Top

Studies in Comparative International Development

Published in:

01-12-2012

Supply or Demand? Migration and Political Manipulation in Mexico

Published in: Studies in Comparative International Development | Issue 4/2012

Activate our intelligent search to find suitable subject content or patents.

search-config

AI-assisted search

Off

Abstract

Collective remittances are the money flows sent by hometown associations (HTAs) of migrants from the USA to their communities of origin. In Mexico, the 3 × 1 Program for Migrants matches by three the amounts that HTAs send back to their localities to invest in public projects. In previous research, we found that municipalities ruled by the party of the federal government were more likely to participate in the Program. The political bias in participation and fund allocation may stem from two possible mechanisms: HTAs’ decisions to invest in some municipalities but not in others may reflect migrants’ political preferences (a demand-driven bias). Alternatively, government officials may use the Program to finance their own political objectives (a supply-driven bias). To determine which of these two mechanisms is at work, we studied a 2 × 2 matrix of statistically selected cases of high-migration municipalities in the Mexican state of Guanajuato. We carried out over 60 semistructured interviews with state and municipal Program administrators, local politicians, and migrant leaders from these municipalities. Our qualitative study indicates that migrant leaders are clearly pragmatic and that the political bias found is driven by elected officials strategically using the Program. The bias in favor of political strongholds is reinforced by the Program’s requirements for cooperation among different levels of government. This study casts doubt about the effectiveness of public–private partnerships as valid formulas to reduce political manipulation. It also questions the ability of matching grant programs to reach the areas where public resources are most needed.

previous article Why the Poor Vote in India: “If I Don’t Vote, I Am Dead to the State”

next article The Political Economy of Child Mortality Decline in Tanzania and Uganda, 1995–2007

Dont have a licence yet? Then find out more about our products and how to get one now:

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft+Technik" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 102.000 Bücher
über 537 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Automobil + Motoren
Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Elektrotechnik + Elektronik
Energie + Nachhaltigkeit
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Maschinenbau + Werkstoffe
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Springer Professional "Wirtschaft"

Online-Abonnement

Mit Springer Professional "Wirtschaft" erhalten Sie Zugriff auf:

über 67.000 Bücher
über 340 Zeitschriften

aus folgenden Fachgebieten:

Bauwesen + Immobilien
Business IT + Informatik
Finance + Banking
Management + Führung
Marketing + Vertrieb
Versicherung + Risiko

Jetzt Wissensvorsprung sichern!

inform now

Available only for authorised users

The requirement that HTAs’ signatures appear on project applications provoked the formation of ghost migrant clubs, that is, clubs that did not really exist. In response, the rules of operation were changed so that migrant clubs had to be formally registered at consulates. Still, fieldwork shows that very frequently clubs are created and registered for the purpose of a single project proposal and do not survive thereafter (clubs have to renew their registration at the consulates after 2 years).

“Mirror clubs” are the counterpart of HTAs in their localities. Sometimes they are also referred to as “work committees”, which are in charge of supervising and monitoring the execution of the projects in the absence of migrants. However, they are not exactly the same as mirror clubs. Work committees are formed by project beneficiaries whereas mirror clubs may include nonbeneficiaries too. The two kinds of organization frequently, but not invariably, overlap (http://www.sedesol.gob.mx/es/SEDESOL/3x1_para_Migrantes_transparencia).

The figure of the delegate is regulated by state laws governing municipal organization and therefore their appointment does not follow a unique procedure. They are normally appointed by the municipal president, or by the cabildos; but sometimes—like in Guanajuato—they are elected in local assemblies. As a result, local delegates can belong to opposition parties. Although their attributions are in general small, their role in the 3 × 1 is prominent given that delegates are in a unique position to know migrants and their families (interview with researcher Pablo Rojo, 12 December 2011, CIDE).

Former delegate of Huapango, Huapango, 29 June 2010. Former municipal president (PRI, 2003–2006), Tarimoro, 30 June 2010. Current municipal president (2009–2012), Tarimoro, 1 July 2010.

Former municipal President (PAN, 2006–2009), Tarimoro, 1 July 2010.

However, rejection is frequent. Between 2002 and 2004, 192 3 × 1 Program projects were rejected in the state of Michoacán, of which 73 % were projects outside the cabecera (Fox and Bada 2008: 452). In 2010, at SEPLADER Zacatecas a bureaucrat mentioned that about 50 % of the projects presented were rejected, and about 60 % of projects lacked a technical file (SEDESOL Zacatecas, 25 January 2011).

