7. Migration Takes Centre Stage

Renowned British economist of the Enlightenment era, Thomas Malthus—best known for his 1798 masterpiece, An Essay on the Principle of Population—sparked both curiosity and controversy for his theory, which explores the relationship between population growth and planetary limits. Malthus’s theory, which took shape against the backdrop of early nineteenth-century England, observed the delicate balance between burgeoning humanity and the land’s bounty. Using the analogy of a garden overrun by weeds without a vigilant gardener, he believed that unchecked population growth would eventually surpass the earth’s capacity to provide sustenance.

Yet, fate intervened in a whimsical twist. The wheels of industrialisation began to turn across the landscape Malthus had surveyed, bringing forth unforeseen change. Factories arose, machines hummed, and progress reshaped societies. Industrialisation led to a decline in fertility rates, defying Malthus’s predictions. As economic fortunes grew, families got smaller, highlighting the intricate interplay between human behaviour and societal progress.

A similar trend has been observed in developing countries like Brazil, Indonesia, and even certain parts of China and India, previously known for having high birth rates, where fertility rates are decreasing. The Economist’s briefing in 2009 revealed that about half of the world has a fertility rate of 2.1 or lower. This number, often called ‘the replacement fertility rate’, indicates a stable population. It is expected that sometime between 2020 and 2050, the global fertility rate will dip below this replacement rate in most countries.

This decline in fertility comes at a time when concerns reminiscent of Malthus’s predictions are resurfacing, and there is apprehension about the consequences of overpopulation on our planet. The reduction in fertility rates is surprising and somewhat reassuring. However, modern Malthusians often downplay its significance. They argue that the world still has too many people, focusing on the absolute number, which is set to rise by approximately 2.4 billion over the next four decades. This paradox is due to demographic inertia. If previous generations had high fertility rates, there are more significant numbers of women of childbearing age in the present, resulting in more children being born even if each mother has fewer offspring. This leads to more, albeit smaller, families.

The world population has increased threefold in less than 70 years, from 2.5 billion in 1950 to about 7.5 billion today (UN DESA, 2022). If population growth continued unabated in this way, by the end of the century, there could be 22 billion people on the planet, likely stretching resources beyond sustainability. However, that is not going to happen. The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) estimates that the global population will increase to around 9.2 billion by 2050, when it will stabilise, reaching just over 11 billion people by 2100 (The Economist, 2009). The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) projections show lower numbers, peaking at around 9 billion in 2070 and declining slightly above 8 billion in 2100 (Lutz, 2021).

Population growth in today’s giant, Asia, is slowing down and will peak around 2050, after which it will decline. Europe will decline slowly, and the Americas will grow slowly and stabilise. Africa is the only continent where population growth is likely to continue to increase to the point where its population rivals Asia by the end of the century. The world of tomorrow will be mostly Asian and African, with one in four people likely to be African by 2050 (Walsh, 2023).

The population of China, which is the world’s largest, has proliferated, but its growth has slowed and will peak in the next 10 to 15 years, after which it will decline. By 2100, China’s population will be just over 1 billion people (UN DESA, 2022). India’s population is now about 1.3 billion and will soon surpass China’s, but it will plateau and, in the next 30 to 40 years, begin to decline.

What is happening in China and India is happening all over the planet. Female fertility rates are plunging in Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, and Brazil. Even in Africa, though its population is rising today, fertility rates in all countries are dropping. As fewer babies are being born and the population stabilises, people on our planet will keep getting older, which has profound implications for societies and economies as the number of workers declines relative to the number of consumers (Lee & Mason, 2012).

In the 1970s, only 24 wealthy countries had fertility rates of 2.1 or below. This count has surpassed 70 countries across all continents, including Africa. Within five decades, between 1950 and 2000, developing countries saw their average fertility rates decline by half, from six to three children per family. In contrast, Europe’s fertility plummeted by almost half over the same period, from 2.65 to 1.42 children, only a 1.23-child drop. This decline in developing countries resembles the nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century European industrialisation patterns. Remarkably, South Korea achieved industrialised nation status in just 20 years, while Britain took 130 years (Prabhu, 2017).

Today’s trends are even more rapid. Fertility rates have dropped more dramatically than in Japan and all Southeast Asian countries (excluding the Philippines). Bangladesh saw its fertility rate halve from six to three in just two decades (1980 to 2000), while Mauritius achieved the same decline in only ten years (1963–1973). The most astonishing tale comes from Iran. When the clerical regime took over in 1979, the mullahs abolished the country’s family planning system. Fertility rose, reaching seven in 1984. Yet by the 2006 census, the average fertility rate had fallen to a mere 1.9, and just 1.5 in Tehran. From fertility that is almost as high as one can get, to below replacement level in 22 years, social change can hardly happen faster. No wonder the explosion on the streets of Iran this year seemed like a clash between two worlds: 15–29-year-olds, who make up one-third of the population and are better educated, against the established regime and the traditionalists (The Economist, 2009).

The population growth rate encompasses both the rate of natural increase and the impact of migration. Consequently, a substantial natural increase rate can be mitigated by a significant net out-migration, while a modest natural increase rate can be counterbalanced by a substantial net in-migration. This dynamic is particularly relevant when examining population trends, such as the influx of African migrants into Europe, where migration patterns play a crucial role in shaping demographic outcomes.

Despite the fact that Africa has the fastest-growing population globally, this does not translate into high numbers of migrants, as many fear.

In 2017, more than half of the global migrant population originated from just 21 countries. Notably, the top ten nations contributing the highest proportions of emigrants were India (6.4 per cent), Mexico (5 per cent), Russia (4.1 per cent), China (3.9 per cent), Bangladesh (2.9 per cent), Syria (2.7 per cent), Pakistan (2.3 per cent), Ukraine (2.3 per cent), the Philippines (2.2 per cent), and the UK (1.9 per cent) (The Economist, 2009). None are African. It is essential to emphasise that among these figures, the African nation with the most significant emigrant population was Egypt, ranking 19th globally. Approximately 36.3 million individuals have left African countries, accounting for a mere 0.5 per cent of the global population and contributing to only 14.1 per cent of the world’s migrant population (The Economist, 2009).

Contrary to the notion of Africa as a continent experiencing mass exodus, data sets highlight a different narrative. Africa’s role in the global migrant population is significantly smaller than other regions. Asia and Europe, for instance, account for 41 per cent and 23.7 per cent of the global migrant population, respectively (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Hence, Africa’s share of migrants is notably lesser in scale.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that a substantial proportion of sub-Saharan African migrants (70 per cent) choose to stay within the continent’s borders. While migrating beyond Africa, a notable portion heads towards Europe, representing approximately 25.7 per cent of the African migrant population (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). The EU stands out as a destination, accommodating around 9.1 million African migrants in 2017. It includes 5.1 million migrants from North Africa and 4 million from sub-Saharan Africa (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019). Notably, France emerges as the leading host for African migrants, with a significant share of 10.5 per cent, surpassing even the numbers in various African host countries.

This perspective underscores the importance of understanding migration dynamics within the African context. It dispels the misconception of Africa as a continent experiencing a mass exodus, highlighting that its contributions to the global migrant population are comparatively modest. While Europe hosts many African migrants, most sub-Saharan migrants choose to remain within their continent, challenging the conventional narrative of massive outward migration (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2019).

