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2013 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

11. Telecommunications Industry in the Era of Globalization with Special Reference to India

Authors : Debabrata Datta, Soumyen Sikdar, Susmita Chatterjee

Published in: Development and Sustainability

Publisher: Springer India

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Abstract

Globalization opens up possibilities for gains in efficiency through international exchange based on the principle of comparative advantage. These gains are very significantly augmented with the development of communications system that reduces cost of negotiations, monitoring, and coordination. The advent of telegraph as a communication device in 1839 in Britain marked a signal change in this scenario of cost of communication.

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Appendix
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Footnotes
1
In the USA, a private company American Telephone and telegraph Co (AT&T) worked as a national monopoly under a deal with government. In 1982, AT&T was broken up into regional companies with the hope that local monopoly would pave the way for competition in the market with the development of satellite technology. In Israel, incumbent monopoly firm was instructed to not to reduce the connection price to ensure the entry of new firms. The entire scenario, however, changed with advent of wireless technology (Shy 2001).
 
2
In an ITU estimate, the cost of wired-line service is 80 % higher than that of wireless telephony. In effect, in many countries, there has been steady decline in fixed line—mobile connection ratio since the introduction of mobile telephony. See Oestmann (2003).
 
3
FM transmission is clearer than AM transmission because of high data wave frequency but its range is limited.
 
4
Inefficiency should not always be taken in a pejorative sense. A part of the inefficiency may be a legacy of the inefficiencies of its past monopoly. But higher cost may be due to better adherence to regulatory norms compared to private firms. BSNL scores higher than the private firms in terms of transparency but that imposes a burden on BSNL. See Datta and Chatterjee (2012).
 
5
In fact, those days are gone even in India when one had to wait a long period to get a telephone connection but as TRAI has documented quality of services in Indian telephony is pathetic.
 
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Metadata
Title
Telecommunications Industry in the Era of Globalization with Special Reference to India
Authors
Debabrata Datta
Soumyen Sikdar
Susmita Chatterjee
Copyright Year
2013
Publisher
Springer India
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-81-322-1124-2_11