Making Politics in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic

Table of Contents

1. Frontmatter

2. Mnangagwa’s Formative Project: Risks and Limits

   Kirk Helliker, Gorden Moyo

   Abstract

   This book is about the continuities and discontinuities in the transition from the Mugabe to the Mnangagwa regime in contemporary Zimbabwe. This introductory chapter offers a short narrative around key events and themes that are pertinent to understanding the transition and, most importantly, it sets out an analytical framework for examining the character, content and contingencies of the transition. This framing draws heavily upon the thoughts of Antonio Gramsci. So far, the emerging scholarly literature on the transition in large part highlights the continuities across the two regimes, thereby downplaying the existence and relevance of any changes, at least changes of a reformist or progressive character. While not necessarily denying this overall conclusion, we argue that it is reached in a linear and un-dialectical manner. In recognising the importance of contradictory trends in any transition, we identify the presence of a formative project embedded in many of Mnangagwa’s initiatives. This project exists as a counter-tendency to the likely dominant logic of continuity. Because of the potential risks entailed in this project, mainly moving farther along the road of reform than intended and thereby jeopardising the grip on power, it remains circumscribed to date. The various chapters in this book, focusing on a range of issues around civil and political rights, governance, and socio-economic development, highlight the many shortcomings of this formative project. Nevertheless, it is important to remain analytically cognisant of this project if the scholarly inquiry is to comprehend the contradictory forces animating the Mnangagwa regime.

3. Activating Civil and Political Liberties

   1. Frontmatter

   2. The Quest for Transitional Justice in the Post-Mugabe Era

      Tobias Guzura

      Abstract

      The 15th of November 2017 was a watershed moment in Zimbabwean history, marking a new era in Zimbabwean politics, as the military executed a coup deposing long-ruling Robert Mugabe, ultimately replacing him with his recently fired deputy Emmerson Mnangagwa. His fall ushered in great hope as incoming President Mnangagwa articulated a policy of openness that many Zimbabweans believed would lay a foundation for pursuing transitional justice. Mnangagwa vowed a break from Mugabe’s authoritarian rule and economic mismanagement, declaring a “new Zimbabwe” that is “open for business”. In his inaugural speech, Mnangagwa provided pointers to his stance on reconciliation and transitional justice when he said that “I thus humbly appeal to all of us that we let bygones be bygones, readily embracing each other in defining a new destiny”. To the discerning, this clearly showed his unwillingness to accept culpability for past injustices. Against this background, this chapter provides a critique regarding the prospects of attaining transitional justice under Mnangagwa’s watch. The chapter posits that the lack of a genuine transition post-Mugabe has dented the prospects of transitional justice and the agency entrusted with this task, the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, lacks the necessary teeth and autonomy to execute its mandate.

   3. Mnangagwa’s Missed Opportunities for Reconciliation

      Mandlenkosi Ndlovu, Christopher Ndlovu

      Abstract

      This chapter examines the seemingly static ‘transition’ from the First Republic under former president, Robert Mugabe, to the so-called ‘Second Republic’ led by Emmerson Mnangagwa, with specific reference to reconciliation. The ‘Second Republic’ has left many Zimbabweans disillusioned and wondering whether the current levels of intolerance, political exclusion and polarisation in the country are worth the sacrifices they made in facilitating the ‘transition’. What emerges poignantly from the first few years of the ‘Second Republic’ in the office is that Zimbabweans’ expectations for political transformation, as well as for political inclusivity and national reconciliation, remain unfulfilled. It appears that the ‘Second Republic’ is failing to harness the political unity, hope and enthusiasm that was prevalent during the build-up and actual ouster of Mugabe in November 2017 to foster meaningful national reconciliation and political unity. Well into its first five-year term, the ‘Second Republic’ appears to be robust in political rhetoric, but deficient in practice when it comes to pursuing reconciliation, as argued in this chapter. The risks for the Mnangagwa regime, if it were to enact genuine reconciliation as part of his formative project, are quite high as this would bring about serious questions about the very legitimacy of the regime and of Mnangagwa’s leadership of it.

   4. The Second Republic’s Stance on Corruption and the Battle for Public Confidence

      Rodney Ruwende

      Abstract

      Corruption in Zimbabwe has become a part of a government system of plundering state resources by a few well-connected individuals with the aid and blessing of the ruling elite. President Emmerson Mnangagwa has declared war on corruption and scored some levels of success through enhanced legislation and a renewed vigour to fight the scourge. However, this effort has become somewhat problematic given the continued blatant abuse of state resources by politically-connected individuals. In this regard, Mnangagwa’s formative project with specific reference to corruption is taking place within strict limits, as a pronounced anti-corruption crusade would likely undermine the very political hegemony of the ruling party. In assessing the Second Republic’s stance on corruption and the battle for public confidence, this chapter seeks to show that corruption is reducing the chances of the country attaining an upper-middle-class economic status and inhibiting progress towards effective functioning democratic institutions. Utilising an archival and documentary search methodology, the assessment shows that Zimbabweans generally have no confidence in the ability of the government to fight corruption and that there is a general lack of political will to address the problem of corruption. The chapter concludes that there is a need for the government to establish and adhere to a proper system for monitoring its resources. The tough anti-corruption talk by the new president must be accompanied by concrete action to jail corrupt individuals.

