The British General Election of 2024

Table of Contents

1. Frontmatter

2. Chapter 1. The Course of the Parliament: Covid, Conflict and Crisis

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   Less than four months into the 2019–2024 Parliament, the nation was in lockdown and the Prime Minister was in intensive care. Reports had emerged from China in the final days of 2019 of a new, highly infectious and often lethal respiratory virus, Covid-19. By the end of January, large parts of China were under strict quarantine and the first cases of the virus had been detected in most European countries—including, on 30 January 2020, the UK. By the end of February, case numbers were rising rapidly in multiple hotspots across the globe, and health experts who understood the remorseless logic of exponential growth were warning that a once-in-a-century pandemic had arrived and that, without drastic action to slow its spread, healthcare systems would collapse under the strain.

3. Chapter 2. Hubris to Nemesis: The Conservatives

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   Speaking in CCHQ at 4.30 am after it had become clear that the Conservative Party had won what he called ‘a huge great stonking mandate’ at the general election held the day before, Boris Johnson told cheering party workers that:

4. Chapter 3. Efficiency Gains: Labour

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   The 2019 general election called time on Labour’s experiment with radical left politics under Jeremy Corbyn, as Labour fell to its lowest seat total since 1935. Though some diehard advisors urged him to fight on, Corbyn recognised he could not continue after such a catastrophe. But he also determined not to depart immediately, pledging to stay on as caretaker leader during a ‘period of reflection’ for his party. While Corbyn’s choice was motivated by a desire to avoid a repeat of the power vacuum which followed Ed Miliband’s abrupt election night resignation in 2015, the lack of a clear departure date upset internal critics, obliging Corbyn to clarify that he would stand down as soon as a successor was chosen. The general election’s proximity to Christmas delayed the succession process, with a timetable for the leadership contest finally agreed by Labour’s National Executive Committee (NEC) on 6 January 2020, nearly a month after polling day. Prospective candidates had two bars to clear—securing nominations from at least 22 MPs or MEPs by 13 January, and endorsements from 33 Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) or three Labour affiliates by 15 February. Voting would then run from 24 February until 2 April, with the winner announced on 4 April.

5. Chapter 4. Winning Here: The Liberal Democrats

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   For the Liberal Democrats, the 2019 election had been both a ‘disaster waiting to happen’ and a ‘massive disappointment’. A disaster waiting to happen because a summer polling surge went to the heads of party strategists and activists, leading them to spread themselves too thin, and a massive disappointment as, despite a big increase in overall vote, the party ended up with just 11 seats, fewer than it had won in 2017. Yet beneath the surface of that bruising setback was a transformed electoral map, one which offered the party a historic opportunity to profit from any decline in Conservative fortunes, as the party had finished second to the Tories in 80 seats. According to the chair of the party’s official review, Baroness Dorothy Thornhill, ‘if electoral good fortune is about preparation meeting with opportunity, then the Liberal Democrats’ story in 2019 is one of real opportunity, but for which we were fundamentally unprepared’. Everything the Lib Dems did thereafter was geared to ensuring that, by the time the next election rolled around, opportunity would indeed be met with preparation.

6. Chapter 5. The Real Opposition? Reform UK, the Greens and Independents

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   The 2024 general election offered unprecedented choice at the ballot box, but ironically with an outcome that seemed certain from the start. The election set a record for candidates standing, driven by two developments: first, the emergence of national five-party politics, with Labour, the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, Reform UK and the Greens all standing candidates in at least 90% of seats in Great Britain; and, second, a range of small parties and Independent candidates won substantial support, including more Independents returned to Parliament than in any general election since 1945. Not only were there more candidates than ever, but voters were also more willing to look beyond the traditional parties, with the combined share of the vote for the Conservatives, Labour and the Liberal Democrats falling below 70% for the first time since the introduction of the universal franchise.

7. Chapter 6. The Devolved Nations

   Punishing Two for the Price of One: The Election in Scotland Ailsa Henderson, Richard Wyn Jones, Jac Larner, Jonathan Tonge

   Abstract

   The Scottish election results appeared at first glance as a seismic shock given what we have come to expect in post-referendum Scotland. The Scottish National Party (SNP) had won more votes than any other party for every devolved, UK, local and European election since 2010, so coming second to Labour marked a significant change. The volatility of the vote can be seen in the double-digit rise for Labour and double-digit drops for both incumbent parties—the SNP at Holyrood and the Conservatives at Westminster. The results also revealed (yet again) the disproportional effects of a first-past-the-post electoral system, with Labour receiving almost two-thirds of the seats on one-third of the vote, and the SNP, despite earning 30% of the vote, getting half that proportion in seats (Table 6.1).

8. Chapter 7. A Losing Bet: The National Campaign

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   With the Fixed-term Parliaments Act repealed, the timing of the 2024 election was once again up to the Prime Minister. Rishi Sunak did not play this card to his advantage. His surprise announcement on 22 May required taking a gamble on a break in the day’s heavy rain. This swiftly backfired as the heavens opened on an unprotected leader, soaking through his expensive suit as he struggled to make his case over the strains of ‘Things Can Only Get Better’ by D: Ream, Tony Blair’s campaign theme tune, helpfully blasted into Downing Street by a nearby protester. Images of the sodden and bedraggled Prime Minister led the evening news and splashed the morning papers, with editors competing to find the best mocking caption to accompany their front-page photos. It was the first of many setbacks for Sunak.

