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Published in:

09-07-2024 | Original Paper

Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity

Authors: Andrei Gomberg, Romans Pancs, Tridib Sharma

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 2/2024

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Abstract

Padding is the practice of adding nonvoters (e.g., noncitizens or disenfranchised prisoners) to an electoral district in order to ensure that the district meets the size quota prescribed by the one man, one vote doctrine without affecting the voting outcome in the district. We show how padding— and its mirror image, pruning—, can lead to arbitrarily large deviations from the socially optimal composition of elected legislatures. We solve the partisan districter’s optimal padding problem.

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Appendix
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Metadata
Title
Padding and pruning: gerrymandering under turnout heterogeneity
Authors
Andrei Gomberg
Romans Pancs
Tridib Sharma
Publication date
09-07-2024
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 2/2024
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01536-z

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