveda Iguiniz (2006), p. 228.

Cordero (2010), p. 128.

Among the legal frameworks considered it is possible to identify different types of approval majorities. The most common are the simple, absolute, and qualified majority, but there can be other voting requirements. In Chile for instance the absolute majority is equivalent to the majority of the members of the deputies and senators in office, this means all the members of the National Congress of Chile and not only the ones attending a session. A simple majority, on the other hand, is equivalent to the majority of the deputies and senators present during the voting. Nevertheless, amending the constitution requires the three-fifths of the deputies and senators in office and reforming and organic law requires the approval of “four sevenths of the deputies and senators” in office. See Const. Chile Art. 66 para 2.

In Colombia there are four types of majorities. There are simple and absolute majorities with the same characteristics as in Chile. There are also, qualified, and special majorities. The first requires the vote of two-thirds of the members in office of the Senate and the House of Representatives (to approve amnesties and pardons). The latter requires three quarters of the members in office of the Senate and the House of Representatives (to approve the travel abroad of state officials financed with treasure money). See Regulation of the House of Representatives of Colombia Art. 79 (1), 122 (1) [Reglamento del Congreso de los Diputados, Boletín Oficial No. 237, 4 October 1993]. See also Const. Colombia Art. 145.

In Argentina and Mexico there are three types of majorities. Qualified majority means two-thirds (66%) of the votes of those present in the voting. Absolute majority represents 50%+1 of the vote of those present in the voting. Finally, simple majority is the equivalent to having at least one more vote in favor of an option above other option. See Rules of the Chamber of Deputies of Mexico Art. 3 (XII, XIII, XIV) [Reglamento de la Cámara de Diputados de México, Diario Oficial de la Federación of 24 December 2010].

In Peru, the relative majority (simple majority) requires that the votes in favor of a proposal exceed the votes against it. Absolute majority requires 50%+1 vote of the members in office. Finally, the qualified majority requires two-thirds of the votes of all the members in office. See Standing Rules of the Congress of Peru Art. 81 [Reglamento del Congreso de Perú, Diario Oficial, 10 March 2018].

In Brazil, no decision of the National Congress of Brazil is taken with simple majority. The only options are absolute majority which is equivalent to the 50% plus one of the members in office or qualified majority equivalent to two-thirds of the members in office. See Const. Brazil Art. 47.

Const. Chile Art. 63.

Freijedo (1981), p. 290.

Rios (1983), pp. 41–43. See also Santamaría Pastor (1979), p. 40; Sepúlveda Iguiniz (2006), pp. 231, 234.

For more detail on the differences between organic and ordinary laws, see Santamaría Pastor (1979), p. 40.

Cordero (2010), p. 136. See also Rios (1983), pp. 41–43; Santamaría Pastor (1979), p. 40.

Francisco José Bautista Villalobos v. Congreso de la República de Colombia, CCC, Sentencia C-557, 20 August 2009. See also Cordero (2010), p. 135.

Santamaría Pastor (1979), pp. 42–43.

For more on the discussion about the principles of legal hierarchy and legal competence of organic laws, see Freijedo (1981), pp. 290–295. See also Santamaría Pastor (1979), pp. 40–46.

The Const. Brazil Art. 59 sole para: Among the legislation enacted by the Congress are the “supplementary laws” that “provide for the preparation, drafting, amendment and consolidation of laws.”

Const. Brazil Art. 93: “A supplementary law, proposed by the Supreme Federal Court, shall provide for the Statute of the Judicature […]”.

Const. Brazil Art. 29: “Municipalities shall be governed by organic law, voted in two readings, […] and approved by two thirds of the members of the Municipal Chamber […].”

According to Const. Peru Art. 143, the jurisdictional bodies are the Supreme Court of Justice and tribunals as determined by their organic acts.

Cordero (2010), p. 130.

The laws of qualified quorum are a legal category only existent in the Chilean legal framework. This type of law was introduced in the constitution of 1980. See Cordero (2010), pp. 134–135. Laws of qualified quorum in Chile are in charge of regulating sensitive topics such as all related with terrorism, death penalty or the exercise of fundamental rights. For instance, Const. Chile Art. 9 para 2 states that “A law of qualified quorum will determine terrorist conduct and its penalty.” Art. 19 Number 1 para 3 sets forth: “The death penalty can only be stablished for a crime provided for in a law adopted by qualified quorum.” Number 12 para 1 says: “Freedom to express opinion and to inform, without prior censorship, in any form and by any medium, without prejudice to responsibility for any crimes or abuses committed in the exercise of these freedoms, in conformity with the law which must be of qualified quorum.”

