5. Resilience to Threats from Foreign Intelligence Services
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- 2026
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Abstract
5.1 Introduction
The global and regional security environment of today remains fast-changing and complex. Authoritarian states increasingly being against democracies are making the security environment more and more unpredictable, becoming a source of new military, political, and economic tensions or conflicts, and increasing regional instability.
Institutions assessing threats to Lithuania’s national security point out that Russia, Belarus, and China are expanding their intelligence capabilities in the Baltic region (Šakočius & Tekorius, 2024). Recognising the need for intelligence information for political and military decision-making and the potential of intelligence operations to influence the adversary and its allies, these states pay close attention to intelligence and make every effort to use all available human, technological, information, and financial capabilities and resources (Turčinavičiūtė, 2024).
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Intelligence and security services of states hostile to Lithuania are actively conducting espionage operations, cyber, information, influence, and other hybrid attacks as well as organising and carrying out acts of sabotage in Lithuania and other Baltic States. Therefore, to reduce the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, particular emphasis is placed on strengthening the resilience of Lithuania and the other Baltic States by enhancing the capabilities of their intelligence and counterintelligence institutions, strengthening citizens’ awareness, critical thinking, and resistance to the unlawful influence of foreign intelligence and security services of Russia, Belarus, and China.
State resilience to hostile foreign influence includes the ideological resilience of state institutions, civil servants, soldiers and other citizens, and the readiness to effectively manage emerging threats and address risks, hazards, and threats. It is therefore essential to build resilience, citizenship, awareness, community, and patriotism among all citizens, and to promote the ability to critically assess information.
Resilience, civic will, and knowledge are key elements that need to be developed in order to resist the hostile influence of foreign intelligence institutions.
In Lithuania, resilience is understood as “the ability of citizens to withstand any disruption to the state or society without significant consequences, to return to their initial state as soon as possible after it has ended, or to adapt rapidly to changed circumstances”. “Resilience reduces the potential for hostile forces to have a negative impact on the state and society and creates a stronger basis for sustainable state development” (Resolution No. XIV-1102 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2022).
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Aspects of resilience to foreign intelligence threats have been addressed in scholarly works by H. Prunckun, A. Šakočius, A. Tekorius, R. Žilinskas, and others. These issues are also analysed in the annual national security threat assessments of the intelligence and security services of Lithuania and other Baltic States. However, this is clearly not enough. The analysis of good practice in Lithuania in this chapter fills this gap. The chapter examines the threats posed by foreign intelligence services, the intelligence methods used by these services, and analyses aspects of best practices in the resilience of the Lithuanian state and society to these threats.
5.2 Threats from Foreign Intelligence Services
One of the main tasks of the intelligence services against Lithuania and the other Baltic States is to gather military, political, economic, scientific, and technical information. Human intelligence, signals, communications, cyber, imagery, and open-source intelligence are all used to gather information, using all available intelligence techniques and tools (Šakočius & Tekorius, 2024). The search, collection, processing, and evaluation of intelligence data, as well as the encryption and decryption of information, benefit from the technological and software capabilities of artificial intelligence (Turčinavičiūtė, 2024).
Foreign intelligence activities go beyond gathering information and include actions aimed at influencing an adversary to reduce its ability to threaten the national security of its country. This is done through special information, psychological, cyber, and kinetic operations (Clark, 2013).
Foreign intelligence services are intensively conducting cyberattacks to block and disrupt military, energy, transport, civil aviation, and communications management systems. Information attacks are aimed at creating a favourable opinion, misleading, intimidating, creating distrust in the leaders and decisions of the country and its institutions, influencing elections, suppressing the will to resist, or exerting any other psychological influence on the adversary’s and its allies’ decision-makers, politicians, soldiers, civil servants, and the population. Kinetic operations, which are usually carried out by diversionary reconnaissance groups, are aimed at destroying or damaging military and critical civilian infrastructure, the destruction or damage of which would have serious consequences such as disorganising the adversary’s armed forces, the activities of state and local government institutions, affecting the civilian population, causing fear, panic, and disrupting the will to resist (Šakočius & Tekorius, 2024). Foreign intelligence services also organise and carry out hybrid actions to influence the political, social, and economic processes of other countries, while avoiding detection and response.
Russian intelligence tactics in armed conflict are well illustrated by the methods and tools used in the war with Ukraine: from the capture, detention, imprisonment, interrogation, recruitment of persons, and use of spies, diversionary reconnaissance teams sent to the enemy’s rear, the use of electronic, communications, and cyber-intelligence tools, monitoring of the media, the Internet, and social networks, monitoring of telephone conversations and electronic correspondence, to the use of reconnaissance satellites and drones (Turčinavičiūtė, 2024).
The greatest threat to the national security of the Republic of Lithuania is posed by espionage activities of foreign states, carried out through clandestine human intelligence (intelligence collected from human sources using clandestine methods), including intelligence officers and citizens of their own country recruited for intelligence activities, of the country being spied on, and the citizens of third countries. The use of clandestine human intelligence is particularly focused on obtaining information that constitutes state and official secrets. The hijacking, unauthorised disclosure, loss or destruction, collection, purchase, sale, possession, or dissemination of classified information pose a threat not only to the security of the State of Lithuania and its citizens but also to the security of allies.
