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2020 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

16. Precarious Peace: Nuclear Deterrence and Defence Doctrines of Nuclear-Weapon States in the Post-Cold War Era

Author : Jonathan Black-Branch

Published in: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume V

Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press

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Abstract

The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the deterrence and defence policies of the nuclear-weapon States under the NPT—the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, and France. It begins by reviewing the concept of deterrence, followed by an examination of each nuclear-weapon State’s present stance on nuclear deterrence within its respective military doctrine. It subsequently looks at the requirements under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) moving to explore concerns regarding disarmament matters, noting the continued reliance on deterrence as a central feature of military protection and defence doctrine. Instead of deterrence becoming an out-dated concept that should have expired with the Cold War, it remains the status quo, despite requirements to the contrary under Article VI of the NPT.

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previous chapter Possible Means to Overcome Tendencies of the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty to Erode the NPT

next chapter Legal Aspects of Nuclear Weapons Doctrines

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Finnis et al. 1987, Chapter XII (Disarmament).

Gerson 2009, at 34.

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Article IX(3) states that ‘a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967’.

Article I requires that nuclear-weapon State Parties are ‘not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices’.

Article II stipulates in no uncertain terms that, non-nuclear-weapon State Parties are ‘not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; [as well as] not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices’.

Unconfirmed estimates for Israel's nuclear weapons stockpile range around 80 intact nuclear weapons and additional inventories of fissile materials of 0.3 tonnes highly enriched uranium (HEU) plus 0.84 ± 0.13 tonnes of separated plutonium, see Schell and Kristensen 2013; Glaser and Mian 2013. See also reports by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/; Cohen 1998.

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See SC Res 1172 (1998); Agreement between the Government of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Government of Republic of India on Reducing the Risk from Accidents Relating to Nuclear Weapons (21 February 2007), http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/agreement-on-reducing-the-risk-from-accidents-relating-to-nuclear-weapons/.

Article X states: 1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. 2. Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties to the Treaty.

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Gerson, at 34. See also Morgan 2003, at 25.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (General Assembly Request), ICJ Reports 1996, 226, para 67.

Kristensen and Korda 2019a.

Id.

Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review February 2018 (NPR 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF.

Arms Control Association, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: the United States (Last updated May 2019), https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/unitedstatesprofile.

NPR 2018, at 1.

NPR 2018, at II–III.

NPR 2018, at I.

NPR 2018 at I.

Id at I.

NPR 2018, at II–III.

NPR 2018, at VII.

NPR 2018, at VIII.

NPR 2018, at VI–VII.

International Law and Policy Institute, Nuclear umbrellas and umbrella states (last modified 22 April 2016), http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1221.

NPR 2018, at III.

McGwire 2006.

McGwire, at 775, 776.

Id at 778.

NPR 2018 at VII.

Kristensen and Norris 2019a.

Kulacki 2016.

Grinter 2013.

Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2019, at 65–66.

See Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Russian Armed Forces Held Strategic Nuclear Forces Control Training (26 October 2017), http://eng.mil.ru/en/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12148494@egNews.

Kristensen and Norris 2019b.

Arms Control Association: Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Russia, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/russiaprofile.

Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation for the Time Period through the Year 2020, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/.

Quinlivan and Oliker 2011, at 16–19.

Nuclear Threat Initiative: Russia, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/russia/nuclear/.

Berls Jr. et al. 2018.

Arms Control Association: Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: United Kingdom, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/ukprofile.

Nuclear Threat Initiative: United Kingdom, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/united-kingdom/nuclear/.

Norris and Kristensen 2013.

Nuclear Threat Initiative: United Kingdom, https://www.nti.org/learn/countries/united-kingdom/nuclear/.

Kristensen and Korda 2019b.

See N Sarkozy (21 March 2008) Presentation of ‘Le Terrible’ Submarine. Cherbourg, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Speech_by_Nicolas_Sarkozy_presentation_of_Le_Terrible_submarine.pdf0[GoogleScholar], as quoted from France’s nuclear forces, 2019.

