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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

10. Legal Incentives for Compliance Programmes: Stick or Carrot?

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Abstract

One way to improve antitrust compliance may be to incentivise compliance programmes. Compliance programmes can certainly help undertakings detecting and remedying illegal behaviour. Infringements might be avoided by providing undertakings with incentives to intensify their compliance efforts. On a basic level, legislators can use two different approaches to foster compliance programmes. Undertakings can be legally obliged to introduce compliance programmes. Without a legal obligation, undertakings can still introduce compliance programmes on a voluntary basis, and the legislator can use incentives to motivate undertakings to use compliance programmes. In this chapter, these two ways of promoting compliance programmes are discussed by taking a comparative approach, which takes into account different legal systems. Based on the analysis, reservations in respect of a compliance defence are formulated.

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Footnotes
1
See also: Sec. 28 Code on financial investment (Kapitalanlagegesetzbuch), sec. 64a Insurance Supervision Act (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz).
 
2
See LG Munich, Judgment of 10 December 2013, 5 HK O 1397/10, juris, para. 89.
 
3
European Commission, Decision of 13 May 2009, COMP/C-3/37.990—Intel.
 
4
Judgment of 12 June 2014, T-286/09—Intel v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2014:547.
 
5
Directive 2014/104/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union.
 
6
U.S. v. Barclays PLC, 3:15-CR-77 (SRU), D.Conn.
 
Literature
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go back to reference Deutsches Institut für Compliance – DICO e.V. (2014). Compliance-Anreiz-Gesetz. Deutsches Institut für Compliance – DICO e.V. (2014). Compliance-Anreiz-Gesetz.
go back to reference Landes, W. (1983). Optimal sanctions for antitrust violations. University of Chicago Law Review, 50, 652–678.CrossRef Landes, W. (1983). Optimal sanctions for antitrust violations. University of Chicago Law Review, 50, 652–678.CrossRef
go back to reference Office of Fair Trading. (2012). OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty. Office of Fair Trading, Reference number OFT423, 1 Sept 2012. Office of Fair Trading. (2012). OFT’s guidance as to the appropriate amount of a penalty. Office of Fair Trading, Reference number OFT423, 1 Sept 2012.
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Metadata
Title
Legal Incentives for Compliance Programmes: Stick or Carrot?
Author
Per Rummel
Copyright Year
2016
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44633-2_10