In order to ensure the national security of the state—to protect the vital interests of the state, society, and citizens from foreign intelligence threats, measures are taken to identify emerging risk factors, dangers, and threats in a timely manner.
To this end, Lithuania is taking appropriate and sufficient preventive measures to prevent these threats and to address their causes and conditions: counterintelligence and information protection capabilities are being strengthened and expanded; the society is being educated about the threats posed by foreign intelligence services, how to identify and protect against them; public citizenship is being promoted, and critical thinking and resilience against hostile influences are being developed. These measures effectively manage foreign intelligence threats and mitigate their damage to the interests of the state, society, and citizens (Turčinavičiūtė, 2024).
Resistance to destruction and the strategy of deterring the enemy require the Lithuanian intelligence and security services, state institutions, armed forces, and the public to work together to prevent enemy subversive activities and eradicate their consequences (Šakočius & Tekorius, 2024).
Hostile espionage and subversive activities carried out by the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, and the People’s Republic of China against Lithuania are one of the main threats to Lithuania’s national security. These services intensively collect military, political, and economic information for military and political planning, and organise and execute information and cyber operations and hybrid attacks. Foreign intelligence is interested in both classified and unclassified information, and intelligence needs are met by human (gathering information from people), electronic (gathering information from communications and other electronic systems), cyber (gathering information from cyber systems), and open-source (gathering information from the media, social networks, and other publicly available sources) intelligence gathering methods. Intelligence activities against Lithuania are carried out not only in Lithuania but also in other countries, such as Russia, Belarus, and elsewhere. For example, Nikolai Filipchenko, an officer of the Russian Federal Security Service arrested by Lithuanian counterintelligence in 2015, recruited Lithuanian citizens to spy against the Republic of Lithuania in the territory of Russia, Belarus, and Poland. According to Lithuanian intelligence authorities, by cooperating with their allies Russia, Belarus, and China, the intelligence and security services have the opportunity to fill their intelligence gaps and disguise their intelligence activities by exchanging intelligence information and assisting in intelligence operations (The National Threat Assessment, 2024).
The Republic of Lithuania pays particular attention to the management of threats posed by foreign intelligence activities. The National Security Strategy (National Security Strategy, approved by Resolution No. IX-907 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 28 May 2002) approved by the Seimas (the Parliament) of the Republic of Lithuania identifies three pillars of national security policy priorities and objectives: preparing for national defence, increasing the resilience of the state and society, and ensuring an international security system that is consistent with the interests of Lithuania. It sets out the following objectives for preventing the hostile activities of foreign intelligence and security services:
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To develop innovative and technologically advanced intelligence and counterintelligence activities that meet intelligence information requirements.
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To counter the activities of foreign intelligence and security services and persons associated with them in the Republic of Lithuania, which are hostile to the interests of the Republic of Lithuania.
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To strengthen the security culture of state institutions which deal with classified information and the population by raising awareness of threats and protection against them, the proper protection of information comprising a state secret and an official secret, and to carry out educational activities (to explain the threats posed by intelligence and security services of foreign states and persons associated with them as well as the methods of their operation).
In conclusion, the hostile espionage and subversive activities carried out by the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, and the People’s Republic of China against Lithuania by gathering intelligence, recruiting Lithuanian citizens for espionage activities, and organising and carrying out information, psychological, cyber, and kinetic operations are one of the main threats to Lithuania’s national security. The Republic of Lithuania pays particular attention to managing these threats.
In the following, we will present the threats posed by the intelligence and security services of the Russian Federation, followed by the threats posed by the services of the Republic of Belarus and the People’s Republic of China against Lithuania.
5.2.1 Threats from Russian Security and Intelligence Services
The most intensive and aggressive Russian intelligence and security services against Lithuania are the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces (GRU), and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Russia’s intelligence interests cover many key areas of Lithuanian state life. Russian intelligence services are interested in:
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Domestic policy: Processes, trends, election campaigns, political leaders and their personal characteristics.
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Foreign policy: Position in international organisations, bilateral relations, and specifics of policymaking.
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Economy and energy: Economic development and outlook, strategic energy projects, their political support/non-support and potential for discredit.
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Intelligence services and other institutions responsible for national security, their capabilities and personnel.
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Defence system: Military capabilities, military and civilian infrastructure of strategic importance, military cooperation with NATO and European Union allies.
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Telecommunications and cyberinfrastructure: Security gaps, interception of information of interest to intelligence services (Who, how, and why is spying in Lithuania, 2014).
Russian intelligence activities cover all of the following areas, and Russian intelligence services take active measures (information, psychological, and cyber operations) to influence Lithuania’s domestic and foreign policy.
Russian intelligence activities in Lithuania. Russian intelligence officers have long operated in Lithuania under diplomatic cover, working as diplomats at the Russian Embassy, Russian Trade Representation, and consulates, and using “clean” Russian diplomats for their own purposes. Russia’s recent intelligence activities under diplomatic cover have been significantly curtailed by active counterintelligence measures (The National Threat Assessment, 2024).
