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2021 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

3. States and Utopian Goals of International Law

Author : Deepak Mawar

Published in: States Undermining International Law

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

Abstract

This chapter explores the nature of States in order to argue that the primacy it enjoys in international law is problematic for those seeking to achieve utopian goals of international law. The argument is made that a State possesses dual duties; the first duty is to the territory and citizens that it has sole authority over, and the second duty is to the international community. When analysing the nature of the State using the works of Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner, Thomas Franck, Michel Foucault, Carl Schmitt and Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, it becomes apparent that the State tends to prioritise its first duty over it second duty, which can lead to the undermining of international law. Such a phenomenon is of grave concern for emancipatory idealists, who would consequently argue that the primacy States enjoy in international law should be reassessed.

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Footnotes
1
K. Parlett, The Individual in the International Legal System: Continuity and Change in International Law, (2011), 3. See also H. Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, (1625), chapter 1.
 
2
Ibid., 7. See also G. Jellinek, Die Rechtliche Natur der Staatenvertrage, (1880), 2, 42–49, 56–58; S.R. Ratner and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Appraising the Methods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers’, (1999) 93 AJIL 291, at 293.
 
3
E. Vattel, The Law of Nations, (1758), introduction, para 3, p. 67.
 
4
J. Goldsmith & E. Posner, The Limits of International Law, (2005), 169.
 
5
Ibid.
 
6
R. Niebuhr, Moral Man and the Immoral Society, (1946); E.H. Carr, The Twentieth Century Crisis 1919–1935: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (1948); H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948) & In Defence of the National Interests, (1951).
 
7
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (1948), at 61–62.
 
8
Goldsmith & Posner, supra 4, at 170.
 
9
Ibid., at 184.
 
10
Ibid., at 168.
 
11
Ibid.
 
12
H.H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) The Yale Law Journal 2599, at 2604.
 
13
For a comprehensive account of how the question of why States obey international law has developed over time, see H.H. Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) The Yale Law Journal 2599, at 2604–2634. This section of the article starts from ancient and primitive international law right up to the theory of the New Haven School and International Legal Process, to provide a somewhat comprehensive account of how the compliance question has been tackled in international law and international relations.
 
14
Ibid., at 2601.
 
15
Ibid., at 2636.
 
16
A. Chayes & A.H. Chayes, The New Sovereign, (1995), 1–28.
 
17
Ibid., at 15.
 
18
Ibid., at 32–33.
 
19
Ibid., at 54.
 
20
Ibid., at 109–111.
 
21
Ibid., at 190. ‘[F]or all but a few self-isolated nations, sovereignty no longer consists in the freedom of states to act independently, in their perceived self-interest, but in membership in reasonably good standing in the regimes that make up the substance of international life …. In today's setting, the only way most states can realize and express their sovereignty is through participation in the various regimes that regulate and order the international system.’.
 
22
Ibid., at 25.
 
23
Koh, supra note 12, at 2637.
 
24
A. Chayes, T. Ehrlich & A. Lowenfeld, International Legal Process, (2 Vols. 1968).
 
25
M.E. O’Connell, ‘New International Legal Process’, (April, 1999) 93.2 AJIL 334, at 334.
 
26
H.H. Koh, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, (1996) 75 Nebraska Law Review 181, at 189.
 
27
O’Connell, supra note 25, at 337.
 
28
T. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions, (1995) at 6.
 
29
Koh, supra note 12, at 2641–2642.
 
30
Franck, supra note 28, at 7.
 
31
Ibid., at 7.
 
32
The subjectivity of the fairness criteria fulfilment is worth elucidating. What may be perceived as fair for one particular State for the sake of their national interests, may not be the same for another State, or even the international community as a whole. As States seek to comply with rules of international law on the basis of Franck’s fairness criteria, there is a strong correlation with the perceived fairness of rules and the benefit to national interest.
 
