2014 | OriginalPaper | Chapter
Reflexive Constitutionalism in Crisis
Author : Prof. Dr. Erik O. Eriksen
Published in: Deliberative Kritik - Kritik der Deliberation
Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden
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What do the strong emotional reactions to the European Union’s Eurozone crisismanagement tell us about the normativity of the European Union (EU)? Why is more expected by the European institutions when collective action is constrained by the politics of European states? The EU has no competence in fiscal matters; it cannot redistribute resources, issue state bonds, print money, and it has no sovereign tax basis. The European Central Bank (ECB) cannot act as a lender of last resort. These competencies rest with the member states. This is all well known and a result of member states’ unwillingness to surrender sovereignty and grant more powers to the Union. All the same this has not prevented social groups, political parties and intellectuals from demanding more resolute action from the EU to curb the crisis.