The Russian intelligence services also actively use a journalistic cover to collect information, in the hope that this cover will provide reliable protection for the collectors of information. Under journalistic cover, intelligence officers are able to attend political, economic, and scientific events, such as conferences, seminars, or debates, without arousing suspicion, and gather information of interest.
Russian military intelligence cooperates with Belarusian military intelligence, coordinating actions and exchanging information. Russian GRU officers seek to establish and maintain contacts with Soviet war veterans and graduates of Soviet military academies living in Lithuania, and to obtain information of intelligence interest from them (The National Threat Assessment, 2024).
Intelligence activities against Lithuania on Russian territory. All Russian intelligence and security services carry out intelligence activities against foreign countries from Russia’s territory. The FSB is the most active in this area, constantly expanding its intelligence capabilities and gathering intelligence and counterintelligence information on foreign countries, especially Russia’s neighbours, to influence the processes taking place there.
The FSB is particularly interested in Lithuanian politicians, civil servants, former and current law enforcement officers, military personnel, businessmen, journalists, scientists, students, employees of non-governmental organisations, and other Lithuanian citizens with political or business ties who travel to Russia. Key targets include people who are financially vulnerable and looking for business opportunities in Russia, who are easily manipulated, who hold pro-Russian views, and who are negative towards the Baltic States. Usually, such people are lured to Russia, Belarus, or other countries before making an offer of cooperation. The FSB is interested in foreign businessmen because of their contacts in political parties, government institutions, law enforcement, finance, and energy. They use such individuals as “access” agents—although they are not in a position to provide the FSB with useful information, they help to establish contacts with persons of interest to the FSB (The National Threat Assessment, 2020).
The FSB often uses heavy-handed recruitment methods in Russia. Individuals can be forced to cooperate by blackmailing them for offences or immoral acts (smuggling, incidents with the local police, drunken accidents, etc.). For example, in 2017, Lithuanian intelligence authorities announced that FSB officer Sergei Kuleshov was actively recruiting Lithuanian citizens travelling to the Kaliningrad region (Pancerovas, 2019).
Intelligence activities against Lithuanian diplomats and officials abroad. The Russian FSB is actively targeting and recruiting Lithuanian diplomats and their family members working in and/or visiting Russia. In addition to human intelligence methods, the FSB uses a wide range of technical means to penetrate foreign diplomatic missions in Russia, such as intercepting telephone conversations and information transmitted via computer networks or using video surveillance and audio recording devices (The National Threat Assessment, 2023).
While the greatest intelligence threat to Lithuanian diplomats, officials, and soldiers is in Russia and Belarus, it also exists in other foreign countries. Russian intelligence can also track and recruit the desired target in Western countries.
Intelligence activities at the Lithuanian border. By recruiting Lithuanians on its territory, Russian intelligence takes advantage of the fact that many residents of the border areas travel to Russia to buy cheaper goods. Intelligence services charge them with fictitious or real charges of smuggling, border crossing procedures, and other irregularities. They are motivated to cooperate by the promise of unrestricted opportunities to continue transporting goods from Russia or to continue smuggling.
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) activity from Russia and Belarus is frequently observed along Lithuania’s borders. UAVs are used for intelligence activities against the Republic of Lithuania and for planning illegal infiltrations into Lithuanian territory. There are indications that Russian special-purpose troops are infiltrating foreign countries in peacetime. These operations train troops to be able to operate undetected in another country’s territory, to reconnoitre objects of interest, or to carry out special tasks. This is likely in preparation for diversionary attacks against facilities. An example of such intelligence activities is the 2015 infiltration of Russian Special Forces into the Curonian Spit on the Lithuanian coast near the port of Klaipėda and the liquefied gas terminal (Saldžiūnas, 2018).
Intelligence methods used. Russian intelligence services use clandestine human intelligence, electronic, communications, cyber, imagery, and other intelligence-gathering techniques.
Human intelligence is a method of intelligence gathering in which intelligence officers gather information and pursue other intelligence objectives by interacting with people. Russian intelligence services select specific individuals as recruitment targets based on their ability to obtain information of interest. Targets can also make or influence decisions that benefit Russia or disseminate information in the public domain that benefits Russia (The National Threat Assessment, 2020).
For example, in 2021, Algirdas Paleckis, a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania, was convicted by a court of preparing to spy for Russia. Together with his accomplice Deimantas Bertauskas, he collected, under the instructions of Russian intelligence, information of interest to the Russian intelligence service about cases related to Soviet aggression against Lithuania in 1990–1991 and the officials and judges who investigated them. A. Paleckis is also considered one of the founders of the International Forum for Good Neighbourhood, which was dissolved by the court as acting against Lithuania. A. Paleckis, who completed studies in journalism and political science in Russia, has worked at the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as an advisor to the Deputy Speaker of the Seimas, as Deputy Mayor of Vilnius, and was a Member of the Seimas in 2004–2007 (Steniulienė, 2024).
The range of potential “targets” of Russian intelligence services is very wide. These are not only civil servants, officials, and military personnel working with classified Lithuanian, NATO, and EU information. Targets include individuals who can provide non-public, unclassified political, economic, and military information and identify and characterise other individuals who could be recruited by Russian intelligence services. When recruiting agents, Russian intelligence services give priority to people who have some kind of connection to Russia: they have lived or studied, have relatives or friends in the country, or are involved in business or other activities related to Russia (The National Threat Assessment, 2020).