   5. Media Policies and Practices in Zimbabwe’s ‘New Dispensation’

      Mandlenkosi Mpofu

      Abstract

      Mnangagwa’s ascendancy into the presidency in November 2017 came with significant promise for Zimbabweans who were tired of the long autocratic rule of President Robert Mugabe. Touting itself as the ‘New Dispensation’ and Zimbabwe’s ‘Second Republic’, the new regime promised to lead Zimbabwe into prosperity, underpinned by respect for democratic principles and the rule of law. Significantly, Mnangagwa’s regime reached out to the opposition Movement for Democratic Change, promised to restore relations with the international community and declared that Zimbabwe was ‘open for business’. In this chapter, I argue that the Second Republic’s declared intentions have not been matched by its actions, with specific reference to the media. Since the general elections in July 2018, Zimbabweans have experienced various forms of repression that have included violent disruption of demonstrations and the brutal and public killing of civilian protestors by the army. This assault on civic spaces and basic liberties has been accompanied by similar efforts targeting opposition political parties and spaces. The new regime has also used different tactics, including co-optation, to control the media and emasculate communicative spaces. I conclude that, under Mnangagwa, there has been more continuity than change from the old media policies and practices of Robert Mugabe. Because of this, the significance of Mnangagwa’s formative project should be seriously doubted.

4. Reconfiguring Governance

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Exploring the Politics of Jecharism in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic

      Divane Nzima, Geogina Charity Gumindega

      Abstract

      This chapter traces the character and methods of power contestation in the Zimbabwean political space since independence, including during the Second Republic. In doing so, the politics of deliberate systematic sabotage in contemporary Zimbabwe (kudirajecha or Jecharism) is conceptualised and argued to be a key barrier of progress. While this is often associated with opposition party politics, throughout history in Zimbabwe, this strategy has been employed by ruling and opposition parties. Therefore, Jecharism is a politics that negates the interests of the people and the country in favour of politicians’ own self interests of consolidating their hold on power or their ambition to hold power. Hence, in the case of Zimbabwe, there has never been evidence of any benefit that ordinary citizens have gained from Jecharism, only perpetual economic misfortunes and continued suffering. Continuing in this path where self-interest precedes what is best for the country will only result in perpetual conflict and suffering. To move forward, politicians must exercise political tolerance and compromise. However, this does not seem to be the case with reference to the Second Republic under Mnangagwa. Indeed, any ongoing Jecharism on the part of Mnangagwa’s government is bound to minimise the possibility of the development of a formative project which takes democratic transition and consolidation seriously.

   3. Change and Continuity—Traditional Leadership’s Political and Developmental Footprint in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic

      Rodrick Fayayo, McDonald Lewanika, Bheki R Mngomezulu

      Abstract

      This chapter examines the role of traditional leaders in the Second Dispensation under Emmerson Mnangagwa in Zimbabwe. It seeks to understand whether there are continuities or discontinuities in the relationship between the traditional leadership and the Mnangagwa presidency in comparison to the previous Mugabe regime. It concludes that the Mnangagwa regime has adopted the same forms of bargains and compromises that were part of the Mugabe regime’s political strategy vis-à-vis traditional leaders. In particular, though the Mnangagwa-led government has “changed” the strategy of fetishising traditional leaders, it has ensured that this leadership institution in rural spaces has remained constant and captive to political interests, with development strategies pertinent to the areas of jurisdiction of traditional leaders administered as part of the ruling party’s clientelist politics. At the same time, Mnangagwa’s “open for business mantra”—as part of his formative project—implies the possibility of a strengthened state-corporate alliance which lessens the dependence of his regime and its legitimacy on traditional leaders and the interests of the rural populace, leading to possible tensions which the Mnangagwa administration will need to balance.

