2. Spain: Agricultural Empire on the Waves

go back to reference Gyeong-cheol Ju, Daehanghae Sidae: Haesaeng Paengchanggwa Geundae Segyeui Hyeongseong [Age of Exploration: Maritime Expansion and the Formation of the Modern World] (Seoul University Press, 2008), p. 26. Gyeong-cheol Ju, Daehanghae Sidae: Haesaeng Paengchanggwa Geundae Segyeui Hyeongseong [Age of Exploration: Maritime Expansion and the Formation of the Modern World] (Seoul University Press, 2008), p. 26.

go back to reference Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1974). Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York, 1974).

go back to reference Raymond Carr, et al., Seupeinsa [Spain: A History] (Kachi Books, 2006), pp. 85–90; Anthony Pagden, Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle between East and West (New York, 2008), pp. 188ff. Raymond Carr, et al., Seupeinsa [Spain: A History] (Kachi Books, 2006), pp. 85–90; Anthony Pagden, Worlds at War: The 2,500-Year Struggle between East and West (New York, 2008), pp. 188ff.

go back to reference Raymond Carr, et al., Seupeinsa [Spain: A History], pp. 95–98; David Levering Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570–1215 (New York, 2008), pp. 343–346. Raymond Carr, et al., Seupeinsa [Spain: A History], pp. 95–98; David Levering Lewis, God’s Crucible: Islam and the Making of Europe, 570–1215 (New York, 2008), pp. 343–346.

go back to reference Lewis, God’s Crucible, p. 378. Lewis, God’s Crucible, p. 378.

go back to reference William Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire (London, 2009), pp. 13–15. William Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire (London, 2009), pp. 13–15.

go back to reference John Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present 137 (Nov. 1992), pp. 48–71. John Elliott, “A Europe of Composite Monarchies,” Past and Present 137 (Nov. 1992), pp. 48–71.

go back to reference Of the approximately 380,000 people living in Catalonia, 30% lived in towns or cities, and Barcelona grew to the size of 35,000 people, which made it a metropolis for the time. Farmers in Catalonia focused less on cultivating grains than on growing cash crops and raising sheep, and Catalonian merchants plied their wares from the Levant to Sicily, Genoa, and southern France. Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, the cities of Catalonia became less competitive, as a result of no fewer than 10 epidemics that ravaged the region between 1348 and the mid-fifteenth century, war with Castile, and fluctuations in demand for wool fabric. See Alan Ryder, The Wreck of Catalonia (New York, 2007). Of the approximately 380,000 people living in Catalonia, 30% lived in towns or cities, and Barcelona grew to the size of 35,000 people, which made it a metropolis for the time. Farmers in Catalonia focused less on cultivating grains than on growing cash crops and raising sheep, and Catalonian merchants plied their wares from the Levant to Sicily, Genoa, and southern France. Beginning in the mid-fourteenth century, the cities of Catalonia became less competitive, as a result of no fewer than 10 epidemics that ravaged the region between 1348 and the mid-fifteenth century, war with Castile, and fluctuations in demand for wool fabric. See Alan Ryder, The Wreck of Catalonia (New York, 2007).

go back to reference Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469–1716 (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 24–25. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1469–1716 (Harmondsworth, 1970), pp. 24–25.

go back to reference Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974), especially chap. 4. Perry Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London, 1974), especially chap. 4.

go back to reference Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “Castile in the Middle Ages,” Richard Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200–1815 (Oxford, 1999), pp. 177–178. Miguel Angel Ladero Quesada, “Castile in the Middle Ages,” Richard Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State in Europe c. 1200–1815 (Oxford, 1999), pp. 177–178.

go back to reference Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power 1492–1763 (New York, 2003), p. 21. Henry Kamen, Empire: How Spain Became a World Power 1492–1763 (New York, 2003), p. 21.

go back to reference Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (eds.), 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), 2:626. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, R. H. Campbell and A. S. Skinner (eds.), 2 vols. (Oxford, 1976), 2:626.

go back to reference A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808: A World on the Move (Baltimore, 1998), p. 9. A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415–1808: A World on the Move (Baltimore, 1998), p. 9.