For example, in January 2024, Lithuanian counterintelligence detained Eduard Manov, who, as part of his GRU intelligence tasks, joined one of the main parties in Lithuania—the Lithuanian Homeland Union-Christian Democrats (TS-LKD) and the Exiles’ Union—and collected and sent intelligence information to Russia using sophisticated communication equipment (Aleknavičė, 2024).
Russian intelligence and security services assess not only the intelligence capabilities of specific targets but also their motives for cooperation. They seek out individuals who may be vulnerable because of their personal characteristics or interests. Motivations for cooperating with Russian intelligence and security services may include financial interests (debt, desire for luxury living, lucrative business deals in Russia, etc.); career frustration; compromising information (legal and criminal offences, sexual orientation, addictions, or family problems); sympathy for Russia because of beliefs or nationality. Russian intelligence services also manipulate civil servants who communicate with Russian diplomats or other officials in the hope of achieving their personal career or political goals. Russian intelligence services establish and develop contacts with selected recruitment targets in Lithuania, Russia, and third countries (The National Threat Assessment, 2023).
For example, in 2014, Lithuanian counterintelligence detained a Captain of Lithuanian Air Force, Sergejus Pušinas, and his Russian recruiter Sergei Moiseyenko, who were collecting information on the Lithuanian Armed Forces under the Russian GRU intelligence tasks (Lithuanian officer and Russian citizen punished for espionage, 2017).
Russia also spies on Lithuania through electronic intelligence. Electronic intelligence against Lithuania uses fixed and mobile intelligence platforms in Russia, reconnaissance ships in the Baltic Sea, and reconnaissance aircraft. Belarus is increasingly involved in Russian signals intelligence, with Belarusian airspace used for reconnaissance flights, and intelligence on the activity of NATO aircraft is exchanged (The National Threat Assessment, 2022).
The Russian intelligence services have the capability to use special technical means to penetrate telecommunications networks. The FSB and GRU radio-electronic intelligence centres are deployed on the border with Lithuania to help the Russian intelligence services collect information from telecommunications networks about Lithuanian citizens, civil servants, and other persons of interest to Russia.
Cyber espionage by Russian intelligence services poses the greatest threat to the security of Lithuania’s information systems and the information they contain. The development of information technology is boosting human communication and the transfer of part of our lives to cyberspace, opening up new opportunities for spy services. Information on social networks, financial transactions, data banks, and registers in information systems tell us more today than eavesdropping on telephone conversations or intercepting electronic correspondence. Computer viruses, which are constantly evolving, can take advantage of cybersecurity vulnerabilities to steal large amounts of valuable information from both encrypted and unencrypted information systems without being detected (The National Threat Assessment, 2022).
Russian intelligence services also use traditional methods of influence operations: they disseminate information discrediting Lithuania in the public sphere and try to shape the views of politicians, diplomats, and businessmen in favour of Russia through unofficial personal contacts. Biased and untrue information aimed at creating resonance in the Lithuanian public sphere is being disseminated in the Russian media and on the Internet (The National Threat Assessment, 2022).
5.2.2 Threats from Belarusian Intelligence and Security Services
Three intelligence and security services of the Republic of Belarus conduct intelligence activities against Lithuania: the State Security Committee (BKGB), the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence (GRU), and the intelligence units of the State Border Committee (SBC). The Belarusian KGB is the most active against Lithuania.
The main tasks of the Belarusian intelligence and security services in Lithuania are related to ensuring the stability of the Belarusian government inside the country and supporting Belarus’ political and economic interests in Lithuania and the EU. Belarusian intelligence services use classical intelligence methods in their intelligence activities towards Lithuania, such as clandestine human intelligence gathering of political, economic, and military information, information on Belarusian opposition organisations in Lithuania, as well as hostile intelligence activities at the Lithuanian border (The National Threat Assessment, 2024).
By collecting information about Belarusian opposition organisations operating in Lithuania, Belarusian intelligence services recruit members of the Belarusian community in Lithuania and Belarusian citizens living in Lithuania, and seek to keep this community under their influence. For example, in 2022, Lithuanian counterintelligence detained Lithuanian citizen Mantas Danielius who, on behalf of the Belarusian KGB, infiltrated Belarusian organisations in Lithuania and passed information about them to Belarusian intelligence (Jakučionis, 2024). This is the intelligence method used by Belarusian intelligence in Poland, Latvia, and other countries where Belarusian opposition organisations and large Belarusian communities are based.
The BKGB constantly seeks to find suitable candidates for recruitment among Lithuanian businessmen, politicians, and civil servants who could be influenced by their business interests in Belarus, their family or personal ties and other private interests in this neighbouring country.
Belarusian intelligence and security services are generally more cautious and avoid aggressive actions in foreign territories but are active and aggressive in their own territory.