Stanford biologist and ecologist Paul Ehrlich (1970) published his controversial book The Population Bomb, foreseeing dire consequences from rapid population growth. Inspired by Malthusian ideas, this perspective briefly amplified discussions on population concerns following a surge in the global population after World War II (Linnér, 2003) as a result of advancements in public health. Concerns were raised about potential social and ecological upheaval. While many advocated for family planning and education, Ehrlich’s stance was more extreme. Rejecting incremental approaches, he asserted that population control was essential.

Despite technological advancements, such as the Green Revolution, which increased agricultural yields, Ehrlich found arguments to persist in his extreme views, for instance, warning about the potential environmental repercussions, including pesticide resistance (Ehrlich, 1970). While instrumental in steering attention towards population concerns, Ehrlich’s warnings were criticised for their pessimistic outlook. Eminent critics, such as economist Julian Simon, voiced counterarguments by emphasising the power of human adaptability and technological innovation in addressing resource scarcity.

Simon’s Ultimate Resource theory challenged Ehrlich’s dire predictions, asserting that human ingenuity and inventiveness have historically led to the development of new technologies and solutions to alleviate resource constraints (Simon, 1981).

Ehrlich’s ideas offer a cautionary tale on the limitations of relying solely on extreme prognostications. While his work undoubtedly spurred vital discussions, the subsequent critique highlights the importance of nuanced analysis. The story of Ehrlich’s predictions illuminates the significance of incorporating a multifaceted understanding of the factors shaping our global landscape. As we examine the legacy of Ehrlich’s extreme perspectives, it becomes evident that they must be accompanied by a balanced appreciation of the intricate web of variables that influence the trajectory of our societies.

Complexity science underscores the nonlinearity inherent in natural and societal systems. As the butterfly effect exemplifies, small changes can yield disproportionately large outcomes (Lorenz, 1963). Similarly, the relationship between population growth and resource availability is not unidirectional; it involves intricate feedback loops that can amplify or dampen trends. Technological advancements, while transformative, do not follow predictable linear paths. For instance, the exponential growth of computing power outlined by Moore’s Law only linearly translates to some domains.

Systems thinking emphasises that the trajectory of our world emerges from the intricate interplay of factors and urges us to embrace complexity rather than relying on linear projections (Moore, 1965). However, international organisations tend to focus on African population growth through a neo-Malthusian lens, emphasising scarcity, incapacity, unemployment, and other negative undercurrents. This view is influenced by a complex interplay of historical legacies, prevailing narratives and policy paradigms. The historical context of colonisation has left a lasting imprint on Africa’s socioeconomic landscape, engendering structural inequalities and fostering a perception of resource scarcity (Mamdani, 2007). This narrative converges with neo-Malthusian beliefs about overpopulation straining resources. Moreover, development paradigms prioritising economic growth may view population growth as a hurdle, potentially exacerbating unemployment and resource limitations (Lush et al., 2000).

In this context, prevalent narratives and reporting often amplify negative aspects of African countries. Additionally, external actors’ concerns over instability or migration pressures driven by population growth can also align with neo-Malthusian ideas, shaping policy strategies (Mamdani, 2007). Policy approaches and funding priorities of international organisations can consequently become oriented towards addressing these perceived challenges rather than focusing on creating new value.

Nonetheless, within international organisations, diverse perspectives also recognise the need for a more holistic understanding of African population dynamics that goes beyond the constraints of the neo-Malthusian framework. These voices advocate for nuanced approaches considering social, economic, and cultural contexts, striving to reflect the complexity of factors influencing Africa’s development.

In 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron’s remarks at the G20 summit illuminated a complex interplay between media obsession, humanitarian justifications, and underlying fears regarding overpopulation and fertility. In response to a question about Africa’s development, Macron’s statement, “The challenge of Africa, it is totally different, it is much deeper, it is civilisational”, ignited a flurry of reactions (Attiah, 2017). While President Macron’s full remarks resembled typical discourse within international development agencies, his words carried historical weight. In a 2023 interview, when asked about the riots that were observed in France throughout the year, mainly to contest retirement age, he stated that it is necessary to “significantly reduce immigration, starting with illegal immigration”. While reinforcing his belief that countries of origin need to be re-civilised, President Macron emphasised that although it is ‘untrue to claim’ that France is ‘overwhelmed’ by immigration, the current situation is ‘unsustainable’ (Le Monde, 2022).

Furthermore, he believes “we have an obligation to produce results”. According to him, France’s migration policy would be built upon the foundation of “protecting the external European borders”, as he views the nation as “a secondary immigration destination for foreigners who have entered another European Union country”.

The term ‘civilisational’ has often been employed to subtly attribute a nation’s successes and failures to essentialist characteristics. This is reminiscent of colonialist justifications. This rhetoric, intersected with overpopulation concerns, echoes neo-Malthusian fears that fertility rates in certain regions, such as Africa, might exacerbate resource scarcity and social instability.

In a separate incident, Prince William’s comments on African population growth sparked controversy in November 2021. He suggested that population growth was contributing to the endangerment of wildlife. In reality, the connection between population growth and environmental issues is complex and fraught with ethical considerations. Critics drew attention to the ‘eco-fascism’ concept, which posits that specific populations bear more responsibility for environmental degradation. This notion carries racist undertones, blaming overpopulation and its environmental consequences on marginalised communities, especially in regions like Africa (BBC, 2021). William’s statement highlighted the intricate nature of discussing population dynamics within environmental contexts, necessitating careful consideration of the historical baggage and implicit biases such discussions can carry. This incident resonates with concerns about a population explosion.

Such implicit bias was also evident within Western media narratives on the Ukraine refugee crisis, as exposed by Hellyer H. in The Washington Post (Hellyer, 2022). Charlie D’Agata’s remarks about Kyiv’s ‘civilised’ and ‘European’ nature inadvertently perpetuate a biased perception that conflict is less likely in such regions, reinforcing negative stereotypes about non-European areas. This prejudiced representation was further underscored by comments from various sources, suggesting that Western media and politics often prioritise the suffering of White Europeans over that of non-White communities facing similar struggles. This bias was evident in statements made on French news programmes Aljazeera (2021) and ITV News, illustrating how deeply embedded these discriminatory attitudes are.

Instances of discrimination extend beyond mere media rhetoric, finding disturbing resonance in the treatment of African and Asian migrants at Ukrainian border points with Poland, Romania, and Belarus. (Bergmann & Kijzer, 2022). African students seeking refuge from the conflict in Ukraine were met with barriers and mistreatment from Ukrainian security officials and civilians. The experiences recounted by these individuals highlight stark disparities in treatment based on their skin colour, causing Nigerian President Muhammadu Buhari to emphasise the universal right to safe passage for those fleeing conflict, regardless of ethnicity or passport colour. The ordeal faced by African students, as narrated by Samuel George, a Nigerian software engineering student, underscores the harsh realities and challenges they endured, including being denied passage and subjected to physical violence.