Zacatecas has been ruled by the PRI since December 2010; but it was perredista during the whole period of our study.

For parsimony, this specification is analog to the selection equation in the Heckman sample selection models reported in the “Appendix”.

Note that since Table 2 refers to the year 2007 only, we made sure that high and low/nonparticipation was not unique to this year. In other words, municipalities of high and low participation that are consistently participating or not participating during the years we covered in the database. For instance, Jaral del Progreso is a PAN municipality of high participation in 2007 (12 projects) but it did not participate in previous years. We had only two options to choose a comparable non-participating/non-PAN municipality: Cuerámaro and Dolores Hidalgo. However, Dolores Hidalgo is much more populated than the rest of our selected municipalities. Given the high correlation that exists between municipal resources and population, and the role that municipal finances play in matching the resources migrants invest, we opted for Cuerámaro to avoid the variation arising from different budgetary capacities. Similarly, we chose Santiago Maravatío over Abasolo as our non-PAN participating municipality.

To save space, the list of interviewees and the questionnaires has been omitted but is available on request.

Note that in practice, this amounts to blurring the line between demand and supply in the sense that the initiative to participate in the Program (demand) is frequently created by the different parties (especially municipalities) in charge of supplying the Program through the spread of information and mobilization of diasporas. Thus, states and municipalities both indirectly demand and supply.

Phone interview, 7 October 2010. The leader of the club recalled that they were invited to collaborate with funds to set up a shoe maquiladora. “The business failed and trust was lost”, said the leader.

Tupátaro, Cuéramaro, 21 September 2010.

San Gregorio, Cuerámaro, 23 September 2010.

Huanímaro, 22 September 2010. One interesting thing is that the official responsible for migratory issues in Huanímaro under the current PT administration (2009–2012) was in charge of migratory issues in the municipality of Cuéramaro during the PRI administration (2006–2009).

12 November 2010.

Huanímaro, 11 November 2010.

Our interviews in Zacatecas revealed the same. According to one member from the State Secretaría de Planeación y Desarrollo (SEPLADER), the reason why municipalities do not participate is that their migrants are not organized, the municipalities being responsible for that organization (25 January 2011). Another member from SEDESOL mentioned that HTAs are clearly promoted by municipal presidents and referred to them as “Triennial Clubs” (25 January 2011). The former representative at SEPLADER mentioned that non-participation arises because municipalities have not devoted themselves to promoting migrant organization (26 January 2011). A similar opinion was given by another representative from SEDESOL and the former representative of SEPLADER. All interviews were held at Zacatecas in January 2011.

Social Program Coordinator at the Municipality of Cuerámaro, Cuéramaro, 22 September 2010.

See, for instance, the research of Lynn Stephen (2007) on transborder Oaxacans. See also Moctezuma and Pérez (2006) for multiple examples of migrants’ involvement without state intervention. Thus, municipal mobilization of migrants appears to be important in promoting the formation and registration of clubs.

Research in the state of Jalisco corroborates this finding. In the municipality of Jamay, the municipal president stated that whether clubs are approached depends on municipal presidents’ willingness to work: “…it depends on the municipal president, because Clubs are ready to help…” (Valenzuela 2006: 148–149; 149; authors’ translation). In the same vein, the account of Iskander (2010: 264–265) on the evolution of the Program in Zacatecas shows that the engagement of municipalities implied, among other things, involving them in community mobilization among migrants. The author describes the formation of the Federation of Zacatecan Clubs in Denver. Municipal presidents “were tasked with finding out whether they had a large population of migrants living in Denver and, if so, to get their addresses.”

Subsecretary at the municipality of Cuéramaro, 22 September 2010.

From 2008, migrant HTAs were required to register at the consulates and to renew their registrations every 2 years. This measure was taken to avoid the ad hoc creation of so-called ghost clubs by municipalities with the sole purpose of using the Program resources. Although the requirement to register has reduced this problem, our fieldwork revealed that practices such as creating a club to carry out a single project or borrowing the signatures of registered clubs (without their actual monetary contribution) were not at all uncommon.

