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Published in:
Preliminary Issues Read chapter Read first chapter

2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

2. Participatory Rights in Italian Criminal Justice and the Developments Towards a contradictoire-Based Model of Criminal Proceedings

Author : Stefano Ruggeri

Published in: Audi Alteram Partem in Criminal Proceedings

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

A close examination of the Italian criminal justice reveals that significant changes took place in the understanding of criminal proceedings over the last few decades. At the time of the enactment of the current code of criminal procedure (1988), criminal justice in Italy was still governed by the 1930 code, albeit largely amended. The so-called ‘Rocco-code’ maintained some of the main features of the original model, which left to private parties very limited room in criminal proceedings. In particular, the defence could give only indirect contribution to the taking of oral evidence in open court, since depending on the types of the proceedings, witnesses were examined by either the president of the trial court or by a district court judge (pretore). Furthermore, evidence-gathering was largely frustrated by the widespread use of information collected by law enforcement authorities in the pre-trial stages. In particular, the drafters of the fascist code had construed the intermediate stage (istruzione) as the procedural phase primarily aimed at the collection of criminal evidence. Most significantly, defendants were normally remanded into custody at the beginning of the judicial proceedings, being therefore deprived of the right to take part in criminal proceedings as free persons, with inevitable repercussions on their defence rights. Under the 1930 model, the intermediate phase should have been headed either by an investigating magistrate or the public prosecutor. However, the prosecutorial inquiry, though initially conceived as an exception to the ordinary judicial inquiry, soon gained ground in practice, thus also frustrating the accused’s right to be heard by an impartial body. This result was long tolerated on the ground that the public prosecutor, forming part of the judiciary, is under Italian law an independent body of justice (organo di giustizia). Yet nothing could justify the result of an independent inquiry being conducted by the same authority that charged defendants with a criminal offence, remanded them into custody, and collected incriminating evidence against them.

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previous chapter Preliminary Issues
next chapter Participatory Rights in Brazilian Law and the Requirements of contradictoire and Full Defence in Criminal Proceedings
Footnotes
1
Art. 440of the 1930code.
 
2
Siracusano (1973), p. 166 ff.
 
3
The inclusion of the rules on both arrest and remand detention into the systematic structure of the 1930 code at the beginning of the Book concerned with the intermediate phase was clearly in line with the typically inquisitorial appreciation of pre-trial custody as the most appropriate means of forcefully achieving the collaboration (if not the confession) of the defendant, who was also viewed as an instrument for the success of the criminal inquiries rather than a right holder. Cf. Marzaduri (1994), p. 61.
 
4
Investigative judges headed a formal inquiry (istruzione formale), whereas prosecutors an interim one (istruzione sommaria).
 
5
Cordero (1966), p. 3 ff.
 
6
Critical remarks on this concept were formulated by Chiavario (1971), p. 714 ff.
 
7
Art. 1 Law 81/1987.
 
8
See respectively Arts. 431 and 433 CCP. Despite the heading of the latter Article, the ‘prosecutorial file’ has never contained only the pieces of evidence gathered by the competent prosecutor but also the information collected by the police as well as the evidence taken in the intermediate phase by the competent judge. In the light of its comprehensive scope, it therefore constitutes a general file containing, as a rule, all the information taken in the pre-trial phase.
 
9
Art. 514 CCP.
 
10
Art. 487 CCP.
 
11
Arts. 459 et seq. CCP.
 
12
Carnelutti (1963), p. 14.
 
13
Art. 210 CCP.
 
14
Art. 498(4) CCP.
 
15
Since in Italy prosecutors are part of the judiciary (magistratura), they are still empowered to order a number of coercive measures, such as, in particular, searches and inspections, as well as wiretaps in urgent cases.
 
16
Law Decree 306/1992 converted into the Law 356/1992. In the sense indicated in the text cf. also Marzaduri (2004b), p. 223 ff.
 
17
Law 66/1996.
 
18
Art. 392 et seqq. CCP.
 
19
Di Chiara (2002), p. 553.
 
20
Chapter 8, F.II&III.
 
21
Chapter 16, B.II&III.
 
22
On this development see among others Conti (2013), p. 103 ff.
 
23
Chapter 1, A.
 
24
On the developments of individual rights after the fair trial constitutional reform see Marzaduri (2004a), p. 283 ff.
 
25
Cordero (1958), p. 1025 ff.
 
26
Art. 101 CPC. See Luiso (1981).
 
27
Garlati (2010).
 
28
Giostra (2001), p. 3; Marzaduri (2000), p. 767.
 
29
Art. 24 Const. See CConst, 46/1957. In the same sense, more recently, CConst, 117/2007.
 
30
Art. 2 Const.
 
31
Chiavario (1969), p.49 ff.
 
32
CConst, 361/1998.
 
33
Constitution Amendment Law 2/1999. On this constitutional reform see Grevi (2000), p. 237 ff.; Marzaduri (2000), p. 762 ff.
 
34
Art. 111(4) Const.
 
35
Art. 111(3) Const.
 
36
For instance, the constitutionalisation of the defendant’s consent to the use of untested evidence, as one of the exceptions to the principle of contradictoire in the evidence-gathering, was mainly aimed at giving a constitutional justification for alternative proceedings structured on a consensual basis. See Art. 111(5) Const.
 
37
Art. 111(2) Const. Remarkably, a lively debate also divided the Italian criminal law scholarship in the interpretation of the principle of reasonable length of criminal proceedings, raising the question of whether it should be viewed as an individual right or an objective guarantee of a fair process. See Grevi (2000), p. 326 ff.
 
38
Art. 111(2) Const.
 
39
Marzaduri (2000), p. 767.
 
40
The term ‘accused’ (accusato) is traditionally extraneous to Italian criminal procedural law, which usually relates to the person formally charged with a criminal offence as ‘defendant’ (imputato). Over recent years, however, the rising influence of international human rights law and EU law has led to the gradual spread of this new concept in Italian law. This poses delicate problems of compatibility with the national terminology, which in turn entails substantial implications on the scope of application of fundamental guarantees.
 
41
Art. 111(3) Const.
 
42
Ibid.
 
43
Art. 111(4) Const.
 
44
Conti (2000), p. 198 ff.
 
45
Art. 111(5) Const. On these constitutional derogations from the principle of contradictoire cf. Di Chiara (2009).
 
46
Chapter 8, F.II.
 
47
It is apparent that the Constitution, as a rule, does not allow entrusting the examination to an investigative magistrate in favour of the defence, since judges cannot clearly hear people before themselves.
 
48
Marzaduri (2000), p. 783.
 
49
Ferrua (2013), p. 46 f.
 
50
Marzaduri (2000), p. 785.
 
51
On close examination, the Constitution enabled, rather than required, the legislature to enact these derogations. In this sense cf. Giostra (2001), p. 9. Of a different opinion see Ferrua (2009), p. 20 ff.
 