The research of Bergmann and Kijzer (2022) brings into focus the EU’s response to the Ukraine conflict, highlighting a heightened level of determination and unity. Within an astoundingly brief timeframe, the EU demonstrated solidarity and implemented sanctions as part of its response to the crisis. However, the pivotal moment arrived with the EU’s decision to supply lethal military equipment to Ukraine through the European Peace Facility, marking an unprecedented shift in EU policy and action. This alteration underscores a new geopolitical approach. Nevertheless, when juxtaposing these actions with the racial biases and discrimination unearthed in media coverage and the treatment of migrants, a disconcerting pattern emerges, questioning the consistency and impartiality of Western attitudes and responses, particularly concerning distinct regions and populations.

Beneath the surface of these media-covered statements lies a more profound concern: migration. Population growth often intersects with migration, employment, and resource distribution discussions in international discourse. The latent fears surrounding these issues fuel debates around humanitarian justifications or ecological concerns.

These discussions reflect broader debates about the potential impact of overpopulation on migration patterns and the socioeconomic fabric of nations, underscoring the need for a nuanced understanding of these issues and holistic approaches to address interconnected challenges.

The discourse surrounding migration is increasingly fraught with mass hysteria driven by media sensationalism and political agendas. Vincent Chetail’s work, Demystifying Migration: A Call for an Evidence-Based Narrative (2019), demonstrates how emotions and perceptions often overshadow facts and rationality in discussions about migration. Chetail points out that the current misperceptions primarily reveal the shortcomings of mass media and political discourse rather than reflecting the true nature of migration.

Chetail’s evidence-based approach challenges prevailing stereotypes about migration. He emphasises that migrants constitute only 3.5 per cent of the global population, a far cry from the frequently portrayed invasion narrative. Contrary to the disproportionate focus on irregular migration, most migrants travel safely and legally for work, family, or study reasons. Undocumented migrants are estimated at around 10–15 per cent of the migrant population globally. Additionally, Chetail dispels the myth of the male migrant leaving his family behind, revealing that women constitute 48.4 per cent of the global migrant population.

The narrative propagated by media and politics obscures migrants’ significant contributions to their destination and origin countries. Migrants are pivotal to host countries’ economic growth, filling critical roles in key sectors. Contrary to misconceptions, migrants pay more taxes and make more social contributions than they receive and contribute to entrepreneurship and innovation. Remittances sent by migrants greatly bolster their home countries’ economies, too, surpassing development assistance more than threefold.

In 2022, Africa received an injection of around $95.6 billion from migrant remittances (World Bank, 2023). These funds, sent through various channels, including banks, money transfer agencies, and fintech companies, constitute 2 to 3 per cent of Africa’s GDP and support the living expenses of roughly 200 million relatives. The potential to utilise a portion of these remittances for long-term projects like infrastructural development is gaining traction, contingent upon African governments forging solid connections with their diaspora, which consists of approximately 160 million people originally from the continent (World Bank, 2023).

Chetail (2019) goes further and highlights that the visibility of migrants has increased, offering both challenges and opportunities for the countries they inhabit and originate from. However, migrants often become scapegoats, masking politicians’ failure to address socioeconomic challenges. Chetail notes that in a politically charged atmosphere, advocating for an evidence-based approach to migration is often perceived as partisan or even an affront to democracy. In such a climate, Chetail calls for developing a pedagogy of migration to foster a better understanding of migration’s normalcy and safeguard democratic discourse from demagoguery.

In the historical context of human mobility, UN DESA’s (2022) data reveals a gradual rise in international migrants, increasing from 173 million in 2000 to 281 million in 2020. This constitutes 2.8 per cent and 3.6 per cent of the global population, respectively, with women accounting for 135 million (3.5 per cent of females) and men for 146 million (3.7 per cent of males). The International Organisation on Migration (2021) also highlights that the stock of international migrants outside their birth countries reached 281 million by mid-year 2020, compared to 173 million in 2000 and 153 million in 1990. While the absolute numbers have grown, the share of international migrants as a proportion of the world’s population has remained relatively stable between 2.9 per cent and 3.6 per cent from 1990 to 2020. Notably, the COVID-19 pandemic is believed to have caused migrant populations to fall by nearly 2 million between mid-2019 and mid-2020.

Migration across extensive distances is an enduring facet of human history. Over the ages, individuals have journeyed across the globe, seeking sustenance, security, and prosperity while leaving indelible marks on their cultures, languages, ailments, and genetic traits. The dawn of the New World presented unprecedented avenues for amassing wealth and fostering production and trade, but the scarcity of labour posed a significant challenge. The demand for labour consistently outstripped supply, leading to high associated costs. Preceding the nineteenth century, migrations of coercion and contractual arrangements dominated the intercontinental movement. The transatlantic slave trade epitomised these dynamics, witnessing the harrowing transportation of around 12 million enslaved individuals to the Americas (mainly South America and the Caribbean) amid dire conditions and elevated mortality rates. Brazil alone had received 4.5 million enslaved people by 1850 (Ferrie & Hatton, 2013).

As the nineteenth century unfolded, the movement to dismantle the slave trade gained momentum, particularly in Britain, the United States, and various European nations, giving way to new forms of migration. Leading up to 1820, Europe was a substantial source of migrants to the Americas, with approximately 2.6 million Europeans making the journey. Many embarked on this voyage through indentured contracts or as convicts, contributing to the burgeoning labour force. The indenture system was introduced in 1607 when the Virginia Company recruited labourers from England to work in its Jamestown colony. Workers agreed to serve for a fixed term, after which they were free. In exchange for their service, servants received the costs of their passage and subsistence during their term (Ferrie & Hatton, 2013).

After World War II, a further wave of migration saw Italians, Germans, British, and individuals from various backgrounds relocating to countries in South America, such as Argentina, Australia, and New Zealand.

During this period, some countries implemented policies to attract migrants of European descent, often emphasising ‘whiteness’ while concurrently imposing restrictions or rejecting migrants from other backgrounds. These policies, driven by racial biases and socioeconomic considerations, profoundly impacted the composition of migrant populations and the societies they joined (Gabaccia, 2000; Fitzgerald & Cook-Martin, 2019).

In his transformative work, Move: The Forces Uprooting Us, Parag Khanna (2021) offers an insightful narrative of the coming phase of human civilisation characterised by mobility and sustainability. Khanna’s book underscores the multifaceted challenges facing our world, including geopolitical divisions among powerful nations, demographic imbalances, economic upheavals stemming from technological advancements, and the far-reaching impacts of climate change.

As the title suggests, Khanna explores the dynamic nature of the global movement, illustrating how people are continually relocating, reshaping the world map in the process. A notable revelation in his book is the prediction that, in the next decade or two, the number of Asian Europeans will surpass that of Asian Americans. This projection challenges prevailing assumptions in today’s hyper-nationalistic landscape. Khanna advocates for a paradigm shift away from outdated notions of sovereignty, emphasising the crucial link between relocating people to resources and deploying technologies to individuals, all essential for achieving a new equilibrium (Khanna, 2021).

Khanna contends that the unrestricted movement of people across borders is integral to human social dynamics and offers economic advantages to countries despite recent stringent immigration policies observed in various regions, including Europe and the United States, under the Trump administration. Furthermore, Khanna delves into the emergence of generational identities overshadowing national allegiances, particularly among the younger population. He prognosticates that the growing impact of climate change will lead to the formation of ‘climate-resilient zones’, with regions such as Alaska gaining desirability. At the same time, acute water shortages might displace populations from Egypt and the Sahel region.

