Private Military and Security Companies and States

Table of Contents

1. Frontmatter

2. 1. Introduction

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 1 highlights a puzzle. On the one hand, the range of private military and security services is ostensibly boundless for a number of reasons. On the other hand, it is evident that in practice, there are divisions between states and Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) in terms of what they do and what they own and operate. This is clear on land, on the waves, and in the air. Firms do not enjoy a tabula rasa. Thus, because of the significance of these matters – the ownership, direction, and application of violence – this chapter spells out the book’s primary objectives: to develop an understanding of what has changed, what has not, why this is so, and what the future might bring. It stresses that achieving these objectives is in large part anchored in identifying and explaining the functional and ideational boundaries regarding what states and PMSCs both do and possess in regards to violence. This chapter identifies that to complete these tasks, one must focus on two related elements. The first element is the conventional forces norm, one that has global acceptance in terms of the standardization of the organizational form for militaries and the weighting on sophisticated military technology – i.e., machines – over labour or manpower. Functional and symbolic rationales support this norm. The second element is the state proclivity towards the offensive. Taken together, states very much form what the PMSC industry looks like and offers: predominantly labour-based services oriented towards the defensive.

3. 2. Conventional Forces Norm

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 2 identifies the components of the conventional forces norm that set what states do and consequently helps to define the commercial and operational limitations of PMSCs. It offers a background presentation of norm characteristics and their importance in order for the reader to realize specifically what states, as members of a club, should possess militarily. At play are both the perceived instrumentality of technology and the desire for prestige amongst states. In a related manner, also evident here is the increasing importance of machines rather than labour in the application of violence. This chapter builds on this by revealing the trend of capital/machines both compensating for reduced human involvement and protecting those human beings – military personnel – that are in harm’s way. The chapter concludes that the conventional forces norm and its associated trends are not likely to go away quickly. Militaries are unlikely to become more labour-intensive in terms of the application of violence (as opposed to supporting the machines used to apply violence).

4. 3. Mercenaries, Privateers, and Chartered Companies

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 3 offers a historical consideration of commercial non-state violent actors and commercial type policies under two rationales. The first is to highlight the one-time prominence of such actors, predominantly in the land milieu and especially understood through the term “mercenary”. This then allows one to reveal how mercenarism either declined in an absolute sense or those who might be described as mercenaries were absorbed into state expectations and the standing, standardized, and technologically dependent organizations of states. Here attention is paid to pejorative implications related to nationality and military service and to bodies such as the French Foreign Legion, the Gurkha units in a variety of countries, and the bands of (mostly) Cold War era soldiers of fortune. The second is to note that commercial non-state violent actors became less and less associated with advanced machines in warfare. The decline of phenomena like privateering and armed chartered company fleets made the possession and utilization of sophisticated technologies in conflict more and more the preserve of states. The chapter inherently emphasizes that today’s Private Military and Security Companies owning and operating sophisticated technologies that we commonly associate with the state would be, at the very least, a surprising bucking of historical trends.

5. 4. Land Power and PMSCs

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 4 assesses how and why Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are so constituted regarding land power. This chapter introduces the importance of state military doctrines that intrinsically set what activities PMSCs perform. As such, this chapter grants particular attention to the multi-valued role of the offensive amongst state militaries that is in keeping with the conventional forces norm. To illustrate the ways by which PMSCs are “boxed in” on land specifically, this chapter describes a South African PMSC, Executive Outcomes, as an offensive minded actor; an outlier in an industry that increasingly was placed, and saw itself within, a defensive context. Even with this defensive limitation, however, PMSCs find an operational space by compensating, numerically and ideationally, for technologically fixated state militaries. This chapter makes it plain that in so doing, PMSCs employ labour-centric approaches rather than those involving expensive major weapon systems typical of modern state military forces.

6. 5. Sea Power and PMSCs

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 5 emphasizes PMSC labour-centric stances in its focus on sea power. With the conventional forces norm in mind, this chapter identifies the milieu in which PMSCs are injected, one that favours expensive and sophisticated technology for decisive effect, for replacing personnel on land, and for augmenting state prestige. The result is that there is a space for a PMSC presence, but one should note a difference in kind because PMSCs do not and cannot access the marketplace for sophisticated naval machines. For the PMSC industry, this is not necessarily a bad thing because rather than replicate the characteristics and limitations of state forces, PMSCs instead compensate for the qualitative and quantitative challenges that these forces confront. This chapter makes this plain in its extended consideration of PMSCs countering Somali pirates, an endeavour that has been both largely labour-centric and framed by states and others in a defensive mode.

7. 6. Air Power and PMSCs

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 6 concerns air power and while one is, by physical necessity, pushed towards considering Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and machines, this chapter nevertheless stresses the compensating qualities of PMSCs that are similarly bounded defensively and limited by relative technological sophistication. This chapter does this by first explaining the importance of technology in the air, the offensive proclivities of air power as set by theorists and doctrine, and the increasing costs and prestige tied to jet age air power. These matters are all in keeping with the conventional forces norm. This chapter then reveals that while a space, at first glance, does exist for PMSC air power through the conduct of certain tasks with less sophisticated aircraft, firms are nevertheless constrained. This chapter explains that a defensive orientation sees PMSCs utilized much more towards protecting themselves in the air and/or others on the ground. To make this plain, this chapter presents a number of cases in which PMSCs have employed state-owned assets, conducted defensive operations, or been rolled into much larger state efforts to apply military power.

8. 7. Conclusion

   Christopher Spearin

   Abstract

   Chapter 7 closes the book by summarizing the argument and by reflecting upon what the defensively bounded and largely labour-centric nature of the Private Military and Security Company PMSC presence might indicate for both future academic analysis and policymaking. In regards to proxy wars, this chapter considers the degree to which PMSCs can serve as proxies given their prominence combined with the pressures generated by the conventional forces norm and the state proclivity towards the offensive. In regards to other clients (i.e., developing world states and non-state actors), this chapter reveals what might be expected of firms, expectations that are constrained given the book’s findings. Finally, in regards to the future influence and impact of PMSCs, this chapter examines the division of tasks between states and PMSCs to suggest implications for both actors stemming from how security challenges are constructed and responded to.

9. Backmatter