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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Mergers and Competition in Digital Markets: Learning from Our Mistakes

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Abstract

This paper analyses two particular merger decisions; the EU Commission’s Facebook/WhatsApp decision and the UK OFT’s (now CMA) Facebook/Instagram decision. In analysing these two cases common flaws are discovered. First, a poor or superficial assessment of the relevant market and second, the assumption that rapid growth of entrants in these new product or geographical markets is an indication of low barriers to entry. These miscalculations lead to a mistaken belief that the markets in which the proposed mergers were to be conducted were competitive. It is argued here that once account is taken of these mistakes it becomes clear that the markets had far fewer competitors than originally thought and that they were not characterised by low barriers to entry on an ongoing basis. Policy recommendations are made to remedy these issues for the benefit of global competition enforcement authorities.
Footnotes
2
Mandrescu (2017), p. 353.
 
3
See Commission Staff Working Document on Online Platforms SWD (2016) 172, https://​ec.​europa.​eu/​digital-single-market/​en/​news/​commission-staff-working-document-online-platforms [Accessed 08 July 2019]; Commission Decision of 26.4.2018 on setting up the group of experts for the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, C (2018) 2393 final. Auer and Petit (2015), p. 426.
 
4
Kupčík and Mikeš (2018), p. 393; Stucke and Grunes (2016); “Big Data: Bringing Competition Policy to the Digital Era” OECD Report ref. no.DAF/COMP(2016)14 published on 27 October2016. Consider also: Viktoria Robertson, H.S.E., Excessive Data Collection: Privacy Considerations and Abuse of Dominance in the Era of Big Data (June 24, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3408971 (Accessed on 08/07/2019); Kathuria, Vikas and Globocnik, Jure, Exclusionary Conduct in Data-Driven Markets: Limitations of Data Sharing Remedy (February 18, 2019). Forthcoming in: Marco Botta (ed.), EU Competition Law Remedies in Data Economy, Springer 2019; Max Planck Institute for Innovation & Competition Research Paper No. 19-04. Available at SSRN: https://​ssrn.​com/​abstract=​3337524 (Accessed on 08/07/2019); Although also consider Dirk Auer, Geoffrey Manne, ‘The Antitrust Dystopia: The Case of Big Data Competition’ (presented at ASCOLA conference 2019, forthcoming).
 
5
Mandrescu (2017) notes the following: rapport of the German national competition authority, http://​www.​monopolkommissio​n.​de/​images/​PDF/​SG/​s68_​fulltext_​eng.​pdf; see also the rapport from the DG for internal policy on online platforms, http://​www.​europarl.​europa.​eu/​RegData/​etudes/​STUD/​2015/​542235/​IPOL_​STU(2015)542235_​EN.​pdf; and the OECD Round table on two sided markets DAF/COMP/WD/(2009)69, https://​www.​oecd.​org/​daf/​competition/​44445730.​pdf [Accessed 08 July 2019].
 
6
Kommission Wettbewerbsrecht 4.0, Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, https://​www.​bmwi.​de/​Redaktion/​DE/​Artikel/​Wirtschaft/​kommission-wettbewerbsrecht​-4-0.​html [Accessed 10 July 2019].
 
8
Jacques Crémer, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye and Heike Schweitzer (European Commission), Competition Policy for the Digital Era (4 April 2019), http://​ec.​europa.​eu/​competition/​publications/​reports/​kd0419345enn.​pdf [Accessed 10 July 2019].
 
9
Jean Tirole, Competition Policy in the Digital Age (Shaping competition policy in the era of digitisation, Brussels, January 2019).
 
10
Jung and Sinclair (2019), p. 266.
 
11
Jung and Sinclair (2019), p. 267.
 
12
Jung and Sinclair (2019), pp. 268–270.
 
13
Jung and Sinclair (2019), p. 270.
 
14
Consider Germany’s new § 35 1a in the Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 1957 and Austria’s new § 9(4) in the Bundesgesetz gegen Kartelle und andere Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen 2005. Also consider as a solution to this issue Andrew McLean, “Futurity and the Future of Competition: The Case of Killer Acquisitions” (15th ASCOLA conference, online, June 2020).
 
15
Weitbrecht (2015), p. 153.
 
16
Weitbrecht (2015), p. 153.
 
17
Mandrescu (2017), p. 353.
 
18
Consider for example OFT, ‘Motorola Mobility Holding (Google, Inc.) of Waze Mobile Limited’ (2013) ME/6167/13; OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Amazon.​com Inc. of the Book Depository International Limited’ (2011) ME/5085/11; Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.4731 - Google/ DoubleClick’ C(2008) 927 final; OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Expedia of Trivago’ ME/5894/13 (the OFT elected not to assess this merger due to failing the market share test); and most recently Facebook/Giphy although whether this will be challenged in the US jurisdiction is open to question.
 