It is well known that, as the baby boom generation retires, OECD populations will age rapidly over the next several decades. According to recent demographic projections by the United Nations (2023), the share of the old-age population is expected to double, on average, in major industrialised countries over the next 50 years, and the dependency (ratio of dependants to the working-age population) is set to rise substantially. There is growing concern about this demographic. Changes will have significant macroeconomic effects and pose complex fiscal policy challenges.

Ageing may also influence economic growth, depending on the adjustments of factor inputs and government policy responses. However, the neoclassical Overlapping Generational (OLG) models used in previous studies cannot capture these effects because they feature diminishing returns in the reproducible inputs and exogenous technological change, implying that growth is also fuelled by technological progress and independent of economic forces in the long run.

The convergence of increased life expectancy and declining fertility rates drives the ageing and demographic dynamics, shaping the trajectory of average population age (Prabhu, 2017). Projections predict a nearly doubled proportion of elderly individuals in the next five decades, with Italy and Japan undergoing the most pronounced demographic shifts (Prabhu, 2017; Inada, 2021). In contrast, Sweden’s ageing trend appears less dramatic, with Canada, France, the US, and the UK ranking in the middle (Prabhu, 2017; Inada, 2021).

Japan, known for its remarkable longevity rates, confronts an unparalleled demographic challenge with global repercussions (Inada, 2021). Japan’s demographic challenges are magnified by plummeting fertility rates and declining birth figures (Weller, 2017). The nation is the world’s oldest, with over 29 per cent of its population aged 65 or older, in stark contrast with figures in Africa, where the average age is under 25 (Inada, 2021).

Japan’s National Institute of Population and Social Security Research forecasts a staggering reduction of nearly 40 million from its population of 127 million by 2065, despite the government’s stated goal of maintaining at least 100 million inhabitants (Weller, 2017). This phenomenon is attributed to waning interest among younger generations to initiate families and low immigration rates (Weller, 2017). A telling 2016 study reveals that many unmarried Japanese men and women lack relationships despite expressing intentions to marry (Weller, 2017).

Although endeavours to revitalise the population have faltered, a linguistic innovation has emerged to grapple with Japan’s ageing dynamics (Inada, 2021). The term ‘pre-old age’, advocated by both the Japan Gerontological Society and the Japan Geriatrics Society, is gaining prominence to redefine the 65 to 74 age range (Inada, 2021). This lexical adaptation illuminates Japan’s evolving understanding of ageing, acknowledging a life phase beyond traditional delineations.

This linguistic evolution aligns with Japan’s shifting work patterns and societal roles (Inada, 2021). Many, like Norihiro Aizawa, a 38-year-old part-time farmer, intend to contribute actively into their 70s, signifying a societal re-evaluation of age and productivity (Inada, 2021). Japan’s agricultural sector perceives those in their 60s and 70s as being at the zenith of their careers, redefining ageing as a continuous contribution rather than a simple transition into retirement (Inada, 2021).

Japan’s experience offers vital insights into the intricate interplay between demographics, societal values, and the evolving human journey (Weller, 2017). Today’s median age in Japan is 46 years old and is expected to increase to 55 by 2100. Because it has very little immigration, Japan is like a microcosm of the world itself. We know that its economy has been sluggish, its schools are closing, and more and more elderly people are looking after each other because there are no longer young people for those tasks. The deceleration that looms over Japan as its population ages is the same phenomenon occurring in Europe, with ripple effects extending to governmental policies, societal norms, and economic dynamics (Edmond, 2019).

The old-age dependency ratio amplifies the impact of age distribution, exemplified by the rapid growth of this ratio in Japan and Italy (Prabhu, 2017; Inada, 2021). Conversely, other countries foresee a gradual rise until 2100, followed by a more rapid ascent (Prabhu, 2017; Inada, 2021). Canada, France, and the US anticipate dependency ratio surges of 130 per cent, 100 per cent, and 90 per cent, respectively, contrasting with the UK and Sweden’s projected increases of 60 per cent and 50 per cent (Prabhu, 2017; Inada, 2021).

Within this global demographic landscape, Prabhu notes a paradigm shift (2017). Concerns of overpopulation are replaced by the realisation that transitioning demographics will pose challenges, particularly for nations with limited immigration. Europe is pivotal, as demographic shifts shape policies and societies (Prabhu, 2017; Inada, 2021). The resulting economic, societal, and innovative implications resonate worldwide. How will governments cope with declining revenues as tax bases no longer increase and new short-term expenses supplant capital expenses?

For example, labour shortages, illuminated by Whiteman (2022), could be one of the most far-reaching consequences of changing demographics. Healthcare costs are also set to rise. With fewer people in the workforce, tax collections decline, houses are empty, and schools close. The infrastructure requirements, such as roads, bridges, dams, and airports, will decline. Innovation, too, could be a casualty of ageing populations. Much of the innovation of the past 50 years has been driven by young people, who have helped create new and remarkable technologies such as the internet, smartphones, social media, automation, and artificial intelligence. Older people need help adapting to these new technologies. What will happen to innovation as certain countries’ populations grow older?

These impacts are exacerbated by crises and conflict. For example, the war in Ukraine has intensified the logistics sector’s labour shortage, first observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Sanctions impede recruitment for seafarers and drivers and a host of low-skilled labour. International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) data notes that Russians account for 10.5 per cent (198,123) of the global shipping workforce, with Ukraine providing 76,442 (or 4 per cent) and warned restrictions on Russian crew could hinder a sector already hit by labour shortages (Whiteman, 2022). The interconnectedness of trade and labour markets necessitates unrestricted movement (Whiteman, 2022).

Other sectors are also struggling. In 2021, 28 occupations in Europe, ranging from construction and healthcare to engineering and information technology, suffered from shortages, and the Digital Economy and Society Index shows that four out of ten adults who work in Europe need basic digital skills (Soler, 2023). As a result, the European Commission has implemented mitigation measures to reduce regional and industrial-specific labour shortages.

“Labour shortages have a catastrophic cost. Of course, an economic cost. In Germany alone, €86 billion per year in lost output”, said the EU Home Affairs Commissioner Ylva Johansson. The EU is working to reduce the unfilled vacancy rate among the 27 member states and combat the working-age labour force, which is projected to fall from 70 per cent to 56–54 per cent by 2070, according to the latest Eurostat figures (Soler, 2023).

Johansson affirms that in today’s Europe, two working people support somebody who does not work. However, in 2070, it will be one-to-one unless something is done about it (Soler, 2023). This urgency should have made Africa’s young population an asset for the partnership between the two continents. However, the opposite appears to be true.

In their comprehensive analysis, Moreno-Lax et al. (2021) scrutinised the EU’s approach to Mediterranean migration from the eruption of the 2015 refugee crisis to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The study’s findings show a persistent absence of fully unified standards despite concerted efforts towards harmonisation at the EU level. Particularly evident within asylum policy are enduring discrepancies in practices and standards across member states and a lack of EU law coverage for legal entry routes, including humanitarian visas. Moreover, the EU’s legal framework still needs to be completed regarding legal migration, leaving many categories of third-country national (TCN) workers outside EU regulations.