52
Marzaduri (2000), p. 800.
 
53
See, albeit from different viewpoints, Giostra (2002), p. 3291 f. and Ubertis (2002), p. 1184.
 
54
Marzaduri (2000), p. 800 fn. 252.
 
55
Ibid., 783 f.
 
56
Ibid., 784 ff.
 
57
Arts. 326 and 358 CCP.
 
58
Marzaduri (2000), p. 768 f.
 
59
In this sense see Marzaduri (2000), p. 769.
 
60
Nobili (2001), p. 5 ff. Notwithstanding that the heading of Law 63/2001 explicitly related to the implementation of the 1999 constitutional reform, this result was therefore due to both these legislative instruments.
 
61
On this topic cf. Siracusano (2008), p. 500 ff.
 
62
Art. 391-bis CCP.
 
63
Art. 391-bis(10) CCP.
 
64
Marzaduri (2000), p. 768.
 
65
Art. 267(3).
 
66
Art. 391-septies CCP.
 
67
Marzaduri (2000), p. 770.
 
68
Art. 391-decies CCP, enacted by the 2000 reform, submitted the use of defensive evidence to the ordinary rules regarding out-of-court untested evidence, rules that Law 63/2001 drastically amended pursuant to the requirements set by the 1999 constitutional reform. See Arts. 500 et seqq. CCP.
 
69
Art. 391-bis(3) CCP.
 
70
Art. 391-ter CCP. This is a very delicate issue with a view to a correct understanding of the institutional position and the responsibility of defence lawyers. The Joint Sections of the Supreme Court acknowledged that lawyers, despite being free to receive informal statements, must draw up complete documentation if they choose to minute up the statements obtained by informants, with the result that uncompleted documentation makes them liable for falsification in an official act. From this it follows that the responsibility of lawyers as public officials is dependent on their choice to draw up official records of the statements collected. Cf. CCass, S.L.
 
71
Art. 391-octies CCP.
 
72
Below, I.II.2.
 
73
On this topic see Caianiello (2003). For an in-depth reconstruction of the role of the victim in the institution of criminal prosecutions see Parlato (2012), p. 113 ff.
 
74
Carrara (1875), p. 4 ff.
 
75
For instance, the Royal Decree 368/1904 enabled the Prefect to institute criminal proceedings in case of infringement of the rules governing the draining of the marshes. For an overview of the cases of criminal prosecution by bodies other than the public prosecutor under the 1930 code see Marzaduri (1996), p. 4.
 
76
Marzaduri (1996), p. 3.
 
77
Art. 74(3) of the 1930 CCP (1930 version).
 
78
Carnelutti (1947), p. 48.
 
79
Royal Legislative Decree 288/1944.
 
80
Art. 74(3) of the 1930 CCP.
 
81
On this discussion see Ruggeri (2015a), p. 63 f.
 
82
Presidential Decree 570/1956.
 
83
Marzaduri (1996), p. 3.
 
84
CConst. 61/1967.
 
85
Chiavario (1975), p. 897 f.
 
86
CConst. 84/1979 and 474/1993.
 
87
Art. 60(1) CCP.
 
88
Art. 231 RICCP.
 
89
Marzaduri (1996), p. 4.
 
90
Ibid., 5 f. Of a different opinion see Cordero (2012), p. 1098.
 
91
Art. 21 et seqq. Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
92
Ruggeri (2002), p. 655 ff.; Marzaduri (2016), p. 1121 ff.
 
93
Art. 21(2)(i) Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
94
Art. 21(2)(f-h) Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
95
Art. 21(3) Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
96
Art. 24 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
97
Art. 25 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
98
Of a different opinion CConst, 381/2005. In this ruling, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the detailed contents of the ricorso enable the prosecutor to assess the merits of the private initiative. This conclusion cannot be sustained, since prosecutors have a very short period of time to assess the victim’s legal action.
 
99
Art. 26 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
100
Of course, the prosecutorial power of amending the facts stated in the victim’s ricorso has its limits and cannot lead to a distortion of the essential features of the offence indicated by the injured party. See Marzaduri (2016), p. 1124.
 
101
CConst, 321/2008.
 
102
CConst, 361/2005.
 
103
For a critical approach to the legal solution of Article 409(5) CCP cf. Giostra (1994), p. 80.
 
104
Marzaduri (2016), p. 1126.
 
105
CConst, 361/2005.
 
106
Art. 409(1) CCP.
 
107
Art. 410(1) CCP.
 
108
Art. 409(2) CCP.
 
109
As possible alternatives, the competent judge can either order the termination of the proceedings or require the competent prosecutor to carry out further investigations or to bring the defendant to court. See Art. 409(4–5) CCP.
 
110
Moreover, the court summons must be communicated to the General Prosecutor before the Court of Appeal. Cf. Art. 409(3) CCP.
 
111
CCass, Mariottini.
 
112
CConst, 418/1993.
 
113
Legal scholarship advocates the need to summon also the victim’s counsel pursuant to the general rules of in camera hearings. See Caprioli (1994), p. 418 fn. 64. The case law does not share this opinion, however. Cf. CCass, Barlettelli. Of course, the question is relevant in the cases in which the victims have not yet appointed a counsel, since otherwise the summons will be notified at their legal domicile pursuant to Article 33 of the code’s implementing rules. See Campo (1993), p. 1497.
 
114
CCass, P.o. in proc. Mercuri.
 
115
Art. 409(6) CCP.
 
116
Art. 408(2) CCP. More recently, the legislature, following the indications of the 2011 Council of Europe Convention of Istanbul on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence, launched a reform—namely, Law 119/2013—aimed at enhancing the criminal law protection of women also by means of procedural tools. In this light, the 2013 reform on gender-based violence strengthened the information rights of the victims who must be notified of the prosecutorial application for discontinuance of the proceedings regardless of whether they requested to be informed. This innovation only applies, however, to the cases of gender-based violence. Outside these cases, the notice of the prosecutorial application for discontinuance of the proceedings is still dependent on the request of the injured parties who may however have not been informed in the course of the pre-trial inquiry about the consequences of their inaction.
 
117
Art. 408(3) CCP.
 
118
Art. 410 CCP.
 
119
See, among others, Giostra (1994), p. 60; CCass, Noschese.
 
120
See respectively CConst, 353/1991, and CCass, Testa (in relation to the case of unlawful declaration of inadmissibility of the victim’s objection) as well as CCass, Lo Mauro (in relation to the case of lack of assessment of the admissibility of the objection).
 
121
In this sense Caprioli, who shared moreover the proposed extension to the case in which the judge failed to assess the victim’s objection. See Caprioli (1994), p. 430 f.
 
122
Art. 177 CCP.
 
123
In a different sense see Iasevoli (2007), p. 3.
 
124
Art. 178(c) CCP. On the grounds for this approach see Tranchina (1989), p. 4 f.
 
125
Art. 181 CCP.
 
126
On this topic see Quattrocolo (2004), Cesari (2006).
 
127
Art. 27 Presidential Decree 448/1988.
 
128
Di Chiara (2003), p. 258 ff.
 
129
Art. 34 Legislative Decree 274/2000.
 
130
The low severity of the deed must be assessed not only in light of the interests protected by statutory criminal law, the damages or dangers derived from the offence, the degree of guilt and the occasional character of the criminal action but also taking into consideration the potential damage that the institution of a criminal process would cause to personal interests such as work, family, health and so on.
 
