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Power Systems: A Matter of Security and Privacy Read chapter Read first chapter

2018 | OriginalPaper | Chapter

6. The Design and Classification of Cheating Attacks on Power Marketing Schemes in Resource Constrained Smart Micro-Grids

Authors : Anesu M.  C. Marufu, Anne V. D. M. Kayem, Stephen D. Wolthusen

Published in: Smart Micro-Grid Systems Security and Privacy

Publisher: Springer International Publishing

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Abstract

In this chapter, we provide a framework to specify how cheating attacks can be conducted successfully on power marketing schemes in resource constrained smart micro-grids. This is an important problem because such cheating attacks can destabilise and in the worst case result in a breakdown of the micro-grid. We consider three aspects, in relation to modelling cheating attacks on power auctioning schemes. First, we aim to specify exactly how in spite of the resource constrained character of the micro-grid, cheating can be conducted successfully. Second, we consider how mitigations can be modelled to prevent cheating, and third, we discuss methods of maintaining grid stability and reliability even in the presence of cheating attacks. We use an Automated-Cheating-Attack (ACA) conception to build a taxonomy of cheating attacks based on the idea of adversarial acquisition of surplus energy. Adversarial acquisitions of surplus energy allow malicious users to pay less for access to more power than the quota allowed for the price paid. The impact on honest users, is the lack of an adequate supply of energy to meet power demand requests. We conclude with a discussion of the performance overhead of provoking, detecting, and mitigating such attacks efficiently.

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previous chapter A Resilient Smart Micro-Grid Architecture for Resource Constrained Environments
next chapter Inferring Private User Behaviour Based on Information Leakage
Footnotes
1
Also referred to as a bargaining agents by Priest and Tol [15].
 
2
Also referred to as bargaining agent by Priest and Tol [15].
 
3
The domain is considered abstract as its elements do not have the specifics required for the modelling and analysis of a CDA.
 
4
These are described as disclosure resources.
 
5
Strategy developed by Tesauro and Bredin [29] as a modification of the Gjerstad-Dickhaut (GD) strategy that uses dynamic programming to price orders.
 
6
Aggressive behaving agents focus on successfully bidding while trading off their profitability.
 
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Metadata
Title
The Design and Classification of Cheating Attacks on Power Marketing Schemes in Resource Constrained Smart Micro-Grids
Authors
Anesu M.  C. Marufu
Anne V. D. M. Kayem
Stephen D. Wolthusen
Copyright Year
2018
Book
Smart Micro-Grid Systems Security and Privacy

Print ISBN: 978-3-319-91426-8

Electronic ISBN: 978-3-319-91427-5

Copyright Year: 2018

DOI
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-91427-5_6

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