   4. Devolution in Zimbabwe’s ‘Second Republic’: A Myth or Reality?

      Mbuso Moyo, Ray Motsi

      Abstract

      This chapter plots progress in the implementation of devolution in Zimbabwe, with a particular focus on post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. It identifies and discusses the actual actions and interventions by the state for the realisation of a devolved political system in Zimbabwe. While the new Constitution of Zimbabwe was adopted under his tutelage in 2013, Mugabe had taken an unambiguous aversion to devolution. Instead of giving effect to constitutional provisions on devolution, Mugabe continued to implement the old clauses of Zimbabwe’s 1979 Lancaster House Constitution. For example, he appointed Ministers of State for Provincial Affairs, not Provincial and Metropolitan Councils as stipulated by the Constitution. President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ascension to power in November 2017 and his promise of a ‘Second Republic’ posited a departure from Mugabe’s dictatorial and centralist system to a more open, accountable and devolved system of government, as part of a broader formative project. The transition though has been elusive and progress disappointing. Mnangagwa has not only continued the actions that are ultra vires Zimbabwe’s new Constitution but has exhibited reticence to supporting meaningful actions that give effect to a devolved political system in Zimbabwe. If the actions of Mnangagwa’s government are anything to go by, devolution will remain a chimera for the longest time to come in Zimbabwe.

   5. Prospects of Implementing Devolution in the Post-Mugabe Era

      Didmus Dewa

      Abstract

      This chapter looks at the constraints and prospects of devolution implementation in Zimbabwe in the Mnangagwa era. Zimbabwe’s quest for devolution in the post-third wave era of democratisation and good governance is evident through ongoing civil society organisations and opposition politics advocacy themes. The desire for devolution saw the light of the day through the Constitutional Parliamentary Committee-led constitution of 2013. Since 2013, significant political events took place that ushered in a second republic in 2017. The purpose of this chapter is to offer a critical analysis of the devolution initiative since 2013 when it became a constitutional obligation. To comprehend the political economy of devolution in Zimbabwe, prevailing literature and authoritative government data is interrogated. The chapter traces devolution in history and looks at the strides made before discussing the current challenges and steps that have been taken post the Mugabe era. It also considers several conceptual issues around devolution before dwelling more fully on policy and legislative issues around devolution in Zimbabwe. In focusing on variations in the scope, form and political dynamics of devolution, the chapter concludes that there are certain important steps taken in the Second Republic though there are also significant stumbling blocks to implementing devolution in Mnangagwa’s Zimbabwe. In this light, like other dimensions of Mnangagwa’s formative project, there seems to be a hesitancy to pursue devolution with maximum vigour.

5. Stimulating Socio-Economic Development

   1. Frontmatter

   2. The Right to Development in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic

      Kucaca Ivumile Phulu, Serges Djoyou Kamga

      Abstract

      The emergence of the post-Mugabe government sparked a frenzy of speculation about whether it heralds the beginning of a new era or simply more of the same. Against the “open for business” slogan and positive language around rights implementation, we assess if the new administration genuinely understands and is committed to implement Zimbabwe’s right to development. The Zimbabwean Constitution recognises a distinct right to development, following the spirit of the African Charter. The right to development is therefore more than just a social or political demand; it is also a legal right with enforceable legal responsibilities on governments to promote, defend, and fulfil the right to development. The Second Republic’s shortcoming has been in failing to deliver on its promises. This is seen in its reaction to the Covid-19 pandemic. While it sought to establish a suitable legislative framework for dealing with the pandemic, it failed horribly in putting its policies into action. For example, Zimbabwe’s government has failed to show transparency in how it handled millions of dollars of donated funds for the pandemic. Corruption was allowed to run helter-skelter and the Minister of Health was implicated in swindling almost, if not, all the donations. All this was taking place while lives were at stake. Further, the opposition contends that the government’s democratic rhetoric is not matching with what is obtained on the ground and cites the persecution of opposition leaders, labour leaders and civil society activists, among other issues. This exemplifies the typical government practice of failing to live up to the constitutional obligation of ensuring the right to development on a consistent basis. The Mnangagwa government has failed to implement the right to development in practice, despite putting in place policy and legislation consistent with the right to development. In this respect, even on what would seem like a safe and risk-free policy initiative (after all, who would argue against the right to development), the Mnangagwa’s government’s formative project falls short.

   3. China’s Expanding Footprint and Deepening Debt Crisis in Zimbabwe—From Robert Mugabe to Emmerson Mnangagwa

      Gorden Moyo

      Abstract

      This chapter discusses the controversial Chinese development finance in the post-Mugabe era in Zimbabwe. It argues that President Emmerson Mnangagwa, who succeeded Robert Mugabe in 2017, has continued to depend on the opaque Chinese financing models despite promising the nation a new chapter of transparency, accountability and openness in his inauguration speech. It further argues that, while the Mnangagwa presidency has been celebrating the Chinese funding, the country has remained engrossed in a morass of a debilitating debt trap and has been struggling to extricate itself from the debt peonage for over two decades now. Instead of contributing towards social and economic development, the Chinese loans to Zimbabwe under President Mnangagwa are implicated in the deepening of debt sustainability problems in the country. This is mainly because some of the loans are shrouded in secrecy while others are resource-backed loans that have left the country mortgaged to Beijing. This chapter therefore sets out to unpack the notion of ‘continuity and change’ through examining China’s expanding geo-economic footprint and the implications of this for debt sustainability in the post-Mugabe era in Zimbabwe. It concludes that, although Mugabe’s rule formally ended in November 2017, the Chinese debt diplomacy which started during his era has continued to define the debt landscape of Mnangagwa’s Second Republic.

