Russian Influence Operations and the War in Ukraine

Table of Contents

1. Frontmatter

2. The Historical Evolution of the Russo-Ukrainian War

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Does History Matter? Historical Politics, Narratives and the Securitisation of Memory in the Russo-Ukrainian War

      Sergii Pakhomenko

      Abstract

      The Russo-Ukrainian war has one noteworthy detail—the Kremlin’s appeal to history and so-called historical justice to explain its actions. Considering such a notable “historical” background of modern Russian geopolitics, the author of this article considered the use of history in three aspects: (1) the ideology of the modern Russian regime; (2) the interpretation of Ukraine and Ukrainian statehood; (3) the general directions of historical policy in the temporarily occupied territories. The author refers to securitisation theory to explain and conceptualise the algorithm by which the Kremlin’s version of history is securitised and subsequently used by Russian Federation to justify the large-scale invasion of Ukraine. Russian model of memory securitisation exhibits several distinct features. First, within this framework, Ukraine’s politics of history—including decommunisation and reinterpretation of the Soviet legacy—is consistently framed as a security threat aimed at undermining “historical unity” of Russians and Ukrainians and discrediting the shared past. Second, it entails the production of legitimacy—aggression is presented as a necessary act of self-defence and a means of protecting “historical justice”, while “historical arguments” are employed via propaganda to replace the principles of international law. Third, it involves identity construction—the narrative of “unity” between Russians and Ukrainians is used to justify the imposition of Russian identity on occupied Ukrainian territories. Thus, what unfolds is not only a physical occupation but also a cultural and symbolic one.

   3. The Role of Affect and History in Russia’s Strategic Conspiracy Narratives in the Context of the War in Ukraine

      Andreas Ventsel

      Abstract

      This article examines the link between Russia’s strategic culture and conspiracy theories in the context of the war in Ukraine. A key element of Russia’s strategic culture is a sense of encirclement by foreign adversaries, particularly from the West, perceived as aiming to destabilize Russia. These narratives of external threats are integral to Russian identity and are mirrored in Kremlin-driven conspiracy theories. The “enemies” in these narratives vary—spanning nations, ideologies, and ethnicities—but share common themes and imagery. Using the concept of affective semiosis from cultural psychology and code-text from cultural semiotics, the article outlines how conspiracy theories create associative connections between different actors across time and space. It shows how these theories intensify perceptions of external threats, fostering an immediate “us versus them” mentality. Such narratives help to mobilize audiences and reinforce Russia’s strategic objectives, including justifying the war in Ukraine.

   4. The Evolution of Russian Strategic Narratives on Military Humanitarian Intervention and Responsibility to Protect from Georgia to Ukraine

      Juris Pupčenoks

      Abstract

      This chapter assesses Russian strategic narratives toward own interventions in Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014–). By looking more broadly at Russian strategic narratives aimed at persuading other global actors and publics abroad and at home, it identifies how Russia attempted to develop a story that could win global acceptance. It identifies numerous similarities in diplomatic language used to justify military interventions in Georgia and Ukraine—while also outlines how Russian rationale for interventions changed through time. Overall, Russian narratives on intervention focus on delegitimizing the perceived opponents, making the case for the appropriateness of own actions under international law, and projecting what it proposed as the proper solution to the conflicts. A major factor that influenced Russian narratives was considerations whether the given situation will lead to increase or loss of Russian influence and territory. This analysis shows that contrary to traditional Russian emphasis on sovereign responsibility and non-intervention, Russia supported claims for self-determination by separatist groups in Georgia and Ukraine (from 2014–2022). Russia used deception and disinformation in its strategic narratives as it mis-characterized these conflicts using Responsibility to Protect (R2P) language, yet mostly justified own interventions through references to other references to international law. R2P language continued to play a role in justification of an all-out invasion of Ukraine starting 2022. Additionally, Russia’s focus on the protection of co-ethnics and Russian-speakers is reminiscent of interventions in the pre-R2P era.