Migrants and delegates frequently referred to a problem of cost inflation under the Program and to unmet commitments on the part of municipalities. They perceived that the costs of public works were intentionally inflated so that public work contractors (who were selected by the municipality) could benefit. Many Program administrators mentioned to us that one of their first tasks with migrants had to be restoring trust after failed partnerships (delegate of La Moncada, Tarimoro, 1 July 2010; Municipal President of Santiago Maravatío, Santiago Maravatío, 14 July 2010; Social Development Coordinator in the Municipality of Santiago Maravatío, 13 July 2010; delegate of Ojo de Agua, Santiago Maravatío, 14 July 2010; leader of the Club La Joyita, Santiago Maravatío, 23 November 2010; former delegate of Panales Galera, Tarimoro, 30 June 2010; the leader of Club Huapango, phone interview, 7 October 2010; The leader of Club Hawaiian Gardens, phone interview, 7 October 2010; the co-leader of Club San Nicolás de la Condesa, Dallas, 2 November 2010).

Tarimoro, 30 June 2010.

Panales Galera, 30 June 2010.

La Moncada, 1 July 2010. Priests are frequently crucial intermediaries in the relationship between migrants and the locality, in great part because migrants’ most requested investment is church restoration.

Dallas, TX, USA, 2 November 2010. Also, interview with the co-leader of the Club San Nicolás de la Condesa, interviewed 2 November, 2010 in Dallas, TX, USA.

Telephone interview, 1 November 2010.

In fact, we observed the same discretion in favor of localities that share the municipality party label in municipalities not ruled by the PAN (which ratifies our H_L hypothesis). For instance, we found another example of the stronghold advantage plus the gate-keeping role of municipalities in impeding access to the Program in the locality of Santa Rita in the municipality of Santiago Maravatío (PRI). Santa Rita is a PRD stronghold. It has an active HTA in Houston, Texas: Club Santa Rita. We visited the locality and talked to the club leader, who happened to be in town for the summer vacation. He told us that he was involved in the electoral campaign in support of his brother-in-law, who happened to be the PRD candidate in the 2009 election. Having lost the election, the club representative complained that the doors of the presidential municipality have been closed to him and that Santa Rita would not entertain any 3 × 1 projects “because it [Santa Rita] is yellow [the PRD color].” (Santa Rita, 14 July 2010). As Valenzuela (2004) mentioned, this illustrates the risks that migrants run if they become openly partisan.

Zacatecas, 25 January 2011. Valenzuela (2004: 477) supports this view. As the author states, “[F]or some migrant leaders the political participation of clubs, taking part in electoral campaigns, supporting some candidate, may hurt the clubs. It may hurt them in the sense that it unnecessarily risks the future support of projects and works promoted by clubs, above all when clubs support the wrong candidate.” (Authors’ translation).

Phone interview, Mexico City, 7 October, 2010.

Tarimoro, July 1, 2010.

Tarimoro, June 30, 2010.

Phone interview, Mexico City, October 7, 2010.

Leader of the Mirror HTA at Ojos de Agua (22 September 2010). Although Huanímaro qualified as a nonparticipating municipality, migrants started to become organized from 2008 on. The official responsible for migratory issues at the municipality also stated that migrants do not make participation contingent on party labels (Huanímaro, 22 September 2010). The former delegate of the locality of Otates held that migrants talk about what can be done and how they can help; but they do not care about politics (11 November 2010).

Phone interview, Mexico City, October 7, 2010.

Dallas, TX, USA, 1 November 2010.

Dallas, TX, USA, 2 November 2010.

Subdelegate from SEDESOL Guanajuato, Mexico City, 3 March 2011. Recall that the rules of the Program are not explicit about the criteria for appointing municipal and migrant representatives.

Guanajuato, 16 July 2010. A representative of the state of Guanajuato who asked to remain anonymous openly acknowledged that this type of partisan bias in project allocation is not at all uncommon.

Former representative at SEPLADER. Former representative at SEDESOL. Rodolfo García Zamora, University of Zacatecas. All interviews held in Zacatecas, 25 January 2011. One representative of SEDESOL, 26 January 2011. Project Director at the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, 26 January 2011. The Zacatecan Federation of Southern California has traditionally been identified with the PRI. Yet a faction of it supported Ricardo Monreal (PRD) during his campaign in 1998 (Goldring 2002).

The study of Goldring (2002: 83) of the relevance of Zacatecas under PRI rule adopts a similar argument of partisan alignment to explain migrant organization s’ ascendancy. As Goldring explains, the alignment of the powerful Zacatecan federation of Southern California with the PRI, a PRI governor (Arturo Romo), and PRI rule at the federal level empowered migrants as strategic transnational actors in Zacatecas, unlike in other states where those political alignments were absent.

Former representative at SEPLADER, 25 January 2011. Former representative at SEDESOL, 25 January 2011. Former representative at SEPLADER, 26 January 2011.

