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15-01-2022

Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework

Authors: Ozgur Aydogmus, Erkan Gürpinar

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications

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Abstract

We model the interaction between science and technology using an evolutionary game theoretic framework. Conflictual rather than synergistic relation between science and technology is assumed, in which they rely on openness and secrecy as alternative behavioral norms. We argue that science-driven technology and intellectual property extension to basic science blur the distinction between openness and secrecy, which result in competition and tension between them. We first discuss why two-player static games are insufficient to model the interaction between science and technology. Then, we show that there are different dynamical outcomes in multiplayer settings, including coexistence in which both of these strategies survive. Finally, we discuss how the stable equilibria of the evolutionary game are related to the codification of knowledge, and intellectual property rights policies that affect the balance between open culture and exclusive control rights.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
Note that when both agents choose withhold, each agent may yield net benefits greater than or equal to 0. The net benefit is proportional to the amount of the knowledge leakage between agents. Yet, this amount is assumed to be sufficiently small; hence, we take \(f_0=0\) as in [54]
 
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Metadata
Title
Science, Technology and Institutional Change in Knowledge Production: An Evolutionary Game Theoretic Framework
Authors
Ozgur Aydogmus
Erkan Gürpinar
Publication date
15-01-2022
Publisher
Springer US
Published in
Dynamic Games and Applications
Print ISSN: 2153-0785
Electronic ISSN: 2153-0793
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00416-w

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