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Safety Culture and Leading Indicators for Safety in the Maritime and Offshore Environment

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About this book

This book provides guidance and insight into the development process for safety indicators to comply with general classification rule requirements. The utilisation of this guidance will provide tangible benefits as the marine and offshore industry is able to realise the positive results of tangible safety indicators that are developed correctly and managed appropriately throughout the lifecycle of the vessel or platform.

In the marine and offshore industry, design and equipment configurations vary from one system to the next, and systems are in many cases increasingly complex. There are gaps in codes and standards which may lag technological innovations and there are issues related to interfaces between systems. Safety indictors such as risk analyses, FMEA, job safety analyses, management of change procedures, HSQE, technical manuals and reliability-based maintenance provide a formalised approach to identify hazardous situations, address the gaps and interconnection variances, and improve safety, environmental performance and operational downtime. The majority of Classification Societies (‘Class’) require their clients to develop and submit safety indicators as part of the classification requirements for certain systems and to obtain certain special notations.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter
Chapter 1. Introduction

The HSE, which is an independent authority of the UK Government, uses the term ‘adverse event’ to describe what we are calling an ‘accident’ or ‘incident’. HSE describes an incident.

Alexander Olsen

Leading Safety Indicators for the Marine and Offshore Industries

Frontmatter
Chapter 2. Introducing Leading Indicators of Safety

The goal of the International Safety Management (ISM) Code, and of Safety Management Systems (SMS) is the attainment of peak safety performance.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 3. Safety Culture

Safety factors are important dimensions of a safety culture, such as effective communications or safety awareness.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 4. Leading Indicators of Safety

The purpose of a leading indicators programme is to identify which safety metrics are most strongly associated with safety performance in a particular organisation. This information can be used to guide actions to improve future safety performance. This chapter introduces the basic concepts and principles of a leading indicators programme.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 5. Interpreting the Results

This chapter discusses how to interpret the significance of the results obtained for both the safety culture survey and the leading indicators analysis.

Alexander Olsen

Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

Frontmatter
Chapter 6. Introducing the FMEA

In the marine and offshore industry, design and equipment configurations vary from one system to the next, and systems are in many cases increasingly complex.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 7. Planning the FMEA

Conducting an FMEA or any risk analysis takes time, human resources and funds. However, the best way to save on resources is to do a proper FMEA the first time.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 8. Developing the FMEA

After concluding the initial tasks of establishing a scope and intent of study, selecting a team, etc., the owner/stakeholder will be engaged to deliver as much information on the subject of the FMEA as possible. This information might include general configuration and layout data, hardware listings, system schematics (such as electrical, HVAC, piping diagrams, etc.), previously performed system/subsystem FMEAs, prior trials documentation and operational philosophy documentation. Vendor-specific FMEAs may also be referenced for each piece of equipment but are typically generalised documents that do not include installation specifications required for an accurate system analysis. Data may also be collected by interviewing design personnel, operations, testing, and maintenance personnel, component suppliers and outside experts to gather as much information as possible.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 9. FMEA Report and Class Review of FMEA

The FMEA report should contain sufficient system information for the reader to understand the stated failure modes, effects, existing risk control measures and related recommendations.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 10. FMEA Verification Programme

The FMEA is a desktop study, and it alone may be insufficient to provide a satisfactory level of assurance.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 11. FMEA Lifecycle Management

As general rule, the majority of Classification Societies do not address the management of the FMEAs after granting of the Classification or special notation. However, Class should be notified of any changes such as design, function, operations that impact the basis of the Class requirements and it will be up to the discretion of the Class reviewer whether to require a revised FMEA.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 12. System-Specific FMEA Requirements

The use of risk studies in the industries served by Class is becoming increasingly prevalent. The general elements of the FMEA process were discussed in detail in Chap. 6 through Chap. 11 . This chapter provides the detail and clarification of select FMEA requirements that appear in the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Rules.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 13. Sample FMEA/FMECA Worksheets

This chapter provides sample worksheets to illustrate the characteristics of an FMEA or a FMECA requested to demonstrate compliance with Class. Only one or two representative pages of an FMEA or a FMECA are provided for illustration.

