Moral decay, inequality, and the perception of corruption: the reproduction of bribery as a social norm

In the paper, the role of a citizen, a public official, and an observer in the reproduction of bribery as a social norm are each analyzed. To make the analysis of this cellular-social form of corruption, three variables are incorporated: the agent’s perception of how widespread the corruption is, the agent’s available resources with which to act, and the role of moral values. Later, some scenarios of normalization and denormalization of corruption are explored, making different assumptions regarding the analysis and assignment of agents to different roles in the interactions. What was found is that power relations among corrupt and non-corrupt agents are key for understanding the social reproduction of bribery, where inequality might facilitate the social reproduction of corruption. The role of the observer of the interaction of bribe-givers, bribe-takers, and bribe-resisting agents was also found to potentially tip the balance in the direction of normalization or denormalization of bribery. Hence, giving the observer tools to intervene in these interactions becomes essential to combat corruption.