33
Koh, supra note 12, at 2642. See also Franck, supra note 28, at 196. (‘Nations, or those who govern them, recognize that the obligation to comply is owed by them to the community of states as the reciprocal of that community’s validation of their nations’ statehood.’).
 
34
Ibid., at 2602.
 
35
See T. Nardin, ‘Ethical Traditions in International Affairs’, in T. Nardin & D.R. Mapel (eds.), Traditions of International Ethics, (1992), 1, at 13. (‘Every student of international affairs has encountered the view that international law is ‘not really law’ because it lacks effective institutions for making and applying laws, and that it is therefore of negligible importance in international affairs.’).
 
36
L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, (1979), 49.
 
37
Ibid., at 47.
 
38
Ibid., at 47.
 
39
K.W. Abbott, ‘Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International Lawyers’, (1989) 14.2 The Yale Journal of International Law 335, at 349. See also R. Keohane, After Hegemony, (1984), 66–67.
 
40
Ibid. at 350. See also R. Keohane, After Hegemony, (1984), 111–116; E. Mackay, Economics of Information and Law, (1980), 135–143.
 
41
Koh, supra note 12, at 2632. See also Abbott, supra note 39.
 
42
L. Odysseos & F. Petto, ‘Introducing the International Theory of Carl Schmitt: International Law, International Relations, and the Present Global Predicament(s)’, (2006) 19 LJIL 1, at 2.
 
43
F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, (1986), 158.
 
44
G. Schwab, ‘Introduction’ in C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (2005) at xxxix.
 
45
Ibid., at xlii.
 
46
Ibid., at xlix.
 
47
C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, (2005) at 5.
 
48
Ibid., at 6.
 
49
Ibid., at 6.
 
50
Ibid., at 7.
 
51
M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars-A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations, (2015) at 254.
 
52
Ibid.
 
53
C. Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, (1985) at 13.
 
54
C. Aradau & R. Van Munster, ‘Exceptionalism and the War on Terror’, (2009) 49 British Journal of Criminology 686, at 689.
 
55
Schmitt, supra note 47, at 8.
 
56
Ibid., at 12.
 
57
Ibid., at 15.
 
58
M. Koskenniemi, ‘International Law as Political Theology: How to Read Nomos der Erde’, (2004) 11.4 Constellations 492, at 499.
 
59
Ibid.
 
60
Ibid. See also C. Schmitt, supra note 47, at 17.
 
61
Ibid., at 500.
 
62
J. Huysmans, ‘Minding Exceptions: Politics of Insecurity and Liberal Democracy’, (2004) 3 Contemporary Political Theory 321, at 338.
 
63
C. Schmitt, Concept of the Political, (2007), at 27.
 
64
Ibid., at 27.
 
65
Schmitt, supra note 63, at 29.
 
66
D. Luban, ‘Carl Schmitt and the Critique of Lawfare’, (2010) 43 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 457, at 464.
 
67
Schmitt, supra note 63, at 29–30.
 
68
G. Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, (1998), at 142.
 
69
Ibid., at 128.
 
70
Ibid.
 
71
C. Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen, Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen, (1963) at 80.
 
72
Agamben, supra note 68, at 142.
 
73
Schmitt, supra note 71, at 80.
 
74
Agamben, supra note 68, at 143.
 
75
Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 495.
 
76
Ibid., at 496.
 
77
Ibid. See also C. Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth: in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum, (2006).
 
78
SS Lotus case (France v. Turkey), PCIJ Rep Series A No 10, at 18.
 
79
J.L. Brierly, The ‘Lotus’ Case, (1928) 44 Law Quarterly Review 154, at 155. Reprinted in The Basis of Obligation in International Law and other papers 143–144 (Sir Hersch Lauterpacht ed., 1958).
 
80
Annex 2 to the ‘Second Periodic Report of the United States of America to the Committee Against Torture’, submitted 6 May 2005, US Department of State.
 
