The Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: How Deep Does the “Rabbit Hole” Go?

Despite the original aim of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) to establish a neutral and non-political forum for resolving disputes, recent scholarly debates demonstrate an increasing level of politicisation. However, as this article demonstrates, complete depoliticisation was never either the intention of ISDS or a realistic possibility—at least substantially. Investment protection standards, for example, serve as safeguards against political risk. In this context, the article demonstrates that it is the adherence to procedural international rule of law elements that can actually counter the growing politicisation and maintain ISDS’s neutrality. The first section explores the desirability of depoliticisation in ISDS, distinguishing between procedural and substantive aspects. The second section delves into the parameters of procedural depoliticisation, highlighting the tools employed and identifying instances of its strongest implementation. The paper concludes by explaining the impracticality and undesirability of achieving complete substantive depoliticisation.