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2017 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Relief Maximization and Rationality

Authors : Paolo Galeazzi, Zoi Terzopoulou

Published in: Logic, Rationality, and Interaction

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Abstract

This paper introduces the concept of relief maximization in decisions and games and shows how it can explain experimental behavior, such as asymmetric dominance and decoy effects. Next, two possible evolutionary explanations for the survival of relief-based behavior are sketched.

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Footnotes
1
The symmetric games presented there are actually six, but one of them is irrelevant for our study. As usual, since games are symmetric, it suffices to specify row player’s payoffs.
 
2
For a (compact convex) set of probabilities \(\Gamma \subseteq \varDelta (A_{-i})\), it is also straightforward to generalize the definition to the “multiple-prior version” of relief maximization: \(\arg \max _{a_{i}}\min _{P\in \Gamma }\,\{\mathbb {E}_{P}\left[ u_{i}(a_{i},a_{-i})\right] -\min _{a_{i}'}\mathbb {E}_{P}\left[ u_{i}(a_{i}',a_{-i})\right] \}\).
 
3
Note that in general a tie-breaker is needed for a principle to always output a single action.
 
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Metadata
Title
Relief Maximization and Rationality
Authors
Paolo Galeazzi
Zoi Terzopoulou
Copyright Year
2017
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-55665-8_50

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