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See N Sarkozy (21 March 2008), Presentation of ‘Le Terrible’ Submarine. Cherbourg, 21 March. https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Speech_by_Nicolas_Sarkozy_presentation_of_Le_Terrible_submarine.pdf[GoogleScholar] as quoted from France’s nuclear forces, 2019.

Kristensen and Korda 2019b.

Tertrais 2019.

Kristensen and Korda 2019b.

French Ministry of Defense, White Paper on Defense and National Security 2013, https://www.defense.gouv.fr/english/dgris/defence-policy/white-paper-2013/white-paper-2013[GoogleScholar] as quoted from France’s forces, 2019.

Speech by Florence Parly, Minister of Defence—60 years of DAM. French Ministry of the Armed Forces, Paris (21 November 2018), https://www.defense.gouv.fr/salle-de-presse/discours/discours-de-florence-parly/discours-de-florence-parly-ministre-des-armees-60-ans-de-la-dam.

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Speech by Nicolas Sarkozy, President of the French Republic Presentation of “Le Terrible” Submarine in Cherbourg (21 March 2008), https://docplayer.net/37504211-.html.

Article IX(3) NPT states that, ‘a nuclear weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January, 1967’.

Article VI NPT: ‘Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.’.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (General Assembly Request), I.C.J. Reports 1996, 226.

Id, at 267.

Jonas 2012, at 631.

Docherty 2018, at 9.

Jonas 2012, at 624.

Ruff 2018, at 7.

See Marshall Islands v. United Kingdom (5 October 2016), I.C.J. Reports 2016, 833, at para 11.

Ibid., para 100.

The Court quoted from its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion (General Assembly Request), I.C.J. Reports 1996, at para 23.

NATO, NATO’s Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues (22 October 2009) online (pdf): North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_NATO_Position_on_nuclear_nonproliferation-eng.pdf, at 4.

ICJ, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 (General Assembly Request), ICJ Reports (1996), 226.

See NATO, NATO’s Positions Regarding Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Arms Control and Disarmament and Related Issues (22 October 2009), at 4, online (pdf): North Atlantic Treaty Organization, https://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_topics/20091022_NATO_Position_on_nuclear_nonproliferation-eng.pdf.

Developments regarding land mines, cluster munitions and chemical weapons.

See ILA Committee on Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation and Contemporary International Law, Second Report: Legal Aspects of Nuclear Disarmament (2014), at 6.

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See Russian State Duma statements on 25 January 2011. ‘As the US has withdrawn from the Soviet-US Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, special significance has to be attached to maintaining missile defence systems and all their components at a designated level of preparedness for improvement in case of a military threat against Russia.’ … ‘The State Duma considers the deployment of the US non-strategic nuclear weapons outside the US unjustified and not complying with today’s Euro-Atlantic relations.’.

‘President Donald Trump declared Wednesday [April 2017] that U.S. relations with Russia “may be at an all-time low”. His top diplomat offered a similarly grim assessment from the other side of the globe after meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow [stating] “Right now we’re not getting along with Russia at all”, Trump said during a White House news conference. It was stark evidence that the president is moving ever further from his campaign promises to establish better ties with Moscow. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president stated: ‘The level of trust … has not improved but has rather deteriorated’, https://www.stuff.co.nz/world/europe/91530508/vladimir-putin-says-usrussia-trust-deteriorated-by-donald-trump.

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For a comprehensive overview, see Kimball and Reif 2019.

BBC News (2019) Is nuclear disarmament set to self-destruct? (1 February 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46510957.

See Chap. 3 in this Volume.

100

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Title: Precarious Peace: Nuclear Deterrence and Defence Doctrines of Nuclear-Weapon States in the Post-Cold War Era
Author: Jonathan Black-Branch
Publisher: T.M.C. Asser Press
Book: Nuclear Non-Proliferation in International Law - Volume V
Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-346-7

Electronic ISBN: 978-94-6265-347-4

Copyright Year: 2020
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-347-4_16

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