For instance, the move from 3 × 1 Iniciativa Ciudadana to 3 × 1 Program for Migrants, which implied banning non-migrants from proposing projects, is attributed to pressure from Zacatecan migrant federations (Burgess 2005).

Project Director at the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, 27 January 2011.

A former representative of SEPLADER shared this same opinion, 26 January 2011. Note that even in Michoacán migrants have been granted political positions.

Project Director at the Zacatecan Federation of Southern California, 27 January 2011.

Rodolfo García Zamora (Universiy of Zacatecas) shared the same opinion, 27 January 2011.

Authors’ interview Zacatecas, 26 January 2011.

Adida C, Girod D. Do migrants improve their hometown? Remittances and access to public services in Mexico, 1995–2000. Comp Political Stud. 2011;44(3):3–27.CrossRef

Alarcón R. Hacia la construcción de una política de emigración en México. In: Gonzáles C, editor. Relaciones Estado-Diáspora: Aproximaciones desde Cuatro Continentes. Mexico: SER, IME, Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas, ANUIES, Miguel Angel Porrúa; 2006. p. 157–79.

Aparicio J, Meseguer C. Remittances and the state: the 3x1 program in Mexican municipalities. World Dev. 2012;40:206–22.

Bleich E, Pekkanen R. How to report interview data: The interview method appendix. In Mosley L, (ed.) Interview research in political science. Typescript. 2011.

Bravo, J. 2007. “Emigration and Political Engagement in Mexico.” Unpublished Ms, Nuffield College, Oxford University

Bravo, J. 2008. “Mexico without (Some) Mexicans: Migration and Politics in Mexico.” Chapter 4. Unpublished Ms, Nuffield College, Oxford University

Burgess K. Migrant philanthropy and local governance in Mexico in Merz, Barbara. In: Chapter 10 in new patterns for Mexico. Remittances, philanthropic giving, and equitable development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 2005.

Burgess K. El Impacto del 3x1 en la Gobernanza Local. In: Fernández de Castro R, García Zamora R, Freyer Vila A, editors. El Programa 3 × 1 para migrantes. Primera política transnacional en México? Mexico: ITAM, Miguel Angel Porrúa, Universidad de Zacatecas; 2006. p. 99–118.

Burgess K. Translocal governance and social capital in Mexico. Paper presented at the 106th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington DC, 2–5 September 2010

Byrnes D. Driving the State. Families and public policy in Central Mexico. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 2003.

Chhibber P, Nooruddin I. Do party systems count? The number of parties and government performance in the Indian States. Comp Polit Stud. 2004;37(2):152–87.CrossRef

Cox G, McCubbins M. Electoral politics as a redistributive game. J Polit. 1986;48:370–89.CrossRef

Fernández de Castro R, Rodolfo García Z, Ana Vila F, editors. El Programa 3 × 1 para migrantes. Primera política transnacional en México? Mexico: ITAM, Miguel Angel Porrúa, Universidad de Zacatecas; 2006.

Díaz Cayeros A, Estévez F, Magaloni B. “Strategies of vote buying: social transfers, democracy, and welfare in Mexico.” Unpublished book manuscript, Stanford University; 2007.

Dixit A, Londregan J. The determinants of success of special interests in redistributive politics. J Polit. 1996;58(4):1132–55.CrossRef

Faret, L. 2004. “Implicarse Aquí, con la Mirada Hacia Allá: La Organización Comunitaria de los Guanajuatenses en los Estados Unidos.” In G. Lanly and M. B. Valenzuela (eds), Clubes de Migrantes Oriundos Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos. Universidad de Guadalajara, 225–52.

Fox J, Bada X. Migrant organization and hometown impacts in rural Mexico. J Agrar Chang. 2008;8(2–3):435–61.CrossRef

García Zamora R. El Programa 3 × 1 y los retos de los proyectos productivos en Zacatecas. In: de Castro Rafael Fernández, Rodolfo García Zamora, Ana Vila Freyer, editors. coordinadores, El Programa 3 x 1 para migrantes: ¿Primer política transnacional en México? Miguel Angel Porrúa: México, ITAM, UAZ; 2006. p. 157–70.

Goldring L. The Mexican State and transmigrant organizations: negotiating the boundaries of membership and participation. Lat Am Res Rev. 2002;37(3):55–99.