131
In this sense cf. Marzaduri (2016), p. 1137 f., who pointed out that, notwithstanding clear legal indications, the prosecutor who decides to apply for a termination of the proceedings for the low severity of the deed should previously hear the victim and verify his interest in the institution of a criminal process.
 
132
Marzaduri (2016), p. 1137 f.
 
133
Ibid., 1138.
 
134
Art. 34 Legislative Decree 274/2000. In particular, judges can declare the offence extinguished if the defendants demonstrate that after the first appearance hearing, they took concrete measures to repair the damages caused by the offence committed, by means of restitution or compensation, and to eliminate the harmful or dangerous consequences of their act.
 
135
Marzaduri (2016), p. 1138 f.
 
136
Ibid.
 
137
Arts. 168-bis et seqq. PC. The procedural arrangements are governed by Articles 464-bis et seqq. CCP. The procedural rules on the suspension of the proceedings for the purposes of a probation period were enacted into a new Title V-bis of the 6th Book of the code on alternative proceedings. Notwithstanding this systematic approach, it can be doubted whether this can be considered an ‘alternative proceeding’ in the sense attached to this notion by the 1988 code.
 
138
Art. 28 Presidential Decree 488/1988.
 
139
Art. 168-bis PC.
 
140
Art. 168-ter PC.
 
141
Art. 464-bis(2) CCP.
 
142
Art. 464-ter CCP.
 
143
Art. 464-quarter(1–2) CCP.
 
144
Art. 464-quarter(3) CCP.
 
145
See Arts. 28–29 Presidential Decree 488/1988.
 
146
Art. 464-quarter(7) CCP.
 
147
Art. 464-quinquies CCP.
 
148
Art. 464-septies CCP.
 
149
Art. 411 CCP, in relation to Art. 131-bis PC. See among others Caprioli (2015), p. 82 ff.
 
150
Caprioli (2015), p. 99.
 
151
Art. 411(1-bis) CCP.
 
152
Ibid.
 
153
Giuliani (2016), p. 560.
 
154
Caprioli (2015), p. 100 f.
 
155
Ibid., 101.
 
156
Marzaduri (2000), p. 777.
 
157
Ibid., 776.
 
158
For an overview of the multiple applications of the notion of ‘charge’ to Italian procedural law see Ubertis (2009), p. 28 f.
 
159
ECtHR, Foti et al. v. Italy, § 52. On this point see more extensively Chap. 8, D.II.2.
 
160
Marzaduri (2000), p. 777.
 
161
Below, E.II.1.
 
162
Marzaduri (2000), p. 778.
 
163
Ibid., 780 f.
 
164
Ibid., 781 f.
 
165
Chapter 8, D.III.
 
166
Marzaduri (2000), p. 782.
 
167
Ibid., 782.
 
168
Art. 335(2) CCP.
 
169
Art. 335(3) CCP (1988 version).
 
170
Art. 335(3) CCP.
 
171
Art. 335(3-bis) CCP.
 
172
Art. 335(3) CCP.
 
173
Marzaduri (2000), p. 779 fn. 110.
 
174
Art. 369 CCP.
 
175
Art. 304 of the 1930 CCP.
 
176
Marzaduri (2000), p. 778.
 
177
CConst, 10/1993. On the systematic importance of this decision see Chap. 16, B.I.2.
 
178
Marzaduri (2000), p. 780.
 
179
Law 60/2001.
 
180
Art. 369-bis CCP.
 
181
CCass, Mariano.
 
182
CCass, Iuzzolini.
 
183
Art. 365(1) CCP.
 
184
CCass, Mariano.
 
185
CCass, Zaccaria.
 
186
Art. 409(2) CCP.
 
187
Art. 409(1) CCP.
 
188
On this discussion see Ruggeri (2015a), p. 65 ff.
 
189
Art. 416 CCP, as reformed by the Law 234/1997. On this reform see Marzaduri (1997), p. 759.
 
190
Art. 415-bis CCP.
 
191
If suspects were not informed of the proceedings during the pre-trial inquiry, they need be notified pursuant to Article 157(1) CCP. However, this provision, despite starting with notification in person, provides for different forms of notification of defendants, which cannot ensure their knowledge of the proceedings. The lack of attention to the need to ensure effective information is even more evident in the provision requiring that the notification be renewed only where it is proved or probable that the defendant had no effective knowledge of the act of notification. Cf. Art. 157(5) CCP.
 
192
Caprioli (2000), p. 276.
 
193
Art. 416(1) CCP. A similar rule applies to the proceedings before single judges (tribunale in composizione monocratica). Cf. Art. 552(2) CCP.
 
194
Art. 358 CCP.
 
195
Art. 155 CCP.
 
196
To be sure, Article 121 CCP enables all the parties to present statements at any stage of the proceedings. Yet this provision cannot be used for the purposes of assessment of the accusation, since it only regards statements presented to the judge.
 
197
Bene (2004), p. 194.
 
198
CConst, 203/2002. In the same sense CCass, Bardi, as well as Caprioli (2000), p. 274.
 
199
Under the Rocco code, however, this approach, despite being widely shared by the case-law, had raised several criticisms by the criminal law scholarship. See Carnelutti (1949), p. 257; Cordero (1987), p. 80 ff.
 
200
Art. 417(b) CCP.
 
201
Art. 419 CCP.
 
202
Art. 423 CCP. Precisely the legal basis of this jurisprudence has, however, given rise to several concerns among scholars, who have pointed out that the tools allowing for the prosecutor to amend the charge presuppose that the original indictment fulfilled all its requirements. In this sense see Lorusso (2008), p. 68.
 
203
CCass, Battistella.
 
204
Below, J.III.1.
 
205
Art. 291(1) CCP.
 
206
CCass, Capri. See Marzaduri (1998), p. 179.
 
207
CCass, Sanna.
 
208
The difference from the formulation used in the field of restrictions on freedom—namely, strong suspicion of guilt (gravi indizi di colpevolezza)—lies in the fact that the remand detention and the alternatives to custody presuppose that the criminal inquiry has already been directed against one or more individuals. Instead, there is no need that a suspect has been detected for the purposes of wiretapping, which can also be ordered against third parties. See CCass, Zita.
 
209
Marzaduri (2008), p. 4848.
 
210
Art. 268(5) CCP.
 
211
Marzaduri (2008), p. 4848 f.
 
212
Art. 15 Const.
 
213
Caprioli (2000), p. 276.
 
214
Art. 419(3) CCP.
 
215
Art. 430 CCP.
 
216
Art. 420(2) CCP (1988 version).
 
217
Art. 485(1) CCP (1988 version).
 
218
Art. 420(4) CCP (1988 version).
 
219
Art. 420-bis(1) CCP.
 
220
Art. 420-ter(1–2) CCP.
 
221
See respectively Arts. 420-bis(2) and Art. 420-ter(2) CCP.
 
222
Art. 420-quater CCP.
 
223
Below, F.II.2.
 
224
Art. 154(1) CCP.
 
225
Art. 155(1) CCP.
 
226
Furthermore, notification at the court registry can also be ordered when a victim resident abroad failed to elect a legal domicile in Italy. Cf. Art. 154(1) CCP. As to the judicial service by means of public announcements, this solution can be the result of the number of the victims and the difficulty of reaching them by ordinary means. See Art. 155(1) CCP.
 
