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2014 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Flawed Security Protocols (Extended Version)

Authors : Michele Peroli, Luca Viganò, Matteo Zavatteri

Published in: Security Protocols XXII

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

Security protocols are often found to be flawed after their deployment. We present an approach that aims at the neutralization or mitigation of the attacks to flawed protocols: it avoids the complete dismissal of the interested protocol and allows honest agents to continue to use it until a corrected version is released. Our approach is based on the knowledge of the network topology, which we model as a graph, and on the consequent possibility of creating an interference to an ongoing attack of a Dolev-Yao attacker, by means of non-collaboration actuated by ad-hoc benign attackers that play the role of network guardians. Such guardians, positioned in strategical points of the network, have the task of monitoring the messages in transit and discovering at runtime, through particular types of inference, whether an attack is ongoing, interrupting the run of the protocol in the positive case. We study not only how but also where we can attempt to defend flawed security protocols: we investigate the different network topologies that make security protocol defense feasible and illustrate our approach by means of concrete examples.

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previous chapter Red Queen’s Race: APT Win-Win Game (Transcript of Discussion)
next chapter Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Vulnerable Security Protocols (Transcript of Discussion)
Footnotes
1
It is interesting to note how this idea of “living with flaws” is becoming more and more widespread; see, e.g., [9] where runtime monitors are employed to warn users of android applications about “man in the middle” attacks on flawed implementations of SSL. Our approach is also related to signature-based intrusion detection systems, but we leave the detailed study of the relations of our approach with runtime monitors and signature-based intrusion detection systems for future work.
 
2
In the following, we focus on one competitor (i.e., one attacker), but it is quite straightforwardly possible to extend our work to multiple competitors.
 
3
If an attacker were omniscient and omnipotent (i.e., if he were to control the whole network) then there’d actually be no “space” for another attacker, and thus there’d be no interference. The more “adventurous” reader may want to compare this with the proof of the uniqueness of God by Leibniz, which was based on the arguments started by Anselm of Canterbury and was later further refined by Gödel.
 
4
In this paper we only use the inflow-spy and the outflow-spy filters and not the restricted-spy filter used in the previous exploratory works. This is due to the fact that we can certainly know who we want to defend, but we cannot know who the attackers are and we want to have the possibility of intercepting all outgoing/incoming messages which leave/come from/to an agent \(X\).
 
5
In [14, 15], we analyzed two protocols: (i) a key transport protocol described as an example in [6], which we thus called the Boyd-Mathuria Example (BME), and (ii) the Shamir-Rivest-Adleman Three-Pass protocol(SRA3P [8]), which has been proposed to transmit data securely on insecure channels, bypassing the difficulties connected to the absence of prior agreements between the agents \(A\) and \(B\) to establish a shared key.
 
6
This channel could be a digital or a physical channel, say a text message sent to a mobile (as in some two-factor authentication or e-banking systems), a phone call (as in burglar alarm systems), or even a flag raised (as is done on some beaches to signal the presence of sharks). We do not investigate the features of this channel further but simply assume, as done in all the above three examples of runtime guarding (monitoring) systems, that such a channel actually exists.
 
7
We do not make assumptions on the real topology of the network between \(A\) and \(S\) (i.e., there could be more than one channel) but only consider the fact that the communications from \(E\) are received by \(G\).
 
8
We deliberately wrote “protocol” instead of “protocols” since, for now, we are not going to consider multi-protocol attacks or protocol composition, e.g., [7, 10, 17]. As future work, we envision a distinguisher able to distinguish between messages belonging to different protocols and thus consider also the attacks that occur when messages from one protocol may be confused with messages from another protocol.
 
9
Formally, for the ISO-SC 27 we have: \(f^{-1}(f(N_A,2),2) = f^{-1}(N_A,2) = N_A\) (where \(s = 2\) refers to message \((2)\) in Table 4 or, equivalently, message \((1.2)\) in Table 2).
 
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Metadata
Title
Non-collaborative Attackers and How and Where to Defend Flawed Security Protocols (Extended Version)
Authors
Michele Peroli
Luca Viganò
Matteo Zavatteri
Copyright Year
2014
Book
Security Protocols XXII

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-12399-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-12400-1

Copyright Year: 2014

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-12400-1_9

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