González JR. Rendición de Cuentas públicas y participación social: El Caso del Programa 3 × 1 en el Estado de Zacatecas. Ph. D. Dissertation in Development Studies. Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas; 2011

Goodman GL, Hiskey J. Exit without leaving: political disengagement in high migration municipalities in Mexico. Comp Polit. 2008;40:169–88.CrossRef

Iskander N. Creative State. Forty years of migration and development policy in Morocco and Mexico. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; 2010.

Kitschelt H, Wilkinson S. Patrons, clients, and policies: patterns of democratic accountability and political competition. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2007.CrossRef

Lanly G, Valenzuela MB (eds). Clubes de migrantes oriundos Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos. Universidad de Guadalajara; 2004.

Levitt P. Social remittances: migration driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion. Int Migr Rev. 1998;32(4):926–48.CrossRef

Londregan J. Political income redistribution. In: Weingast B, Wittman D, editors. The Oxford handbook of political economy. New York: Oxford University Press; 2006. p. 84–101.

Magaloni B. Voting for autocracy: Hegemonic party survival and its demise in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press; 2006.CrossRef

Martin CJ. The sounds of silence: capturing cause and effect in interviews. In L. Mosley (ed.), Interview research in political science. Typescript. 2011.

McCann JA, Cornelius WA, Leal DL. Absentee voting and transnational civic engagement among Mexican expatriates. In: Domínguez JI, Lawson C, Moreno A, editors. Consolidating Mexico’s democracy: the 2006 presidential campaign in comparative perspective. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press; 2009. p. 89–106.

Moctezuma M, Pérez Ó. Remesas colectivas, Estado y formas organizativas de los mexicanos en Estados Unidos. In: Fernández de Castro R, García Zamora R, Vila Freyer A, editors. El Programa 3 × 1 para migrantes: primer política transnacional en México. México: ITAM, UAZ, Miguel Ángel Porrúa; 2006. p. 119–38.

OECD. Policy coherence for development: migration and developing countries. Paris: OECD Development Center; 2007.

Orozco M. Hometown associations and their present and future partnerships: new development opportunities? Washington, DC: USAID; 2003.

Pérez-Armendáriz C, Crow D. Do migrants remit democracy? International migration, political beliefs, and behavior in Mexico. Comp Polit Stud. 2010;43(1):119–48.CrossRef

Pfutze T. Do Remittances promote democratization? How international migration helps to overcome political clientelism. Unpublished Ms; 2007.

Secretaría de Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL). Reglas de operación del programa 3 × 1 para migrantes. www.sedesol.gob.mx2011.

Smith MP. Transnationalism, the state, and the extraterritorial citizen. Polit Soc. 2003;31(4):467–502.CrossRef

Soto S, Velázquez MA. El Proceso de institucionalización del Programa 3 × 1 para Migrantes. In: de Castro Rafael Fernández, Rodolfo García Zamora, Ana Vila Freyer, editors. El Programa 3 × 1 para Migrantes. Primera Política Trasnacional en México? ITAM, Miguel Angel Porrúa: Universidad de Zacatecas; 2006. p. 11–44.

Spector AR, de Graauw E. Capitalizing on remittances: A Cross-national comparison of remittance actors and policies. Paper presented at the 2006 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago 31 August–3 September 2006.

Stephen L. Transborder lives: indigenous Oaxacans in Mexico, California, and Oregon. Durham: NC: Duke University Press; 2007.

Stokes S. Perverse accountability: a formal model of machine politics with evidence from Argentina. Am Polit Sci Rev. 2005;99(3):315–25.CrossRef

Valenzuela MB. La instauración del 3 × 1 en Jalisco. El Acomodo de los Gobiernos locales a una política adoptada por el gobierno del Estado. In: Fernández de Castro R, García Zamora R, Vila Freyer A, editors. El programa 3 × 1 para Migrantes. Primera política transnacional en México? México: ITAM, UAZ, Miguel Ángel Porrúa; 2006. p. 139–56.

Valenzuela MB. Retos y perspectivas de la sociedad civil en los Estados Unidos: entre la participación política y la Quimera del Desarrollo local. In G. Lanly and M. B. Valenzuela (eds), Clubes de migrantes oriundos Mexicanos en los Estados Unidos. Universidad de Guadalajara; 2004:455–88.

World Bank. Global economic prospects: economic implications of remittances and migration. Washington, DC: World Bank; 2006.

Title: Supply or Demand? Migration and Political Manipulation in Mexico
Publication date: 01-12-2012
Published in: Studies in Comparative International Development / Issue 4/2012
Print ISSN: 0039-3606
Electronic ISSN: 1936-6167
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-012-9116-5