go back to reference In the early fifteenth century, Portugal had a population of about 1 million, which was one-fourth the size of Castile’s population and just one-tenth of France’s. The country also had little in the way of natural resources. Aside from wool, about the only product that Portugal had to offer was salt. Maritime activity cannot thrive without the support of advancements in shipbuilding, and here, too, Portugal was at a disadvantage. The country had far too little of the iron and lumber needed to build ships. Some scholars argue that political stability was what facilitated Portugal’s expansion, focusing on the fact that there was no dynastic change in Portugal for around two centuries after the crown passed to the House of Aviz in 1385. But since there are countries in which rebellions and other political upheavals have only served to promote expansion, this does not seem to be the whole story. An explanation of Portugal’s precocious overseas expansion can be found in Fernand Braudel, Civilization & Capitalism 15 th –18 th Century Vol. 3: The Perspective of the World (New York, 1984), pp. 138-143; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration (New York, 2006), pp. 118–119. In the early fifteenth century, Portugal had a population of about 1 million, which was one-fourth the size of Castile’s population and just one-tenth of France’s. The country also had little in the way of natural resources. Aside from wool, about the only product that Portugal had to offer was salt. Maritime activity cannot thrive without the support of advancements in shipbuilding, and here, too, Portugal was at a disadvantage. The country had far too little of the iron and lumber needed to build ships. Some scholars argue that political stability was what facilitated Portugal’s expansion, focusing on the fact that there was no dynastic change in Portugal for around two centuries after the crown passed to the House of Aviz in 1385. But since there are countries in which rebellions and other political upheavals have only served to promote expansion, this does not seem to be the whole story. An explanation of Portugal’s precocious overseas expansion can be found in Fernand Braudel, Civilization & Capitalism 15 ^th –18 ^th Century Vol. 3: The Perspective of the World (New York, 1984), pp. 138-143; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Pathfinders: A Global History of Exploration (New York, 2006), pp. 118–119.

go back to reference Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, chap. 1. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, chap. 1.

go back to reference Fernández-Armesto, Pathfinders, pp. 129–138. Fernández-Armesto, Pathfinders, pp. 129–138.

go back to reference A leading role in these reforms was played by the third son of John I, who is regarded as a major figure in establishing Portugal as a maritime kingdom. A leading role in these reforms was played by the third son of John I, who is regarded as a major figure in establishing Portugal as a maritime kingdom.

go back to reference John Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World (New Haven, 2003), p. 18; Hugh Thomas, Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire from Columbus to Magellan (New York, 2003), pp. 58–60. John Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World (New Haven, 2003), p. 18; Hugh Thomas, Rivers of Gold: The Rise of the Spanish Empire from Columbus to Magellan (New York, 2003), pp. 58–60.

go back to reference Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 59-60. Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 59-60.

go back to reference Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 61; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Columbus: And the Conquest of the Impossible (London, 1974), pp. 43–45. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 61; Felipe Fernández-Armesto, Columbus: And the Conquest of the Impossible (London, 1974), pp. 43–45.

go back to reference It is unclear how many of the 200,000 Jews in Spain left the country at this time. There are a range of estimates: around 100,000, between 120,000 and 150,000, and around 200,000. Whichever estimate we accept, this was clearly no small number, considering that the entire population of unified Spain at the time numbered about 6 million. Thomas, Rivers of Gold, pp. 78–84; Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies (Ithaca, 1973), p. 60; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 110. It is unclear how many of the 200,000 Jews in Spain left the country at this time. There are a range of estimates: around 100,000, between 120,000 and 150,000, and around 200,000. Whichever estimate we accept, this was clearly no small number, considering that the entire population of unified Spain at the time numbered about 6 million. Thomas, Rivers of Gold, pp. 78–84; Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies (Ithaca, 1973), p. 60; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 110.

go back to reference Quesada, “Castile in the Middle Ages,” pp. 178, 182–183. Quesada, “Castile in the Middle Ages,” pp. 178, 182–183.