Belarus’ military intelligence needs in Lithuania are broadly the same as Russia’s military intelligence interests. They recruit agents and collect information on the Lithuanian Armed Forces, their readiness, and military infrastructure. Belarusian and Russian military intelligence services cooperate closely against Lithuania and other NATO countries. The following examples illustrate the recruitment practices of agents (The National Threat Assessment, 2023).
In 2014, Lithuanian counterintelligence detained Lithuanian Army paramedic Andriej Oshurkov who was recruited by the Belarusian GRU in Belarus and purposefully infiltrated into the Lithuanian Armed Forces, and who, in the course of his intelligence-gathering tasks, collected and passed intelligence information on the Lithuanian Armed Forces and NATO missions to Belarusian military intelligence.
In the same year, Romualdas Lipskis, an employee of the Lithuanian state-owned company Oro navigacija, was detained for gathering information on NATO’s air policing mission in the Baltics and other information on behalf of Belarusian military intelligence (Jablonskas, 2024).
Belarusian intelligence and security services are also actively engaged in hostile activities at the Belarusian border. They use technical intelligence against Lithuanian soldiers and State Border Guard Service officers guarding the Lithuanian–Belarusian border, and recruit people travelling to Belarus. Belarusian border guards photograph and film Lithuanian border surveillance systems, do not react to unauthorised persons in the Belarusian border protection zone, let migrants into the protected border area, and direct them towards the Lithuanian border (The National Threat Assessment, 2024).
5.2.3 Threats from Chinese Intelligence and Security Services
As China’s economic and political ambitions grow in the West, Chinese intelligence activities in Lithuania are becoming more aggressive. There are two intelligence and security agencies of the People’s Republic of China—the Ministry of State Security and the Military Intelligence Directorate.
In Lithuania, Chinese intelligence traditionally uses diplomatic cover, exploits Chinese companies and news agencies, and takes advantage of Chinese students studying in Lithuania. In November 2024, three employees of the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China were declared persona non grata and expelled to put an end to illegal intelligence activities under diplomatic cover.
Chinese intelligence activities in Lithuania are mainly focused on solving China’s domestic political problems, and they seek to ensure that Lithuania does not support Tibetan and Taiwanese independence or raise these issues at the international level. Chinese intelligence is also interested in Lithuania’s domestic and foreign policy, economy, defence sector, and information available to Lithuanian citizens on international cooperation projects with China and the future plans of various countries. In Lithuania, Chinese intelligence seeks suitable recruitment targets—decision-makers and others sympathetic to China and with political leverage—and seeks to influence them with gifts, free trips to China, and payment for training there. China is also actively engaged in social media and cyber-intelligence activities against Lithuania (The National Threat Assessment, 2023).
Based on the data of Lithuanian intelligence institutions, it can be concluded that, given the growing activity of the intelligence and security services of Russia, Belarus, and China in NATO and EU countries, the intelligence activities of these countries in Lithuania will also expand and intensify in the long term, using traditional intelligence methods and the rapidly developing new technological capabilities of intelligence, and the increasing use of social networks for the search for and recruitment of sources of intelligence (The National Threat Assessment, 2024).
5.3 Resilience to Threats from Foreign Intelligence Services
5.3.1 State and Societal Resilience
Ensuring national security requires the timely identification of emerging threats, hazards, and risk factors, the adoption of appropriate and sufficient preventive measures to prevent threats, to address their causes and conditions, and the effective management of the threats that emerge, as well as the restoration of the damage caused by them.
The Law on the Basics of National Security of the Republic of Lithuania states that the national security of the country is the responsibility of the state, its national security, defence and other institutions, citizens, their communities and organisations. Every civil servant, soldier, and citizen contributing to the country’s national security should have a thorough understanding of the threats to Lithuania’s national security, their causes and conditions, as well as ways to prevent and manage them if they do occur.
Russia’s efforts to exploit state vulnerabilities make building national resilience a necessity rather than an aspiration. To counter Russia’s power projection, a state’s national security system should be based on resilience, deterrence, and resistance (Žilinskas, 2017).
The professionalism and proactivity of the Lithuanian intelligence and security services, the resilience of state officials and citizens to hostile foreign influence, and the will to resist play an effective deterrent role to hostile foreign intelligence activities in Lithuania.
State resilience to hostile foreign influence includes the ideological resilience of state institutions, civil servants, soldiers, and other citizens, and the readiness to effectively manage emerging threats and address risks, hazards, and threats. It is therefore essential to build resilience, citizenship, awareness, community, and patriotism among all citizens, and to promote the ability to critically assess information.
The National Agenda of the Republic of Lithuania “Strategy for preparing citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for civil resistance” (Resolution No. XIV-1102 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2022), approved by the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, states that “<…> Civil resistance is a part of the most important principle of Lithuania’s defence—the common defence. Every citizen, regardless of age and place of residence, must be committed to preventing threats and resisting aggression <...>, as must all civilian state and municipal institutions and agencies, economic operators, the public, civil society, and citizens’ associations and organisations. All public resources must be mobilised and used for defence” (Resolution No. XIV-1102 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2022).
Resilience, civic will, and knowledge are key elements that need to be developed in order to resist the hostile influence of foreign intelligence institutions.
