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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Risiko, Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit

Author : Martin Kolmar

Published in: Handbuch Wirtschaftsphilosophie III

Publisher: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden

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Zusammenfassung

Dieser Beitrag bietet eine Übersicht, Einordnung und Kritik der gängigen ökonomischen Entscheidungstheorien unter Risiko und Unsicherheit. Dabei werden insbesondere wichtige der in diesen Theorien oftmals implizit hinterlegten epistemischen und ontologischen Vorannahmen herausgearbeitet. Es zeigt sich, dass diese in vielen Anwendungsbereichen schwierig bis unmöglich zu rechtfertigen sind. Gleichzeitig geht von ihnen eine auch ethisch relevante Normativität aus, über die sich die Anwenderin/der Anwender klar sein und über die er Rechenschaft ablegen sollte.

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Metadata
Title
Risiko, Unsicherheit und Ungewissheit
Author
Martin Kolmar
Copyright Year
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-22107-2_21