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A Logical Framework for Graded Predicates Read chapter Read first chapter

2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Rational Coordination with no Communication or Conventions

Authors : Valentin Goranko, Antti Kuusisto, Raine Rönnholm

Published in: Logic, Rationality, and Interaction

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

We study pure coordination games where in every outcome, all players have identical payoffs, ‘win’ or ‘lose’. We identify and discuss a range of ‘purely rational principles’ guiding the reasoning of rational players in such games and analyse which classes of coordination games can be solved by such players with no preplay communication or conventions. We observe that it is highly nontrivial to delineate a boundary between purely rational principles and other decision methods, such as conventions, for solving such coordination games.

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Footnotes
1
Note that, unlike the common use of ‘preplay communication’ in game theory to mean communication before the given game is played, here we mean communication before the players are even presented with the game.
 
2
Schelling shares this view on pure coordination games (see [17], p. 283, footnote 16).
 
3
In fact, the initial motivation for the present work came from concerns with the semantics of Alternating time temporal logic ATL, extending Coalition Logic.
 
4
This example is based on the children’s book When the Robbers Came to Cardamom Town by Thorbjørn Egner, featuring the characters Casper, Jesper and Jonathan.
 
5
In pictures these lines can be drawn in different styles or colours, to tell them apart.
 
6
Isomorphism is defined as usual for relational structures (see, e.g., [4]).
 
7
Recall, that a choice a is strictly dominated by a choice b if the choice b guarantees a strictly higher payoff than the choice a in every play of the game (see e.g. [12, 16]).
 
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Metadata
Title
Rational Coordination with no Communication or Conventions
Authors
Valentin Goranko
Antti Kuusisto
Raine Rönnholm
Copyright Year
2017
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book
Logic, Rationality, and Interaction

Print ISBN: 978-3-662-55664-1

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-55665-8

Copyright Year: 2017

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_3

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