The New Pact on Migration and Asylum, proposed in September 2020, introduces several contentious propositions. In legal migration, national schemes are set to continue in parallel with EU initiatives, while comprehensive EU-wide mobility for TCNs remains largely elusive. Within asylum policy, the foundational tenets of the Dublin system persist and, in some instances, are reinforced. However, the proposed border procedure’s envisioned link between asylum and repatriation raises concerns about compromised protection for migrants and asylum seekers. The externalisation of international protection obligations, which involves redirecting asylum seekers and refugees to other countries without adequate safeguards, underscores potential vulnerabilities in the EU’s asylum policies, heightening apprehensions about the influence of foreign political interests on the decision-making process.

Furthermore, the report reveals that despite a substantial decrease in asylum applications and arrivals at EU external borders since 2015, the discourse and strategies around crisis management endure. Unfortunately, solidarity within the EU is often a response to emergencies rather than a fundamental aspect integrated into common asylum and external border control policies; a situation mirrored in various African regions. For instance, in the face of crises like displacement due to conflict or natural disasters, African countries often resort to ad-hoc and reactive measures, lacking a cohesive, pre-established framework for collective response. This fragmented approach, akin to the EU’s current predicament, highlights the need for a more systemic integration of solidarity into policies that address humanitarian needs, ensuring a more proactive and unified response to challenges across diverse contexts.

The lessons learned from the EU’s reassessment could potentially inform and inspire a more comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing humanitarian challenges in Africa and beyond (EUAA, 2019).

In 2019, the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) signed an updated cooperation plan that strengthened their cooperation in their respective work on asylum, border control, and migration management. Their augmented and combined authority has led to significant shifts in the implementation of EU asylum and external border control policies. This change raises concerns about independence, executive powers, accountability, and compliance with fundamental rights, which have yet to be comprehensively addressed.

Established in 2004, Frontex is the European border agency responsible for aiding EU countries and Schengen-associated nations in managing their external borders. Its broader mission encompasses the harmonisation of border controls across the EU. The agency is pivotal in fostering collaboration among border authorities within EU member states, offering indispensable technical support and expertise. The Federal Ministry of the Interior and Community in Germany has indicated that Frontex, in response to escalating migration levels, has expanded its personnel at its Warsaw headquarters, growing from approximately 400 in 2016 to 655 by the close of 2017 and further exceeding 1000 by 2020 (Moreno-Lax et al., 2021). These expansions are accompanied by a parallel budget growth, ascending from €254 million in 2016 to €302 million in 2017, with a projected increase reaching €346 million by 2020 (Moreno-Lax et al., 2021).

Moreno-Lax et al. highlight deficiencies within the European Commission’s plan for a new standard approach to search and rescue (SAR), which risks formalising ongoing irregularities by Frontex, the European Union Naval Force Mediterranean Operation (EUNAVFORMED), and member states’ bilateral arrangements with third countries, some of which have faced legal contestation in European courts and other forums. Current SAR practices, both in their present form and within the New Pact, contravene the principle of treating rescue as an exception to the broader rule of preventing unwanted arrivals. This deviation from SAR conventions heightens the risk of normalised use of techniques such as pullbacks and related abuses, regardless of their implications for human rights.

Another pivotal concern arising from the study by Moreno-Lax et al. is the criminalisation of humanitarian assistance by SAR NGOs. This issue remains politically significant, with the Commission either incapable or unwilling to end it. The inadequacies of the Commission’s Guidance on the Facilitation Directive are laid bare alongside the challenges SAR NGOs encounter in their daily operations across various member states, hindering their ability to fulfil their mandate. The current focus of the Guidance on ‘mandated by law’ humanitarian assistance leaves room for legal ambiguity, potentially fostering disparities among member states and eroding the cohesion of EU law. Beyond their immediate humanitarian role, the Guidance fails to acknowledge the broader responsibilities civil society organisations bear in overseeing the implementation of human rights standards. Hence, there is an urgent need for an effective monitoring and redress mechanism to safeguard civil society organisations as defenders of human rights and champions of democratic values.

Lastly, the study delves into the external dimension of migration and asylum policy, tracking the influence of significant documents such as the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, the EU Agenda on Migration, and the Migration Partnership Framework within the Commission’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum. This includes an assessment of the utilisation of EU funds in this context.

Three case studies on EU collaboration with Turkey, Libya, and Niger reveal a predominant focus on combatting irregular migration, with limited regard for the rights of TCNs. Furthermore, the prioritisation of migration management within EU funding mechanisms has led to the misallocation of development and humanitarian aid, often disregarding the genuine needs and interests of the involved parties, even when the adverse impact on fundamental rights is evident from multiple sources.

In their insightful book Dictators as Gatekeepers for Europe, Jacob and Schlindwein (2019) shed light on opaque European strategies to secure borders and markets. This work explores European states’ intricate governance tactics and their approach to migration management. The book uncovers a profound reality: the EU has taken concrete steps to restrict mobility within the African continent, driven by its domestic policy agenda. The authors highlight a series of agreements with countries such as Turkey, Libya, and Sudan, which serve to obstruct migrants’ routes to the European continent, evoking parallels to a modern-day ‘Berlin Wall’ that extends beyond Europe, resulting in the militarisation of borders across Africa.

Through interviews and meticulous documentation, Jacob and Schlindwein expose the mechanics of border outsourcing and elucidate the EU’s multifaceted strategy. First, the Dublin Regulation assigns responsibility for asylum seekers to the states through which they enter the EU (primarily southern Europe). Then, strategic interventions militarise border zones between Europe and Africa, as evidenced in cases like the Spain-Morocco border. At the same time, coastal states such as Turkey and Libya are incentivised to intercept and detain individuals attempting to reach Europe. Finally, those who succeed in reaching Europe face deportation to their initial entry points or states willing to accept them.

Beyond unveiling the EU’s collaboration with contentious figures like Sudanese Major General Hamdan Daglo and the dire conditions endured by migrants detained by Libyan militias, the book underscores the historical continuity between European colonial practices in Africa and current policies. It illuminates the echoes of colonialism reverberating in modern strategies, exemplified by instances such as the German Development Minister likening a summit to the largest Africa conference since 1884 and advocating for establishing special economic zones for migrants.

While unveiling the complexity of the dialogue between Europe and Africa, Dictators as Gatekeepers for Europe also offers insights that suggest pathways to transcend neocolonial trends.

In 2022, Lighthouse Reports initiated an investigation into Frontex’s operations, unearthing instances of human rights violations and maritime law breaches that confirm the concerns expressed by Jacob and Schlindwein. Despite Frontex’s repeated denials, a collaborative investigation involving Frontex’s internal database and cooperative efforts with media outlets Der Spiegel, SRF Rundschau, Republik, and Le Monde exposed a far-reaching involvement of Frontex in illegal pushbacks in the Aegean, a situation more extensive than previously acknowledged (Lighthouse Reports, 2022).

A Le Monde report reveals an internal document spanning several million lines, acquired by Le Monde and its investigative partners from the Lighthouse Reports, which chronicles numerous cases of illegal pushbacks of migrants (defined as a set of state measures by which refugees and migrants are forced back over a border—generally immediately after they crossed it) under the guise of ‘prevention on departure’ operations from Turkey between March 2020 and September 2021.