Alexander Olsen

Job Safety Analysis

Frontmatter
Chapter 14. Introduction

Risk assessment, the proactive and systematic assessment of risks, is a standard element of most offshore and maritime companies’ safety management systems. Risk assessment is a powerful and flexible tool to identify and control potential undesirable events that can have safety, environmental, quality, or financial repercussions. The focus of this part is the risk assessment applied to work tasks, commonly referred to as Job Safety Analysis (JSA). The marine and offshore industries have implemented job safety analysis at varying levels of maturity and sophistication. These chapters provide considerations for any company desiring to strengthen their safety management system through the use of a job safety analysis. The best practices and concepts contained within this book can be applied by any marine or offshore company wishing to initiate or improve their JSA programme.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 15. Job Safety Analysis Process

A JSA focuses on identifying the tasks necessary to perform a specific job; the potential safety and health, and in some cases, environmental, hazards associated with each task; and the possible risk control measures needed to eliminate or reduce these hazards. The JSA process can be divided into a number of steps, the complexity of which can vary depending on the job being analysed. As mentioned before, it can be used informally through a verbal discussion before performing a simple, routine job, or formally following a prescribed set of steps and a well-defined JSA form for more complex, non-routine, or new jobs. The JSA process presented in this chapter is a flexible approach that can accommodate any level of detail. A so called informal JSA process is described, as well as a formal JSA process for more complex jobs. Even within the formal JSA, the process can be applied at different levels of detail, depending on the complexity of the job. It can take minutes to several hours to complete. This chapter describes a range of options in terms of level of detail and complexity of each JSA process step. Each company can modify and adapt this JSA process to the appropriate level of detail for the different type of jobs applicable to them. Regardless of the type of JSA to be performed, there are three basic parts that need to be completed.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 16. Getting the Most Out of Job Safety Analysis

JSAs are primarily used for controlling risks to the safety and health of the workers. However, other undesirable impacts beyond those on the individual could be considered as well.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 17. Job Safety Analysis Programmeme Implemention

A company’s successful implementation of a JSA programme starts with a commitment from the company management to implement the process and enforce its use. This commitment must be identified so that all levels of management and workers understand their responsibility to go forward with the programme.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 18. Job Safety Analysis Programmeme Monitoring

JSA programme enforcement in the marine and offshore industry presents a set of unique challenges. Ship Masters, for example, are under significant pressure to meet schedules irrespective of weather and sea conditions.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 19. Hazard and Control Checklists

A list of hazards associated with typical job tasks can be used in JSA forms or JSA software tools to aid in the hazard identification phase of the JSA analysis. Such a list prompts considerations of the most common types of hazards, allowing for consistent naming of the hazards among the organisation, as well as facilitating training on the JSA process.

Alexander Olsen

Marine HSQE Management

Frontmatter
Chapter 20. Introduction

The significant impact of management practices on the safe operation of ships has been recognised for some time.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 21. Context, Leadership and Policy

The Company should determine external and internal issues that are relevant to its purpose and its strategic direction and that affect its ability to achieve the intended result(s) of its management system (ISO 9001:2015 4.1, ISO 14001:2015 4.1, ISO 45001:2018 4.1, ISO 50001:2018 4.1).

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 22. Planning

When planning for the management system, the Company should consider the issues referred to in Chap. 21 and accordingly review the company’s activities and processes that can affect the management system performance, determine risks and opportunities that need to be addressed to: (ISO 9001:2015 6.1.1, ISO 14001:2015 6.1.1, ISO 45001:2018 6.1.1, ISO 50001:2018 6.1.1): Provide assurance that the management system can achieve its intended outcomes/result(s). Enhance desirable effects. Prevent, or reduce, undesired effects. Achieve continual improvement of the management system.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 23. Implementation and Operation

The Company’s top management should determine and provide the resources essential to establish, implement, maintain, and continually improve the management system.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 24. Performance Evaluation

The Company shall establish, implement and maintain a process(es) for monitoring, measurement, analysis and evaluate the performance and effectiveness of the management system.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 25. Management Review and Improvement

The Company should develop, implement, and maintain procedures for management reviews.[s] The Company’s top management should at planned intervals, not to exceed 1 year, review the policies and management system(s) in accordance with documented procedures.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 26. Supplemental Requirements of the ISM Code

These requirements (refer to Part B of the ISM code) are provided for guidance only. Requirements of this chapter pertain to issuance of certificates and periodical verifications.