go back to reference Carlos Álvarez-Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “Searching for the Roots of Retardation: Spain in European Perspective, 1500–1850,” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Papers in Economic History (March 2007); Carlos Álvarez-Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “The Rise and Fall of Spain (1270–1850),” The Economic History Review 66:1 (February 2013) pp. 1–37. It is our view that the Reconquista enabled Spain to largely avoid the Malthusian Trap that affected other parts of Europe. See pp. 18–20. Carlos Álvarez-Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “Searching for the Roots of Retardation: Spain in European Perspective, 1500–1850,” Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Working Papers in Economic History (March 2007); Carlos Álvarez-Nogal and Leandro Prados de la Escosura, “The Rise and Fall of Spain (1270–1850),” The Economic History Review 66:1 (February 2013) pp. 1–37. It is our view that the Reconquista enabled Spain to largely avoid the Malthusian Trap that affected other parts of Europe. See pp. 18–20.

go back to reference For the limited success of measures designed to check the power of the aristocracy, see Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 96-99; for the tax exemptions granted the aristocracy, see Quesada, “Castile in the Middle Ages,” pp. 189–192. For the limited success of measures designed to check the power of the aristocracy, see Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 96-99; for the tax exemptions granted the aristocracy, see Quesada, “Castile in the Middle Ages,” pp. 189–192.

go back to reference Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469–1714: A Society of Conflict, 2nd ed. (London, 1991), p. 48. Henry Kamen, Spain, 1469–1714: A Society of Conflict, 2nd ed. (London, 1991), p. 48.

go back to reference The government bond, called the juro, paid a fixed rate of interest. The interest rate was initially 10% but later fell to 7.12%. The government bond, called the juro, paid a fixed rate of interest. The interest rate was initially 10% but later fell to 7.12%.

go back to reference Regina Grafe and M. A. Irigoin, “Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-State and Empire Building,” Hispanic American Historical Review 88 (2008), pp. 173–209. Regina Grafe and M. A. Irigoin, “Bargaining for Absolutism: A Spanish Path to Nation-State and Empire Building,” Hispanic American Historical Review 88 (2008), pp. 173–209.

go back to reference The bribes that Charles I gave to ensure his election as Holy Roman Emperor amounted to 850,000 florins. The bribes that Charles I gave to ensure his election as Holy Roman Emperor amounted to 850,000 florins.

go back to reference Henry Kamen, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?” Past and Present 81 (November 1978), pp. 26–27. Henry Kamen, “The Decline of Spain: A Historical Myth?” Past and Present 81 (November 1978), pp. 26–27.

go back to reference Kamen, Empire, pp. 50–57; Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 144–159. Kamen, Empire, pp. 50–57; Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 144–159.

go back to reference For Charles V’s ambitions of a “universal monarchy,” see Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires (New York, 2001), pp. 42-45. In regard to the empire’s structure, Pagden says (on p. 44) that “Charles’s empire resembled a modern multinational corporation more than a state. Although it was governed in accordance with an overarching legal principle, the imperial public law (ius publicum), it had no common legal system and no single administrative structure. It did not even have a single language.” For Charles V’s ambitions of a “universal monarchy,” see Anthony Pagden, Peoples and Empires (New York, 2001), pp. 42-45. In regard to the empire’s structure, Pagden says (on p. 44) that “Charles’s empire resembled a modern multinational corporation more than a state. Although it was governed in accordance with an overarching legal principle, the imperial public law (ius publicum), it had no common legal system and no single administrative structure. It did not even have a single language.”

go back to reference Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, pp. 33–42. Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, pp. 33–42.

go back to reference Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 168–169. Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 168–169.

go back to reference It is estimated that between 23,000 and 27,000 kilograms of gold was brought to Spain by 1525. After the Aztec Empire was conquered, gold exports increased dramatically. By the 1550s, around 4,200 kilograms were flowing into Spain every year. Carla Rahn Phillips, “The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450–1750,” James Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750 (Cambridge, 1990), p. 83. It is estimated that between 23,000 and 27,000 kilograms of gold was brought to Spain by 1525. After the Aztec Empire was conquered, gold exports increased dramatically. By the 1550s, around 4,200 kilograms were flowing into Spain every year. Carla Rahn Phillips, “The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450–1750,” James Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires: Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750 (Cambridge, 1990), p. 83.