The publication of these findings led to significant repercussions, notably the resignation of Frontex’s executive director, Fabrice Leggeri, shortly after the investigation became public (Lighthouse Reports, 2022). Cross-referencing data from Frontex’s internal Joint Operations Reporting Application (JORA) database with external sources confirms that Frontex was involved in at least 22 verifiable cases wherein individuals were placed on life rafts before being forcibly returned to Turkey over 18 months from March 2020 to September 2021 (Lighthouse Reports, 2022).

JORA data indicates that the estimated 957 individuals involved were subjected to hazardous and life-threatening situations after encountering Frontex assets in the Aegean. Alarmingly, two instances underscore individuals being placed on life rafts and set adrift in the open sea despite having reached Greek islands prior (Lighthouse Reports, 2022).

However, the scale of pushbacks implicating Frontex is likely even more significant. The Lighthouse Reports (2022) expose Frontex’s involvement in illicit practices at the EU’s borders and shed light on the agency’s use of misleading terminology within its reporting system, potentially serving to obscure instances of human rights violations. Between March 2020 and September 2021, Frontex recorded its direct involvement in 222 incidents categorised as ‘prevention of departure’, affecting a total of 8355 individuals, according to the Lighthouse Reports. This term, often used to describe practices that amount to pushback, is recognised as illegal under Greek, EU, and international law. As documented by the Lighthouse Reports, interviews conducted with sources within Frontex and Greek authorities corroborate this (Lighthouse Reports, 2022).

Despite these revelations, it is clear that Frontex has the full backing of the EU. The EU’s emphasis on border control and deterrence has garnered notable attention for its disproportionate nature. This situation can be traced back to decisions taken in 2016 when the European Commission assented to provide Turkey with a substantial €6 billion fund to retain Syrian refugees within Turkish borders.

For those who managed to traverse the perilous journey to European shores, their confinement to five Greek islands, aptly termed ‘hotspots’, entailed adherence to stringent asylum regulations primarily aimed at facilitating their return to Turkey or their countries of origin (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

In 2020, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen lauded Greece as the ‘shield’ of Europe, unveiling an allocation of an additional €700 million earmarked for border management, infrastructure enhancement, and intensified repatriation efforts (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020). This financial commitment followed the Greek government’s proclamation on March 1, 2020, of emergency measures designed to temporarily suspend the right to seek asylum for individuals entering the nation. These measures encompassed swift deportations of new arrivals without formal registrations, complemented by the reinforcement of borders through the deployment of augmented military and security personnel (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

On March 3, 2020, the highest echelons of EU leadership embarked on a symbolic flight across the Greek-Turkish border, utilising a military helicopter as their vessel. Von der Leyen was seeking to convey the significance of sustaining order at the Greek external border and safeguarding Greece and Europe (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

Remarkably, the initial response did not encompass denunciations or expressions of concern regarding the escalation of violence, the suspension of asylum, or the imperative need for essential protection for those at the border. Rather than vocalising condemnations, the Commission deployed Frontex’s Rapid Intervention Team, supplemented by an influx of border guards, vessels, helicopters, and essential equipment. This was accompanied by financial provisions dedicated to enhancing migration management (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

In the wake of widespread criticism stemming from the EU’s perceived silence, President von der Leyen subsequently emphasised the paramount significance of upholding ‘the individual right to ask for asylum’. Nonetheless, Greece’s emergency measures remain in effect (Médecins Sans Frontières, 2020).

The overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi, the long-time leader of Libya, marked a turning point in the EU’s approach to the migration crisis. Marked by the intervention of European powers and the notable resistance from the AU to this, the Libyan crisis began with a popular uprising against Gaddafi’s rule in early 2011. As the conflict escalated, external actors, primarily European nations supported by the UN, intervened militarily, leading to Gaddafi’s downfall. Concurrently, the AU attempted to mediate and find a peaceful resolution, showcasing its opposition to external intervention.

The European intervention was framed as a response to the Libyan government’s violent suppression of the popular uprising. The UN Security Council authorised the establishment of a no-fly zone and using ‘all necessary measures’ to protect civilians. This provided the legal basis for a coalition of European nations, along with some Arab allies, to launch a military campaign. NATO played a significant role in carrying out airstrikes and supporting anti-Gaddafi rebel forces. The intervention, however, sparked controversy and debate as it evolved from a mission to protect civilians into active support for regime change.

In response, the AU stance was firm, advocating for mediation and a peaceful resolution. In an attempt to find a political solution to prevent further bloodshed, the AU proposed a roadmap that included an immediate ceasefire, the protection of civilians, and a negotiated settlement. However, these efforts were met with scepticism by France and the UK, which led to the charge for Ghaddafi’s overthrow. AU efforts were eventually sidelined as the conflict escalated and external military intervention gained momentum.

The differing approaches of Europe and the AU reflected broader divisions within the international community. While European powers and their allies believed that Gaddafi’s removal was necessary for stability and democratisation, the AU and other countries like Russia and China warned against the unintended consequences of military intervention. The AU’s “African solutions to African problems” stance and resistance to external interference were driven by its commitment to African sovereignty and its concern over the potential for long-term instability in the region.

Indeed, the aftermath of Gaddafi’s overthrow has demonstrated the complexities of intervention and the challenges of post-conflict stabilisation. Libya descended into chaos, with competing factions and armed groups vying for power. The vacuum left by Gaddafi’s removal contributed to the proliferation of arms and the rise of extremist groups. Ironically, the country became a central transit point for migrants attempting to reach Europe, exacerbating regional and international challenges.

Martin (2013) documents a distressing incident involving 72 individuals, including two infants, who departed from Libya for Italy in March 2011. Their ill-fated boat drifted at sea for 14 days, with the passengers enduring extreme food and water scarcity. Eventually, a helicopter came across the vessel, distributing eight bottles of water and a handful of biscuits. Despite being informed of the dire situation, the Italian and Maltese authorities refrained from acting due to their conflicting interpretations of SAR obligations. Tragically, 63 lives were lost before the vessel eventually returned to Libyan shores.

This heartrending episode, later called the Left-to-Die Boat case, prompted the Council of Europe to launch an inquiry into the incident. A year later, Rapporteur Tineke Strik concluded that a ‘catalogue of failures’ had transpired, urging NATO, the military authorities of the UK, France, Spain, and the Italian and Maltese search and rescue entities to account for their neglect (Martin, 2013).

In another tragic incident on October 3, 2013, 366 migrants lost their lives off the coast of Lampedusa, prompting the EU’s establishment of the Task Force for the Mediterranean to confront the pressing issue of sea-bound fatalities along its southern border (Martin, 2013). Despite this response, initiatives such as Italy’s Mare Nostrum and the EU’s Mediterranean Task Force have been marked by their limited scope and a prevailing focus on security considerations.

Mare Nostrum has successfully rescued nearly 30,000 migrants at sea since its inception. However, the EU’s and its member states’ paramount concern remains the prevention of migrants and refugees from departing from southern Mediterranean countries and reaching EU territories. Consequently, efforts to mitigate the loss of lives at sea are either undermined by or inherently linked to strategies aimed at curtailing access to the EU (Martin, 2013).