Alexander Olsen

Risk Assessment

Frontmatter
Chapter 27. Introduction

The aim of these chapters is to provide a common understanding of risk concepts and associated terms; present key applications of risk assessment in the marine and offshore industries; provide an overview of commonly used risk assessment techniques in the marine and offshore industries along with specific references to standards that describe these in detail; provide best practices for setting up, conducting, and lifecycle management of risk assessments; and, provide an understanding of Class’s approach to risk assessments with respect to process, submittals, and review criteria.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 28. Risk Assessment Techniques

The risk assessment process is applied to determine risk levels. The risk assessment process is illustrated in Fig. 28.1. The risk assessment process. This process consists of four basic steps. (1) Risk identification. Risk identification seeks to identify the possible sources of hazardous events and scenarios, their causes and potential consequences. For specific hazardous events, the existing safeguards (preventive, detection or recovery) that can reduce the likelihood of failure or mitigate the consequence should also be identified during the risk study.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 29. Conducting a Risk Assessment

To start any risk analysis, a well-defined risk assessment plan or terms of reference (TOR) should be created.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 30. Risk Management

Management of change (MOC) is a best practice used to confirm that safety, health, and environmental risks and hazards are properly controlled when an organisation makes changes to their facilities, operations, or personnel.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 31. Major Hazards in the Marine and Offshore Industries

Historically, while “hazards of the sea” were well recognised, they tended to be taken for granted. The seamanship of the captain and crew were the primary safeguards against the hazards of the sea in the early days. In fact, early classification societies were founded to confirm ship captains’ credentials. The advancement of technology, in the last hundred years or so, has made shipping so much safer that “hazards of the sea” are no longer considered major shipping hazards. In fact, it now appears that human error is the principal hazard of shipping. However, it must be remembered that most accidents actually involve a combination of pre-conditions and events, and human error is usually just one contributing factor. Hazards differ depending upon the type of vessel and the operating scenario. The hazards in operating an oil tanker are different from those of a passenger ship. The hazards in the open sea are different from those in a harbour approach. Hazards of shipping can be classified as external or internal.

Alexander Olsen

Technical Manuals and Publications

Frontmatter
Chapter 32. Introduction

Humans have a limited capacity to store information in short-term and working memory. Research suggests that humans can process in short-term or working memory about five to nine pieces of information at one time. Working memory is that memory involved in directed conscious attention. For example, start-up operating instructions for the manual operation of a potable water system requires the operator to remember pumps, chemical levels, etc. For this reason, the maritime and other industries should not rely exclusively on an individual’s memory to perform work-related tasks, especially those that are complex, hazardous, and have the potential to impact personnel safety, equipment, or the environment. Appropriately written and implemented instructional materials (procedures and technical manuals) can reduce the cognitive effort of personnel, especially the memory element of performing a task, thus aiding in reducing human errors. The principles and guidance in this book apply to authors and writers of maritime procedures and technical manuals who wish to further understand the document development process, the intent of, and the benefits derived from appropriate procedure and technical manual design, development, implementation, and life-cycle tracking. For the purpose of brevity, the terms “procedures” and “technical manuals” are not explicitly mentioned throughout this document and are instead referred to as “instructional materials/documents”. These umbrella terms include procedures, technical manuals, checklists, and/or any other instructional-type of material used to perform a specific task(s). This guidance can be considered applicable to all instructional documents in both paper and electronic format.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 33. Role of Instructional Materials

The development and proper use of instructional materials are integral parts of a successful quality system because they provide people with the information needed to perform tasks appropriately, efficiently, and safely.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 34. Writing Instructional Materials

There are many steps in the development of instructional documents. Chapter 4 Checklist for the preparation of instructional materials, provides an example checklist to follow when developing documents.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 35. Constrained Words and Constrained Language

The following checklist is a summary of the steps discussed in this part. This checklist can be used by developers as an aid in the document development process. Not all steps in this checklist are necessary for every document or every organisation. It is up to individual organisations to determine the level of detail required by the instructional materials.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 36. Graphics in Instructional Materials

Some instructional materials can be very detailed and describe more complicated or involved tasks than one single set of instructions. Graphics and pictorials are non-text materials that support a document, such as figures, checklists, tables, and data sheets. The use of graphics or any other visual aid can help clarify a specific task for the user and should complement the text, providing an alternative and often more intuitive way of presenting the information. Illustrations and diagrams of equipment and machinery are of particular importance. When describing a process for repairing or maintaining a highly complex piece of machinery or equipment, detailed drawings are helpful for the user. Additionally, an instructional document may be used and interpreted by many nationalities throughout the life of the equipment, task, or document. Therefore, graphics and visual images should benefit users from different cultural backgrounds to help identify or understand the presented material. It is important to remember the use of graphics, pictorials, or other media to represent an idea. It should help explain the ideas that are contained in the document and presented simultaneously with the associated text. Graphics are a good supplement to text and may also help keep users interested. Always use high-quality, relevant graphics to communicate to the audience effectively.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 37. Verifying, Validating, Approving, Certifying, and Implementing Instructional Materials