Const. Chile Art. 66 para 3: “The legal norms of qualified quorum will be established, amended or repealed by the absolute majority of the deputies and senators in exercise.” see also Cordero (2010), p. 135.

Mexico does not differentiate between organic and ordinary laws. “Every single bill or decree shall be discussed successively at both Houses, except the issues that are within the exclusive jurisdiction of one of the Houses. The House shall observe the methods, periods of time and debating and voting procedures established by the Congress Act and its regulations.” See Const. Mexico Art. 72.

Const. Argentina Art. 85 para 3: “This body of technical assistance of the Congress, with functional autonomy, shall be made up in the manner that the law that regulates its creation and operation establishes; such law shall be approved by an absolute majority of the members of each Chamber […].”

Cordero (2010), p. 132.

Sepúlveda Iguiniz (2006), pp. 231, 234.

Cordero (2010), p. 127.

Santamaría Pastor (1979), p. 41.

Sepúlveda Iguiniz (2006), p. 226. See also Rivero Ortega (2013), p. 65.

Tsebelis (2000), pp. 446–447.

Ibid., p. 449.

Falaschetti and Miller (2001), p. 391.

North and Weingast (1989), p. 817. North and Weingast argue that during the Glorious Revolution in England the Crown lost the possibility of legislating and creating policy unilaterally because it always needed the approval of the Parliament. The Parliament was also constrained because it represented several different points of view and interests that made individual rent-seeking more complicated. Further, the judiciary was supposed to be independent which reduced the influence of the Crown in the appointment and control of judges. The Crown was also restricted economically because there were for the first-time restrictions over the loans of the Bank of England. The Bank was only allowed to give loans to the Crown or to buy land that belonged to the Crown with approval of the Parliament.

Falaschetti and Miller (2001), pp. 401–408.

Ibid., p. 402. See also Campos and Esfahani (2000), p. 230; Pedroza de la Llave (2002), p. 177.

Another way to delegate might be by moving competences to an international organization, when the leeway to make decisions is removed totally or partially from the government. On international delegation, see Ginsburg (2005), p. 734.

Yingyi and Weingast (1997), pp. 85–89.

Rodden (2004), p. 489. See also Guerrero (1979), p. 83.

Hutchcroft (2001), p. 31.

Obviously, this is the case when a unified state decides to distribute powers. In contrast, in the US the States were originally independent and decided to delegate power to the central state. However, the remaining State power does improve transparency and allows for jurisdictional competition.

Yingyi and Weingast (1997), pp. 83–88.

The terms used in the Latin American administrative law to define administrative autonomies can be a bit confusing. For instance, the Mexican legal framework states that according to the degree of freedom to develop their activities, administrative autonomies can be “deconcentrated”, “decentralized” or “autonomous” organs. The common characteristic that all of them share is that they are opposites to centralized institutions of the public administration, at least to some degree. Among the differences, a deconcentrated institution has relative freedom to act but cannot manage itself because it is an institution that is always within a ministry or sub-secretary. A decentralized organ enjoys higher independence because it has its own legal personality, organizational structure, and administrative faculties to manage itself and handle its own budget. Nevertheless, they are hierarchically inferior and dependent on the organ of central administration that is responsible for the transfer of competences. Thus, the superior organ is the one that decides about the dimension and duration of the transfer of power. Finally, an autonomous institution has the highest degree of independence. Basically, they can manage themselves, their own budget, and, they also have the attribution of self-regulation. See Pedroza de la Llave (2002), pp. 176–178.

Guerrero (1979), p. 83.

There has been some discussion about whether the legal terms “independence” and “autonomy” can be regarded as synonyms. Some authors argue that they are different because independent institutions have complete freedom and are out of the scope of the legislation enacted by the Congress. On the other hand, the term autonomy is applicable to institutions that have institutional constraints but enjoy some freedom to achieve their goals and to elaborate their own regulation. See Laurens et al. (2007), p. 263 (Footnote 1).