In 2022, Human Rights Watch brought to light disturbing revelations concerning the use of aerial surveillance by Frontex to facilitate the Libyan Coast Guard’s interception of migrant boats. This practice knowingly exposes migrants and asylum seekers to systematic and widespread abuse upon their forcible return to Libya, effectively implicating Frontex in these grave violations. Judith Sunderland, associate Europe and Central Asia director at Human Rights Watch, pointedly remarked, “Frontex’s rhetoric around saving lives remains tragically empty as long as the border agency does not use the technology and information at its disposal to ensure that people are rescued promptly and can disembark at safe ports” (Human Rights Watch, 2022).

Furthermore, on November 29, 2022, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) complained to the International Criminal Court (ICC), contending that European responsibility for crimes against humanity committed against migrants and refugees in Libya should be acknowledged.

Aerial surveillance is a pivotal component of the EU’s emerging strategy to prevent migrants and asylum seekers from reaching European shores by boat, effectively distancing itself spatially, physically, and legally from its responsibilities. European authorities have meticulously woven an intricate web of aerial surveillance across the central Mediterranean as they progressively withdrew Frontex and other EU vessels from the region. This was coupled with the delegation of responsibilities to Libyan forces, thereby hindering the vital operations of non-governmental rescue groups.

While Frontex underscores its maritime law obligation to alert relevant coastal authorities about distress situations at sea, it must be viewed in tandem with its commitments under regional and international human rights law. This includes its responsibilities concerning the right to life, the prohibition against torture and inhumane treatment, and the concomitant prohibition on refoulement, safeguarding individuals from the threat of torture, persecution, and other forms of grave harm under human rights and refugee law. However, in too many instances, these rights are not being realised.

The story of Kouassi, a 23-year-old who fled Côte d’Ivoire and was later sold to human traffickers in Libya, mirrors the reality that many migrants actually face upon reaching Libya.

After being rescued from a perilous boat in the central Mediterranean by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) search and rescue ship Geo Barents, Kouassi revealed that he had been detained in Libya for three months in 2020 after crossing the Algerian border. During his detention, he experienced shackling, beatings, and torture while the guards demanded a ransom of $900 for his release (MSF, 2023).

Thousands, including women, children, and men, are subjected to kidnappings, captivity, and extortion by militias and traffickers. Discrimination, persecution, and mass arrests also await migrants living in cities. The Italian Government’s bilateral agreement with Libya, supported by the EU, has led to support for the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept migrant boats. This arrangement aids human rights abuses as migrants intercepted at sea often end up in Libyan detention centres, as highlighted by Human Rights Watch (2022).

Despite international reports and evidence of these grave violations, European governments, including Italy, have agreed to prioritise border defence over human rights. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Migration signed between Italy and Libya in 2017 and renewed in 2020 has contributed to the exploitation and abuse of migrants. Under this agreement, Italy and the EU have supported the Libyan Coast Guard financially and with technical assets. At the same time, migrants intercepted at sea are frequently subjected to the Libyan detention system.

Considering this dire situation, MSF and numerous advocates urge the Italian government and EU institutions to cease supporting returning migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers to Libya and detaining them there. The current approach perpetuates a cycle of suffering and abuse. At the same time, safe and legal alternatives remain elusive for those seeking to escape Libya’s turmoil and cross the Mediterranean Sea in search of safety and freedom.

The 2023 “strategic partnership” between the EU and the Tunisian government, signed by Tunisia’s President Kais Saied in the presence of Von der Leyen and extreme-right Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in the realm of migration, has also garnered scepticism and criticism from those most affected. Although currently a MoU, the agreement aligns with a broader pattern of European deals with North African nations. Despite its intentions, this pact has raised concerns among human rights activists, who argue that it perpetuates a trend of restricting migration pathways and asylum opportunities for refugees.

Critics contend that the deal favours the EU’s interests, leaving migrants vulnerable to exploitation, violence, and abuse. The increasingly autocratic actions of Tunisia’s president and his blatant racist anti-sub-Saharan African positions since taking power in 2021 raise doubts about the agreement’s democratic foundation. Moreover, the deal’s support for the Tunisian economy is viewed as superficial, with the real focus being on deterring irregular migration to Europe. Reports of migrants being abandoned in harsh desert conditions and Tunisia’s tough stance on sub-Saharan asylum seekers underline concerns that the deal could lead to more deportations and further entrenchment of the migrant crisis (Knipp & Guizani, 2023).

The EU’s explanation that the agreement aims to combat people smugglers is met with scepticism, as critics argue that providing legal pathways to migration would be a more practical approach. The deal has been criticised as inconsistent with international humanitarian law.

The EU’s migration strategy demonstrates a dual-pronged approach akin to a carrot-and-stick dynamic, prominently visible in its interactions with African nations. This tactic perpetuates historical colonial power dynamics, reinforcing existing inequalities. A compelling illustration of this can be found in Niger, a country at the geographical centre of the Saharan conflicts and routes resulting from the Libya war. The EU effectively wielded its influence to orchestrate the passage of legislation in Niger about detention, all in exchange for financial aid dedicated to development. This intricate mechanism starkly underscores the perpetuation of historical imbalances, ultimately extending the EU’s dominion over Africans.

Similarly, the EU’s recent collaboration with Niger to counter migrant smuggling and bolster border security, unveiled as the “Partnership to Combat Migrant Smuggling” in July 2022, prompts questions regarding the EU’s migration management approach. While the initiative aims to preserve lives and curtail rights abuses, sceptics argue that this strategy could merely displace the predicaments of irregular migration and asylum seekers onto other nations, potentially entrenching cycles of vulnerability and exploitation.

Furthermore, the emphasis on border security and the dismantling of criminal networks could eclipse the imperative to address migration’s fundamental triggers and offer bona fide economic alternatives for individuals wanting to pursue better prospects. The various agreements and partnerships initiated by the EU epitomise a broader trend wherein EU member states seek to dissuade migration by outsourcing border control to non-European countries, potentially jeopardising human rights and engendering intricate challenges for all parties involved (Sanderson, 2022).

Although no longer an EU member, the United Kingdom’s (UK) collaboration with Rwanda to tackle migration and border management resonates with the broader trend of European countries seeking to externalise their border control measures. This bilateral agreement, established in 2019, reflects a strategy to prevent irregular migration and asylum seekers from reaching the UK by investing in the border control capabilities of partner countries. The UK-Rwanda deal involves financial support to enhance Rwanda’s border security infrastructure, training for Rwandan officials, and measures to discourage migrants from embarking on dangerous journeys to the UK.

Like the EU-Niger collaboration, this agreement has sparked concerns about potential human rights violations and the lack of emphasis on addressing the root causes of migration and providing adequate protection for asylum seekers. Critics argue that such arrangements might merely shift the burden of border control while sidestepping the broader humanitarian and human rights obligations.

A plethora of agreements and partnerships between the EU and Africa have been formed over the past two decades in an attempt to address the migration question.

The Rabat Process, launched in 2006, represents a significant framework for dialogue and cooperation on migration between the EU and African states. Focused on the Dialogue on Migration and Development, the Rabat Process has four pillars: organising mobility and legal migration, improving border management and combating irregular migration, strengthening synergies between migration and development, and promoting international protection. While it has identified priorities such as migration and development and border management, critics argue that its emphasis on security and containment can undermine the rights and well-being of migrants (Euro-African Dialogue on Migration and Development, 2006).