227
The difference between victim and damaged party is particularly evident in the field of offences against the administration of justice, where the state is the victim, even though individuals suffered from damages from a criminal action. See Tranchina (1989), p. 1.
 
228
Zumpano (2000), p. 347.
 
229
See critically Scalfati (1999), p. 37.
 
230
On the principle of contradictoire in the field of in camera proceedings see Di Chiara (1994).
 
231
Below, F.III.2.
 
232
Below, J.III.1.
 
233
See recently the detailed analysis of Mangiaracina (2010), Negri (2014).
 
234
ECtHR, Colozza v. Italy. See extensively Chap. 8, C.II.
 
235
Article 179(1) CCP provides for the absolute nullity of criminal proceedings conducted without the participation of the defendants’ lawyers, where the law requires their involvement in procedural activities.
 
236
Chapter 4, D.I.
 
237
See respectively ECtHR, Somogyi v. Italy and ECtHR, Sejdovic v. Italy.
 
238
Law Decree 17/2005, subsequently converted in Law 60/2005.
 
239
Chapter 16, D.II.1.a.
 
240
Negri (2005), p. 260 ff.
 
241
Art. 488 CCP (1988 version).
 
242
Quattrocolo (2014), p. 2 ff. The question will be discussed in detail in Chap. 16, D.II.1.a.
 
243
See respectively Arts. 420-bis and 420-quinquies CCP.
 
244
Art. 420-bis(2) CCP.
 
245
Art. 420-bis(2) CCP.
 
246
Here also, the code put together heterogeneous situations, i.e., (a) the fact that suspects chose their domicile in the pre-trial investigations; (b) their arrest or the adoption of pre-trial measures; (c) the decision to appoint a lawyer of their own choosing; and in general terms, (d) the circumstance that suspects were aware of the beginning of criminal inquiries against them or voluntarily avoided the information on the proceedings.
 
247
Caprioli (2014), p. 664.
 
248
Art. 420-bis(3) CCP.
 
249
Art. 420-bis(4) CCP.
 
250
Art. 489(2) CCP.
 
251
Art. 625-ter CCP.
 
252
Caprioli (2014), p. 667 f.
 
253
Quattrocolo (2014), p. 10 f.
 
254
See Article 159(3) CC, as amended by Article 12 of Law 67/2014.
 
255
Below, I.III.
 
256
See among others Bellavista (1952).
 
257
Tranchina (1961), p. 516 ff.
 
258
CConst, 46/1957.
 
259
On close examination, the approach followed by the Constitutional Court mixes the justification elaborated by two outstanding scholars of civil procedural law during last century, namely Piero Calamandrei and Francesco Carnelutti. The former advocated the idea of subsequent involvement of the other parties, while the latter focused on the eventual nature of their participation. See respectively Calamandrei (1926), and Carnelutti (1924), p. 270 ff. The scholar who first imported Carnelutti’s doctrine to penal order procedures was Girolamo Bellavista. Cf. Bellavista (1952), p. 47.
 
260
In 1988, the period was shorter than in normal cases (4 months) but further legislation enabled prosecutors to investigate up to 6 months.
 
261
Caprioli (2004), p. 586 ff.
 
262
Art. 460(4) CCP.
 
263
Art. 460(3) CCP.
 
264
Ruggeri (2008), pp. 104 and 159 f.
 
265
CConst, 504/2000. In the same sense see CCass, Kusi Kwaben. Of a different opinion CCass, Gradi.
 
266
Marzaduri (2000), p. 767 f.; Scalfati (2000), p. 530 f.
 
267
Art. 460(3) CCP.
 
268
Ruggeri (2008), p. 156 ff.
 
269
CCass, Huzuneanu.
 
270
CConst, 317/2009.
 
271
Under the 1988 regulation, these two proceedings shared several common features. On close examination, the drafters of the 1988 code aimed at introducing two negotiated proceedings, i.e. (a) an agreement on a financial penalty or a detention up to 2 years (patteggiamento) and (b) a procedural agreement (giudizio abbreviato). In both cases, the agreement only involved the accused and the prosecutor, and above all, the accused could benefit from a reduced sentence. There was however a big difference between the two procedures, in that the former necessarily led to a conviction, whereas the latter only aimed at a hearing in camera, which could lead either to the conviction or the acquittal of the accused. As will be explained in the text, the 1999 reform deeply alter the dynamics of the abbreviated proceedings, which are no longer a negotiated procedure.
 
272
Art. 447 CCP.
 
273
Art. 446(5) CCP.
 
274
CCass, Di Costanzo.
 
275
CCass, Morini.
 
276
CConst, 443/1990.
 
277
Arts. 80 et seqq. CCP.
 
278
Art. 444(2) CCP.
 
279
CCass, Bosio.
 
280
Marzaduri (2004c), p. 245.
 
281
Since the enactment of the code, the problem of fact-finding in plea bargaining has given rise to lively debates both in the case-law and the criminal law scholarship. For an in-depth analysis of this problem area see Gialuz (2008), p. 17 ff.
 
282
Art. 441(4) CCP.
 
283
Art. 75(3) CCP.
 
284
See Art. 652(1) CCP, which moreover provides for the exception that either the civil law action was not transferred to the criminal proceedings or the damaged party initiated the civil proceedings where the possibility of lodging a civil-law complaint before a criminal court was no longer allowed, pursuant to Article 75(2) CCP.
 
285
See respectively Arts. 651(2) and 652(2) CCP. There are, however, some differences between the cases of conviction and acquittal. Alongside the consent of the damaged party, civil or administrative courts must abide by the defendant’s conviction under the additional condition that the damaged party did not oppose the binding effects. This condition needs systematic interpretation, since the lack of opposition clearly presupposes that the damaged party was able to participate in the criminal proceedings. In this regard, see Scalfati (1999), p. 37. The fact that the requirement of consent presupposes the effective participation of the damaged party in the abbreviated proceedings leads to the result that any form of binding effects should also be ruled out if the damaged party was excluded from the criminal proceedings, pursuant to Article 80 CCP.
 
286
See critically Scalfati (1999), p. 37.
 
287
On close examination, the 1988 code neither specified the grounds for the prosecutorial dissent nor allowed for a judicial review in the subsequent trial phase. The Constitutional Court, sharing most of these arguments, declared the 1988 rules unconstitutional, while enabling the trial court to evaluate the reasons for the prosecutorial dissent and, if it was not justified, to apply the reduced sentence proposed by the accused. Cf. CConst, 81/1991. Furthermore, the code enabled prosecutors also to block the defendants’ request—frustrating their expectation to obtain a reduced sentence or anyway a judgment in camera—in case of investigations negligently performed or uncompleted results achieved during the pre-trial inquiry.
 