9. Chapter 8. The Campaign in the Constituencies

   Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

   Abstract

   Though the choice put to voters is between national parties, a British general election is not structured as one national contest but 650 winner-takes-all local competitions. Every campaign therefore operates at two levels—an ‘air war’ of interviews, set-piece events and national media communications where political leaders make their cases on air, in print and online, and a ‘ground war’ of door knocking, phone calls, text messages, direct mail, leaflet deliveries and targeted online communication where activists and candidates seek to inform, persuade and mobilise local voters. While the ‘ground war’ is less visible to the national media or the average voter (particularly the average voter outside target seats), it is a core part of campaigns—one which parties plan carefully and resource intensively, and which can, at least sometimes, be decisive. And in an election where local variations in party fortunes and voter behaviour were historically large—so large, indeed, that talk of ‘national swings’ conceals as much as it reveals—the ground game may have mattered more than usual

10. Chapter 9. The Digital Campaign

    Katharine Dommett, Sam Jeffers

    Abstract

    In January 2024 Facebook users were invited to request a personalised video from Prime Minister Rishi Sunak. ‘Hi [insert name]’, it went, ‘I just wanted to take a moment to wish you a very happy New Year. Now, like you, I think immigration levels are too high. So, I hope you know that today, and every day throughout 2024, whether I’m working in my office in Downing Street or at home in Yorkshire, I will deliver for you.’ Within hours, videos addressing Nigel (Farage) or with photoshopped backgrounds offering pro-Labour messages began to appear. The tool was removed soon afterwards. Initially rumoured to have been generated by Artificial Intelligence (AI), it was quickly reported that Sunak had in fact spent hours recording thousands of names, revealing a surprisingly low-tech infrastructure behind the flashy new tool.

11. Chapter 10. The Press: It’s the Sun Wot Shunned It

    Nathan Ritchie, David Smith, Dominic Wring

    Abstract

    ‘Time for a New Manager (and We Don’t Mean Sack Southgate)’. So rang out The Sun’s final frontpage of the 2024 general election campaign on 4 July. Positioned over the backdrop of a football pitch and accompanied by an image of England manager Gareth Southgate and a football stamped with the text ‘The Sun ELECTION SPECIAL’, the headline managed to deftly distil both the sentiment of ‘change’ that the ultimately victorious Labour Party had coalesced its messaging strategy around and the major distraction that the ongoing Euro 2024 tournament (and England’s hopes of success) presented to the public and redtop journalists alike during the campaign. More than this, however, the frontpage seemed to exemplify ambivalence about and avoidance of the implications of the headline’s message. Nowhere in this image were any parties, politicians or policies. The Sun’s reluctance to offer a full-throated visual backing to the country’s prospective ‘new manager’ was symptomatic of the lukewarm endorsement for Labour found inside the paper. And while this campaign might be the last in which there is extensive speculation about the newspaper’s influence, the related digital brand looks set to continue playing a role in British politics.

12. Chapter 11. The Campaign on Air and Online

    Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

    Abstract

    Broadcasters’ coverage of the 2024 campaign, like broadcast news in general, reflected the evolving relationship between the big screens in viewers’ living rooms and the smaller screens on their desks and in their pockets. While media consumption is steadily shifting away from the traditional television channels and towards more fragmented and fluid digital and online outlets, legacy broadcasters still hold a central place in this fast-changing media ecosystem. Viewing habits, once set, die hard, so older citizens still receive their news primarily through television, with reduced but still substantial numbers still watching the traditional broadcast news programmes at dinner time and before bedtime. Younger viewers get more of their news online and via social media, but even the youngest report consuming a lot of television news, and citizens of all ages regard television as more trustworthy than online or social media sources (or print for that matter). The biggest broadcast brands, like their print media counterparts, have exceptional reach and have extended themselves effectively into new online environments, either directly through websites and social media accounts, or indirectly, as the news reports and political shows they produce are clipped and shared by others.

13. Chapter 12. The Polls

    Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

    Abstract

    The polls played a central role in charting the ebb and flow in public opinion over the course of the Parliament, shaping the political narrative and the parties’ strategies. The polling industry itself is always in flux, as pollsters come and go, and polling firms adjust their practices to maintain and improve their measurement of public opinion in an ever-changing environment. This was arguably the first election where ‘MRP’ models, which give estimates of the state of the race in every constituency, played a major role in framing pollsters’ estimates and public understanding of the contest. This rapidly spreading new technique highlighted the importance of local variations in party performance ahead of the election, meaning Labour and the Liberal Democrats’ positions were widely understood to be better, and the Conservatives’ position worse, than aggregate polling alone would suggest. The polls also help us chart the changing political agenda across a turbulent four years, with different issues rising and falling as first Brexit, then Covid-19, then Ukraine, then inflation, then towards the end immigration and public services became the centre of attention for the public. While the detailed picture is complex and dynamic, the broad-brush polling story in this Parliament is more straightforward: Labour had the more popular (or at least less unpopular) leader and gradually gained an advantage over the Conservatives across most issues – including the economy and even immigration – aided by the steep declines in voters’ assessments of three successive Conservative governments and their Prime Ministers. Election day is a crucial day of judgement for the pollsters and in this election they were fortunate, in that the expected Labour landslide duly came to pass and so distracted from what in fact was a large polling miss. Several features seem to have contributed to that miss, but there is no guarantee the same issues will not arise next time, and indeed new challenges may emerge even if pollsters manage to address those identified this time.

