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2015 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. Other Single-Unit Auctions

Authors : Asunción Mochón, Yago Sáez

Published in: Understanding Auctions

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In the previous chapter, we studied the four standard single-unit auctions. However, the seller has multiple options when designing an auction. In this chapter, we examine other single-unit models, such as hybrid auctions (Anglo-Dutch and Dutch–English auctions), auctions with different pricing rules (third-price or average price), auctions with different closing rules, and all-pay auctions. The chapter ends with the definition of optimal and efficient auctions.

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previous chapter Standard Single-Unit Auctions

next chapter Assigning Multiple Homogeneous Items in a Single Auction

This auction model corresponds to a first-price auction in which everyone pays.

An example might be the race of many governments to invest in nuclear weapons. Although it would be more rational to reach an agreement that no one has nuclear weapons, some governments invest in them if other countries have done so.

Krishna and Morgan [42] compared the expected revenue for an all-pay auction and a war of attrition, assuming that the bidders have interdependent values.

This auction model corresponds to a second-price auction in which everyone pays.

Under the assumptions mentioned in Chap. 2: risk neutral bidders, bidders with independent-private-values, symmetric bidders and no budget constraints.

Ausubel and Cramton [6] show that if there is an efficient resale market, an efficient auction can also maximize the seller’s expected revenue.

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Title: Other Single-Unit Auctions
Authors: Asunción Mochón
Yago Sáez
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Book: Understanding Auctions
Print ISBN: 978-3-319-08812-9

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-08813-6

Copyright Year: 2015
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-08813-6_3