From the perspective of institutional economics, the most accepted notion is to use both terms “interchangeably” because the term autonomy entails “operational freedom”, and the term independence entails “absence of political interference”. See, e.g., Lybek (2004), p. 1. See also Jácome and Vásquez (2008), p. 788 (Footnote 1).

From a linguistic perspective, the word “autonomy” is related to words such as “self” and “law.” Thus, we can understand it as an attribution of self-regulation. It may further be associated with the concepts of “freedom” and “self-government.” See Pedroza de la Llave (2002), p. 175.

Inversora Bursátil, S.A., Amparo, SCJN México, Sentencia 2a. XV, Tomo XV, March 2002, p. 430. See also Jaime Rafael Pedraza Vanegas v. Congreso de la República de Colombia, CCC, Sentencia C-050, 10 February 1994. For literature, see Ugalde (2010), p. 256. See also Zúñiga (2007), p. 227; Cordero (2012), p. 16.

Miller (2002), p. 321.

Hutchcroft (2001), p. 30.

Keefer and Stasavage (2003), p. 407.

Zúñiga (2007), p. 227. See also Cordero (2012), p. 16.

Zúñiga (2007), p. 231.

Given the technical character of the decisions, officials in charge are typically not selected via democratic elections. See Hutchcroft (2001), p. 32.

Brunner et al. (2011), p. 12.

Knill (1999), p. 122.

Control constitucionalidad enmienda “Ley General de Bancos”, TC Chile, Sentencia Rol No. 216, 17 July 1995.

Const. Colombia Art. 113: “The branches of government are the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary. In addition to the organs that constitute them, there are others, autonomous and independent, for the execution of other functions of the State. The various organs of the State have separate functions but cooperate harmoniously for the realization of their goals.” See also René Vargas Pérez v. Congreso de la República de Colombia, CCC, Sentencia C-481, 7 July 1999.

Cárdenas et al. (1999), p. 469.

Pedroza de la Llave (2002), pp. 175–176. See also Control constitucionalidad “Ley Orgánica Banco central de Chile”, TC Chile, Sentencia Rol No. 78, 20 September 1989.

Smits (1997), p. 154.

Urbiztondo et al. (1998), p. 3.

Taliercio (2004), pp. 213–214.

Const. Argentina Art. 30.

Negretto (2009), p. 40.

These special laws rule the following specific aspects: Referendum, see Const. Argentina Art. 40; budget allocations, see Const. Argentina Art. 75 (2) and (5); political parties and the electoral system, see Const. Argentina Art. 77 para 2; the General Audit of the Nation, see Const. Argentina Art. 85 para 3; the Judicial Council, see Const. Argentina Art. 114.

Tsebelis (2000), p. 459.

For the participation of the executive branch, see Const. Argentina Arts. 81, 83, and 99 para 3.

This is the case for instance of the organic law that governs the Federal District according to Const. Brazil Art. 32. It is also the case of the Municipalities even though their organic law is not enacted by the legislative branch but by the Municipal Chamber. See Const. Brazil Art. 29.

The Const. Brazil Art. 68 establishes that “[d]elegated laws shall be drawn upon by the President of the Republic, who shall request delegation from the National Congress.” They are not included in the Table as there is not much specific about them in the constitution.

However, the enactment of organic laws in Brazil is reserved for the state legislatures which have legislative powers and not to the National Congress of Brazil. Creating or amending organic laws demand the approval voting of two-thirds of the members in office of the Congress. See Const. Brazil Art. 32.

See also Const. Brazil Art. 66 including para 1: “The House in which voting is concluded shall send the bill of law to the President of the Republic, who, if he concurs, shall sanction it. […] Paragraph 1. If the President of the Republic considers the bill of law, wholly or in part, unconstitutional or contrary to public interest, he shall veto it, wholly or in part, within fifteen workdays, counted from the day of receipt and he shall, within forty-eight hours, the President of the Senate of the reasons of his veto.”

Const. Brazil Arts. 47 and 69.

Const. Chile Art. 127.