go back to reference Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies, pp. 40–56. Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies, pp. 40–56.

go back to reference Phillips, “The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires,” p. 84. The silver mined in the Americas in the sixteenth century made up 74% of the world’s total silver production. Ward Barrett, “World Bullion Flows, 1450–1800,” Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires, p. 225. Phillips, “The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires,” p. 84. The silver mined in the Americas in the sixteenth century made up 74% of the world’s total silver production. Ward Barrett, “World Bullion Flows, 1450–1800,” Tracy (ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires, p. 225.

go back to reference The silver amalgamation process was introduced to Mexican mines in 1556 and to mines at Potosí in 1573. The mit’a was a mandatory labor system in which a certain number of workers were drafted from Indian villages. The silver amalgamation process was introduced to Mexican mines in 1556 and to mines at Potosí in 1573. The mit’a was a mandatory labor system in which a certain number of workers were drafted from Indian villages.

go back to reference Timothy H. Parsons, The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fail (New York, 2010), p. 137. Timothy H. Parsons, The Rule of Empires: Those Who Built Them, Those Who Endured Them, and Why They Always Fail (New York, 2010), p. 137.

go back to reference Gyeong-cheol Ju, Daehanghae Sidae, pp. 242–243, 255–257. Gyeong-cheol Ju, Daehanghae Sidae, pp. 242–243, 255–257.

go back to reference John Lynch, Spain 1516–1598: From Nation State to World Empire (Oxford, 1981), chap. 4. John Lynch, Spain 1516–1598: From Nation State to World Empire (Oxford, 1981), chap. 4.

go back to reference Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World. Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World.

go back to reference M. Drelichman and H. Voth, “Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain,” Elhanan Helpman (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Cambridge, Mass., 2008). M. Drelichman and H. Voth, “Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain,” Elhanan Helpman (ed.), Institutions and Economic Performance (Cambridge, Mass., 2008).

go back to reference James D. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance and Domestic Politics (Cambridge, 2002). James D. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War: Campaign Strategy, International Finance and Domestic Politics (Cambridge, 2002).

go back to reference As the servicio came to represent an increasing portion of the crown’s revenue, a greater burden fell on the common people (and not the aristocrats and hidalgos who were exempt from taxes) and the wealthier commoners worked even harder to gain tax-exempt status. According to Elliott, 13% of the Spanish people enjoyed the privilege of tax exemption. This reflected the high percentage of Spaniards who belonged to the lower and higher nobility, a distinctive characteristic of the country. In England and France around the same time, the nobility did not exceed 5% of the population. For more on tax exemption, see Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 203–204. As the servicio came to represent an increasing portion of the crown’s revenue, a greater burden fell on the common people (and not the aristocrats and hidalgos who were exempt from taxes) and the wealthier commoners worked even harder to gain tax-exempt status. According to Elliott, 13% of the Spanish people enjoyed the privilege of tax exemption. This reflected the high percentage of Spaniards who belonged to the lower and higher nobility, a distinctive characteristic of the country. In England and France around the same time, the nobility did not exceed 5% of the population. For more on tax exemption, see Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 203–204.

go back to reference Giovanni Muto, “The Spanish System: Centre and Periphery,” Richard Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford, 1995), pp. 241–242. Revenue increased from 1 million ducats in 1522 to 4 million ducats in 1556, when Philip II came to the throne. It continued to increase afterward, reaching 10 million ducats in 1598 (around the coronation of Philip III), 18 million ducats in 1654, and 30 million ducats in 1674. Giovanni Muto, “The Spanish System: Centre and Periphery,” Richard Bonney (ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance (Oxford, 1995), pp. 241–242. Revenue increased from 1 million ducats in 1522 to 4 million ducats in 1556, when Philip II came to the throne. It continued to increase afterward, reaching 10 million ducats in 1598 (around the coronation of Philip III), 18 million ducats in 1654, and 30 million ducats in 1674.