The concept of resilience is sufficiently well defined in the Strategy for preparing citizens of the Republic of Lithuania for civil resistance. It defines resilience as “<…> the ability of citizens to withstand any disruption to the state or society without significant consequences, to return to their initial state as soon as possible after it has ended, or to adapt rapidly to changed circumstances. Resilience reduces the potential for hostile forces to have a negative impact on the state and society, and creates a stronger basis for sustainable state development. In this context, citizens’ knowledge of contemporary security threats, as well as their ability to cope adequately with the consequences of these threats, and their critical thinking are crucial, making resilience important both as a deterrent and as a prerequisite for building a strong civil will. The link between resilience and civic will is important in this respect, especially in terms of trust in the state, as a high level of trust in the state (in its democratic system, in state and municipal institutions and bodies, in their activities, and in other citizens) reduces the chances of hostile external influences (especially information, recruitment activities)” (Resolution No. XIV-1102 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2022).
Civic will is defined in the Strategy as “<…> the determination and resolve of all citizens to resist the enemy in every possible way <…>. Civic will is an important deterrent: it encourages citizens to participate actively in preparations for national defence, while a potential aggressor, seeing the public’s willingness to resist, may be more inclined to abandon hostile intentions. Awareness of national defence as a constitutional right and duty, and the determination to contribute to it, are important for the development of civic will. Civic will is also strengthened by an interest in the country’s history and general civic values (trust in state and municipal institutions and bodies, other citizens, anti-corruption awareness, conscious and active participation in state governance, public life and volunteer activities), which encourage identification with the state, the perception of contributing to its creation and positive changes in it, and the belief in the importance of preserving and defending it all” (Resolution No. XIV-1102 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2022).
Knowledge acquisition ensures that citizens’ participation in civil resistance becomes a real defensive power (Resolution No. XIV-1102 of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania of 17 May 2022). This requires knowledge of the threats posed by the actions of foreign intelligence agencies and the characteristics of such actions, as well as knowledge of how to deal with such actions: how to resist the recruiting influence and how to inform the Lithuanian intelligence agencies of such actions.
In accordance with the Law on National Security of the Republic of Lithuania, the National Security Strategy, and the Strategy for preparing citizens for civil resistance of the Republic of Lithuania, in order to ensure that citizens are able to identify threats posed by foreign intelligence services and are resistant to attempts to break their will to resist, publications are issued for various groups of society. The general public is constantly informed and educated on intelligence, information, and cyber threats.
Lithuanian intelligence institutions present annual National Threat Assessments to the public; issue publications to identify intelligence threats (“Who, how and why is spying in Lithuania, 2014”); create informative videos on recruitment situations and publish them on social networks (“Recruitment stories that could be yours”, etc.); conduct prevention campaigns (Campaign “This could be your story—How hostile intelligence agencies try to recruit Lithuanian citizens”); publish information on the websites of their institutions (“Hostile intelligence activities against Lithuania. What is the threat and how to identify it”, “Who is spying against Lithuania and the threat of hostile intelligence”, etc.).
The National Cyber Security Centre under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania presents annual National Cyber Security Reports to the public each year, which provides an overview of cyber security and information threats. The institution’s website provides cybersecurity recommendations (e.g. “Cybersecurity Guide for Businesses”) for public authorities, businesses, and citizens.
Aspects of resilience to foreign intelligence threats, along with other threats to Lithuania’s national security, are also addressed in the National Security Course for civil servants and media representatives, as well as in the Hybrid Threat Resilience Course for soldiers and civil servants, organised by the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania for several years; Civil Resistance courses for civil servants, university lecturers, students, and members of the public, regularly organised by the Mobilisation and Civil Resistance Department under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania; National Security and National Defence Summer Courses for educators; Civil Resistance Courses for Owners of Arms; and the Civil Resistance Training Platform “Mobilisation School”. These aspects are also included in the Civic Education Programme for upper secondary school students, developed with the participation of scientists from the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania.
The Lithuanian intelligence authorities encourage people living in Lithuania to inform the Lithuanian Intelligence Service via the hotline phone number or email on its website if they suspect that the intelligence services of hostile countries are operating or attempting to recruit them, thus preventing the recruitment, manipulation, or blackmail of Lithuanian citizens. Persons already involved in the activities of foreign intelligence services are encouraged to cease such activities, to contact the Lithuanian intelligence authorities, and to benefit from the amnesty provided for by the laws of the Republic of Lithuania. The intelligence authorities guarantee the confidentiality of the person, and the information provided to the persons who have provided such information.
In order to strengthen the resistance of the state and society to the hostile influence of foreign states, Lithuania has been implementing a comprehensive set of measures, which include building the ideological resilience of civil servants, soldiers, and other citizens, enhancing public citizenship, awareness, community spirit, patriotism, and vigilance, and increasing the ability to critically assess information, by providing the Lithuanian public with sufficient knowledge of the hostile activities of foreign intelligence services and their signs. In conclusion, the measures in place in Lithuania are sufficient to ensure the resilience of the state and society to hostile foreign intelligence influence.
