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2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

11. Soziale Dilemmata

Authors : Prof. Dr. Peter Fischer, Dr. Kathrin Jander, Prof. Dr. Joachim Krueger

Published in: Sozialpsychologie für Bachelor

Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg

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Zusammenfassung

Das Wechselspiel von Menschen in Gruppen ist oft von Konflikten geprägt. Die mathematische Spieltheorie beschreibt viele solcher Situationen, wie etwa das Gefangenendilemma, greift aber psychologisch zu kurz: Denn Menschen koordinieren ihr Verhalten und kooperieren wesentlich besser miteinander als man aus einer rein wirtschaftlich-rational geprägten Sichtweise heraus vermuten würde. Absprachen, soziale Kontrollen, wiederholte Begegnungen und sogar Egozentrismus tragen zur erfolgreichen Kooperation bei. Trotzdem bleiben grundlegende Risiken bestehen. Individuen können ausgebeutet werden und Kollektive können zusammenbrechen.

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Title: Soziale Dilemmata
Authors: Prof. Dr. Peter Fischer
Dr. Kathrin Jander
Prof. Dr. Joachim Krueger
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Book: Sozialpsychologie für Bachelor
Print ISBN: 978-3-662-56738-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-662-56739-5

Copyright Year: 2018
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-56739-5_11