   5. The Personal Factor in Ukraine’s Strategic Communication in Times of War

      Iryna Gridina, Sergii Pakhomenko, Vladimir Sazonov

      Abstract

      In the communication model, where the State is one of the subjects of communication, the problem of personal representation of a communication message arises, which can have a decisive impact on the final effect of communication interaction. A charismatic leader or a vivid image, which is an important component of the state brand, is perhaps the key element in building public trust, solidarity and the necessary emotional background. In this chapter, we will try to deconstruct one of the factors that shaped the “face” of Ukraine’s resistance in the Russian–Ukrainian war—the personal factor of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. We examine how the strategic communication of the state during the years of full-scale war (from February 2022 to February 2025) actually focused on the personality of President Zelenskyy who shaped the narratives of unity and resistance for the domestic audience and, at the same time, tried to mobilise the democratic world to support the Ukrainian struggle. Also, based on theories of leadership and populism, we show the influence of three main factors on the personal communication of the Ukrainian president: Zelenskyy’s personal image, the leadership model of communication he uses, and populist rhetoric as one of the important components of personalist power and which can be correlated with the model of “valence populism”.

3. The Impact of the Russo-Ukrainian War on Russian Influence Operations

   1. Frontmatter

   2. Introduction to Russian AI Exploitation for Influence Operations

      Anthony Seaboyer

      Abstract

      This chapter introduces how Russia exploits artificial intelligence (AI) applications for influence operations and highlights the implications of the use of AI for influence operations. There are many indications of Russia increasingly exploiting AI for influence operations—from the use of ChatGPT for message design to the distribution of narratives at scale. This chapter starts with defining AI-enabled influence operations and initially describes how AI-enabled applications affect influence operations. Following is a description of the changes in capabilities that AI brings to Russian military influence operations. The report then describes how Russia is using AI for influence operations and why Russia is using AI capabilities for this capability. Based on the analysis of several examples of Russian AI-enabled influence operations, major implications of AI exploitation for influence operations are then described. Finally, the report closes with thoughts on the effectiveness of Russian AI exploitation for influence operations as well as how to detect AI-generated influence operations. This chapter is designed to give an initial overview of how Russian AI-enabled applications are revolutionizing influence operations capabilities and what this means for defence.

   3. Forced Passportization as a Mechanism of Subjugation and Creation of Collaborational Narratives in the Occupied Territories of Ukraine

      Maksym Bulyk, Mykola Trofymenko, Yuliia Konstantynova, Anastasiia Trofymenko

      Abstract

      The article analyzes the integration of forced passportization into Russia's broader strategy of information warfare and the creation of collaborationist narratives. It thoroughly examines the legal and socio-political consequences for the occupied population. The paper investigates the Kremlin's tactics of intimidation, economic coercion, and narrative manipulation aimed at undermining Ukrainian sovereignty and fostering internal division. The focus is on the impact of these practices on the creation of pro-Russian narratives and the formation of long-term agents of influence. The need for a balanced legal and humanitarian approach to instrumentalized passportization is emphasized, concerning the historical contexts of collaborationism and the specific dynamics of the Russian-Ukrainian war. The research is promising in theoretical and practical terms for understanding the broader frameworks and consequences for preserving national identity, sovereignty, and the reintegration of temporarily occupied territories.

   4. Strategic Corruption and Its Role in the Russian Aggression Against Ukraine

      Gediminas Buciunas, Igor Grynenko

      Abstract

      This article analyses the phenomenon of strategic corruption primarily in the context of the implementation of the Russian Federation's foreign policy towards Ukraine and the Western states. Strategic corruption is one of the most intensively used forms of hostile influence by authoritarian regimes against democracies. Modern strategic corruption differs in scale, modus operandi and impact from both traditional ‘bureaucratic’ corruption and corrupt practices used in international relations in previous decades. Strategic corruption is used as a tool to influence the decision-making process and policies of hostile states, as an instrument of influence within the toolbox of war against Ukraine. In the modern context, strategic corruption is an instrument used by revisionist powers to change the international order through criminalisation. Instruments designed to combat ‘bureaucratic’ corruption are of limited use in the case of strategic corruption. The authors argue that this phenomenon should be addressed in the context of international politics, international and national security, taking into account, inter alia, its role as an instrument of warfare and hostile foreign policy.