288
Art. 441(5) CCP.
 
289
See respectively Arts. 350 and 351, and Arts. 362 and 375 CCP.
 
290
Art. 363 CCP.
 
291
Art. 350(5–6) CCP.
 
292
Art. 63(1) CCP.
 
293
Ibid.
 
294
Art. 63(2) CCP.
 
295
Art. 348(1) CCP (1988 version).
 
296
Art. 370(1) CCP (1988 version).
 
297
Art. 374 CCP. Although suspects could also give spontaneous statements to the police, the evidence gathered could only be used at trial to assess the reliability of the information obtained in open court. Cf. Art. 350(7) CCP.
 
298
Art. 348(1) CCP.
 
299
Arts. 11 et seqq. Legislative Decree 275/2000.
 
300
Art. 370 CCP.
 
301
Art. 351(1-bis) CCP.
 
302
Art. 197-bis CCP. On this topic see Conti (2003).
 
303
See respectively Arts. 351(1) and 362(1) CCP.
 
304
CCass, Papia et al.
 
305
Art. 375(3) CCP. The only exception relates to the immediate proceedings. Here also, however, there is no mandatory provision requiring prosecutors to disclose all the investigations conducted.
 
306
Art. 350(3) CCP.
 
307
Art. 364(7) CCP.
 
308
Art. 503(5) CCP.
 
309
CConst, 262/1998.
 
310
CConst, 63/2005.
 
311
Directive 2011/36/EU.
 
312
Art. 398(5-ter) CCP.
 
313
Art. 362(1-bis) CCP, introduced by the Law 172/2012.
 
314
Art. 351(1-ter) CCP.
 
315
CCass, Barillà; CConst, 460/2002.
 
316
Caprioli (2000), p. 275.
 
317
Art. 127 CCP.
 
318
Art. 127(3) CCP.
 
319
Art. 406(3) CCP.
 
320
Art. 406(4) CCP.
 
321
Art. 406(5) CCP.
 
322
Art. 210(4) CCP.
 
323
Art. 198(2) CCP.
 
324
Conti (2001b), p. 644.
 
325
Art. 64 CCP.
 
326
As a rule, pursuant to Article 197-bis(1) CCP, co-defendants can be summoned as witnesses only after their trial has finally been disposed of. This is the case for offences committed by several individuals either jointly or through independent actions [Art. 12(a) CCP], as well as for crimes committed to hide or execute other offences [Art. 12(c) CCP], and offences committed while other crimes were being perpetrated, or to ensure to the perpetrator the product, profit or price of another crime, or crimes several individuals perpetrated against each other, or when the proof of one crime depends upon the proof of another [Art. 371(2)(b) CCP]. Furthermore, in the two latter situations [Arts. 12(c) and 371(2)(b) CCP], co-defendants can also be summoned to be examined as special witnesses whille their proceedings are still ongoing, if they are available to give evidence in issues related to other individuals. It is worth observing, moreover, that the Constitutional Court declared Article 197-bis CCP unconstitutional it that it required legal assistance even when the co-accused was acquitted because the prosecuted offence did not exist or he did not commit it. See CConst, 381/2006 and 21/2017.
 
327
Conti (2003), p. 234.
 
328
Ibid., 229 ff.
 
329
Gaeta (2001), p. 442.
 
330
Nobili (2001), p. 6.
 
331
Art. 371-bis CC. More recently, Law 277/2012 extended this criminal law provision to false information given or to information withheld to the Prosecutor before the International Criminal Court.
 
332
Amodio (2001), p. 3596.
 
333
A delicate question concerns the hearing of the accused in the intermediate phase. It has been noted that defendants, after being brought to court, can be examined only at their own request. Moreover, the drafters of the 1988 code structured the intermediate phase in such manner that further information could only be gathered in exceptional circumstances and oral evidence was taken only by the competent judge. Yet the 1999 reform entitled any party to request the cross-examination of the accused. From this it followed that, though defendants could still be heard only at their request, the initiative of any other party could expose them to the cross-examination by the prosecutor and the lawyers in a non-public hearing. See Arts. 421(2) and 422(4) CCP. For critical remarks cf. Scalfati (1999), p. 68, who considered it possible, however, to ensure the defendants’ right to request to be questioned by the competent judge. It should also be taken into account that as a consequence of this reform, the evidence that the accused will give in response to the cross-examination can be read out at trial and can be used as inculpatory evidence both against the person examined and other parties (in the latter case, however, provided only that the lawyers of the individuals concerned were present in the intermediate phase).
 
334
CConst, 221/1991.
 
335
Art. 490 CCP.
 
336
Art. 513 CCP.
 
337
Conti (2001a), p. 603.
 
338
Art. 503(4) CCP.
 
339
Before the 2001 reform, the case-law had adopted a rather broad interpretation of this provision, allowing that all the recorded evidence taken in the pre-trial phase—that is, not only the parts containing the statements contrasting with the evidence given in open court—be read out at trial. This interpretation could not be deemed in line with the constitutional acknowledgment of the principle of contradictoire. In the same sense see Conti (2001a), p. 603.
 
340
Art. 513(1) CCP.
 
341
Art. 498(4) CCP.
 
342
CConst, 283/1997.
 
343
Di Chiara (1997), p. 2575.
 
344
Art. 498(4-bis) CCP, introduced by the Law 268/1998.
 
345
Art. 498(4-ter) CCP.
 
346
Art. 498(4-quater) CCP.
 
347
3rd Book of the code.
 
348
Art. 190(1) CCP. Under the 1988 code, this also applied to the exceptional evidence-gathering intermediate phase. Since the 1999 reform, the competent judges for the pre-trial inquiry can also gather information at their own initiative in the intermediate phase. Cf. 422 CCP. It is worth observing, moreover, that in this phase the competent judge can also take evidence requested by the parties. Neither the prosecutor nor private parties, however, are entitle to cross-examine the person being heard, who is questioned by the judge on the basis of eventual observations or requests of the parties. It is not an unremarkable difference, since the fact the parties have no direct access to the source of evidence can give rise to the risk that the defence’s contribution will be trivialised or even misunderstood. Relying on this difference in the method of evidence-gathering, as noted, the code still requires the evidence taken in the intermediate phase to be included in the prosecutorial file rather than in the trial file Cf. Art. 433 CCP.
 
349
Art. 190(2) CCP.
 
350
190(3) CCP.
 
351
A significant exception concerned the proceedings before district judges who, upon agreement between the parties, could examine witnesses and private parties at trial, taking into account eventual questions and objections raised by the defence and the prosecutor. The 1999 reform, dropping district judges, maintained this solution for the new proceedings before single judges (tribunale monocratico). Cf. Art. 559(3) CCP.
 
352
Art. 501 CCP.
 
353
Art. 503(3) CCP.
 
354
Art. 210(5) CCP.
 
355
Art. 468 CCP.
 
356
Art. 512 CCP.
 
357
See Arts. 500 and 503 CCP.
 
358
Cordero (2012), p. 891.
 
359
Tonini (2001), p. 272.
 
360
See Article 360(5) in conjunction with Article 431 CCP.
 
361
To be sure, the 1988 rules already provided for an important case of evidence-gathering unconnected from urgent reasons. Pursuant to Article 392(2) CCP, complex expert evidence should, as a rule, be taken in the pre-trial stage to avoid excessive congestion of the trial phase.
 