Another initiative, the Khartoum Process, was launched in 2014, focusing on addressing migration and human trafficking along migration routes in the Horn of Africa. While its objective was to strengthen cooperation and coordination among participating countries, critics contend it often prioritised border control and security measures over safeguarding human rights. Such an approach can lead to rights violations and harm to vulnerable populations as insufficient attention is paid to the root causes of migration.

Similarly, the 2015 Valletta Summit convened EU and AU leaders to discuss migration and development and produced the Valletta Action Plan, which outlines commitments to tackle migration through development assistance and cooperation. Critics, however, argue that the emphasis on development aid as a migration solution oversimplifies the intricate factors driving migration. Such agreements can inadvertently instrumentalise aid for migration control instead of fostering genuine development efforts (European Commission, 2015).

Established in 2018, the EU-AU Partnership for Migration, Mobility, and Employment aimed to establish legal migration pathways and enhance job opportunities for African youth. Despite commendable intentions, various factors undermine the effectiveness of this partnership, including failing to comprehensively address economic inequality, lack of access to education, and political instability in many African countries that continue to drive migration. Additionally, the focus on border security and containment can overshadow efforts to ensure the safety, dignity, and human rights of migrants (IOM, 2018).

At the core of the discourse between the two continents is a fundamental dichotomy of cooperation and partnership versus confrontation and isolation. Federica Mogherini, the EU High Representative and Vice President of the European Commission, articulated this during the Valletta Senior Officials Meeting in 2017. Mogherini emphasised the importance of collaboration in managing migration effectively, rejecting the notion of building walls and closures as solutions. This reflects the ongoing tension between those advocating comprehensive cooperation and those favouring more security-focused measures (Mogherini, 2018).

The AU-EU Summit in Abidjan marked a significant effort to bridge the gap between the two sides. Building on the framework established in Valletta and the Rabat Process, the Abidjan Declaration emphasised five critical pillars for a holistic migration strategy: support for the developmental benefits of migration, promoting legal migration and mobility, ensuring protection and asylum, preventing and combating irregular migration and human trafficking, and facilitating return, readmission, and reintegration (AU & EU, 2017).

Despite Abidjan’s spirit, the EU’s collaboration with Niger, launched as the “Partnership to Combat Migrant Smuggling” in July 2022, raised concerns about its approach to managing migration. As discussed earlier in this chapter, while the initiative aims to save lives and prevent rights violations, critics argue that this approach merely shifts the challenges of irregular migration and asylum seekers to other nations, potentially perpetuating a cycle of vulnerability and exploitation. In addition, the focus on border security and criminal network dismantling may overshadow the need to address the root causes of migration and provide genuine economic alternatives for people seeking better lives (European Commission, 2022a).

In December 2022, the EU and African Partners launched Team Europe Initiatives (TEI) to address migration challenges along the Atlantic/Western Mediterranean and Central Mediterranean migratory routes. These initiatives aim to harness joint efforts by member states and the EU in response to the surge in irregular flows and abuse by smuggling networks in North Africa. The TEI endeavours to implement the external dimension of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, promoting comprehensive cooperation and coordination among EU states while embracing a whole-of-route strategy (European Commission, 2022b).

These initiatives serve as platforms for collaboration among countries of origin, transit, and destination from Africa and Europe, offering opportunities for coordination with international partners and UN Agencies. The TEI for the Central Mediterranean Route supports operational actions aligned with the EU Action Plan for the Central Mediterranean. The initiatives prioritise enhancing migration governance across various domains, including the prevention of irregular migration, countering human smuggling and trafficking, facilitating legal migration and mobility, ensuring protection, enabling return, readmission, and sustainable reintegration, as well as fostering migration and development efforts, as articulated in the Joint Valletta Action Plan.

Equally, the EU-AU 2022 Brussels Summit outcomes underscored yet again the urgency and complexity of addressing migration. With the rhetoric surrounding asylum and migration becoming increasingly contentious at national and EU levels, the conclusions of the European Council’s summit that preceded it highlight this polarisation (Zanker, 2019). The European policy focused on reinforcing border control and deterrence rather than prioritising enhancing domestic asylum systems or creating secure and legal pathways for refugees. The conclusions of the European Council that preceded the 2022 EU-AU Summit lack any explicit mention of support for refugees and access to asylum in Europe, except in the context of Ukrainian migrants (Zanker, 2019).

Central to the discourse was the EU’s shift towards externalising asylum responsibilities beyond its borders, a point of consensus among member states. The conclusions underscore the imperative for increased external engagement, which involves collaborating with countries of origin and transit. This collaborative effort is aimed at preventing the influx of asylum seekers and streamlining the process of returns, achieved through mechanisms such as development aid, trade initiatives, and visa agreements.

The question of migration and refugees was recognised as a major international issue for the first time in 2016 when the 193 UN member states came together in New York to discuss a comprehensive approach to human mobility and enhanced cooperation at the global level. This led to the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants and set in motion a process of intergovernmental consultations and negotiations towards the development of a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. This process concluded on 10 December 2018 with the adoption of the Global Compact by the majority of UN member states at an Intergovernmental Conference in Marrakesh, Morocco, followed closely by formal endorsement by the UN General Assembly on 19 December (UN Migration, 2023).

Despite their substantial support for the compact, African countries found that rather than supplanting existing arrangements, it has functioned as an augmentation to them.

A Chatham House (2023) report highlighted the limitations of the new compact, indicating that while it was intended as a fresh start, it failed to ensure reliable responsibility-sharing among member states. Instead, it diminished human rights safeguards, focusing on returns, deterrence, and the externalisation of migration control to non-European countries. Negotiations were delayed as the EU resisted the African interpretation that the new compact would supplant existing agreements with the EU, but in 2022, the French EU presidency achieved a breakthrough on crucial legislative matters, including reforming Schengen border codes, screening, and the Eurodac regulations. An approach of incremental reform, rather than comprehensive restructuring, could help progress in the long-delayed EU asylum reforms and secure mini-deals before the parliamentary term concludes in 2024.

As things stand, several factors are undermining the effectiveness of the various agreements and partnerships between the EU and Africa. These include the lack of comprehensive measures to address economic inequality, lack of access to education, and political instability in many African countries that continue to drive migration. Additionally, the focus on border security and containment often overshadows efforts to ensure the safety, dignity, and human rights of migrants (European Commission, 2018).

The ineffectiveness of these deals can be attributed to factors such as power dynamics between the EU and AU, inadequate attention to root causes, limited consideration of migrants’ needs and rights, a focus on short-term security measures, and the rise of European extreme-right racist positions. As a result, many critics argue that the agreements often fail to address the complex realities of migration and risk exacerbating vulnerabilities and human rights violations facing those on the move.

From an African perspective, it becomes evident that the proliferation of negotiations and partnerships, driven by various processes imposed by the EU, contradicts the AU’s expressed desire for a unified framework spanning the entire continent. This fragmentation of approaches weakens African agency and undermines the cohesive stance that the AU seeks to establish.

Addressing migration challenges requires multifaceted responses, particularly among youth. A comprehensive strategy for migration and mobility could save lives, combat criminal networks, and generate employment opportunities, especially for Africa’s 18 million new labour market entrants each year. Balancing short-term crisis management and long-term solutions addressing the root causes of migration is a nuanced challenge. Not to mention that the African youth play a pivotal role in shaping the future of an ageing Europe (Zanker, 2019).