Const. Chile Art. 128 para 2: “If the President of the Republic totally rejects a reform project approved by both Chambers and they insist entirely by two thirds of the members in exercise of each Chamber, the President of the Republic shall promulgate that project […]”. The promulgation is a solemn act through which the President of the Republic announces officially the existence of a new law. The Law Dictionary, Definition of promulgation in English: http://​thelawdictionary​.​org/​promulgate/​.

Const. Chile Art. 128 para 2.

Const. Chile Art. 66 para 4.

The Const. Chile Art. 72 states that if the President of the Republic “approves it, [he] will arrange its promulgation as a law.”

The Const. Chile Art. 73 para 3 sets forth that “[i]f both Chambers approve the observations, the project will have the force of law and will be returned to the President for its promulgation.”

Const. Chile Art. 73 para 4 states that “if both Chambers […] insist by two-thirds of its present members, on all or part of the project approved by them, it will be returned to the President for its promulgation.”

Const. Peru Art. 206 para 2.

Const. Peru Art. 32: “A referendum may be held in the […] [p]artial or complete amendment of the Constitution.” For the ways to constitutional reform, see Const. Peru Art. 206 para 1.

Const. Peru Art. 206 para 2: “A law concerning a constitutional reform shall not be objected to by the President of the Republic.”

In Peru, the Standing Rules of the Congress of Peru Art. 73 [Reglamento del Congreso de Perú, Diario Oficial, 10 March 2018] provide for the process of creating and amending ordinary legislation.

Const. Peru Art. 106 para 2.

Const. Peru Art. 107 para 1 states that “[b]oth the President of the Republic and the congressmen have the right to initiate in lawmaking.”

Patino Camarena (2011), p. 176.

Const. Mexico Art. 135: “This Constitution may be subject to amendments. The vote of two-thirds of the present members of the Congress of the Union is required to make amendments or additions to the Constitution. Once the Congress agrees on the amendments or additions, these must be approved by the majority of state legislatures.” See also Standing Rules of the Senate of Mexico Art. 89 (2) (e) [Reglamento del Senado de la República de México, Diario Oficial de la Federación, 4 June 2010] [hereinafter RSRM]: “The bill of reform of the constitution approved by the House of Representatives shall be immediately sent to the chamber for revision. [Own Translation]”

RSRM Art. 225, para 1, I: “When the Senate, as the chamber of revision in the legislative process of amendment of the Constitution, approves the bill, the President of the Senate […] send the bill to each of the state legislatures […] for their consideration. [Own Translation]”

RSRM Art. 225, 1: “If the Bill is approved by a minimum of sixteen state legislatures, (the President of the Senate) makes the corresponding calculation reports, informs to the Plenary and makes the corresponding declaration [Own Translation].” See also Constitution of the State of Baja California Art. 166 para 1: [Own translation of Constitución Política del Estado de Baja California, Periódico Oficial No. 23, 16 August 1953]: “The present Constitution may be added or amended. The initiatives that have that objective […] require the approval of at least two-thirds of the total representatives that integrate the legislature [Own Translation].”

Const. Mexico Art. 72 (a).

RSRM Art. 79.

Const. Mexico Art. 71.

Const. Mexico Art. 72 (a) suggests that after the discussion and approval of a bill in both legislative, “[…] the bill shall be submitted to the President of the Republic who, after deciding that no further corrections should be made, shall publish it without delay.”

Const. Mexico Art. 72 (c).

Const. Colombia Art. 375 paras 1 and 2.

Const. Colombia Art. 375 paras 2 and 3.

Congress of Colombia, Frequent Questions: http://​www.​camara.​gov.​co/​portal2011/​preguntas-frecuentes/​116-ique-fechas-comprenden-los-periodos-legislativos-de-sesiones.

Const. Colombia Art. 376.

Const. Colombia Art. 377.

Const. Colombia Art. 151.

According to the Const. Colombia Art.157, “[n]o bill will become law without meeting the following requirements: […] 4. Securing the approval of the government.” See also Const. Colombia Art. 165: “Once a legislative bill is approved by both Houses, it shall be transmitted to the government for its approval. […]”.

Const. Colombia Art. 151 in combination with Art. 157.

Const. Colombia Art. 152.

Const. Colombia Art. 157.

Const. Colombia Art. 153. See also Const. Colombia Art 154 para 2 on initiation.

Const. Colombia Art. 163.