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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

Self-Esteem

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Abstract

The aim of this chapter is to apply the analytic apparatus developed in Brennan and Pettit (The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) for the case of social esteem to the case of self-esteem. The thought is that whereas the standard social case involves actor and observer being different persons, in the self-esteem case the actor and the observer are the same person. Attention is thereby directed to the distinctive features of the actor as an observer of her own ‘performance’ in relevant esteem domains. This ‘reflective’ case raises some interesting questions not just about self-esteem but also about aspects of social esteem that might otherwise be overlooked. On the other hand, the nature of the esteem relation is distinguished from other reflexive attitudes with which it might be confused.

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Footnotes
1
See, for example, the discussion of norms and contracts in Collective Action, pp. 216–219.
 
2
The terms ‘esteem’, ‘approbation’ and ‘favourable regard’ are taken to be equivalent here.
 
3
People can be esteemed both for actions and for ‘character’ (or dispositions). For example, a soldier might be esteemed because he performed some heroic act—and it is the quality of the act as such that elicits the esteem of others. Or he might be esteemed because that act indicates that he has a courageous disposition. In this latter case, if it turned out that he had performed the act for non-courageous reasons (say, because he wanted the rewards of promotion and esteem), then the esteem forthcoming would be diminished and in the limit extinguished. For our purposes here, it won’t be significant whether the object of esteem is action or disposition. But we do need a term to cover both cases: accordingly, we shall use the generic term ‘performance’ to cover all cases.
 
4
Following of course the tradition for which Smith is merely a representative spokesman. See Lovejoy (1961).
 
5
‘Standards’ are a term of art here. For present purposes just think of the ‘standard’ as the performance level that separates disesteem from esteem. If the performer’s performance is above standard S, the performer will be positively esteemed: if that performance is below S the performer will be disesteemed.
 
6
An implication is that someone who has a low level of self-esteem will have a higher demand for social esteem ceteris paribus than someone who has a high level of self-esteem.
 
7
This is perhaps a rather transparent attempt to make a virtue of my own ignorance—but with ignorance, what else can you do?
 
8
The EC property might extend beyond beliefs about performance quality to beliefs about ‘value’. That is, the fact that others share your values might give you confidence in their validity. These EC domains are of course distinguishable—in row three, the opposition between V and M might confirm A’s judgements of performance quality, but moderate A’s confidence in her values. In that event, the esteem incentive might also be moderated, as A’s self-esteem becomes correspondingly less secure. This effect, if present, will be identical across the columns—the difference in esteem incentive levels between (i) and (ii)/(iii) will remain.
 
9
The classic reference is Prentice and Miller (1993) and Miller and Prentice (1994).
 
10
Suppose they were in such doubt. Then revealing to them that lots of their peers secretly disapproved of binge-drinking would not have any effect: they would still go on acting in the same way in ignorance of the fact that binge-drinking was what they were doing!
 
11
If no one thought binge-drinking was a good idea, then presumably binge-drinking would disappear. Some people must think binge-drinking is macho or desirable on other grounds.
 
12
See Munger and Harris (1989)
 
13
For a more extended discussion of all these matters, see Brennan and Pettit (2002, 2004).
 
14
There is a considerable literature on this phenomenon, by now well-attested, in relation to self-evaluation, to clinical depression and to illusions concerning degree of control over outcomes. The classic references are Taylor and Brown (1988) and Bandura (1989).
 
15
It is worth emphasising that it is what I take the neighbours to think of my performances, rather than what they actually say to me about them that is critical. Indeed, part of the source of the divergence between what others think of me and what I think of myself may well lie in a (corresponding) divergence between what others really think of me and what they say to me about such things. Norms of politeness shade into flattery: when we consider the divergence between what we say to others and what we really think about them, we have perhaps good reason to discount the things that people say to us. But such ‘good reason’ is equally something that it is a bit depressing to entertain. One implication is that ‘social esteem’ as revealed by the signals of esteem that are given to us by others may be as much the cause of self-partiality as a cure for it! I am grateful to Loren Lomasky for this point. [He may have been suggesting that his remarks to me about this paper might be a case in point!]
 
16
Perpetual presence has another (non-epistemic) aspect, which is taken up in the next section.
 
17
And, for example, not because your mother/partner is always around!
 
18
Of course there are certain self-promotional activities that are more or less legitimate—sending free copies of your latest book to your most influential colleagues; providing free tickets to the Opera to the most widely respected critics; and so on. But such activities are after all mediated by the belief that these people will call the shots as they see them—so that all one is subsidising is their attention to your performances. You are not buying (and almost certainly cannot buy) esteem as such.
 
Literature
go back to reference Bandura, A. 1989. Social Cognitive Theory. In Annals of Child Development, Six Theories of Child Development, ed. R. Vasta, vol. 6, 1–60. Greenwich: JAI Press. Bandura, A. 1989. Social Cognitive Theory. In Annals of Child Development, Six Theories of Child Development, ed. R. Vasta, vol. 6, 1–60. Greenwich: JAI Press.
go back to reference Brennan, G., and P. Pettit. 2002. Power Corrupts, But Can Office Ennoble? Kyklos 55 (2): 157–178.CrossRef Brennan, G., and P. Pettit. 2002. Power Corrupts, But Can Office Ennoble? Kyklos 55 (2): 157–178.CrossRef
go back to reference ———. 2004. The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef ———. 2004. The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRef
go back to reference Lovejoy, A.O. 1961. Reflections on Human Nature. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lovejoy, A.O. 1961. Reflections on Human Nature. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
go back to reference Miller, D.T., and D.A. Prentice. 1994. Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20: 541–550.CrossRef Miller, D.T., and D.A. Prentice. 1994. Collective Errors and Errors About the Collective. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 20: 541–550.CrossRef
go back to reference Munger, K., and S.J. Harris. 1989. Effects of an Observer on Handwashing in a Public Restroom. Perceptual and Motor Skills 69: 733–734.CrossRef Munger, K., and S.J. Harris. 1989. Effects of an Observer on Handwashing in a Public Restroom. Perceptual and Motor Skills 69: 733–734.CrossRef
go back to reference Prentice, D.A., and D.T. Miller. 1993. Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Abuse on Campus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64: 243–256.CrossRef Prentice, D.A., and D.T. Miller. 1993. Pluralistic Ignorance and Alcohol Abuse on Campus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 64: 243–256.CrossRef
go back to reference Taylor, S.E., and J.D. Brown. 1988. Illusion and Well-Being – A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental-Health. Psychological Bulletin 103 (2): 193–210.CrossRef Taylor, S.E., and J.D. Brown. 1988. Illusion and Well-Being – A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental-Health. Psychological Bulletin 103 (2): 193–210.CrossRef
go back to reference Young, E. 1968. The Complete Works. Vol. 1. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Young, E. 1968. The Complete Works. Vol. 1. Hildesheim: Georg Olms.
Metadata
Title
Self-Esteem
Author
Geoffrey Brennan
Copyright Year
2018
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61070-2_3