   5. Unification Versus Localisation: National Minorities of Southern Ukraine in Russian, Ukrainian, and Regional Historical Narratives

      Kostyantyn Balabanov, Sergii Pakhomenko, Svitlana Arabadzhy, Anna Hedo

      Abstract

      This article analyses the positioning of national minorities within three historical visions of Southern (Steppe) Ukraine—Russian, Ukrainian, and local. The authors explore how these narratives are implemented through the instruments of historical policy and the role national minorities play within them, particularly in the context of the ongoing information war, decolonization and decommunization policies, and the Russian occupation of part of the region. Special attention is given to the concept of “Novorossiya” as an element of Russian imperial and neo-imperial discourse, aimed at erasing the ethnocultural diversity of the region and integrating it into the broader all-Russian historical paradigm. In this context, the process of appropriating elements of minority historical memory in the occupied territories is also examined. The authors interpret these processes through the lens of a constructivist approach to identity and collective memory formation. At the same time, the Ukrainian state narrative, especially after 2014, tends towards an Ukrainocentric reinterpretation of the South’s history as part of a broader strategy of national self-determination. In the context of conflicting historical policies, the region’s national minorities increasingly turn to local narratives that have emerged through long-term coexistence with the Ukrainian majority.

4. The Portrayal of Warfare in the Information Space by Russian and Pro-Russian Forces

   1. Frontmatter

   2. EU–NATO Cooperation and Perspectives on Countering Hybrid Threats

      Ramon Loik

      Abstract

      Countering hybrid threats has become an important area of focus in the updated security strategies of the European Union (EU) and NATO, as both organizations and their largely overlapping Member States increasingly confront ‘sub-threshold’—below the North Atlantic Treaty’s Article 5—and ‘grey zone’ regional and global security challenges. In 2016, when both organizations agreed on the initial catalog of topics for cooperation, countering hybrid threats was identified as an emerging theme in cooperative policy-making and institutional adaptation. Prior to the alarm caused by the 2014 annexation of Crimea, the subsequent invasion of Eastern Ukraine, and the establishment of a military presence in Syria by the Russian Federation, these events were likely the main triggers for the intensification of such inter-organizational cooperation. In July 2016, the first Joint Declaration between the EU and NATO was signed in Warsaw, outlining seven areas for enhanced cooperation, including countering hybrid threats. In December 2017 and 2018, the EU and NATO Councils endorsed 74 specific actions, with 20 aimed at combating hybrid threats. Since then, both organizations have compiled annual progress reports and assessments of their cooperation. This chapter focuses on the main achievements and underlying theoretical considerations of this politically and operationally complex multi-domain security cooperation, which is still searching for a sustainable program and effective implementation strategy that, if successful, could mutually combine the organizational strengths and meet the security needs of its members in a rapidly changing security environment.

   3. Challenges to Homeland Security in Countering Latent Hybrid Threats During the War in Ukraine: The Case of Estonia

      Holger Mölder, Vladimir Sazonov, Ramon Loik

      Abstract

      In recent years, latent hybrid threats have started to urgently challenge the resilience of homeland security in Europe. Among others, these threats include cyber-attacks, organized crime, covert operations, border and maritime disputes, harming critical infrastructure, influence operations, disinformation campaigns, espionage, instrumentalization of migration, the radicalization of various interest groups, terrorism, sabotage, political blackmail, money-laundering, resource scarcity, exploitation of energy dependence, trade wars, and economic rivalry. This chapter will examine how these threats and challenges align with potential countermeasures and responses that should be considered and implemented. In other words, the urgent task for national authorities is to be prepared to respond to the potential destabilization that may come with hybrid attacks. The authors suggest policy recommendations to address hybrid threats to Estonian national security, particularly after Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