19
In the sense that one comes from the UK and the other from the EU, even though UK and EU law shares the same fundamental principles.
 
20
The European Union Merger Regulation (EUMR) preamble para 4.
 
21
EUMR preamble para 5.
 
22
EUMR Article 2.
 
23
Vertical merger guidelines.
 
24
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5.
 
25
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 11(b).
 
26
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 58–60.
 
27
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, Section IV.
 
28
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 24.
 
29
Although interesting, discussion of these issues will remain outside the ambit of this work as the harm caused by a lack of competition in ‘free’ product and service markets constitute a formidable topic in itself.
 
30
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 68; similarly in the UK Merger Guidelines it states: ‘Where entry barriers are low, the merged firm is more likely to be constrained by entry; conversely, this is less likely where barriers are high.’ Merger Assessment Guidelines CC2 Revised, OFT 1254, Sept 2010, para 5.8.4.
 
31
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 70.
 
32
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 71.
 
33
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 31.
 
34
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 70.
 
35
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 31.
 
36
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final.
 
37
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 108.
 
38
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 109.
 
39
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 117.
 
40
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 118.
 
41
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 119.
 
42
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 120.
 
43
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 121.
 
45
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 135.
 
46
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 133.
 
47
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 134.
 
48
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 132.
 
49
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, footnote 79.
 
50
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, 105.
 
53
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 38.
 
54
Data provided by the Parties for their market share in the EEA market for consumer communications apps on iOS and Android smartphones between November 2013 and May 2014.
 
55
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final 96.
 
59
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 104.
 
60
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 104.
 
61
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 105.
 
62
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 105.
 
63
Commission, ‘Case No COMP/M.7217 - Facebook/ Whatsapp’ C(2014) 7239 final, para 140.
 
64
Mandrescu (2017), p. 353.
 
66
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12.
 
67
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 7.
 
68
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 14.
 
69
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 30.
 
70
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 14.
 
71
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 15.
 
72
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 22.
 
73
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 43–44.
 
74
Maija Palmer, Are there any viable alternatives to Facebook? The difficulties of leaving a social media platform with two billion users (25 April 2018) Financial Times.
 
75
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 28.
 
76
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 34.
 
81
OFT, ‘Anticipated acquisition by Facebook Inc. of Instagram Inc’ (2012) ME/5525/12, para 36.
 
82
Consider early empirical study of such advantages present in 1977; Ronald Bond, David Lean, ‘Sales, promotion and product differentiation in two prescription drug markets’ (1977) Staff Report to the Federal Trade Commission, economic report. Consider further study and comment such as: Robinson et al. (1994), p. 1; Aoki (1998), p. 284; Lean (1994), p. 177; Scherer (1994), p. 173; Tufano (1989), p. 213; Gal-Or (1985), p. 649.
 
83
Robinson and Fomell (1985), p. 305; Robinson (1988), p. 87.
 
84
Pan et al. (1999), p. 81; Shepherd (1972), p. 25; Ravenscraft (1983), p. 22.
 
85
Porter (2001), p. 63; Suarez and Lanzolla (2007), p. 377.
 
86
Downes and Mui (1998); Tapscott (2001), p. 1; Amit and Zott (2001), p. 493.
 
87
M. Lieberman, ‘Did first-mover advantage survive the dot-com crash?’ (2005) Working Paper, Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles; Nikolaeva (2007), p. 560; Geyskens et al. (2002), p. 102; Dewan et al. (2003), p. 1055; Lee and Grewal (2004), p. 157.
 
88
B. Lieberman, ‘Did first-mover advantage survive the dot-com crash? (2005) Working Paper, Anderson Graduate School of Management, University of California, Los Angeles.
 
89
For a study on where easy replication of innovations can actually stymie innovation consider; Rasmusen and Yoon (2012), p. 374.
 
90
Srinivasan et al. (2004), p. 41.
 
91
Wang et al. (2010), p. 1.
 
92
Cross-generational compatibility is where one generation of products is compatible with the next.
 
93
Intra-generational compatibility is where the products are now compatible within a particular generation. The example given by the authors is ‘DVD players are cross-generation incompatible with previous-generation VCR players but are within-generation compatible with each other’; Wang et al. (2010), p. 2.
 
94
Varadarajan et al. (2008), p. 293.
 
95
Varadarajan et al. (2008), p. 293.
 
97
The legally appropriate test in such circumstances, as set out by Case 6/72 Continental Can v Commission EU:C:1973:22, para 32 and Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission EU:C:1978:22, para 22.
 
98
Although it is fully accepted that this is easier to see with hindsight, nonetheless the aim here is to improve enforcement for the future.
 
99
Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers OJ [2004] C 31/5, para 68.
 
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Metadata
Title
Mergers and Competition in Digital Markets: Learning from Our Mistakes
Author
Matthew Cole
Copyright Year
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-72345-3_7

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