14. Chapter 13. Candidates and MPs: A Brand New Commons?

    Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

    Abstract

    The 2024 election made big changes to the composition of the House of Commons. A record 350 MPs departed through defeat (218) or retirement (132); a record 335 MPs arrived for the first time; a record 4,515 candidates stood for election; and more women and ethnic minority MPs were returned to Parliament than ever before. As a result, the ethnic diversity of the Commons now roughly matches the nation it represents, but the gender gap, although narrowed, has not been eliminated. The ranks of Oxbridge and independent schools graduates continue to shrink, but the political class continues to swell, with more MPs than ever drawn from those already working in politics, including many who have done no other type of work. And while MPs are more likely than ever to have graduated from the comprehensive state schools most voters also attend, the legislative class is more than ever a class of university graduates and middle-class professionals. With all the largest parties recruiting ever more heavily from the pool of graduates working in politics-adjacent professions, politics risks becoming a closed ecosystem, as fewer legislators than ever can draw on experiences from careers developed elsewhere.

15. Chapter 14. The British Voter in 2024

    Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

    Abstract

    The outcome of the 2024 general election owed much to the collapse of the winning Conservative electoral coalition that Boris Johnson helped construct in 2019. That collapse scattered voters in multiple directions and, while the governing party’s woes helped put Labour in pole position in a large majority of seats, it was not accompanied by any surge in support for the opposition. Instead, the dominant theme of this election, alongside the decline of incumbents (the SNP and Welsh Labour, as well as the Conservatives), was fragmentation: Reform UK posted a record showing on the radical right, while Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Greens and Independent/minor party candidates all advanced in different areas and with different groups of voters on the left. The brief, Brexit-driven return of two-party politics in 2017 and 2019 fully unwound in 2024, and the deeper trend of party system change, which had been evident for several decades before 2017, returned with a vengeance.

16. Chapter 15. How Geography Decisively Shaped the Outcome of the 2024 Election

    John Curtice, Stephen Fisher, Lotte Hargrave, Patrick English

    Abstract

    Psephological records fell like ninepins at the 2024 election. The Conservative Party, founded nearly two centuries ago, recorded its worst ever result, both in terms of votes (24% in Great Britain) and seats (121). Yet their principal opponents, Labour, won an overall majority with a lower share of the vote (35%) than any previous majority government. Consequently, the combined share of the vote for the two parties that have dominated British politics for 100 years – 58% – was the lowest at any election since 1922, that is, since the first election at which Labour displaced the then Liberal Party as the principal challenger to the Conservatives. On the back of this weak performance by the two largest parties, the Liberal Democrats secured the highest tally of seats (72) that they or their predecessor, the Liberal Party, had secured since 1923. Yet it was ‘fourth’ parties – that is, those other than Conservative, Labour or the Liberal Democrats – rather than the Liberal Democrats themselves (who won just 13% of the vote) that collectively registered a record vote share (28%), with one such party in particular, Reform UK, winning the highest share of the vote ever secured by an individual fourth party (15%). This achievement was reflected in turn in more fourth-party MPs (14) being elected in England than at any election since 1918. Overall, including the 18 members elected in Northern Ireland, a total of 117 MPs were elected under labels other than Conservative or Labour, again the highest number since 1923.

17. Chapter 16. The Election in Retrospect: All Change?

    Robert Ford, Tim Bale, Will Jennings, Paula Surridge

    Abstract

    ‘Change’ was Labour’s slogan in 2024, and change is what voters delivered in an election which sent records tumbling. The 19.9-point drop suffered by the Conservatives was the largest fall in support that any single party has ever suffered and 23.7% was the lowest vote share the Tories have ever received, surpassing the previous low set by the Duke of Wellington in 1832 when the Napoleonic Wars were a recent memory and the universal franchise was nearly a century away. The Conservatives lost 252 seats, beating the previous record of 246 seats lost, also by the Conservatives (but from a larger Commons) in the 1906 Liberal landslide. The 2024 election featured the most ever seats changing hands between parties (303); the most ever incumbents falling from first place to third or fourth; and the second most seats ever gained by the Labour Party (211), surpassed only by the 1945 landslide (239). The previous constituency record for the largest Conservative to Labour swing in a general election was broken in 47 seats, with the new record set by Liz Truss’ defeat by Terry Jermy in Norfolk South West on a 25.8-point swing . Truss also became the first current or former Prime Minister to fight and lose their Commons constituency since Ramsay Macdonald in 1935.

18. Backmatter