81
R. Foot, ‘Torture: The Struggle over a Peremptory Norm in a Counter-Terrorist Era’, July (2006) 20.2 International Relations Issue 131, at 133.
 
82
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, 1 August 2002, reprinted in full in M. Danner, Torture and Truth, (2004), 115–166; see also 146–149 for the Commander in Chief argument. Sir N. Rodley, Torture in the 21st Century, see also the William J. Butler Lecture on International Law, given to the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights at the University of Cincinnati College of Law, 23 September 2004.
 
83
A. Carty, ‘Carl Schmitt’s Critique of Liberal International Legal Order Between 1933 and 1945′, (2001) 14.1 LJIL 25, at 33.
 
84
In this instance, Schmitt was particularly referring to the Geneva (Draft Protocol), the Locarno Treaties and the Kellogg-Briand Pact.
 
85
C. Schmitt, Nationalsozialismus und Völkerrecht, (1934), at 23–25.
 
87
See Nadin, supra note 23, at 47–48; A. Roberts, ‘The United Nations and International Security’, (2008) 35.2 Global Politics and Strategy 3, at 5; S. Tharoor, ‘Security Council Reform: Past, Present and Future’, (2011) 25.4 Ethics & International Affairs 397; I. Hurd, ‘Legitimacy, Power, and the Symbolic Life of the UN Security Council’, (2002) Global Governance 35, at 47.
 
88
M. Glennon, ‘Why the Security Council Failed’, (2003) 82.3 Foreign Affairs 16, at 25.
 
89
E. Posner, ‘Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?’ (2003) 55 Stanford Law Review 1901, at 1912.
 
90
Ibid., at 1914.
 
91
Ibid., at 1914–1915.
 
92
Ibid., at 1913.
 
93
M. Koskenniemi, ‘What Is International Law For?’ in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, (2018), at 34.
 
94
Ibid.
 
95
Koskenniemi suggests that ‘Much instrumentalist thinking about international law today adopts the point of view of the decision-maker in a relatively prosperous State or transnational network, in possession of resources and policy options and seeking guidance on how to fit their objectives within international legality- or to overrule the legality with minimal costs’ in ibid., at 34.
 
96
J. Von Bernstorff, The Public International Law Theory of Hans Kelsen, (2010), 44.
 
97
Ibid.
 
98
H. Kelsen, Völkerrechstslehre, (1995), 278–283.
 
99
Published in English as H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. A Translation of the First Edition of the Reine Rechtslehre or Pure Theory of Law, (1992).
 
100
M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870–1960, (2004), 241.
 
101
Kelsen, supra note 98, at 55–76.
 
102
H. Kelsen, Das Problem der Souveränität, (1960), at 134–139.
 
103
M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument, (2005), at 228.
 
104
Ibid., at 231.
 
105
Ibid., at 230.
 
106
Ibid., at 231.
 
107
Kelsen, supra note 98, at xiv. See also J. Kammerhofer, ‘Hans Kelsen in Today’s International Legal Scholarship’ in J. Kammerhofer & J. D’Aspremont (ed.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World, (2014), at 83.
 
108
H. Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory, (1997), at 119.
 
109
Ibid., at 117.
 
110
Ibid., at 120.
 
111
M. Hardt & A. Negri, Empire, (2000), at 5. See also Kelsen, supra note 102, at 205 and H. Kelsen, Principles of International Law, (1952), 586.
 
112
UN Charter, (1945), Article 40.
 
113
M. Shaw, International Law, (2011), 71.
 
114
G. Schwarzenberger, International Law, (1957), 26–27.
 
115
Shaw, supra note 113, at 71.
 
116
Statute of the International Court of Justice, (1945), Article 38(2).
 
117
See, ‘Shultz Urges Limited Attack on Terrorists’, Hous. Chron., (16 January 1986), at 6, col. 3; ‘Shultz Supports Armed Reprisals’, N.Y. Times, (16 January 1986), at AI, col. 5. The entire speech is now reprinted in ‘Documents Showing the Evolution of Sanctions Against Libya’, (1986) 25 International Legal Materials 174, at 204.
 