362
Art. 401(5) CCP.
 
363
Art. 401(6) CCP.
 
364
Art. 403 CCP.
 
365
Art. 431(1)(e) CCP.
 
366
CConst, 74/1991.
 
367
Law 267/1997.
 
368
Art. 398(3) CCP.
 
369
CConst, 77/1994.
 
370
Art. 392(1)(c-d) CCP, as reformed by the Law 267/1997.
 
371
Bargis (1996), p. 504.
 
372
Art. 498(4-ter) CCP.
 
373
Art. 498(4-quater) CCP, as amended by Legislative Decree 212/2015. See Chap. 16, D.V.1.a.
 
374
Art. 147-bis RICCP.
 
375
Art. 147-bis(1-bis) RICCP, introduced by Law 136/2010, enacting an extraordinary anti-mafia programme.
 
376
Art. 497(2-bis) CCP, introduced by Law 136/2010 and further enhanced by the anti-terrorism reform of Law 43/2015.
 
377
Art. 508 CCP.
 
378
Pursuant to Article 507 CCP, additional evidence can be gathered at the initiative of the trial judges only if necessary for the rendering of a verdict and after all the information requested by the parties has been collected.
 
379
Art. 502 CCP.
 
380
Art. 225(1) CCP.
 
381
Art. 230 CCP.
 
382
Art. 225(2) CCP.
 
383
Kostoris (1993), p. 337.
 
384
CCass, Ferrara.
 
385
Art. 391-decies(3) CCP.
 
386
Art. 391-decies(4) CCP.
 
387
Art. 392(1)(f) CCP.
 
388
Art. 392(2) CCP.
 
389
Art. 224-bis CCP.
 
390
Marzaduri (2000), p. 790 f.
 
391
Orlandi (2010), p. 52 f.
 
392
Art. 495(3) CCP.
 
393
Art. 238 CCP (1988 version).
 
394
Art. 238(4) (1992 version).
 
395
Art. 238(2-bis) CCP.
 
396
In this sense Marzaduri (2002b), p. 167, who shared a criticism raised by Lozzi (1997), p. 687.
 
397
The case must be finally disposed of and the decision can only admitted if relevant for the fact-finding in the proceedings of destination. Moreover, it can be assessed as evidence of the matters under prosecution, provided that corroborating evidence exists.
 
398
Art. 238-bis CCP.
 
399
Marzaduri (2009), p. 189 ff.
 
400
Ibid., 197.
 
401
Di Bitonto (2004).
 
402
Art. 238(4) CCP.
 
403
Marzaduri (2009), p. 208.
 
404
By contrast, no problem arises in relation to other private parties who are always represented in court by their lawyers. Cf. Art. 100(1) CCP.
 
405
See Arts. 431(2), Art. 493(3) and 500(7) CCP.
 
406
In the same sense cf. Marzaduri (2009), p. 215 f., who moreover considered an intervention of the Constitutional Court unnecessary to enable the defendant to personally consent to the use of untested evidence.
 
407
CConst, 182/2001.
 
408
For in-depth analysis of this issue see Marzaduri (2009), p. 217 ff. Besides, the role of the judiciary is quite different depending on whether the evidentiary agreement is reached at the end of the pre-trial inquiry or of the intermediate phase, or during the trial inquiry. The main difference is that, whereas in the intermediate phase the competent judge has full access to all the evidence gathered by the investigative bodies, the knowledge of the trial court is limited to the contents of the trial file.
 
409
Art. 507(1-bis) CCP.
 
410
See among others Cordero (1963), Ubertis (1995), p. 296 ff.; Ferrua (2013), p. 1 ff.
 
411
Art. 511 CCP.
 
412
Grifantini (2007), p. 179 ff.
 
413
The first scholar who clearly analysed this phenomenon after the enactment of the 1988 code was Massimo  Nobili. Cf. Nobili (1998), p. 10 ff.
 
414
In 2000, the Join Sections of the Supreme Court shared the distinction between ‘pathological’ and ‘physiological’ non-usability of evidence. See CCass, Tammaro.
 
415
See Negri (2004), p. 136 fn. 6, starting with the studies of Többens (1979), p. 7 ff.
 
416
This requirement was enacted into the new Swiss code of criminal procedure. Cf. Art. 197(1)(b) CCP-Switzerland. See Pieth (2012), p. 118.
 
417
In this context see the detailed analysis of Negri (2004), p. 52 ff., who used the German doctrine of Sachgestaltungsvoraussetzungen, which highlights the procedural projection of the criminal offence for purposes other than those of the decision on the merits. In the German literature see Volk (1978), p. 147 f.
 
418
Negri (2004), p. 166.
 
419
Ibid., 133 ff.
 
420
For an in-depth reflection in Italy on the co-existence of different evidentiary methods in criminal proceedings see already Orlandi (1992), pp. 50 and 221.
 
421
Negri (2004), p. 133 ff.
 
422
Art. 187 CCP.
 
423
On the assessment of procedural issues see Catalano (2002), p. 521 ff. Italian courts may seem to support this distinction, e.g. by ruling out that the unpredictability of the event which rendered certain information unavailable at trial can only be proved on the basis of the evidence gathered in open court or anyway contained in the trial file. See CCass, XY. Pursuant to this approach, the procedural nature of an assessment should justify the use of all the information available, no matter who gathered it and with which methods it was gathered. However, one should not overlook the implications that this approach can have on the defendant’s fundamental rights, e.g. negatively affecting the right to confrontation. Further consequences can be observed in relation to other individuals (for instance, the right of the accused’s next of kin, who claim their right not to testify at trial).
 
424
Below, J.I.
 
425
Art. 512 CCP.
 
426
Art. 195 CCP.
 
427
Art. 500 CC8pP.
 
428
Spencer (2014), p. 5 f.
 
429
Art. 402 CCP.
 
430
The only exception concerns the case of suspicion of guilt arisen only after the end of the pre-trial procedure, if the evidence collected has already become unavailable. Cf. Art. 403(1-bis) CCP. On the problems concerned with this case see Cordero (2012), p. 877.
 
431
Galantini (1992), p. 68 f.
 
432
Art. 512 CCP (1988 version).
 
433
Art. 238(3) CPP.
 
434
CConst, 179/1994.
 
435
CConst, 440/2000.
 
436
Art. 195(2) CCP.
 
437
Art. 195(3) CCP.
 
438
CCass, Scardaccione.
 
439
CCass, Muscas.
 
440
CConst, 24/1992.
 
441
Arts. 351 and 357(2)(a-b) CCP.
 
442
Art. 195(4) CCP, as amended by Law 63/2001.
 
443
Caprioli (2002), p. 83.
 
444
CCass, Torcasio.
 
445
CConst, 305/2008.
 
446
CCass, Torcasio.
 
447
Art. 62 CCP.
 
448
Criticisms were also raised by Balsamo and Lo Piparo (2004), p. 226.
 
449
Art. 500(3) CCP (1988 version).
 
450
See Cordero (1966), p. 189 ff. Moreover, an important reform draft of a new code of criminal procedure, elaborated by Carnelutti in the 1960s (known as ‘Carnelutti draft’), had already provided for the possibility of pre-trial statements being produced at trial to assess the reliability of witnesses or defendants. This proposal was, however, dropped in the amended reform draft. Cf. Carnelutti (1963), respectively 76 and 155.
 