This chapter assumes that a draft copy of a new/revised instructional document has been completed. The document should then go through the following processes before being implemented: verification and validation, approval, and certification. These processes may not be necessary for all instructional materials. A new/revised document should go through two review processes: first for clarity, continuity, and technical content, and second for accuracy and feasibility.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 38. Managing Instructional Materials

Managing changes to instructional material helps to prevent the introduction of new hazards or increased risk of existing hazards. It also allows for documents to be kept up-to-date while making sure that affected personnel are notified of changes. Once the documents have been developed or revised and approved, they must be implemented. Furthermore, they must be maintained for accuracy and completeness. Key aspects to effectively implementing instructional materials include document control, access, and training. Maintenance of instructional documents includes management commitment, management of change, and periodic reviews. A management process for instructional material changes should be in place which includes personnel assignments, administrative systems, and resource allocations. Implementing these processes makes periodic document evaluations and revisions a recognised part of business operations.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 39. Analysis Techniques

This chapter outlines optional analysis techniques that can be carried out to aid in the development of instructional materials. These analysis techniques, the amount of preliminary work (e.g., needs assessment, discovery, etc.), and the number and type of people involved (e.g., SME’s) all depend on the complexity of the system and the system’s role in overall vessel/offshore installation environmental and personnel safety.

Alexander Olsen

Cyber Security

Frontmatter
Chapter 40. Introducing Cyber Security on Ships

The purpose of this guidance is to improve the safety and security of seafarers, the environment, the cargo, and the ships. This guidance aims to assist in the development of a proper cyber risk management strategy in accordance with relevant regulations and best practises on board ships with a focus on work processes, equipment, training, incident response and recovery management. Shipping is relying increasingly on digital solutions for the completion of everyday tasks. The rapid developments within information technology, data availability, the speed of processing and data transfer present shipowners and other players in the maritime industry with increased possibilities for operational optimisation, cost savings, safety improvements and a more sustainable business.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 41. Cyber Security Characteristics of the Maritime Industry

Cyber security is important because of its potential effect on personnel, the ship, environment, company, and cargo. Cyber security is concerned with the protection of IT, OT, information and data from unauthorised access, manipulation, and disruption.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 42. Identification of Cyber Threats

When identifying threats, companies should consider any specific aspects of potential threat actors’ capability, opportunity, and intent to attack. This can include using, for example, an external person or an insider as an unintentional middleman unknowingly carrying the threat, e.g., on an infected USB stick. Once identified, threats should be considered alongside identified vulnerabilities to evaluate the likelihood of an attack or incident taking place. Together with the impact of a given incident, the likelihood of the incident occurring produces the risk factor. Organisations and individuals can constitute an intentional or even unintentional threat to the safety and security of a crew, the environment, and the ship. The following figure lists examples of threat actors and their possible motivations and objectives. The list is non-exhaustive. Such threat actors will have varying degrees of skills and resources to potentially threaten the safety and security of ships and a company’s ability to conduct its business.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 43. Identification of Cyber Vulnerabilities

The following are common cyber vulnerabilities, which may be found onboard existing.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 44. Assessing the Likelihood and Impact Assessment

There is a tendency to assess risks alone based on potential impacts and existing vulnerabilities. However, as previously accounted for, the likelihood of a cyber security event happening is the product of the threat and the vulnerability. This also means that if either of these two factors is close to non-existent, so will the likelihood be, and this should be considered when quantifying the likelihood.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 45. Risk Assessment

Only after having established an overview of threats (intent, capability, and opportunity), vulnerabilities, impacts and likelihood, is it then possible to conduct the risk assessment. A risk assessment is not a one-off activity but should be repeated at appropriate intervals to ensure that the risk assessment’s findings are kept up to date.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 46. Development of Protection and Detection Measures

It is important to protect critical systems and data with multiple layers of protection measures, which consider the role of personnel, procedures and technology to:

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 47. Contingency Planning

A response plan should be developed covering relevant contingencies, and all plans should be kept in hard copy in the event of complete loss of electronic access to them.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 48. Responding to and Recovering from a Cyber Attack

The starting point for effective response is the response plan covering relevant contingencies.