5.3.2 Preventing Hostile Activities by Foreign Intelligence Services
Preventing hostile activities of foreign intelligence services—preventing espionage activities or stopping espionage activities that are already underway—is one of the most important tasks of Lithuanian counterintelligence. Preventing hostile activities includes identifying persons who are about to engage in or are already engaged in espionage activities, stopping such activities, prosecuting persons for illegal activities or expelling persons with diplomatic immunity, and other preventive measures.
The counterintelligence units of Lithuanian intelligence institutions are directly responsible for combating hostile foreign intelligence activities, including espionage, diversionary, subversive, and other hostile activities that threaten the country’s national security and other state interests. They also organise and control the protection of state secrets in Lithuania and its institutions abroad. The State Security Department of the Republic of Lithuania carries out counterintelligence and the protection of state secrets in the non-military sphere, and the Defence Intelligence and Security Service under the Ministry of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania in the military sphere (Article 8 of the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania).
Counterintelligence activities in Lithuania are regulated by the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania which defines counterintelligence as the activities of the institutions authorised by the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania. These include the collection, processing, assessment, and provision of information on internal risks, dangers and threats to the national security, and state interests of the Republic of Lithuania to the national security institutions, as well as the activities aimed at eliminating such risks, dangers, and threats (Article 2 of the Law on Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania).
Counterintelligence methods and measures are comprehensively applied in the fight against hostile intelligence activities of foreign states in order to detect foreign intelligence unlawful acts in a timely manner, to identify persons preparing, committing, or perpetrating such acts, and to limit the possibilities for foreign intelligence services to use methods of clandestine human intelligence, electronic, cyber, and other intelligence activities against Lithuania. Measures are also taken to prevent these unlawful acts by protecting defence, diplomatic service, internal affairs, and other state institutions and bodies, political and other organisations, strategic objects and business enterprises from unlawful activities of foreign intelligence; by protecting state and service secrets from hijacking and unlawful disclosure; by protecting Lithuanian citizens from recruitment and other unlawful influence; by deterring them from assisting another state in acting against the interests of the state, and by encouraging them to cease the unlawful activities already under way.
Since the restoration of independence, Lithuanian counterintelligence authorities have identified dozens of spies operating in Lithuania. Some of them have been declared persona non grata and expelled (for example, Vladimir Malygin, Consul General of Russia in Klaipėda, was expelled in 2014 after it had been discovered that he was a Russian intelligence officer) (Pancerovas, 2019), and several people have been prosecuted for espionage for spying under diplomatic cover. This illustrates the professionalism of Lithuanian counterintelligence and the effectiveness of counterintelligence measures.
5.3.3 Protection of Classified Information
The protection of classified information is one of the most important areas of national security. Theft, unlawful disclosure, or loss of classified information may cause extremely serious damage to the interests of the state and to the country’s defence and economic power, may threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Lithuania, the integrity of its territory, or endanger human life. Classified information is the main object of foreign intelligence services’ activities, which they seek to acquire through all routes and by all means possible, without sparing any effort or resources (Prunckun, 2019). In this context, particular attention is paid to the protection of state and official secrets of the Republic of Lithuania, as well as classified information transferred to Lithuania by NATO, the European Union, and foreign countries.
In order to protect classified information from hijacking and unauthorised disclosure, Lithuania has a comprehensive set of traditional measures in place, which are divided into the areas of personnel security, administration of classified information, physical security of classified information, industrial security, and communication and information system security (Abazi, 2019).
In order to ensure proper protection of classified information, Lithuania has adopted special legislation and signed agreements with the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the European Union (EU), and foreign countries on the protection of classified information transmitted to Lithuania (Tekorius, 2021). In Lithuania, the protection of classified information is governed by strict rules set out in the Law on State and Official Secrets and other legal acts (Resolution No. 820 of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania of 13 August 2018):
1.
Access to classified information shall be restricted to persons authorised in accordance with the established procedure—soldiers, officers, civil servants, and other persons having special authorisation (security clearance) to work with or to have access to classified information, who need to have access to such information in the performance of their direct duties. Access to classified information shall be granted only to cleared, trustworthy, and loyal persons.
2.
Classified information may be stored only in premises which have been designated as suitable for the storage and handling of classified information and which shall be protected by physical and electronic safeguards against unauthorised access or intrusion, interception of classified conversations or unauthorised access to classified information.
3.
Classified information may be processed and transmitted only by means of validated secure communication and information systems that comply with strict standards.
It is important to note that the general organisation and status of the protection of classified information in the possession of a classified entity is the responsibility of the management of the classified entity. In contrast, the loss or unauthorised disclosure of classified information entrusted to it is the responsibility of the person to whom such information is entrusted. In order to protect civil servants, officials, soldiers, and other persons who have been granted a permit to work or have access to classified information from recruitment, the Law on State and Official Secrets of the Republic of Lithuania prohibits travel for non-official and non-work purposes to foreign countries and territories, the list of which is approved by the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (Article 211 of the Law on State and Official Secrets of the Republic of Lithuania).
The application of the above measures in Lithuania contributes to the effective protection of state and official secrets, significantly reduces the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and increases the resilience of civil servants and servicemen to recruitment pressure.
