Skip to main content
Top
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 2/2023

27-01-2023 | Original Paper

Mechanism design with model specification

Author: Pathikrit Basu

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 2/2023

Log in

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config
loading …

Abstract

We consider a setting in which additional parameters that determine preference characteristics are unknown. The mechanism designer specifies a model for possible type distributions and utility functions. We consider mechanisms that are uniformly incentive compatible with respect to a domain of possible utility functions. We identify conditions on the utility domain in which mechanisms always prescribe the same distribution over outcomes. These conditions have implications for optimal mechanism design with max-min objectives, and may be interpreted as capturing different forms of preference heterogeneity.

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 102.000 Bücher
  • über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Automobil + Motoren
  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
  • Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
  • Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

  • über 67.000 Bücher
  • über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

  • Bauwesen + Immobilien
  • Business IT + Informatik
  • Finance + Banking
  • Management + Führung
  • Marketing + Vertrieb
  • Versicherung + Risiko




Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

Literature
go back to reference Banerjee AV, Chassang S, Montero S, Snowberg E (2020) A theory of experimenters: robustness, randomization, and balance. Am Econ Rev 110(4):1206–30CrossRef Banerjee AV, Chassang S, Montero S, Snowberg E (2020) A theory of experimenters: robustness, randomization, and balance. Am Econ Rev 110(4):1206–30CrossRef
go back to reference Bergemann D, Morris S (2005) Robust mechanism design. Econometrica 73(6):1771–1813CrossRef Bergemann D, Morris S (2005) Robust mechanism design. Econometrica 73(6):1771–1813CrossRef
go back to reference Börgers T (2015) An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRef Börgers T (2015) An introduction to the theory of mechanism design. Oxford University Press, OxfordCrossRef
go back to reference Brooks B, Songzi D (2021) Optimal auction design with common values: an informationally robust approach. Econometrica 89(3):1313–1360CrossRef Brooks B, Songzi D (2021) Optimal auction design with common values: an informationally robust approach. Econometrica 89(3):1313–1360CrossRef
go back to reference Carroll G (2015) Robustness and linear contracts. Am Econ Rev 105(2):536–63CrossRef Carroll G (2015) Robustness and linear contracts. Am Econ Rev 105(2):536–63CrossRef
go back to reference Chung K-S, Ely JC (2007) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. Rev Econ Stud 74(2):447–476CrossRef Chung K-S, Ely JC (2007) Foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms. Rev Econ Stud 74(2):447–476CrossRef
go back to reference Fudenberg D, Romanyuk G, Strack P (2017) Active learning with a misspecified prior. Theor Econ 12(3):1155–1189CrossRef Fudenberg D, Romanyuk G, Strack P (2017) Active learning with a misspecified prior. Theor Econ 12(3):1155–1189CrossRef
go back to reference Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15CrossRef Gale D, Shapley LS (1962) College admissions and the stability of marriage. Am Math Mon 69(1):9–15CrossRef
go back to reference Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica J Econ Soc 41(4):587–601CrossRef Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: a general result. Econometrica J Econ Soc 41(4):587–601CrossRef
go back to reference Hu F, Immorlica N, Lucier B, Strack P (2015) Randomization beats second price as a prior-independent auction. In: Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on economics and computation, pp 323–323 Hu F, Immorlica N, Lucier B, Strack P (2015) Randomization beats second price as a prior-independent auction. In: Proceedings of the sixteenth ACM conference on economics and computation, pp 323–323
go back to reference Leonid H (1960) Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes. Mathematical methods in the social sciences. Stanford University Press Leonid H (1960) Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes. Mathematical methods in the social sciences. Stanford University Press
go back to reference Madarász K, Prat A (2017) Sellers with misspecified models. Rev Econ Stud 84(2):790–815 Madarász K, Prat A (2017) Sellers with misspecified models. Rev Econ Stud 84(2):790–815
go back to reference Maskin E (1999) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev Econ Stud 66(1):23–38CrossRef Maskin E (1999) Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Rev Econ Stud 66(1):23–38CrossRef
go back to reference Myerson RB, Satterthwaite MA (1983) Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J Econ Theory 29(2):265–281CrossRef Myerson RB, Satterthwaite MA (1983) Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading. J Econ Theory 29(2):265–281CrossRef
go back to reference Nambiar M, Simchi-Levi D, Wang H (2019) Dynamic learning and pricing with model misspecification. Manag Sci 65(11):4980–5000CrossRef Nambiar M, Simchi-Levi D, Wang H (2019) Dynamic learning and pricing with model misspecification. Manag Sci 65(11):4980–5000CrossRef
go back to reference Roth AE, Sotomayor M (1992) Two-sided matching. Handb Game Theory Econ Appl 1:485–541 Roth AE, Sotomayor M (1992) Two-sided matching. Handb Game Theory Econ Appl 1:485–541
go back to reference Theodore G (1973) Incentives in teams. Econometrica J Econ Soc 41(4):617–631CrossRef Theodore G (1973) Incentives in teams. Econometrica J Econ Soc 41(4):617–631CrossRef
go back to reference Tommy C-CT, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa W (1988) The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games. J Econ Theory 45(2):370–391 Tommy C-CT, Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa W (1988) The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games. J Econ Theory 45(2):370–391
go back to reference Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Finance 16(1):8–37CrossRef Vickrey W (1961) Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders. J Finance 16(1):8–37CrossRef
go back to reference Weinstein J, Yildiz M (2007) A structure theorem for rationalizability with application to robust predictions of refinements. Econometrica 75(2):365–400CrossRef Weinstein J, Yildiz M (2007) A structure theorem for rationalizability with application to robust predictions of refinements. Econometrica 75(2):365–400CrossRef
Metadata
Title
Mechanism design with model specification
Author
Pathikrit Basu
Publication date
27-01-2023
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 2/2023
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-023-01449-3

Other articles of this Issue 2/2023

Social Choice and Welfare 2/2023 Go to the issue