451
In England and Wales, the 1865 Criminal Procedure Act already allowed the use of out-of-court inconsistent testimonial statements to undermine the witnesses’ reliability.
 
452
Vogler (2014), p. 186. Legal scholarship, however, contrasted this argument on the grounds that jury service was originally reserved to middle class. Cf. Spencer (2014), p. 2.
 
453
CConst, 255/1992. This ruling was strongly criticised by many scholars. See Ferrua (1992), p. 1455 ff.
 
454
Art. 500(4) CCP (1992 version).
 
455
Art. 500(2-bis) CCP (1992 version).
 
456
Art. 500(6) CCP (1992 version).
 
457
Art. 500(5) CCP (1992 version).
 
458
Rivello (1993), p. 100.
 
459
S. 119 CJA 2003. See Spencer (2014), p. 221 ff.
 
460
S. 116(2) CJA 2003.
 
461
This risk had been foreseen by Cordero (1992), p. 236.
 
462
CConst, 361/1998.
 
463
Art. 500(4) CCP.
 
464
Art. 500(5) CCP. On this topic see Busetto (2009).
 
465
CConst, 32/2002 and 36/2002.
 
466
In this sense see instead Ferrua (2012), p. 135 ff.
 
467
Ibid., 136 f. Of a different opinion Grevi (2000), p. XVIII.
 
468
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
 
469
Ashworth and Redmayne (2010), p. 365.
 
470
Thus, in Davis v. Washington the US Supreme Court considered emergency calls made to the police office admissible at trial. Cf. 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
 
471
Art. 111(6) Const.
 
472
See Morosini (2009), p. 402 ff.; Maggio (2010), p. 499 ff.
 
473
Carcano and Manzione (2001), p. 57. The Supreme Court has largely shared this approach. Cf. CCass, Capozza. Of a different opinion Ubertis (2013), p. 159, who considered the use of pre-trial testimonial statements against all the defendants unlawful if only one of them or even a third person unlawfully led the witnesses to change their version or not to testify.
 
474
Exceptionally, this result can also be achieved at trial. The 1988 code provided for one single exception, that is, when the defendant—after being brought to court through the so-called ‘direct proceedings’ (procedimento direttissimo)—requests to be tried by means of the abbreviated proceedings. In this case, the direct proceedings are converted into abbreviate proceedings, with the result that the trial court must abide by rules governing the abbreviate proceedings, rules that allow, inter alia, the use of the evidence gathered through police and prosecutorial investigations for the purposes of the decision-making. Cf. Art. 452(2) CCP. The Constitutional Court introduced a similar result by means of the ruling 333/2009, which enabled defendants to re-present at trial the request for the abbreviate proceedings rejected in the intermediate phase, if the indictment was exceptionally amended.
 
475
On this topic see Ruggeri (2009), p. 133 ff.
 
476
Ibid., 150 ff.
 
477
Cf., among others, CConst, 8/2003.
 
478
CConst, 8/2003.
 
479
CConst, 323/2007.
 
480
CConst, 317/2009.
 
481
CConst, 23/2015. For some criticisms see Ruggeri (2015b).
 
482
Under the 1930 code, the decision to join a civil law action to the criminal proceedings precluded the recourse to the penal order procedure. See Cordero (1987), p. 757.
 
483
Art. 459(1) CCP, as amended by the Law 479/1999. The 1988 code did not allow for the recourse to the penal order procedure in relation to such offences.
 
484
Art. 442(1-bis) CCP.
 
485
Art. 442(1) CCP.
 
486
Marzaduri (1990), p. 730.
 
487
Cass, Cardoni.
 
488
For an overlook of this problem see Gialuz (2008), p. 13 ff. It is noteworthy, moreover, that even Marzaduri, who pointed out the need that the bargaining decision be supported by enough inculpatory evidence, excluded the application of the trial rules on the decision-making, which require defendants to be acquitted not only in cases of lack of evidence against them but also in cases of incomplete or contradictory evidence. Cf. Marzaduri (1990), p. 730.
 
489
For some criticisms see Ruggeri (2008), p. 236 f. On the relationship between judicial conviction (richterliche Überzeugung) and the assessment of strong suspicion of guilt (Tatverdachtsgewinnung) from the viewpoint of German penal order procedures see Ebert (2000), p. 193 ff.
 
490
Under the current rules, prosecutors can request evidence in rebuttal if the accused requested supplementary information. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court extended this power to cases in which the defence, despite not requesting further evidence, produces the results of investigations previously carried out. See CConst, 184/2009.
 
491
As noted, moreover, the 1999 reform enhanced the power of the competent judges for the pre-trial phases by enabling them also to take information at the intermediate stage at their own initiative. This power can only be exercised, however, in case of exculpatory evidence manifestly aimed at the termination of the proceedings in the intermediate phase.
 
492
To be sure, the code’s provision is quite ambiguous and has led to the case-law following different interpretations. Unlike the old investigating magistrates, the competent judge for the abbreviated proceedings must abide by the charges preferred by the prosecutor and can neither amend the prosecutorial charge nor elaborate different investigative strategies to prove the offence under prosecution. In this sense see Illuminati (2003), p. 82. Nevertheless, as noted, these judges can gather evidence at their own initiative when they consider that the state of the proceedings is not fit for judgment. This gives them unprecedented powers in the collection of evidence, which certainly go beyond their ordinary functions both in the pre-trial inquiry and in the intermediate phase. On close examination, the fact that the state of the proceedings is not fit for judgment is by definition a referential parameter that can be understood in very different fashions. If any judicial intervention is excluded in cases of complete information (in this sense see Fiorio 2008, p. 90), the need for integrative evidence can emerge either from the arguments brought about in the hearing in camera or from the evidence requested by the defence together with the request for abbreviate proceedings.
 
493
It should be taken into account that under Italian law, control measures (e.g., suspension of the exercise of parental authority, the exercise of a public office or service or a certain business or occupation) are subject to the same general conditions laid down for remand detention and the alternatives to pre-trial custody.
 
494
In some cases, the assessment of sentence thresholds is limited to statutory provisions. For instance, if remand detention is needed because of the risk of the suspect committing other offences of the same type as that under investigation, the competent judge must verify whether the other crimes are punishable with imprisonment of a maximum of at least 5 years. In this sense cf. Article 274(c) CCP, as amended by a recent reform on pre-trial measures—namely Law 47/2015—which raised the amount of sentence required to remand suspects in custody. In other cases, instead, the assessment of sentence thresholds entails concrete forecasts. For instance, under Article 274(b) CCP, the risk of absconding can only hold relevance for the purposes of the application of both control and coercive measures if a sentence is likely to be imposed of at least 2 years of imprisonment. This imposes on the competent judge the difficult task of determining, on the basis of the information available, the severity of the sentence pursuant to the general requirements set forth by Article 133 et seqq. CC.
 