   4. Financing the Social Sector in Zimbabwe’s Post-Mugabe Era—Obstacles and Opportunities

      Smart Manda, Admire Tarisirayi Chirume

      Abstract

      This chapter reviews the trends in social sector outcomes in Zimbabwe and assesses the financing challenges in the post-Mugabe era. While Zimbabwe made significant progress in developing its social sectors in the post-independence era, the economic crisis experienced from 1998 to 2008 reversed some of the gains that had been achieved. When the country adopted a multiple currency system in 2009, social sector outcomes improved, driven by a favourable macroeconomic environment. From 2016, however, the country’s economic fortunes reversed as the economy began to experience renewed challenges, including falling revenues and declining fiscal space, and shortage of foreign currency to import critical drugs, among other factors. In addition, continued depreciation of the domestic currency since its introduction in 2019 presented additional challenges to the Second Republic, as people’s incomes were eroded while fiscal space continued to be squeezed. The situation was further exacerbated by the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic which affected both the education and health sectors in negative ways. These developments underlined the need for additional financing requirements to close the widening financing gap in social sectors in Zimbabwe. As this chapter shows, some of the possible financing options include broadening the tax base to unlock additional resources particularly from the informal economy, exploring contributory schemes, tapping into international financial assistance, strengthening public–private partnerships and tapping into diaspora remittances. There is also a need for strengthening public institutions to ensure efficiency and effectiveness in utilisation of public funds earmarked for social sectors.

   5. Exploring Innovative and Sustainable Financing of Agriculture in Zimbabwe’s Second Republic

      Peter Nkala

      Abstract

      The land reform programme in Zimbabwe began in 1980 following the signing of the 1979 Lancaster House agreement, targeting a more equitable land distribution in the country between black subsistence farmers and white commercial farmers. The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) of 2000 marks a watershed in the development of Zimbabwe’s agricultural sector and it continues to have far-reaching implications in relation to the possibilities of innovative and sustainable financing of agriculture. Using primary, secondary and anecdotal evidence on agricultural livelihoods, this study explores effective, innovative and sustainable agriculture financing approaches that address the financial needs of new farmers in post-Mugabe Zimbabwe. This includes innovations in traditional financing options such as conventional agricultural financing, bank loans, contract farming, joint venture financing, ICT-based mobile payment platforms and financing of agricultural research and extension. The chapter shows that there is no clearly marked shift in agricultural financing between the First and Second Republics as most financial institutions are still stuck in their traditional financing models with only cosmetic and superficial innovations in some instances meant to play ball to the direction of the political whirlwind. The willingness to move towards innovative approaches exists but the usual fear of the unknown hampers and slows down the desire to innovate, particularly so among senior management of financial institutions. The study recommends clear policies aimed at improving agricultural finance in the country through necessary and long-overdue increased agricultural financial intermediaries. Agricultural finance institutions must develop innovative agricultural financing portfolios capable of eliminating financial dependence and moral hazards that disrespect basic banking principles.

   6. Concluding Reflections on Change and Continuity

      Gorden Moyo, Kirk Helliker

      Abstract

      This final chapter revisits the central issue of this book in the context of the preceding thematic-based chapters, namely, change and continuity in relation to the Mugabe and Mnangagwa governments, with a particular focus on what we label as Mnangagwa’s formative project. There is general agreement across the chapters that Zimbabwean scholars must not rush to conclusions about the fundamental character of the Mnangagwa regime, and that unpacking the various dimensions of the Second Republic’s formative project is a worthy analytical endeavour. However, despite the wide-ranging official articulations of this project, the chapters demonstrate that the project has not taken off in any serious manner. Hence, as the chapters show in their own unique way, the project’s limitations are clearly evident. These limitations exist because, currently, the risks of change to power-retention far exceed any risks arising from simply retaining the current political settlement. This raises deep concerns about the space for dissent and mobilisation leading up to the upcoming national elections in 2023. We conclude by arguing that until such time as ordinary Zimbabweans can openly dissent and mobilise against the Zimbabwean government without fear of repression, Mnangagwa’s formative project will remain stalled.