5.3.4 Deterring Espionage
Theoretically, the deterrent measures against espionage fall into three groups: the severity of liability for espionage, its fairness, sufficiency, and proportionality to the threat to the national security of the state and the damage to the interests of the state; the inevitability of the liability, which is implemented through the active and professional activity of the state’s security and law enforcement agencies; the complexity of liability—espionage offences are punishable not only by imprisonment, but also by the recovery of material damage, confiscation of property acquired through illegal activities, and the publicity of information on the illegal activities of the person. All of these measures have been successfully implemented in Lithuania and other Baltic States.
Persons shall be held liable for espionage, aiding and abetting an act against the Republic of Lithuania, theft, unlawful disposal and unlawful disclosure of classified information, in accordance with the procedure laid down in the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania and in the Code of Administrative Offences of the Republic of Lithuania.
To deter persons from unlawful actions related to hostile foreign intelligence activities, in 2024, the liability for espionage was strengthened, with a penalty of up to 15 years’ imprisonment, and up to seven years’ imprisonment for assisting another state to act against the Republic of Lithuania (Articles 118 and 119 of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania).
In order to increase the preventive effect of espionage and to encourage Lithuanian and foreign citizens to refrain from actions related to hostile foreign intelligence activities, the articles of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania, providing for liability for espionage (Article 119(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania) and for assistance to another state to act against the Republic of Lithuania (Article 118(2) of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Lithuania), were supplemented with legal norms allowing persons who have committed these offences to be exempted from criminal liability if they have confessed to committing the offence before being recognised as a suspect and have actively cooperated in identifying the representatives of a foreign state or its organisation and the activities carried out by them.
To reduce the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, it is essential to strengthen the resilience of the state and society by enhancing the capabilities of the country’s intelligence and security institutions, and by strengthening citizens’ awareness, critical thinking, and resilience to the unlawful influence of foreign intelligence services.
5.4 Conclusions
The intelligence services of the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus, and the People’s Republic of China pose the greatest threat to the country’s national security through actively conducting espionage and influence operations. In addition to the traditional clandestine human intelligence approach, the intelligence services of Russia, Belarus, and China are conducting technical intelligence operations and increasingly using online social networks to find and recruit sources. Given the new technical capabilities, it is likely that in the long term, the activities of the Russian, Belarusian, and Chinese intelligence services towards Lithuania will expand, they will continue to attempt to influence Lithuania’s internal political processes through active espionage, disseminate information discrediting Lithuania and its institutions in the public space, infiltrate Lithuania’s national defence system, the diplomatic service and other state institutions in charge of Lithuania’s national security, and threaten Lithuania’s critical infrastructure and the security of classified information with cyberattacks.
Resistance to the destructive activities of foreign intelligence services and the strategy of deterrence require Lithuanian intelligence and other state institutions, the Armed Forces, and the public to join forces in preventing the enemy’s subversive activities and in eliminating their consequences.
To protect the vital interests of the state, society, and citizens from foreign intelligence threats, it is essential, in light of the experience of Lithuania and other Baltic States, to:
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Enhance the intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities of the intelligence institutions, develop new technological capabilities for intelligence gathering and processing, focus on the development of staff competencies, strengthen inter-institutional cooperation in the country, and expand cooperative relations with international allies and partners in the exchange of necessary information and in the implementation of joint actions to mitigate threats posed by foreign intelligence. All of this would allow for more effective identification of foreign intelligence threats, taking the necessary preventive measures to counter these threats, addressing their causes and conditions, effective management of the threats as they occur, and remediation of the damage they cause.
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To develop public civic will and resilience to hostile influences, to explain to the public the threats posed by foreign intelligence services, how to identify and protect against them, to promote citizenship and critical thinking. The resilience of the state and society to the hostile effects of foreign intelligence is a key factor in ensuring national security. It includes the ideological resilience of state institutions, civil servants, soldiers, and other citizens, and the readiness to effectively manage emerging threats and address risk factors, hazards, and threats.
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In order to protect classified information against hijacking and unauthorised disclosure, it is necessary to apply in a comprehensive manner the traditional measures of personnel security, administration of classified information, physical protection of classified information, security of classified transactions, and protection of classified information communications and information systems. The application of these measures contributes to the effective protection of state and official secrets, significantly reduces the threat posed by foreign intelligence services, and increases the resistance of civil servants and military personnel to recruitment.
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Strengthening liability for espionage and other illegal activities is necessary to deter individuals from engaging in unlawful activities related to hostile foreign intelligence activities.
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In order to increase the preventive effect of espionage, it is necessary to provide for the possibility of exempting from criminal liability persons who have committed espionage offences if they have confessed to having committed the offence and have actively cooperated in the identification of the intelligence agents of a foreign state and the activities they carry out.
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Andrius Tekorius
is a lecturer of the Research Group on Security Institutions Management at the General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania. He holds a Master of International Law from Mykolas Romeris University. He is an expert on national security with over 25 years of experience in national security agencies at senior executive positions, holding the rank of colonel. He teaches courses in intelligence, information security, and counterterrorism at the Military Academy of Lithuania. His research interests focus on national security and defense, intelligence, and protection of classified information. His books are Protection of State Secrets (2014), The Protection of NATO Information (2015), and The Protection of the United Nations and the European Union Information (2021).