495
At the beginning of the 1980s, two important reforms largely amended the rules on remand detention. See Law 532/1982 and Law 398/1984. Shortly before the enactment of the new code, Law 330/1988 brought about further important innovations.
 
496
Negri (2004), p. 27 ff.
 
497
Marzaduri (1996), p. 65 f.; Negri (2004), p. 166.
 
498
German scholars traditionally distinguish the proof of Tatbestand from that of Tatverdacht. The latter takes on particular characters in the field of interim decisions (Tatverdachtsurteile) not only due to the incompleteness of the information available but also because of the prognostic features of the fact-finding. On the Tatverdachtsurteile see Paeffgen (1986), p. 192. For an in-depth reflection on this topic see Negri (2004), p. 70 ff.
 
499
In the light of the aforementioned criticisms on the gathering of evidence by co-defendants in the pre-trial inquiry, it is clear that not requiring corroborating evidence entails a further departure from the rules on the trial fact-finding, since suspects have no right to be present at the questioning of the co-accused.
 
500
Art. 273(1-bis) CCP.
 
501
Marzaduri (2002a), p. 266; Negri (2004), p. 143 f.
 
502
For an in-depth analysis of this problem area in the light of principle of proportionality see Negri (2004), p. 150 ff. and 236 ff.
 
503
The 1992 legislation provided for a very controversial regulation with regard to mafia-related crimes (mafia-type association, crimes committed using the typical conditions of mafia-type association and crimes of mafia abetting). Over more than two decades, this regulation has been largely amended. Recently, the legislature extended the scope of Article 275(3) CCP to the area of sexual offences and other serious crimes. This reform was largely countered by the Constitutional Court, which further narrowed the application of this exceptional mechanism. Cf. Di Chiara (2002), p. 133. Following the approach of the constitutional case-law, Law 47/2015 distinguished the special rules on remand detention according to two groups of serious crimes. In the case of the offences under Articles 270, 270-bis and 416-bis CC (subversive association, criminal association aimed at national and international terrorism and at subverting democratic order, and mafia-related criminal association), remand detention is applied if suspicion of guilt arises, unless it was proven that no risk exists to the ongoing inquiry. In the case of other serious crimes (murder, sexual crimes, etc.), the same mechanism applies, with the difference, however, that alternatives to custody can also be applied in cases of attenuated risks to the proceedings.
At first glance, it appears that Italian law provides for proper balance among conflicting interests, allowing for the application of remand detention on the basis of a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness of defendants charged with these crimes. However, the code exonerates the judicial authority from assessing the real existence of any concrete risk to the ongoing inquiry. Thus evidence in rebuttal must, as a rule, be produced by the defendant. Furthermore, the possibility of overturning the presumption of dangerousness depends on very exigent proof on the part of the defence. From the perspective of the present discussion, the fact that the assessment of suspicion of guilt provides the sole justification of remand detention appears to be highly problematic especially in the cases of mafia-related criminal association and of sexual crimes, in which one can observe the widespread tendency of proving fumus delicti on the basis of dangerous inferences and presumptions. On the fact-finding in the field of mafia-typed crimes see the comprehensive analysis of Maggio (2010), p. 491 ff.
 
504
In particular, the accused must be previously examined when a coercive measure is to be applied in the hearing aimed at validating arrest and when a new period of detention is needed after a previous pre-trial detention has expired because of the failure to bring the accused to the judicial authority. Cf. respectively Arts. 294(1) and 302 CCP.
 
505
For instance, German Basic Law grants the individuals concerned the right to be informed of the grounds for arrest, a fundamental right that, moreover, entails the duty of the competent authority to hear them and allow them to raise objections and complaints against the arrest order. Cf. Art. 104(3) Basic Law. Remarkably, these guarantees also apply when the judicial authority orders pre-trial detention. This highlights that Germany enshrined at the constitutional level the right of detained individuals to obtain an independent assessment of the lawfulness of detention on the basis of their allegations and claims. Cf. Gusy (2010), p. 1091; Müller-Franken (2010), p. 103.
 
506
Art. 294(4) CCP.
 
507
Art. 294(6) CCP.
 
508
CConst, 384/1996.
 
509
Art. 294(4) CCP.
 
510
Legislative Decree 101/2014. See Chap. 16, D.VI.1.b.
 
511
Art. 104(3) CCP.
 
512
In these cases, the hearing is void only if the postponement of the interview with the lawyer was unlawfully ordered. Cf. Montagna (2010), p. 3156.
 
513
Art. 294(1) CCP.
 
514
The negative effects of the postponement are reduced in case of house arrest, further coercive means and control measures, since the hearing must here take place within 10 days.
 
515
Art. 294(1-ter) CCP.
 
516
Legislative Decree 101/2014. See Chap. 16, D.VI.3.
 
517
Italian courts rule out, however, that the hearing conducted by a different judge is void. Cf. CCass, Caruso.
 
518
Originally, this provision was enacted into the paragraph 2 of Article 111 of the Constitution. By means of the 1999 constitutional fair trial reform, this provision was shifted to paragraph 7 of the same Article.
 
519
Marzaduri (1986), p. 773.
 
520
Chapter 8, G.III.
 
521
EComHR, Bonazzi v. Italy.
 
522
Chiavario (1984), p. 356 ff.; Marzaduri (1986), p. 773.
 
523
Art. 263-bis of the 1930 CCP.
 
524
Control measures fall outside the scope of this judicial review.
 
525
Art. 311(2) CCP.
 
526
Art. 309 CCP.
 
527
Art. 309(6) CCP. The 2015 reform enabled the defendant who requested judicial review to state new reasons before the hearing.
 
528
Art. 309(3-bis) CCP.
 
529
Art. 309(8-bis) CCP. The 2015 reform also enabled the public prosecutor who requested the coercive measure to appear in court instead of the prosecutor before tribunale della libertà.
 
530
Art. 309(10) CCP.
 
531
Art. 309(3-bis) CCP.
 
532
Art. 309(10) CCP. Even though the competent court must give reasons of these ‘exceptional grounds’, the vague formulation enacted leaves a great margin of discretion.
 
533
Art. 309(5) CCP.
 
534
CCass, Plaku.
 
535
Art. 309(10) CCP.
 
536
Art. 310 CCP.
 
537
Art. 310(2) CCP.
 
538
Art. 299 CCP.
 
539
Art. 299(3-ter) CCP.
 
540
For criticisms against the so-called ‘ne bis in idem cautelare’ see Ruggeri (2010).
 
541
Chapter 8, G.II.
 
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Metadata
Title
Participatory Rights in Italian Criminal Justice and the Developments Towards a contradictoire-Based Model of Criminal Proceedings
Author
Stefano Ruggeri
Copyright Year
2017
Book
Audi Alteram Partem in Criminal Proceedings

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-54572-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-54573-8

Copyright Year: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-54573-8_2