go back to reference Tracy, Emperor Charles V, p. 102, table 5.2. Most of the rapidly increasing revenue from Naples was spent in Italy. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, p. 102, table 5.2. Most of the rapidly increasing revenue from Naples was spent in Italy.

go back to reference Tracy, Emperor Charles V, pp. 100, 104. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, pp. 100, 104.

go back to reference By region, 36% came from Germany, 34% from Genoa, 10% from Antwerp, and 17% from Spain, but only 7% of loans came purely from Spaniards. Two German families—the Fuggers and the Welsers—provided 34.5% of the loans. Five other banking families in Genoa and Antwerp became Charles V’s financial backers. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, pp. 100–101. By region, 36% came from Germany, 34% from Genoa, 10% from Antwerp, and 17% from Spain, but only 7% of loans came purely from Spaniards. Two German families—the Fuggers and the Welsers—provided 34.5% of the loans. Five other banking families in Genoa and Antwerp became Charles V’s financial backers. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, pp. 100–101.

go back to reference Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, p. 47. Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, p. 47.

go back to reference Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, p. 48. Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, p. 48.

go back to reference Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 255-258; Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, p. 101. Braudel and other scholars argue that Philip’s decision to move the capital to Madrid and to manage the empire from Castile ultimately divorced the empire’s economic center from its political center. This distorted the resource distribution inside the empire and weakened the empire, they say. But Parker disagrees, arguing that Philip’s decision is understandable given Castile’s fiscal revenue, its powerful infantry units, and its large number of ships. Parker also says that the Netherlands was not Philip’s highest priority for policy making. For more on this, see Fernando González de León and Geoffrey Parker, “The Grand Strategy of Philip II and the Revolt of the Netherlands,” Graham Darby (ed.), The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt (London, 2001), pp. 111–112; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York, 1973), vol. 2, p. 950. Elliott, Imperial Spain, pp. 255-258; Maltby, The Rise and Fall of the Spanish Empire, p. 101. Braudel and other scholars argue that Philip’s decision to move the capital to Madrid and to manage the empire from Castile ultimately divorced the empire’s economic center from its political center. This distorted the resource distribution inside the empire and weakened the empire, they say. But Parker disagrees, arguing that Philip’s decision is understandable given Castile’s fiscal revenue, its powerful infantry units, and its large number of ships. Parker also says that the Netherlands was not Philip’s highest priority for policy making. For more on this, see Fernando González de León and Geoffrey Parker, “The Grand Strategy of Philip II and the Revolt of the Netherlands,” Graham Darby (ed.), The Origins and Development of the Dutch Revolt (London, 2001), pp. 111–112; Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (New York, 1973), vol. 2, p. 950.

go back to reference The reason that Philip II stood up to all these enemies is that, just like his predecessor, he viewed the empire in terms of the medieval code of honor. He was concerned that the loss of any part of the empire would tarnish not only his personal reputation but also the empire’s prestige and cause other regions to defect in turn. For more on this, see González de León and Parker, “The Grand Strategy of Philip II,” pp. 109–111. The reason that Philip II stood up to all these enemies is that, just like his predecessor, he viewed the empire in terms of the medieval code of honor. He was concerned that the loss of any part of the empire would tarnish not only his personal reputation but also the empire’s prestige and cause other regions to defect in turn. For more on this, see González de León and Parker, “The Grand Strategy of Philip II,” pp. 109–111.