118
B. Van Schaak, ‘The Killing of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory’, (2011) 14 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 255, at 280.
 
119
Ibid., at 272.
 
120
M. Foucault, Society Must be Defended, (2003), at 240.
 
121
Ibid., at Pg240.
 
122
M. Foucault, History of Sexuality, (1978), at 135.
 
123
Ibid., at Pg135.
 
124
Foucault, supra note 120, at 240.
 
125
Foucault, supra note 122, at 136.
 
126
M. Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, (2007), at 87.
 
127
Foucault, supra note 120, at 241.
 
128
M. De Larrinaga & M.G. Doucet, ‘Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security’, (2008) 39 Security Dialogue 517, at 520.
 
129
Ibid.
 
130
Foucault, supra note 120, at 137.
 
131
Ibid., at 140.
 
132
Ibid., at 136.
 
133
Ibid., at 136.
 
134
Ibid., at 137.
 
135
Ibid., at 137.
 
136
M. Dillon & J. Reid, ‘Global Liberal Governance: Biopolitics, Security and War’, (2001) 30.1 Millennium 41, at 46.
 
137
Ibid., at 47. See also Foucault, supra note 122, at 139.
 
138
Ibid., at 48.
 
139
M. Dillon, ‘Governing Terror: The State of Emergency of Biopolitical Emergence’, (2007) 1 International Political Sociology 7, at 9.
 
140
M. Sterio, ‘On the Right to Self-Determination: ‘Selfistans’, Secessions and the Great Power’s Rule’ (2010) 19.1 Minnesota Journal of International Law 137, at 149.
 
141
Ibid., at 150.
 
142
A. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, (2003), 211.
 
143
Z. Nevo & T. Megiddo, ‘Lessons from Kosovo: The Law of Statehood and Palestinian Unilateral Independence’, (2009) 5.2 Journal of International Law and International Relations 89, at 114.
 
144
J. Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law, (2007), 194.
 
145
Koh, supra note 12, at 2602.
 
146
UN Charter (1945), Article 2(5).
 
147
Foucault, supra note 122, at 135–145.
 
148
Hardt & Negri, supra note 111, at 24.
 
149
L. Murphy, ‘International Responsibility’, in S. Besson & J. Tasioulas (ed.), The Philosophy of International Law, (2010), at 303.
 
150
L. Henkin, How Nations Behave, (1979), 49.
 
151
T. Endicot, ‘The Logic of Freedom and Power’, in S. Besson & J. Tasioulas (eds.), The Philosophy of International Law, (2010), at 245.
 
152
T. Franck, supra note 28, at 477. See also Koh, supra note 12, at 2601–2602.
 
153
P. Allott, Eunomia: A New Order for a New World, (1990), 243.
 
154
Ibid.
 
155
I. Scobbie, ‘Thinking About International Law’, in M.D. Evans (ed.), International Law, (2018), at 75.
 
156
Allott, supra note 153, at 247.
 
157
Ibid., at 244.
 
158
Ibid., at 248.
 
159
P. Allott et al., ‘Thinking Another World: “This Cannot be How the World was Meant to Be,”’ (2005) 16 EJIL 255.
 
160
Foucault, supra note 122, at 140.
 
161
P. Allott, ‘State Responsibility and the Unmaking of International Law’, (1988) 29 Harv. Int’l. L. J. 1, at 9.
 
162
Koskenniemi, supra note 58, at 495.
 
163
Allot, supra note 103 at 9–10.
 
164
Koskenniemi, supra note 100, at 11.
 
165
P. Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law, (1997), 11.
 
Metadata
Title
States and Utopian Goals of International Law
Author
Deepak Mawar
Copyright Year
2021
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64789-6_3

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