20. Selective Use of Political Opportunity: A Case of Environmental Protest in Rural China

Furthermore, some scholars believe that the dimensions of political opportunity should also include “the transnational environment and the role of external actors.” See Keck and Sikkink (1998) and Tarrow (2005).

See Xie (2010). Other research demonstrates that different levels of government pursue their goals in different ways, which might affect the provision of opportunity to activists (Shi and Cai 2006; Shi 2005).

Koopmans (2004) also observes that the “selection processes” of movement participants (i.e., their framing strategy and their choice of political opportunities) may “evolve” as a result of contact with factors, such as the influence of the media, which may not engage “directly” with the core concerns of the participants.

This term builds upon the “frame analysis” paradigm developed by Goffman and Berger in Frame Analysis (1986).

An Internet post retrieved by the first author.

There was also a protest against anticipated pollution in October 2001 in the town (see Deng and Yang 2013).

For a discussion of factors that trigger the central government to intervene in protests, and how this contributes to protest success, see Cai (2008).

For more information on this case, see Deng and O’Brien (2013).

An Internet post retrieved by the first author.

Until the summer of 2007, of the villagers whom the author interviewed, there was only one activist who—because they had undertaken training in “methods of public participation and temporary measures for environmental impact assessment,” provided by a Beijing NGO—knew that there was an Environmental Impact Assessment Law.

The construction of industrial parks was (and perhaps still is) perceived to be able to improve the reputations and careers of local officials, and consequently all kinds of industrial parks and economic development zones had sprung up everywhere around the year of 2000. In the eastern coastal regions, economic development zones tended to be small and disorganized, and quite a few of these were not really used for development sake. At the same time, because the setup of industrial parks had involved the displacement of many farmers without adequate compensation and assistance with relocation, there were many related mass incidents. According to Chen Xiwen, director of the Central Rural Working Group, in the few years before 2006, mass incidents relating to rural land disputes made up approximately 50% of all rural mass incidents (see Chang 2007).

From August 8 to September 19, 2003, ten supervision groups were sent to investigate the implementation of the central land policy across China. One investigator found: “What appeared to be vigorous internal investigation and rectification processes were actually quite worrisome. In my view, all local governments did this to take advantage of the regulation that conducting self-investigation and self-rectification would result in more lenient penalties, rather than aiming to genuinely improve the local land markets” (see Tang 2005).

Sourced from a reflection report on the Huashui incident written by a key county leader.

One petition letter suggested that after the written decisions of legal penalties were made by the Bureau of Land and Resources, the Zhuxi Chemical Park had not shrunk but was in fact gradually expanding. More than 100 buildings were constructed in the following two months.

Some other factors that contributed to the success of the Huashui environmental protest are described in Deng and O’Brien (2014) and O’Brien and Deng (2015).

From a record of a meeting of cadres in Huashui town on March 4, 2005.

The authors suggest: “By acting as if they have the rights that they lack, the refugees actualize their political freedom and equality. Even if the public sphere has been defined through their exclusion, they act.”