go back to reference To counter Philip II’s policies, around 400 members of the nobility and religious leaders drew up the Compromise of 1565 and presented Margaret of Parma with a petition to the same effect in 1566. Margaret accepted their petition, but this did not assuage the Protestants’ concerns, which culminated in 1566 in a mass campaign to destroy religious images. Philip seized this as an excuse to dispatch the Duke of Alba to the Netherlands, who set up a special tribunal called the Council of Troubles and set about systematically eliminating those suspected of heresy. As a result, around 9,000 people were put on trial between 1567 and 1572, of whom more than 1,000 were executed. To counter Philip II’s policies, around 400 members of the nobility and religious leaders drew up the Compromise of 1565 and presented Margaret of Parma with a petition to the same effect in 1566. Margaret accepted their petition, but this did not assuage the Protestants’ concerns, which culminated in 1566 in a mass campaign to destroy religious images. Philip seized this as an excuse to dispatch the Duke of Alba to the Netherlands, who set up a special tribunal called the Council of Troubles and set about systematically eliminating those suspected of heresy. As a result, around 9,000 people were put on trial between 1567 and 1572, of whom more than 1,000 were executed.

go back to reference Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 115–116; Parker, The Dutch Revolt, revised ed. (London, 1985), chaps. 1–3. Geoffrey Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567–1659, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 115–116; Parker, The Dutch Revolt, revised ed. (London, 1985), chaps. 1–3.

go back to reference The Holy League had mobilized 203 galleys and 50,000 soldiers for the battle, while the Ottoman Empire’s forces consisted of 208 galleys and 88,000 troops. The Ottomans’ losses in the battle were enormous: 15 galleys were destroyed and 190 taken, while 30,000 men were killed and 8,000 were taken prisoner. Kamen, Empire, pp. 183–184. The Holy League had mobilized 203 galleys and 50,000 soldiers for the battle, while the Ottoman Empire’s forces consisted of 208 galleys and 88,000 troops. The Ottomans’ losses in the battle were enormous: 15 galleys were destroyed and 190 taken, while 30,000 men were killed and 8,000 were taken prisoner. Kamen, Empire, pp. 183–184.

go back to reference In the early sixteenth century, Portugal’s Asian merchants controlled one-third of the global spice trade. It is worth noting Elliott’s argument that Spain’s annexation of Portugal helped it strengthen its naval forces. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 276: “It [the annexation of Portugal] had given Spain a great accession of naval strength, making the combined Spanish and Portuguese merchant fleets the largest in the world: 250,000–300,000 tons, against the 232,000 tons of the Netherlands and the 42,000 of England.” In the early sixteenth century, Portugal’s Asian merchants controlled one-third of the global spice trade. It is worth noting Elliott’s argument that Spain’s annexation of Portugal helped it strengthen its naval forces. Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 276: “It [the annexation of Portugal] had given Spain a great accession of naval strength, making the combined Spanish and Portuguese merchant fleets the largest in the world: 250,000–300,000 tons, against the 232,000 tons of the Netherlands and the 42,000 of England.”

go back to reference The interest the crown owed on its debts rose from 320 million maravedí in 1554 to 550 million maravedí in 1560. Meanwhile, the crown’s regular income in 1559 was just 530 million maravedí. Accordingly, the Spanish government had to default on its debt once again in 1560. Juan Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State, p. 209. The interest the crown owed on its debts rose from 320 million maravedí in 1554 to 550 million maravedí in 1560. Meanwhile, the crown’s regular income in 1559 was just 530 million maravedí. Accordingly, the Spanish government had to default on its debt once again in 1560. Juan Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” Bonney (ed.), The Rise of the Fiscal State, p. 209.