   4. Severing Ties with Russia: The Effects of the Russo-Ukrainian War on Latvia

      Ieva Berzina

      Abstract

      Latvia has been a target of Russian influence operations due to its historical, geographical, and cultural closeness. The aggressiveness of such operations has increased after Russia launched full-scale warfare against Ukraine in 2022. It has introduced the requirement for Latvian political decision-makers to limit Russian influence operations significantly, which were aimed at dividing the nation. Therefore, it is very important to comprehend what measures must be undertaken by Latvia to counter Russian influence operations. The chapter conceptualizes “influence operations” and describes the use of all instruments of national power, such as informational, diplomatic, economic, military, and others of one country, to influence the beliefs and behaviour of target audiences in another country. It is discussed in the context of NATO expansion and changes in Latvia's demographic structure, and an attempt to use the so-called “compatriot policy” by Russia. The chapter is founded by secondary data, it summarizes and analyses Latvia’s non-military solutions to limit Russian influence operations, it concludes that the steps taken by Latvia in the short term increased the polarization of opinions: in the long term, it will reduce effectiveness of Russian influence operations.

   5. From Soft Power to Counter-Normative Propaganda: The Case of the 2024 World Youth Festival in Sochi

      Andrey Makarychev

      Abstract

      The 2024 World Youth Festival in Sochi, as well as many other national sport events, was exploited to the full extent by the Russian government. It is an interesting case study to discuss how the military intervention in Ukraine affected the propagandistic dimension of Russian soft power, especially as specific narratives are still circulating within mega events held in Russia during the war. The thesis is that the war against Ukraine promoted the hybridisation of soft power and counter-normative propaganda, which manifested itself in the fusion of hard and soft power, narratives of politicisation and depoliticisation, securitisation and de-securitisation, and left-wing and conservative ideologies. The empirical base consists of video coverage of the WYF (public lectures, meetings and press conferences), totalling 28 video recordings: some 15 h in both Russian and English.

   6. Russian Disinformation Narratives in the Election Campaign for the National Parliament Elections in Poland in 2023

      Juliusz Sikorski

      Abstract

      The chapter explores the impact of Russian disinformation on the 2023 Polish parliamentary elections. It examines the Kremlin's use of propaganda to influence public debate, deepen social polarization, and undermine trust in political institutions. The study highlights how Russian narratives, particularly anti-Ukrainian and Eurosceptic content, were designed to weaken support for pro-European and pro-Ukrainian political parties. Despite the significant dissemination of such content, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that Russian interference directly influenced the election results. The analysis also points out how the disinformation campaign exploited divisions within Polish society and used various media outlets, including Telegram, to spread false information. Although pro-Kremlin narratives intensified social tensions, the study suggests that the most pro-Russian political faction, Confederation, did not perform as strongly as expected in the election. Ultimately, the research confirms that Russian disinformation played a destabilizing role in the democratic processes of Poland, although its direct impact on election outcomes remains inconclusive.

   7. The Role of “Alternative for Germany” in Spreading Russian Narratives

      Tetiana Ivanets

      Abstract

      In contemporary Europe, radical right-wing parties are the political forces promoting Russian political narratives among European citizens. The German Alternative for Germany (AfD) party occupies a special place among radical right-wing political organisations. Founded in 2013, it quickly transformed from a marginal anti-establishment party into a parliamentary party that is represented at various levels: state parliaments, the Bundestag and the European Parliament. The methodology of the study is based on a comparative analysis of the specificities of the AfD's pro-Russian narratives in two different phases: 2014–2021 and 2022–2024. The methods used include quantitative and qualitative analysis of the AfD's publications on Facebook, election manifestos, speeches of leading politicians and media publications. The AfD's pro-Russian stance is influenced by objective factors, such as the ideological proximity of radical right-wing parties to Russia, and subjective factors, such as the fact that the AfD's electorate consists mainly of people from eastern Germany, the former GDR, who maintain ties and loyalty to Russia. An analysis of social media posts and speeches by AfD politicians revealed not only pro-Russian rhetoric, but also duplication of some of the Kremlin's official narratives, which the party effectively combines with voters’ fears to manipulate voter sentiment. This helps to increase support for the AfD in both eastern states where the party won (Thuringia, 2024) and western states where it became the largest opposition force (Bavaria & Hesse, 2023). For Russia, the AfD's support confirms the thesis that Russian policies have support in western states.

5. Backmatter