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2016 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

11. R&D Policy and Political Corruption in a Growing Economy

Author : Daisuke Ikazaki

Published in: Sustainable Growth and Development in a Regional Economy

Publisher: Springer Japan

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Abstract

Simple growth models were described in Chaps. 4 and 5. The marginal product of capital must not converge to 0 in the long run to attain sustainable growth. Productivity improvement is necessary. Chapter 5 presented analysis of a simple endogenous growth model in which productivity improvement occurs within the model. We consider publicly financed R&D. Therefore, the role of the government is important. As described in Chap. 5, we presume that the government maximizes the social welfare, which is defined as the sum of the utility of households. In practice, many earlier studies of economic growth have assumed that a government maximizes social welfare when market failure occurs (Grossman and Helpman [8], Barro and Sala-i-Martin [4]). However, a government might be selfish or myopic in practice. Governments might carry out policies to please the present generation and leave a huge burden to future generations (e.g., the financial deficit of many countries). Powerful politicians might maximize the welfare of their constituents or major donors rather raising the level of national benefit. Therefore, policies that include sacrifices today to improve future conditions might not be pursued. Resource allocation to research activities or other activities undertaken to improve future conditions tends to be lower than the optimum.

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Footnotes
1
Subscript t represents the level in period t throughout this chapter.
 
2
Acemoglu, Aghion, Zilibotti et al. [1] consider the case in which older low-skilled managers and capitalists entered into a collusive agreement.
 
3
Kurtzman et al. [13] use the opacity index (another index that considers the institutions of the economy) and derive similar results.
 
4
Krueger [12] shows that the Indian government recorded more than 7 % of the GNP used for rent seeking behavior in 1964.
 
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Metadata
Title
R&D Policy and Political Corruption in a Growing Economy
Author
Daisuke Ikazaki
Copyright Year
2016
Publisher
Springer Japan
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-55294-9_11