go back to reference For a brief introduction to the fiscal burden of the wars during Philip II’s reign, see Geoffrey Parker, “War and Economic Change: The Economic Costs of the Dutch Revolt,” Spain and the Netherlands 1559–1659: Ten Studies (London, 1979), pp. 178–203 (the figures quoted here appear on p. 187). According to Parker, the Army of Flanders received around 8,000 Castilian reinforcements each year during the Dutch War for Independence, and about 30,000 Castilian troops were mobilized between 1631 and 1639. In addition, a tremendous amount of money was transferred from Castile for military expenses. Between 1556 and 1624, at least 218 million ducats were transferred to the Netherlands from Castile, while the monarchs received just 121 million ducats in revenue from precious metals shipped from the New World during the same period (p. 188). Castile’s public debt in 1557, when Philip came to the throne, was 36 million ducats, but by his death in 1598 it had increased to 85 million ducats (p. 188). For a brief introduction to the fiscal burden of the wars during Philip II’s reign, see Geoffrey Parker, “War and Economic Change: The Economic Costs of the Dutch Revolt,” Spain and the Netherlands 1559–1659: Ten Studies (London, 1979), pp. 178–203 (the figures quoted here appear on p. 187). According to Parker, the Army of Flanders received around 8,000 Castilian reinforcements each year during the Dutch War for Independence, and about 30,000 Castilian troops were mobilized between 1631 and 1639. In addition, a tremendous amount of money was transferred from Castile for military expenses. Between 1556 and 1624, at least 218 million ducats were transferred to the Netherlands from Castile, while the monarchs received just 121 million ducats in revenue from precious metals shipped from the New World during the same period (p. 188). Castile’s public debt in 1557, when Philip came to the throne, was 36 million ducats, but by his death in 1598 it had increased to 85 million ducats (p. 188).

go back to reference While the crown’s regular income had increased to 1.6 billion maravedí by 1584, interest payments still amounted to 1.2 billion maravedí. Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” p. 212. While the crown’s regular income had increased to 1.6 billion maravedí by 1584, interest payments still amounted to 1.2 billion maravedí. Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” p. 212.

go back to reference Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” p. 213. Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” p. 213.

go back to reference Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” p. 214; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 286. Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” p. 214; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 286.

go back to reference Of course, the troubles at Medina del Campo cannot be completely explained by the fiscal crisis. Alberto Marcos Martín, “Medina del Campo 1500–1800: An Historical Account of Its Decline,” I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (eds.), The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1994). Of course, the troubles at Medina del Campo cannot be completely explained by the fiscal crisis. Alberto Marcos Martín, “Medina del Campo 1500–1800: An Historical Account of Its Decline,” I. A. A. Thompson and Bartolomé Yun Casalilla (eds.), The Castilian Crisis of the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge, 1994).

go back to reference Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” pp. 215–223. Gelabert, “Castile 1504–1808,” pp. 215–223.

go back to reference For recent research on the seventeenth century crisis, see the following: “AHR Forum: The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Revisited,” American Historical Review 113 (October 2008), pp. 1029–1099; Jan de Vries, “The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40 (Autumn 2009), pp. 151–194. For recent research on the seventeenth century crisis, see the following: “AHR Forum: The General Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Revisited,” American Historical Review 113 (October 2008), pp. 1029–1099; Jan de Vries, “The Economic Crisis of the Seventeenth Century after Fifty Years,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 40 (Autumn 2009), pp. 151–194.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 61. The population of 20 cities in Castile increased by 84% between 1530 and 1594, and the population of farming villages is estimated to have continued to increase until 1580. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 61. The population of 20 cities in Castile increased by 84% between 1530 and 1594, and the population of farming villages is estimated to have continued to increase until 1580.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 46; Kamen, Spain 1469–1714, p. 223. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 46; Kamen, Spain 1469–1714, p. 223.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 27–28. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 27–28.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 15–17; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 315. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 15–17; Elliott, Imperial Spain, p. 315.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 82. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 82.

go back to reference For more on the polarization of rural areas, see Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 82–94, and Dennis O. Flynn, “Fiscal Crisis and the Decline of Spain (Castile),” Journal of Economic History 42 (March 1982), pp. 144–145. For estimates of demand for wool, see Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 101–113. For more on the polarization of rural areas, see Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 82–94, and Dennis O. Flynn, “Fiscal Crisis and the Decline of Spain (Castile),” Journal of Economic History 42 (March 1982), pp. 144–145. For estimates of demand for wool, see Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 101–113.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 121, table 6.1. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, p. 121, table 6.1.

go back to reference Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 118–119. Thompson and Casalilla, The Castilian Crisis, pp. 118–119.

go back to reference Ibid.; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, pp. 226–229. Ibid.; Elliott, Empires of the Atlantic World, pp. 226–229.

go back to reference Parsons, The Rule of Empires, p. 119. Parsons, The Rule of Empires, p. 119.