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Published in: Social Choice and Welfare 4/2021

27-11-2020 | Original Paper

Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting

Authors: Antoinette Baujard, Herrade Igersheim, Isabelle Lebon

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare | Issue 4/2021

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Abstract

Many voters seem to appreciate the greater freedom of expression afforded by alternative voting rules; in evaluative voting, for example, longer grading scales and/or negative grades seem desirable in so far as, all other things being equal, they allow greater expressivity. The paper studies to what extent the behavior of voters, and the outcomes of elections, are sensitive to the grading scale employed in evaluative (or “range”) voting. To this end, we use voting data from an experiment conducted in parallel with the 2017 French presidential election, which aimed to scrutinize the negative grade effect and the length effect in grading scales. First, this paper confirms that the introduction of a negative grade disfavors “polarizing” candidates, those whose political discourse provokes divisive debate, but more generally we establish that it disfavors major candidates and favors minor candidates. Second, under non-negative scales, polarizing candidates may be relatively disfavored by longer scales, especially compared with candidates who attract only infrequent media coverage and who are little known among voters. Third, longer scales assign different weights to the votes of otherwise equal voters, depending on their propensity to vote strategically. Overall, we observe that the benefits of the expressivity provided by longer scales or negative grades need to be balanced against the controversial advantage these give to minor candidates, and their tendency to undermine the principle that each vote should count equally in the outcome of the election.

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Appendix
Available only for authorised users
Footnotes
1
Note that not rating a candidate is systematically considered as giving the lowest grade, 0 or \(-1\) depending on the chosen scale, and the participants were clearly notified about this point.
 
2
We can assert with certainty that the voters had assimilated the rule that the default grade was the lowest one: when they do not give a grade, they positively intended to attribute the lowest one and this is a conscious choice. As evidence for this, if we compute the impact of the change of default rule from lowest to median grade, the results of all the candidates arousing rejection attitudes would increase. The score of Marine Le Pen, who arouses strong opinions and no indifference, would increase dramatically.
 
3
Note that a similar analysis based on the Strasbourg data under AV vs. EV4 provides similar conclusions as those presented here.
 
4
The tests carried out relate to the average frequencies of the grades divided into two segments. Individual comparisons are not possible because no participant used EV4 and EV6 simultaneously.
 
5
Note that the same result appears when we consider the different lengths of scales tested in Strasbourg to the same minimum grade, so avoiding other biases: there is significantly less use of the whole extent of the scale from EV3 to EV4 and from EV3neg to EV4neg.
 
6
Note that our observation holds for voters’ behavior when testing a new voting rule in an experimental setting. If an evaluative voting rule were to be implemented, these aspects are likely to be covered by the media and political parties, such that we could expect more strategic behavior.
 
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Metadata
Title
Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting
Authors
Antoinette Baujard
Herrade Igersheim
Isabelle Lebon
Publication date
27-11-2020
Publisher
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Published in
Social Choice and Welfare / Issue 4/2021
Print ISSN: 0176-1714
Electronic ISSN: 1432-217X
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01300-z

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