Alexander Olsen

Reliability Centred Maintenance

Frontmatter
Chapter 49. Introduction

In recent years, there has been an increase in the use of initiative-taking maintenance techniques by Owners for repair and maintenance of machinery onboard vessels and offshore structures.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 50. Equipment Failure

A combination of one or more equipment failures and/or human errors causes a loss of system function.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 51. Planned Maintenance

Planned maintenance is a failure management strategy that restores the inherent reliability or performance of the equipment item. These tasks are best employed on equipment items suffering from age-related failure (e.g., wear-out failure characteristic). The basic principle of planned maintenance is that restoring or discarding the item at a specific time before failure is expected can best manage the probability of failure. Following this principle, the planned-maintenance tasks are performed at set intervals, regardless of whether or not a failure is impending. Restoring the item or discarding it and replacing it with a new item prevent the failure.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 52. Condition Monitoring (Predictive) Maintenance

Although many failure modes are not age-related, most of them give some sort of warning that they are in the process of occurring or about to occur. If evidence can be found that something is in the final stages of a failure, it may be possible to take action to prevent it from failing completely and/or to avoid the consequences.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 53. Failure Finding Maintenance

Failure-finding maintenance tasks are employed to discover equipment faults that are not detected during normal crew operations (e.g., hidden failures). Because these failures are hidden, if proper maintenance is not performed, a second failure must occur, and a failure consequence realised before the equipment fault is detected. For example, a standby electrical generator failing to start on loss of power may only be discovered when the primary generator fails, and power is lost. Because these types of faults result in hidden failures, condition-monitoring or planned-maintenance tasks are typically not an effective failure management strategy. Failure-finding maintenance tasks usually involve a functional test of the equipment to ensure the equipment is available to perform its function(s) when demanded.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 54. Consideration of Risks

Having identified the risk of a loss event, ship designers, operators, insurers and regulators should deploy preventative or mitigative measures or both to the extent that the risk can be reduced to an acceptable level

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 55. Conducting and Documenting an RCM Analysis

The HSE, which is an independent authority of the UK Government, uses the term ‘adverse event’ to describe what we are calling an ‘accident’ or ‘incident’. HSE describes an incident.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 56. Sustaining the RCM Programme

A maintenance programme that is based on the RCM philosophy must be dynamic. This is especially true during the early stages of a new programme when it is based on limited information. The vessel operator must be prepared to collect, analyse, review and respond to in-service data throughout the operating life of the vessel in order to continually refine the maintenance programme.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 57. Overview of Condition-Monitoring Techniques

Equipment failures are many times preceded by an advanced warning period, and maintenance techniques used to detect this warning are known as condition-monitoring (CM) tasks. More specifically, CM tasks are maintenance techniques that are used to detect the onset of an equipment failure so that the failure can be prevented, or the consequences associated with the failure can be mitigated by providing the opportunity for pre-emptive action to be taken. This chapter provides descriptions of and specific examples for general CM categories, and a discussion of factors that should be considered when selecting a CM technique.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 58. Example RCM Analysis of a Low-Speed Diesel Engine

This chapter provides an example RCM analysis for selected portions of a propulsion low-speed diesel engine. The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the RCM analysis process outlined in Chap. 7 . Please note that this chapter does not include RCM analysis data for the entire engine, nor does it contain all of the information that should be provided in a complete RCM analysis report. Specifically, this chapter includes excerpts of the RCM analysis sections for the basic engine, the governor system and the camshaft lubrication system.

Alexander Olsen

Management of Change

Frontmatter
Chapter 59. Introduction

Change is inevitable within any type of business. It arises from the need to respond and adapt to varying conditions.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 60. Recognition Of Change

A system that requires change management to be carried out for every single modification is likely to become onerous and circumvented.

Alexander Olsen
Chapter 61. Management of Change

Regardless of a company’s culture, organisation, values, and programmes, the key steps discussed in this Subsection should be considered when designing any formal management of change programme.

Alexander Olsen
Backmatter
Metadata
Title
Safety Culture and Leading Indicators for Safety in the Maritime and Offshore Environment
Author
Alexander Olsen
Copyright Year
2024
Electronic ISBN
978-3-031-55943-3
Print ISBN
978-3-031-55942-6
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-55943-3

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